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From 1911 to 1914 an Anglo-Belgian boundary commission demarcated some 800 
km of the boundary between the Congo Free State and Northern Rhodesia with 46 
boundary markers. As was common practice across most British colonial boundaries 
in Africa prior to 1914, the process of demarcation was an exercise focused more on 
mapping and exploration than on clearly defining boundaries at the local scale. The 
division of territorial sovereignty through boundaries was known only at a small 
geographic scale. However, in 1927 a second Anglo-Belgian boundary commission 
was sent to demarcate what was by that time the Belgian Congo-Northern Rhodesia 
boundary. Working for six years at a cost that exceeded preceding boundary 
commissions throughout colonial Africa, the 1927-33 boundary commission erected 
boundary marks every 500 metres and literally carved the boundary line onto the local 
landscape. 
Abstract 
This research is framed by a ‘traditional’ understanding of a boundary as a 
fixed, bilateral and linear entity, taking an approach from international law. It is 
shown how boundaries developed as an essential component of the modern state 
territorial sovereignty that was imposed on the African continent through European 
imperialism. In making a boundary ‘known,’ demarcation is then isolated as a distinct 
process and recovered as a narrative in the study of the DRC-Zambia boundary from 
the colonial through the post-independence periods. Examining the disparity in 
demarcation methodology within in this narrative provides a unique lens through 
which to examine the relationship between state and territory throughout this 
narrative. It will be shown how economic aspects of land continue to affect 
demarcation methodology, reflecting some of the very foundational tenets of 
territorial sovereignty. 
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1. Introduction: you are approaching a 
‘boundary’  
 
“Upon what basis then can we divide the intrinsically complex and indivisible world? 
One thing is clear; we can distrust from the start any simple solution. We are not 
looking for the one true method of division since there can be none; we are looking 
for a more or less suitable method.” 
Richard Hartshorne 19491
 
 
                                                 
1 R. Hartshorne On the Nature of Geography: A Critical Survey of Current Thought in Light of the Past 
(Lancaster PA: Association of American Geographers, 1949/1961), 290. 
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Prologue          
 
In August 2007, after consulting with the surveyor general and deputy surveyor 
general of Zambia in Lusaka, I travelled to the Zambian city of Ndola located in the 
heart of the Copperbelt region near the international boundary with neighbouring 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Accompanied by two officials from the 
Ndola office of the Survey Department and travelling in a government vehicle, we 
drove approximately 10 km north of Ndola to the Sakania crossing point. This is a 
main, if not the busiest, crossing point from Zambia into DRC used largely by non-
commercial traffic, with only a handful of private cars crossing per day along the un-
sealed but well-maintained dirt road. It is located within a populated area on the 
Zambian side, where most of the local population live between the boundary and the 
parallel Copperbelt highway, commuting to jobs in Ndola. On the Zambian side, the 
Sakania crossing point itself is a collection of several buildings including a police 
check point and customs/immigration offices as well as a café/bar and restaurant.  
 After lengthy discussions with both police and customs officials, the three of 
us passed under the raised black and white striped gate-arm and continued about a 
kilometre to the objective of our journey.  Extending some 1.5 metres above ground 
level just on the right (east) side of the dirt road was boundary pillar (BP) 16, 
originally built by an Anglo-Belgian boundary commission in 1927. The concrete 
pillar had obviously fallen into extreme disrepair, and appeared to have been recently 
rebuilt, with pieces of the original pillar cemented back together. A second pillar 
constructed of brick had been built next to BP 16, likely an effort to replace the 
original pillar after it crumbled. Of itself as a symbol of an international boundary, BP 
16 remains visually unmistakable, a heavy pale-grey obelisk still inscribed with its 
number ‘16’ and the letters ‘C’ for Congo and ‘R’ for Rhodesia. However, surrounded 
by dense forest, BP 16 and its duplicate are all that inform an individual that he/she is 
passing from the territory of the Republic of Zambia into the DRC. No other markers 
or symbols exist and without consulting a map, it would be impossible to know 
exactly where the boundary ran on the ground. Indeed the boundary could easily be 
interpreted as running parallel to the road rather than its legal definition along the 
Congo-Zambezi watershed running perpendicular to the road. 
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Figure 1: BP 16 (2 August 2007) 
 
 The Congolese border checkpoint is located on the road a further 500-600 
metres beyond BP 16. Given that the Zambian checkpoint is positioned approximately 
a kilometre away from BP 16, a wide zone exists between what can be visually 
perceived as the division of Zambian and Congolese territory. This zone, particularly 
the area between the Zambian customs/immigration office and BP 16, includes a 
variety of local infrastructure including private dwellings, gardens, a playing field and 
a railway line. While the survey officials confirmed that this area was under Zambian 
jurisdiction and in Zambian territory, all of this local infrastructure and resultant 
activity exist within what might be described by a traveller as a ‘stateless’ space, a 
frontier zone between official checkpoints where the division of authority is 
ambiguous. 
 Returning to the Zambian side of the Sakania crossing point, we continued 10 
to 15 km north along the main Copperbelt highway in search of another boundary 
pillar. We consulted two local residents who guided us along a rough track towards 
what they referred to as a boundary pillar. There in the midst of uninhabited bush, we 
came across a two metre high, chain link fence, topped by three strings of barbed wire 
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and flanked by cleared dirt roads on either side. There was a large break in the fence 
at this point presumably created to allow vehicles through. However, the fencing and 
flanking roads continued as a distinct line through the bush to the northwest and 
southeast, roughly following the direction of the DRC-Zambia boundary. The local 
residents indicated that the fence was the boundary and pointed to a large piece of 
broken concrete lying at the base of one fence post suggesting it was a boundary 
pillar. On closer inspection, this concrete block appeared to be part of the fence 
construction and not an official boundary pillar. Undaunted we followed the fence-
line on the Zambian side for 2 to 3 kilometres before coming to another fence that ran 
perpendicular to the ‘boundary fence’ and enclosed the Frontier copper mine operated 
by Quantum Minerals Ltd. At this junction of the two perpendicular fences stands BP 
18. In much better condition than BP 16 although built at the same time by the Anglo-
Belgian boundary commission, BP 18 is also unmistakable with its inscribed number 
and letters ‘C’ and ‘R’. However, in the shadow of the taller and more ominous 
fencing, BP 18 appeared almost intimidated, irrelevant, surplus to its original purpose 
of marking a territorial boundary. 
 
Figure 2: BP 18 at southeast corner of the Frontier Copper Mine 
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The DRC-Zambia boundary was originally delimited as the boundary between 
the Congo Free State (later Belgian Congo) and the British protectorate of Northern 
Rhodesia in 1894 and stretches over 1900 km from Lake Tanganyika in the east to the 
tripoint with Angola in the west. From 1911 to 1914, an Anglo-Belgian boundary 
commission was dispatched to survey and demarcate the boundary on the ground. 
During its time in the field, this commission marked the 800 km watershed section of 
the boundary with just 46 pillars, sited an average of 15 km apart, using a 
methodology that was fairly common for the demarcation of British colonial 
boundaries in Africa at the time. As with the current situation of BP 16, this method 
of demarcation left the boundary indistinguishable on the ground. However, in 1927 a 
second Anglo-Belgian boundary commission was sent to re-demarcate this same 
boundary section along the watershed. Working for six years with a budget greater 
than any previous British boundary commission in colonial Africa, the Anglo-Belgian 
boundary commission marked the watershed boundary with pillars no less than 500 
metres apart and dug a half metre wide trench between each pillar, quite literally 
etching the boundary onto the physical landscape.  
What prompted such a change in demarcation methodology provides critical 
insight into the way in which African territory was perceived by the British imperial 
government, and how that perception echoes through post-independent Zambian 
government policy. 
 
What happened to boundary studies?      
 
The current situation of BP 16 in relation to the respective Congolese and Zambian 
checkpoints is especially illustrative of the conceptual difference between two of the 
most widely used but problematic English terms in contemporary political geography 
that are often used synonymously: ‘border’ and ‘boundary’. In this specific context 
they can be used to describe two different geographic sites that are distinguished by 
different practices and symbols. The former term ‘border’ can be used to describe the 
actual site of asserted state control: the Sakania check point. The later term 
‘boundary’ can be used to describe the actual limit of state territory: the pillar itself. 
The common thread between the two is that they act as the points of contact and 
division between political spaces. In that regard there are two elements operating, 
both the practice that is undertaken and the nature of the spaces that are being divided 
Chapter 1 – Approaching a boundary 
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which is why research into international borders and boundaries leads rapidly into 
discourses about the nature state territorial sovereignty. 
A significant amount of scholarship continues to address international borders 
and boundaries. Much of this approaches them from a regional perspective, looking at 
a wide variety of activities within the areas flanking an international boundary. Some 
literatures expose the influence of borders as social and cultural practices,2 while 
others take a distinct ethnographic approach to the study of borderland areas.3 There 
are studies of borderland interaction4, more generalised studies of border landscapes,5 
research into the micro-economies of local borderland communities6 and the division 
of cultural identities, most appropriately for this research in African borderlands.7 The 
element of the ‘boundary’ is certainly present in these all discourses, but it is 
generally treated as a static, pre-defined constant whose presence “creates its own 
distinctive region, making an element of division also the vehicle for regional 
definition.”8 For example, take John House’s and Oscar Martinez’s similar models of 
borderland interaction. Both depict the penetration of cross-border flows and 
interaction as a regional zone or band on either side of the boundary, but they depict 
the boundary itself as a pre-existent line.9
Within recent discourses in political geography, particularly from the late 
twentieth century, the dominant approach to the study ‘borders’ has emphasised the 
link with practices of state control. As at the Sakania check point, borders can be 
understood as the limits of control whereby an individual must pass between different 
 With more of a regional focus, borderland 
studies encompass a wide range of social practices within a defined space. 
                                                 
2 H. Van Houtum, O. Kramsch and W. Zierhofer eds., B/ordering Space (Aldershot: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2005). 
3 N.S. Megoran, ‘For ethnography in political geography: experiencing and re-imagining Ferghana 
Valley boundary closures’ Political Geography 25, no. 6 (2006): 622-640. 
4 J. House, ‘Frontier studies: an applied approach’ in Political Studies from Spatial Perspectives: 
Anglo-American Essays on Political Geography, ed. A.D. Burnett and P.J. Taylor (New York: Wiley, 
1981), 291-312; O. Martinez, ‘The dynamics of border interaction: new approaches to border analysis’ 
in World Boundaries. Vol. I: Global Boundaries, ed. C.H. Schofield (London: Routledge, 1994), 1-15. 
5 D. Rumley and J. Minghi, eds., The Geography of Border Landscapes, (London: Routledge, 1991); 
G. Smith et al., eds., Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identities 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
6 W. Zeller, ‘Danger and opportunity in Katima Mulilo: A Namibian border boomtown at transnational 
crossroads’ Journal of Southern African Studies 35, no. 1 (2009). 133-154. 
7 A.I. Asiwaju, ed., Partitioned Africans: ethnic relations across Africa’s international boundaries 
1884-1984 (Lagos: University of Lagos Press, 1994); W.F.S. Miles Hausaland Divided: Colonialism 
and Independence in Nigeria and Niger (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994). 
8 J. Minghi, ‘From conflict to harmony in border landscapes’ in Rumley and Minghi, The Geography of 
Border Landscapes, 15. 
9 House, ‘Frontier studies: an applied approach,’ 296-297; Martinez, ‘The dynamics of border 
interaction.’ 
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spaces where force is able to be applied in the enforcement of some kind of regulatory 
arrangement. When addressed in the inter-state context, an international border can 
therefore be observed at a multitude of geographical sites: a border crossing point, a 
border fence, an airport check point, an embassy and conceptually through to the 
fences defining camps described by Agamben as spaces of exception.10
This emphasis on borders as the actual practices of state control in much of the 
political geography scholarship on state and territory in recent decades has been 
influenced by what John Agnew has famously labelled the ‘territorial trap’. Agnew 
originally coined the term in 1994 to critique the tendency of mainstream international 
relations theory to make “geographical assumptions” suggesting that “even when rule 
is territorial and fixed, territory does not necessarily entail the practices of total 
mutual exclusion which the dominant understanding of the territorial state attributes 
to it.”
  
11
The ‘territorial trap’ is a warning to avoid the tendency towards treating states 
as regular, undifferentiated units, implying homogenous application of state control 
over territory, or at least illustrating no discrepancies between the extent of territory 
and the extent of state control. The suggestion being that studies of the state should be 
historically and socially contextualised so as to avoid conveying a unitised 
understanding of state sovereignty. Addressing the assumptions about state territorial 
sovereignty, Agnew continues the argument to indicate: “In the first place, 
sovereignty as construed by mainstream approaches implies a relation of similarity 
among all states in which differences in political and economic practices are defined 
and demarcated by state-territorial boundaries.”
 In other words, Agnew understands that the territorial state model implies the 
sense that states have exclusive control over the full extent of their territory even 
though states are subject (and have historically been subject) to numerous external 
forces that affect the exclusivity of that control.  
12
                                                 
10 In reference to the Nazi legal ‘justifications’ for the establishment of concentration camps, Agamben 
describes: “The camp is a piece of land placed outside the normal juridical order” G. Agamben, Homo 
Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. D. Heller-Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1995/1998), 169-170. The significance in this context is that the definition of a camp as a space 
of exception is through unilateral state action that creates a fence or gate through which one would pass 
from an area of normal legal jurisdiction to an area where it is suspended. 
 There is tension here in that 
boundaries, as the limits of state territory, seem to be characteristics of the de-
11 J. Agnew, ‘The territorial trap: geographical assumptions of international relations theory’ Review of 
International Political Economy, 1:1 (1994): 53-80. 54. See also: J. Agnew and S. Corbridge, 
Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy (London: Routledge, 
1995), 79. 
12 Agnew, ‘The territorial trap,’ 71. See also: Agnew and Corbridge, Mastering Space. 95. 
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contextualised notion of a state’s territory, whereas borders, approached as the actual 
practices of state control, can be contextualised and therefore avoid the territorial trap. 
 
Michel Foucault’s discourse on state power focuses on governing in relation to 
state sovereignty and can be seen to have influenced these contemporary human and 
political geography approaches to the study of international borders. In his famed 
lecture ‘Security, Territory and Population,’ Foucault critiques Machiavelli’s works 
on the art of government suggesting that Machiavelli’s understanding of state 
sovereignty was based on “a juridical principle that from the Middle Ages to the 
sixteenth century defined sovereignty in public law; sovereignty is exercised not on 
things, but, above all, on a territory and the subjects who inhabit it.”13 Drawing a 
parallel between governing a state and managing a household, Foucault believes “the 
question of landed property for the family, and the question of the acquisition of 
sovereignty over territory for a prince, are only relatively secondary matters. What 
counts essentially is this complex of men and things; property and territory are merely 
one of its variables.”14
Foucault’s concern here is very much on the operative acts of governing over 
things/men through sovereign power, that Elden unpacks as both disciplinary power 
over people within the state and security from external threats.
  
15 Foucault admits that 
sovereignty is most important at the moment governing begins, but from this point 
assessment of sovereignty’s influence is retrospective. The more important element 
for governance is the population over which authority and security is exercised “with 
territory that it covers, to be sure, but only in a sense as one of its components.”16
Robert Sack’s work on Human Territoriality is a good example of how recent 
human geography has focused on state control as practice, and its tension with 
territory as a concept. Sack describes territoriality as “the attempt by an individual or 
group to affect, influence or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by 
 
Elden provides much better context to this and other of Foucault’s lectures in the 
understanding of territory, but the key notion is the focus on what the state ‘does’, 
rather than what a state ‘is’.  
                                                 
13 M. Foucault, Power: Essential Works of Foucault Vol. 3, ed. J. D. Faubian, trans. R. Harley et al., 
(London: Penguin, 2002), 208. 
14 Foucault, Power, 209. 
15 S. Elden, ‘Governmentality, Calculation, Territory’ Environment and Planning D 25 (2007): 562-
580. 565. 
16 Foucault, Power, 221. 
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delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area. This area will be called 
territory.”17 He then suggests “this delimitation becomes a territory only when its 
boundaries are used to affect behaviour by controlling access.”18 Problematically, 
Sack combines two processes in this definition: delimiting and controlling access over 
territory are not distinguished as separate.19 This becomes even clearer in his assertion 
that “Territories can occur in degrees” so the greater control asserted at boundaries, 
the greater the degree of territoriality.20
 
 Again, the concepts of territory as an area and 
territoriality as a practice are used interchangeably. Applying this understanding to the 
above example of BP 16, it could be argued that the territory of the Zambian state 
ended at the Sakania check point and the territory of the DRC only began some 1.5 
km away at its border crossing point. More importantly for this work, Sack’s 
assertions suggest that as sites of control, boundaries are constitutive of territory, a 
concept that can come into tension with international law’s understanding of 
territorial sovereignty and be problematic when applied to Africa’s imperial context. 
However, the notion that boundaries can exist in varying degrees (in terms of control) 
can also be seen in the practices related to their physical definition. 
Associating a ‘border’ with the practices and sites of state control has 
broadened the intellectual scope of border studies to encompass a wide range of inter-
disciplinary scholarship that embraces their multiplicity (territorial sites of control, as 
well as sites of control in cyberspace, personal identity as a site of control, and so 
on).21 Avoiding the ‘territorial trap’ has led to this increased focus on practices of 
state control that can be directly contextualised. For example, Donnan and Wilson 
take a distinctly anthropological approach to border studies, and are mainly concerned 
with the effects of state power on border cultures and identities.22
                                                 
17 R.D. Sack, Human Territoriality: Its theory and history (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986), 19. 
 However, there has 
been admission that the ‘boundary’ as a de-contextualised element of the territorial 
18 Sack, Human Territoriality, 19. 
19 The term ‘delimitation’ used by Sack will be examined in greater depth later as one of the boundary-
making processes in Chapter 2. 
20 Sack, Human Territoriality, 20. 
21 See especially D. Newman and A. Paasi, ‘Fences and neighbours in the postmodern world: boundary 
narratives in political geography’ Progress in Human Geography 22, no. 2 (1998): 186-207. 191. 
22 H. Donnan and T.M. Wilson, Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State (Oxford: Berg, 1999), 
4. 
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trap and the notion of a border as contextualised practice may not be separate 
concepts, but instead may exist on some kind of spectrum.  
In their introduction to B/ordering Space, Van Houtum, Kramsch and 
Zierhofer state: “The border of a province or nation-state is first and foremost a legal 
fact, one that is reproduced…ranging from printed bodies of law and maps to 
corporeal inscriptions and the surveillance of boundaries on the landscape.”23
Thus the focus for the study of boundaries is the bounding or bordering 
process; namely the functional impact of the boundary rather than its 
descriptive and static locational characteristics. A deeper understanding of the 
boundary phenomenon places all types of boundaries on a single functional 
continuum. The precise location of any boundary along this continuum will be 
dependant on the extent to which the boundary is permeable to a greater or 
lesser degree, allowing the movement of people, goods, information or other 
sorts of transboundary interaction, from one side to the other.
 Here 
the border is treated both as a ‘legal fact’, with its distinctly modernist elements 
making it able to be reproduced, and as the site of surveillance or the application of 
state control. Newman more explicitly places boundaries and borders on what he 
describes as a continuum, reflecting Sack’s scalar understanding of territoriality: 
24
He goes so far as to suggest that “Any attempt, therefore, to create a methodological 
and conceptual framework for the understanding of boundaries must be concerned 
with the process of ‘bordering’, rather than simply with the means through which 
physical lines of separation are delimited and demarcated.”
 
25
In avoiding the ‘territorial trap’, contextualising aspects of state control 
correctly avoids the simplified unitisation of the territorial state, but it makes it 
difficult to analyse the boundary as a constituent element of the territorial state model. 
The point of departure for contemporary border research is often the actual practice of 
control (the border) with a tendency not to address the model itself (the boundary) 
which is why the lack of distinction between the terms can be problematic. In other 
words, if a ‘boundary’ is determined by some degree of state control (Newman’s 
“functional continuum”) then what was the original concept that directed the actual 
 
                                                 
23 Van Houtum, Kramsch and Zierhofer, B/ordering Space, 3. 
24 D. Newman, ‘From the International to the Local in the Study and Representation of Boundaries: 
Theoretical and Methodological Comments’ in Holding the Line: Border in a Globalized World eds. H. 
Nicol and I. Townsend-Gault (Vancouver: University of British Colombia Press, 2005), 400. 
25 Newman, ‘From the International to the Local,’ 400. 
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geographic assertion of state control in one area and not others? As with Sack’s 
effective fusion of territoriality and territory, Newman’s combining of bordering as a 
process and boundaries as a geographical site has broadened the scope of border 
studies to embrace any application of state control and social practice across a wide 
range of spatial fields. However, this has made it difficult to critically engage with 
what the theoretical concept of ‘boundaries’ and the distinct practices that are 
associated with them. 
In his expansive work The Nation-State and Violence, Anthony Giddens 
described the modern state as “the pre-eminent form of power container, as a 
territorially bounded (although internally highly regionalized) administrative unity.”26
Modern state borders may coincide with natural defensive boundaries (e.g. 
imperial frontiers - Great Wall of China, Roman walls), but while this may be 
important to the fortunes of a state in war, it is irrelevant to the character of 
borders. Borders are nothing other than lines drawn to demarcate states’ 
sovereignty. As such, it is irrelevant to their nature what types of terrain (or 
sea) they pass over.
 
However, when addressing the boundaries (or borders to use his term) of modern 
states, Giddens states: 
27
Although his comments do not necessarily reflect the current complexities of 
state maritime jurisdiction, Giddens’ implies that the division of two state 
sovereignties can be considered separate from the sites of control. More importantly, 
his comment that boundaries are simply the lines that separate sovereignties implies 
that sovereignty itself is a de-contextualised concept, something that is applied 
uniformly, irrespective of geographic conditions.  
 
If a concept is considered to be ‘de-contextualised’ it is a theoretical model or 
system that is examined outside of actual practices. As the dividing line between two 
‘sovereignties’ it is easy to see how boundaries can be assumed to be ‘de-
contextualised’ characteristics. The logical implication is that, as the mathematical 
lines between abstract sovereign entities, boundaries do not have actual practices and 
are therefore unable to be contextualised. Simply because they are the division 
between states’ territorial sovereignties does not mean that boundaries are devoid of 
                                                 
26 A. Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence: Volume Two of A Contemporary Critique of Historical 
Materialism (Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997), 13. 
27 Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence, 51. 
Chapter 1 – Approaching a boundary 
13 
actual practices. Nor should this imply that these practices do not make them physical 
realities rather than ‘simply’ legal or mathematical abstractions. Boundaries do have 
distinct practices related to them that states have performed and continue to perform, 
and that are quite unique from those practices performed at borders.  
 Newman’s comments hint at these practices (delimitation and demarcation) 
but they do not convey their complexity and how they can be contextualised. There is 
more to be discerned from the “descriptive and static locational characteristics” to 
understand more clearly the distinctive conceptual characteristics of a boundary that 
have influenced its “functional impact.” Indeed, studying these practices can be 
recognised as the very nexus where the conceptual idea of the ‘boundary’ is actuated 
into Newman’s functional continuum of bordering. However, for many scholars, the 
boundary concept is incompatible with the more recent border and bordering 
discourses. 
Nick Megoran’s critique of Stephen Davis and Victor Prescott’s chapter on the 
history of the Burma-Thailand boundary in The Razor’s Edge 28 is generally 
representative of the current view in political geography of boundary studies as 
“staunchly empirical, and bereft of any serious engagement with politically-informed 
theory.”29 Megoran goes so far as to suggest that Davis and Prescott’s work has 
hardly moved on from Lord Curzon’s 1907 Frontiers lectures and suggests it would 
have been improved by an engagement with more recent political geographical 
discourses on “power, identity and territoriality” as well as critical geopolitics.30 Van 
Houtum echoes this and recognises that the study of boundaries and borders have 
drifted apart “to become separate subfields.”31
In their pivotal review of the disparity in border and boundary literature, 
Newman and Paasi write “Boundary studies have had a long, descriptive and 
relatively non-theoretical history in geography. This is partly due to the fact that 
boundaries have constituted a very practical, and in some cases technical, question in 
international relations.”
  
32
                                                 
28 S. Davis et al., eds., The Razor’s Edge: International Boundaries and Political Geography - Essays 
in Honour of Professor Gerald Blake (London: Kluwer Law International, 2002). 
 The suggestion here is that studies of the practices related to 
29 N. Megoran, ‘Review Essay: International boundaries and geopolitics: two different lectures, two 
different worlds?’ Political Geography 22, no. 7 (2003): 789-796. 794. 
30 Megoran, ‘Review Essay: International boundaries and geopolitics,’ 794. 
31 H. Van Houtum, ‘The geopolitics of borders and boundaries’ Geopolitics 10, no. 4 (2005): 672-679. 
674. 
32 Newman and Paasi, ‘Fences and neighbours in the postmodern world,’ 189. 
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boundaries, as opposed to borders, succumb to the territorial trap; they are de-
contextualised, technical issues or systematic processes that have been given 
“relatively untheoretical” analysis. With a growing division between the two 
approaches, this is contemporary political geography’s view of boundary studies; still 
mired in modernity’s fixation on lines, focused on de-contextualised technical 
processes, out of touch with theoretical discourse and gradually being shouldered out 
of the political geography conversation.33
 
  
Approach to boundaries through international law    
 
Faced with this situation, boundary scholars have moved to engage more with 
international law where their understanding of territorial boundaries remains firmly 
rooted and influential in state policies and practice. Is it any wonder that the latest 
edition of Victor Prescott’s seminal work Political Frontiers and Boundaries was co-
authored by an international law scholar, Gillian Triggs?34 As Minghi points out, the 
tendency for ‘traditional’ boundary studies was to gravitate towards inter-state 
conflict and the prevention thereof.35
However, there is a deeper reasoning behind why boundary studies now relate 
more closely to international law, and this goes back to the ‘territorial trap.’ 
Boundaries are inextricably linked to the territorial state ‘model’ that Agnew and 
Corbridge warned can lead to de-contextualised treatment of states as equal, 
individual actors. They are the bounds of territory sovereignty that do not necessarily 
coincide with the effective limits of state control. International law is founded on the 
territorial state model, with sovereignty, and its resultant territory, considered 
constants rather than variables dependent on the exercise of state control. This gives 
equal legal personality to every state that provides international law with its 
jurisdictional basis.  
 Due to its intended purpose as the mediator of 
disputes between states, it is easy to see how the empiricism of boundary studies in 
specific contexts continues to be applicable in the settlement of international 
boundary disputes.  
                                                 
33 Van Houtum et al suggest that contemporary border study “embraces the theoretical away from the 
empirical” (Van Houtum, Kramsch and Zierhofer, B/ordering Space, 4). See also Newman and Paasi, 
‘Fences and neighbours in the postmodern world.’  
34 J.R.V. Prescott and G. Triggs International Frontiers and Boundaries: Law, Politics and Geography 
(Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2008). 
35 Minghi, ‘From conflict to harmony in border landscapes,’ 17. 
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To put some initial distance between the concept of the ‘boundary’ from a 
‘border’, it is necessary first to decouple it from notions of control; to understand 
where a state ‘can’ assert control, rather than where it ‘does’ assert control. This issue 
is far more complex than understanding the distinction between geographic areas that 
are recognised as de jure or de facto and relates to the very substantive nature of what 
a boundary is dividing. Giddens’ comments suggest that it is the very nature of 
territorial sovereignty itself that distinguishes the boundary from conventionally 
understood practices of state control (such as checkpoints, fencing and barriers). This 
indicates that there must be clues to the practices related to boundaries within the 
nature of state sovereignty. Likewise, instead of avoiding the ‘territorial trap’ by 
concentrating on borders as determined along Newman’s functional continuum, the 
conceptual basis of this work will jump directly into the trap and examine where the 
boundary concept emerged within territorial sovereignty. This will draw out notions 
of territory that were active in the context of the DRC-Zambia boundary and assess its 
performative value in the imposition of the territorial state model on the African 
continent during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century through British 
imperial practice. 
International law has a very distinct definition of territory that purposely 
ignores the element of unilateral state control and could be seen as being predicated 
on the territorial trap. Malcolm Shaw explains that international law is based on the 
classical notion of the state, founded on the concept of sovereignty and sovereign 
equality.36 Sovereignty is in turn founded on what he calls the “fact of territory.”37 
This phrase “fact of territory” can better be understood as a geographic area of land, 
which becomes ‘territory’ when sovereignty is held over it. Ian Brownlie makes the 
distinction between the term ‘sovereignty’ as “legal shorthand for legal personality of 
a certain kind, that of statehood” and ‘jurisdiction’ which “refers to particular aspects 
of the substance, especially rights (or claims), liberties and powers.”38
                                                 
36 M.N. Shaw, International Law Fourth Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 331. 
 This is crucial 
in understanding the disparity between border, the edge of the application of state 
power and influence, and boundary, the edge of its legal personality; between what a 
state ‘does’ and what a state ‘is’. What a state ‘is’, within international law, depends 
37 Shaw, International Law Fourth Edition, 331. 
38 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law Fifth Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998), 106. 
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on its sovereignty which, as Brownlie explains, is a consequence of its title to territory 
that can only be assessed against other states’ title claims: 
The materials of international law employ the term sovereignty to describe 
both the concept of title and the legal competence which flows from it. In the 
former sense the term ‘sovereignty’ explains (1) why the competence exists 
and what its fullest possible extent might be; (2) whether claims may be 
enforced in respect of interference with the territorial aspects of that 
competence against a particular state. 
The second aspect mentioned is the essence of title: the validity of claims to 
territorial sovereignty against other states.39
International law views sovereignty as the legitimacy (title) held by the state to 
undertake governance. Sovereign title is not a variable dependant on the actual acts of 
governance, rather it is a constant that is either held/recognised or not; imbuing the 
acts of governance with legitimacy.  
 
If territory is actuated by the application of sovereign title over an area of land, 
then it must also be viewed as a constant within international law. Land either has title 
(making it territory) or it does not; just as a state is defined by possessing sovereignty 
or it is not a ‘state’ within international law. Eschewing a deterministic approach of 
categorising distinct modes of a state acquiring title over territory, Brownlie suggests 
that the acquisition of “territorial sovereignty, or title” cannot be ascribed to distinct 
modes, but is best understood when adjudging the relevant validity of competing 
territorial claims.40
In one of its most oft-cited and important decisions in the post-colonial 
context, the ICJ stipulated in its 1986 decision in the Burkina Faso-Mali Frontier 
dispute
 Since the essence of law is that it cannot exist within a vacuum, 
international law’s predilection for title over territory versus control over territory 
therefore can be seen in the adjudicated settlement of boundary disputes, in particular 
by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).  
41
It (the Court) must state forthwith, in general terms, what legal relationship 
exists between such acts (of administration) and the titles on which the 
 that administrative acts of control are pertinent largely in the perfection of 
an already established title. 
                                                 
39 Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law Fifth Edition, 121. 
40 Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law Fifth Edition, 129-130. 
41 S. Lalonde, Determining Boundaries in a Conflicted World: The Role of Uti Possidetis (Montreal 
and Kingston: McGill and Queen’s University Press, 2002), 127-132. 
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implementation of the principle of uti possidetis is grounded. For this purpose, 
a distinction must be drawn among several eventualities. Where the act 
corresponds exactly to law, where effective administration is additional to the 
uti possidetis juris, the only role of effectivités42 is to confirm the exercise of 
the right derived from a legal title. Where the act does not conform to the law, 
where the territory which is the subject of the dispute is effectively 
administered by a State other than the one possessing the legal title, preference 
should be given to the holder of the title. In the event that the effectivité does 
not coexist with any legal title, it must invariably be taken into consideration. 
Finally there are cases where the legal title is not capable of showing exactly 
the territorial expanse to which it relates. The effectivités can then play an 
essential role in showing how the title is interpreted in practice.43
This passage has been cited in several boundary decisions since 1986, including the 
2002 Cameroon-Nigeria case. In that case, one of Nigeria’s central arguments 
concerning the disputed Bakassi peninsula was that its administrative acts of control 
(e.g. tax collection, operation of health centres, use of Nigerian currency and 
passports) over several decades after independence had generated a transfer of title to 
that particular piece of territory.
 
44 But the ICJ ruled instead that title to the territory in 
question had been determined by a 1913 Anglo-German boundary agreement 
(subsequently placing Bakassi within the territory of Cameroon), and that Nigerian 
administrative acts of control failed to displace that pre-existent title. 45
                                                 
42 Effectivités has been used by the ICJ and other international tribunals as short-hand for acts of 
effective administrative control (taxation, policing, currency, funding of infrastructure such as schools, 
etc). 
 This 
reaffirmed the Court’s preference, at least in this important case, for legal title over 
administrative control. In his analysis of the ICJ decision in the 1999 Botswana-
Namibia case over Kasikili/Sedudu island, James Theo Gathii explained how that 
decision expressed a ‘geographical Hegelianism’ due to 1) the probative value given 
to scientific, physical geographical and economic evidence at the expense of 
43 International Court of Justice (ICJ), ‘Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali) Judgment’ I.C.J. Reports 
(1986): 554-651. para. 63. 
44 International Court of Justice (ICJ), ‘Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria 
(Cameroon v. Nigeria with Equatorial Guinea intervening, Judgment’ I.C.J. Reports (2002): 301-458. 
paras. 218-224. 
45 ICJ, Cameroon and Nigeria, para. 223. 
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occupational evidence, and 2) the emphasis on “the subject requirement of intent to 
own territory” as being superior to effective control and the displays of sovereignty.46
This is not to say that unilateral expressions of state control play no role in its 
relationship with title over territory under international law. International courts and 
tribunals have often reiterated that they must apply inter-temporality when assessing 
boundary and territorial disputes, meaning that, for example, valid title can be 
recognised today if earned through conquest at a time when that was a legally valid 
method of appropriation.
 
47 International law also currently observes a valid transfer of 
territorial title through the process of prescription whereby administrative control 
creates a transfer of legal title.48 However, this can only be validated if the losing 
sovereign has implied its consent that it no longer holds title over an area being 
controlled by another state, making it extremely difficult to apply in actual cases.49 
The above citation from the ICJ’s 1986 Burkina-Faso judgment indicates that 
administrative acts can assist in ‘perfecting’ title but they must be assessed against the 
administrative acts of another state claiming title over the same area of land. Yet 
again, title over territory is treated as somehow pre-existent, not created by state 
administration but perfected by it. The ICJ recently reiterated this premise in its 2004 
advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory and cited the UN General Assembly’s ‘Declaration on 
Principles of International law concerning the Friendly relations and Co-operation 
between states’ “No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force 
shall be recognised as legal.”50
The ICJ and international arbitral tribunals have been very reluctant to ascribe 
parameters for prescriptive value of administrative acts particularly in boundary and 
territorial disputes because it would derogate from the concept of sovereignty being a 
constant, held by all recognised states regardless of state power. The resultant notion 
 
                                                 
46 J.T. Gathii, ‘Geographical Hegelianism in territorial disputes involving non-European land relations: 
an analysis of the case concerning Kasikili/Sedudu’ Leiden Journal of International Law 15 (2002): 
581-622. 582. 
47 Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law Fifth Edition, 126-128. 
48 Shaw makes the distinction between ‘occupation’ as a valid method for acquiring title over res 
nullius, or land without sovereignty, and ‘prescription’ with involves acquiring title over territory, or 
land already subject to sovereign claim. Shaw, International Law Fourth Edition, 342-346. 
49 Brownlie provides a simple imagined scenario illustrating this point more clearly. Brownlie, 
Principles of Public International Law Fifth Edition, 106. 
50 United Nations (UN) General Assembly (GA) Res. 2625 (XXV). See also International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) ‘Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion 9 July 2004’ ICJ Reports (2004). paras. 87-88. 
Chapter 1 – Approaching a boundary 
19 
of sovereign equality provides international law with its foundation as a dispute 
mediator between what it must consider to be equal legal personalities. If one state 
could generate legal title through control over territory contrary to another recognised 
title, the very fabric of the international legal system would be compromised. The 
system itself developed largely in response to the outlawing of conquest as a valid 
method of acquiring territorial title after the territorial expansionism of the two World 
Wars.  
The territorial state model exposed by imperial practice in Africa 
It is important to note that these decisions mentioned above largely relate to the legal 
mechanism of uti possidetis juris or the transfer of legal title at de-
colonisation/independence51 which makes this approach applicable in the DRC-
Zambia context. Territorial title has been the mechanism through which international 
law gets around the problematic issue of having the two concepts of sovereignty and 
territory be mutually constructive. In criticising the static understanding of 
sovereignty in relation to the concept of title within law, R.B.J. Walker said that “the 
very attempt to treat sovereignty as a matter of definition and legal principle 
encourages a certain amnesia about its historical and culturally specific character.”52 
Similarly, Cynthia Weber holds that “state sovereignty as a settled question in 
international relations is problematic due to blindness to the historicity of 
sovereignty.”53
                                                 
51 The concept of uti possidetis juris relates to the transfer of territorial title applied at the moment of 
de-colonisation/independence; e.g. when a state or empire fractures into subsequent independent states. 
See especially Lalonde, 2002 and Brownlie, 1998. 132-133. This will be examined in more depth with 
regard to the African context in Chapter 6. 
 This is particularly important to bear in mind when addressing African 
boundaries since the role of title derived from imperial practice, as evidenced in the 
judgments cited above, has been particularly influential in the resolution of boundary 
and territorial disputes in post-independence Africa. Claiming title without actual 
administrative control was a hallmark of European imperialism in Africa and a 
practice that exposes the territorial state model in its rawest form.  
52 R.B.J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), 166. 
53 C. Weber, Simulating Sovereignty. Intervention, the State and Symbolic Exchange (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 2. 
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Shaw asserts that the imperial division of the African continent occurred at 
“the high point of the exclusivity concept of the State in international law as fostered 
by nineteenth century positivism.”54
the view that the organised tribes of peoples of non-European lands had no 
sovereign right over their territories and thus no sovereign title by means of 
effective occupation. The inhabitants, therefore, were merely factually and not 
legally in occupation of the territory, which could be treated as terra nullius 
and acquired by any State in accordance with the requirements of international 
law.
 This was dominated by: 
55
However, Shaw challenges the notion that the European imperial powers considered 
the African continent terra nullius (land without sovereign) since occupation was not 
the recognised mode of acquiring title to territory.
 
56 He explains that although the 
term ‘effective occupation’ was used throughout the 1884-85 Berlin Conference, 
where the European powers agreed on the rules for the partition of the African 
continent, the term was used “as a general expression comprising all modes of 
acquisition, to be interpreted synonymously with acquisition or appropriation.”57 
Based on the pleadings and decision of the ICJ in the Western Sahara case, Shaw 
concludes that the imperial powers gained title to African territory largely through 
acquisition agreements made with local rulers.58
Shaw’s perspective is obviously influenced by Judge Max Huber’s famed 
1928 decision in the Island of Palmas case where he found, commenting on the legal 
validity of purported treaties agreed between the imperial powers and local political 
leaders, that such agreements: 
 This suggests that the European 
powers must have recognised some degree of sovereignty held by indigenous political 
leaders. 
are not, in the international law sense, treaties or conventions capable of 
creating rights and obligations such as may, in international law, arise out of 
treaties. But, on the other hand, contracts of this nature are not wholly void of 
indirect effects on situations governed by international law; if they do not 
                                                 
54 M.N. Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa: International Legal Issues (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1986), 32. 
55 Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa, 32. 
56 Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa, 33. 
57 Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa, 34. 
58 Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa, 36-38. 
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constitute titles in international law, they are none the less facts of which that 
law must in certain circumstances take into account.59
Huber may not have viewed these agreements as international treaties, but Sir Edward 
Hertslet’s widely consulted series Map of Africa by Treaty
   
60 included both inter-
imperial agreements and agreements between imperial and local political leaders that 
allocated and delimited territory across the continent.61
In the cases of African territory acquired by European imperial powers 
through ‘treaties’ with indigenous political leaders, it is overly simplistic to assert that 
all of those African leaders had no concept of what their agreements with the imperial 
powers implied. Many saw it as an opportunity to increase their own power over 
neighbouring groups, securing political allegiance to a powerful ally or beneficial 
commercial arrangement.
  
62 However, the large majority of pre-imperial African 
leaders would have had little idea what the treaties they agreed with European 
representatives would eventually mean in the longer term. This is not to mention the 
serious legal questions that may be raised concerning the validity of those agreements, 
considering: the capacity of European officials presenting the agreements, any 
coercive activity, ambivalent wording of documents and inherent prejudice towards 
written documentation, all of which are exposed by McEwen.63 Even Lord Curzon, 
when reviewing application of the hinterland doctrine for imperial territorial 
acquisition across Africa, hinted that while perhaps “imparting some measure of 
propriety to proceedings (it was) not everywhere over-imbued with scruple.”64
                                                 
59 Island of Palmas Case, 2 RIAA 829. 858; also cited in McEwan, 1971. 13-14. 
 This 
makes it difficult to suggest that pre-colonial African political entities were treated en 
par with the European imperial states in those treaty relationships; that they held the 
same ‘amount’ of sovereignty, or held the same understanding of the territorial 
sovereignty model. 
60 E. Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty Vols. I and II (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1894). 
61 For numerous British imperial examples especially the sections for British East Africa Company (pp. 
107-173), British South Africa Company (pp. 173-191) and Great Britain (pp. 327-771) in Hertslet, 
The Map of Africa by Treaty. 
62 G.N. Uzoigwe, ‘European partition and conquest in Africa: and overview’ in General History of 
Africa VII: Africa under Colonial Domination 1880-1935 ed. A.A. Boahen (Heinemann, CA: 
UNESCO, 1985), 31-33. 
63 A.C. McEwen, International Boundaries of East Africa (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 
12-16. See also A. Allott, ‘Boundaries and the Law in Africa’ in African Boundary Problems ed. C.G. 
Widstrand ed. (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1969). 
64 G.N. Curzon, Frontiers The Romanes Lecture 1907 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908), 45. 
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Most importantly for this research, the treaties agreed with local African 
political leaders were (perhaps deliberately) vague on the geographic extent of those 
political entities.65 This provided the European powers with carte blanche (quite 
literally) to interpret the geographic extent of territory ceded by local political leaders 
as they saw fit. In some cases, the extent of territory controlled by local leaders was 
left vague or was simply dictated by the European agent concluding the agreement. 
The extent of Chief Kawinga’s territory in part of what is now Malawi was defined in 
a 15 June 1891 agreement by John Buchanan of the British South Africa Company, 
acting as vice consul of Nyassaland.66
Boundaries thus defined: ‘Bounded on the west by Lake Moero and the 
Luapula River; on the south by latitude 10° 30’ (or thereabouts); on the north 
by the Kalongwizi River and by latitude 9° 20’ (or thereabouts); on the east by 
east longitude 30° (or thereabouts).’
 One example drawn from an area of eastern 
Zambia is the 30 September 1890 definition of Kasembe’s territory in an agreement 
with a representative of the British South Africa Company: 
67
Left deliberately vague, with terms such as ‘thereabouts’ or using geographical terms 
unlikely to have been familiar to African leaders, the imperial European powers gave 
themselves the privilege of interpreting the territorial extent of these political entities 
as they saw fit. Take this remarkable statement opening the 3 December 1886 
agreement between Great Britain and Zanzibar defining the limits of the Sultan’s 
Dominions: 
 
I am instructed by Her Majesty’s Government to communicate to your 
Highness the particulars of an Agreement which has been entered into 
between the Governments of Great Britain and Germany for the purposes of 
delimitating the extent of the territory which they are prepared to recognise as 
under your Highness’ sovereignty.68
 Another egregious example of this can be found in the Barotseland arbitration 
whereby the King of Italy was requested to define the disputed boundary between the 
British claimed territory of North West Rhodesia (Zambia) and Portuguese West 
Africa (Angola). The boundary was originally defined in an 1891 Anglo-Portuguese 
treaty as the western limit of the Barotse kingdom, since the Barotse king Lewanika 
 
                                                 
65 McEwen, International Boundaries of East Africa, 16. 
66 Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty, 189. 
67 Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty. 189. 
68 Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty. 754. 
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had agreed to be under the British sphere of influence.69
Concerning delimitation of the territory over which King Lewanika reigned as 
paramount chief, all precise delimitation is impossible due to the lack of 
separating geographic features, the imperfect knowledge of the area, because 
of the notorious instability of tribes and their frequent intermingling 
(circumstances that were admitted also by the Marquis of Salisbury and the 
Marquis of Lansdowne), it is necessary, where natural lines are lacking, to 
have recourse to lines of geographic convention;
 Much evidence was taken up 
by British officials in the areas west of the upper Zambezi river of local chiefs who 
paid tribute to the King Lewanika or recognised him as their paramount chief. In the 
end, the arbitrator (King Victor-Emmanuel III of Italy) simply placed the boundary 
along three lines of latitude and longitude, admitting: 
70
 These examples illustrate that the European imperial powers understood the 
pre-colonial African political leaders to have ‘sovereignty’, which is what provided 
the supposed legal-validity to their agreements. However, what the local African 
political entities failed to possess was the definition of territory by boundaries, which 
by the end of the nineteenth century had become a hallmark of modern European state 
sovereignty.  
 
 
Exposing boundary empiricism to contemporary critique   
 
This research will focus on the DRC-Zambia boundary and seeks to illustrate how 
boundaries themselves can be contextualised and exposed to theoretical critiques that 
have been more aligned with more recent border studies. The thesis will begin in 
Chapter 2 by exploring that relationship between boundaries and the territorial state 
model itself, clearly distilling the theoretical concept of boundaries as constituent 
elements of state development within the European notion of territorial sovereignty. 
                                                 
69 For overview of the case, see Royal Geographical Society (no author), ‘The Barotse Boundary 
Award’ The Geographical Journal 26, no. 2 (1905): 201-204. 
70 Translation by the author “concerne la délimitation du territoire sur lequel le Roi Lewanika régnait 
comme Chef Suprême, toute délimitation précise est impossible, soit à cause du manque d'éléments 
géographiques séparatifs, soit à cause de la connaissance imparfaite qu'on a des lieux, soit à cause de 
l'instabilité notoire des tribus et de leurs fréquents entrelacements (circonstances qui ont été admises 
aussi par le Marquis de Salisbury et le Marquis de Lansdowne), de sorte que, il est indispensable, où les 
lignes naturelles font défaut, d'avoir recours aux lignes de convention géographiques” in ‘Award of 30 
May 1905: The Barotseland Boundary Case (Great Britain, Portugal)’ United Nations Reports of 
International Arbitral Awards Vol. XI (1905): 59-69. 69. 
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Some key historical signposts of state development in relation to boundaries will be 
highlighted, including the influence of advances in cartography71
These three characteristics are essential for understanding those ‘technical’ 
practices that are being distanced from contemporary border discourses focusing on 
aspects of state control. These practices are better-known as boundary-making, a 
rubric that was elucidated perhaps most clearly by Stephen Jones in 1945 but was 
influenced heavily by British imperial boundary practice of the early twentieth 
century.
 and how the model 
reached its zenith in the imperial expansion across Africa at the end of the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. To achieve this, and to differentiate the notion of 
boundaries from borders, Chapter 2 will focus on three distinct characteristics of 
boundaries; they are inherently: static, bilateral and linear.  
72
Rather than providing what might be described as a ‘traditional’ analysis of 
the DRC-Zambia boundary that might focus exclusively on its diplomatic history, this 
research will concentrate on just one of the practices within the boundary-making 
rubric, demarcation. The concern here is not with the ‘high-political’ machinations 
that initially determined where the DRC-Zambia boundary was located. Instead the 
focus is on the practices that made the boundary a material reality on the local 
landscape. In spite of its seeming political importance, demarcation has largely 
 As will be examined in more detail in Chapter 2, the unique practices of 
boundary-making were once a core subject of early twentieth-century political 
geography. Yet in spite of the fact that they continue to occupy state policy around the 
world (as will be examined in Chapter 6) it is these practices that have been separated 
from contemporary political geography. The above comments by Agnew and 
Corbridge, Newman and Giddens suggest that contemporary discourses are tending to 
conflate these practices, or as Newman and Paasi indicate, dismiss what can be 
inferred as the process of demarcation as “very practical” or “technical” issues. 
Taking the ‘territorial trap’ warning, this conflation or over-simplification of 
boundary processes appears to discount them as a de-contextualised ‘system,’ a 
mechanism of the trap to be avoided and not subject to theoretical critique. 
                                                 
71 See especially M. Escolar, ‘Exploration, Cartography and Modernization’ in State/Space: A Reader 
N. Brenner et al. eds. (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003). 
72 See S.B. Jones, Boundary-Making: A Handbook for statesmen, treaty editors and boundary 
commissioners (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1945); T.H. Holdich, 
Political Frontiers and Boundary Making (London: MacMillan and Co. Ltd, 1916); and J.W. 
Donaldson and A. Williams, ‘Delimitation and demarcation: analysing the legacy of Stephen B. Jones’ 
Boundary-Making’ Geopolitics 13, no. 4 (2008): 676-701. 
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escaped critical assessment within contemporary political geography and is too often 
written off as simply one of those “technical issues” within a single boundary-making 
system rather than as a distinct process of its own.73
Throughout this thesis, there are three key concepts that will resonate: 
  
• First, prefaced on the conceptual characteristics of a boundary, the differences in 
how sections of the DRC-Zambia boundary have been demarcated on the ground 
indicate that physical representation of international boundaries has not been 
undertaken uniformly, through a finite, systematic methodology. Instead it is 
composed of several methodologies that must be historically, geographically and 
economically contextualised. Likewise, this concept of boundaries that seems 
prima facie as a key mechanism of the territorial trap is effectively diffused. 
• Second, and consequently, by concentrating on the process of demarcation that 
contextualisation can yield insight into the differing geographic scales through 
which territory (in the modern state model) has been perceived by the authority 
claiming ‘sovereignty.’ This will emerge throughout the historical narrative of the 
DRC-Zambia boundary. In particular, the differentiation of geographic scales will 
illuminate how specific features of territory (economic, administrative etc.) 
influenced demarcation practice. In this regard, territory was not the inert canvas 
on which demarcation was undertaken, but an active participant.  
• Third and finally, the perceptions of territory that influence boundary 
demarcation methodology will expose some of the contradictions and prejudices 
that marked British imposition of the territorial state model in Africa and how it 
has been negotiated through post-independent Zambian policy. 
 
The overall aim of this thesis is to dispel the notion that this ‘technical’ 
practice of boundary demarcation is a de-contextualised or systematic operation that 
cannot be subject to critical analysis. Although this research does not seek to 
completely repair the growing gulf between what has been referred to here as 
‘contemporary’ border discourses in political geography and ‘traditional’ boundary 
studies, it will hopefully provide more insight into the latter’s approach and provide 
                                                 
73 See again Minghi, ‘From conflict to harmony in border landscapes,’ 17; Newman, ‘From the 
International to the Local,’ 400. 
Chapter 1 – Approaching a boundary 
26 
some links between the two.74
The DRC-Zambia boundary was chosen as the case study for this research 
because the richness of its historical narrative offers intriguing insight into the 
differing methodologies used for demarcation in Africa, particularly during the 
colonial period. Throughout most historical and geographical contexts around the 
world, boundary demarcation has been undertaken by commissions acting on behalf 
of the neighbouring sovereigns. Recovering the work of boundary commissions as 
narratives using archival sources will be explained in Chapter 3 while Chapters 4 and 
5 will be dedicated to the historical narrative of the 1911-14 and 1927-33 Anglo-
Belgian boundary commissions respectively. 
 Even more so, it is hoped that Megoran’s criticisms are 
avoided here as the ‘technical’ demarcation process in the empirical narrative of the 
DRC-Zambia boundary will be examined in light of this contemporary political 
geography scholarship and shown how boundary practices have indeed been 
contextualised. The two approaches will work in tandem to critically assess the 
empiricism of the historical narrative and the modernist concepts of territory and state 
that were (and still are) at play. 
Uncovering boundary demarcation as a historical narrative, rather than simply 
as a technical process producing an abstract, surveyed line, allows my research to 
expose the work of colonial boundary commissions in Africa to further analysis. As 
will be addressed in Chapter 4, the records of early colonial boundary commissions in 
Africa, such as the 1911-14 Anglo-Belgian boundary commission, reveal an explicit 
focus on the small scale mapping of landscapes, similar to Matthew Edney’s study of 
the Great Trigonometric Survey of India in the mid-nineteenth century. The small 
scale mapping emphasis of early boundary commissions contributed to the imperial 
geographic perspective that has been subject to critical geopolitical analysis, such as 
the works of Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Derek Gregory. The ‘exploratory’ nature of 
colonial boundary commissions in Africa also calls to mind the historical 
geographical discourses of Timothy Mitchell and Felix Driver, as well as the critiques 
of Victorian travel writers throughout the British Empire such as those of Mary 
Louise Pratt.  
The narrative of the 1927-33 Anglo-Belgian boundary commission in Chapter 
5 tells a very different story, as demarcation methodology shifted the geographic scale 
                                                 
74 An overview of ‘traditional’ vs. ‘contemporary’ boundary and border literature is given in Newman 
and Paasi, ‘Fences and neighbours in the postmodern world.’  
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to more localised boundary definition along the watershed section of the Belgian 
Congo-Northern Rhodesia boundary. This shift in methodology was not indicative of 
a general trend around colonial Africa at the time; rather it was a result of local 
economic and commercial forces. This change in methodology suggests that territory 
in British colonial Africa was itself no longer the small scale, inert cartographic 
canvas. Instead, it became an active participant in the boundary-making practices, 
indicating that these practices can be contextualised, specifically in relation to natural 
resources. This contextualisation of territory can be read against the contextualisation 
of colonial governance throughout Africa in general that is revealed in the post-
colonial critiques of Mahmood Mamdani and Achille Mbembe. 
Bringing the narrative through to the present day, Chapter 6 explains how the 
demarcation practices along the DRC-Zambia boundary conducted by post-
independence governments have perpetuated that contextualisation of territory based 
on economic factors. In doing so, it raises questions about more popularised criticisms 
of African boundaries in general, such as those of Anthony Asiwaju, Basil Davidson 
and Antony Allott. This returns the analysis back to the relationship between 
boundaries and the model of state territorial sovereignty that was purportedly 
exported to Africa through colonialism. 
Boundary demarcation remains an important practice for African states as is 
clearly conveyed in the recent initiatives of the African Union Border Programme, 
reflecting the continued reinforcement of the model used by international law in an 
effort to exclude those very aspects of control and power from inter-state 
relationships. Assessing the supposed ‘technical’ practice of boundary demarcation 
will uncover where those aspects of control and power are imbued in the territorial 
state model, but more importantly it will expose contradictions in the way the model 
was exported to Africa through colonialism. In essence, the contextualised nature of 
boundary demarcation across Africa relates more to the imposition of the territorial 
state model than to the appropriateness of the model itself in the postcolonial context.
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2. Boundary as theoretical construct: its 
characteristics and practices 
 
“How is it possible, for instance, for the modern mind to conceive distinctly a 
travelling (sic) political organization, a State without territorial boundaries or the need 
of them, composed of persons, but associated with no fixed or certain habitat?” 
Woodrow Wilson, 19191
                                                 
1 W. Wilson, The State: Elements of Historical and Practical Politics (London: D.C. Heath and 
Company, 1919), 7. 
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Introduction         
 
As the division between neighbouring sovereign territories, a boundary can be 
distinguished from the practices relating to a ‘border’ through three distinct 
characteristics that relate directly to the nature of state sovereignty itself. Boundaries 
are: 
1. Static 
2. Bilateral 
3. Linear 
This chapter will first examine some of the important issues in the European 
development of state territorial sovereignty that required territory, and its constitutive 
boundaries, to be static. The static nature of the territorial state sovereignty model also 
led to the characteristic of boundaries being strictly bilateral, and the responsibility of 
states (legal persons), who were recognised to understand this more ‘developed’ 
model of political organisation. Participating within these two discourses is the 
underlying subtext that boundaries between territorial states must be linear. This is 
most apparent in the gradual linguistic distinction between ‘boundaries’ and 
‘frontiers’, particularly within the Anglo-American and French historical traditions. 
Of recurring importance throughout the analysis of these three characteristics is the 
influence of private property, from Roman legal practice, through Lockean principles 
of land use and modern state development, to imperial boundary-making in Africa. 
The aim here is to not provide a comprehensive, inter-disciplinary analysis of 
state development through multiple historical and regional contexts. Nor are these 
three characteristics of boundaries by any means mutually exclusive, but distilling 
each in turn uncovers clues as to how the concept of the boundary relates to the 
normative principles of territorial state sovereignty that underpinned British boundary 
practice in colonial Africa. Given the chronological breadth and wealth of literature 
dedicated to the subject of state development and territorial sovereignty, this chapter 
will concentrate on just a few key concepts of the territorial state model. Using 
international law as the doorway into the territorial state model, some of the model’s 
generalisations will be further informed and critiqued by political geography and 
political theory. 
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Prefaced by these three characteristics of territorial boundaries, this chapter 
will then look at the actual practices related to boundaries, or boundary-making to use 
a term introduced by Thomas Holdich in 1916.2
  
 Of greatest interest is how and to 
whom a boundary, as a static, bilateral and linear entity, becomes ‘known’ within 
these inter-linked practices. Taking this unique approach of questioning how a 
boundary is known will: first help distil the process of demarcation; second, better 
understand its implication in the actual construction of boundaries; and third, 
complete the conceptual lens through which the historical narrative of the DRC-
Zambia boundary demarcation was analysed during this research. 
Boundaries as static: state territory and sovereignty   
 
At the beginning of his 1919 book The State: Elements of Historic and Practical 
Politics,3 Woodrow Wilson posited that the modern notion of static territory was so 
obvious to the modern mind that it hardly required belabouring: “How is it possible, 
for instance, for the modern mind to conceive distinctly a travelling (sic) political 
organization, a State without territorial boundaries or the need of them, composed of 
persons, but associated with no fixed or certain habitat?”4 Wilson suggested that 
“early tribal states” were never “identified with any definite territory.”5 His inference 
that fixed territory was the very height of acceptable, modern political organisation, 
may have been an unsubtle jibe at German policy of the period that had advocated 
flexible state boundaries based on criteria other than respect for fixed state territory 
and were viewed as an ideological contribution to the causes of the First World War. 
This policy had been heavily influenced by theories of German national identity, 
linked closely to language, and by natural law theories. Certainly the most well 
known geographical theory was Friedrich Ratzel’s concept of the organic state that 
grows and retracts in accordance with its power respective to neighbouring states.6
                                                 
2 T.H. Holdich, Political Frontiers and Boundary Making (London: MacMillan and Co. Ltd, 1916). 
 
Permanent identification of a static boundary was contrary to Ratzel’s thinking as 
such boundaries would inhibit the territorial expression of state power. Even in the 
wake of territorial expansionism in the Second World War, and in stark contrast to 
3 Wilson, The State. 
4 Wilson, The State, 7. 
5 Wilson, The State, 7. 
6 A. Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence: Volume Two of A Contemporary Critique of Historical 
Materialism (Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987), 49. 
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Jones’ 1945 contractual concept of boundaries7, Spykman drew on Ratzel’s thinking 
by arguing that post-war boundaries should be drawn at the equilibrium of state 
power, suggesting that international conflict was created when there was an imbalance 
of power between neighbouring political entities.8
As Wilson’s comments in 1919 suggest, there was a distinct crystallisation of 
the way states (the victorious states more specifically) came to view territory in the 
wake of the First World War, in contrast to the fluidity of organic boundaries and in 
support of the stability of fixed boundaries and resultant fixed territory. The 
codification of international law as a legal mechanism for resolving what were usually 
territorial or boundary disputes between states had strengthened at the turn of the 
twentieth century, perhaps best illustrated by the establishment of what is now the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration in 1899.
 
9
In the landmark 1928 arbitration between the Netherlands and the United 
States over the (now Philippine) island of Palmas, and perhaps one of the most cited 
cases in modern international law, Judge Max Huber outlined the core principles of 
territorial sovereignty, clearly stating that it existed within “fixed boundaries.”
 It gained momentum following the First 
World War with Wilson’s 1918 Fourteen Points of Peace and the establishment of the 
League of Nations in 1920. Although the concept of territorial state sovereignty had a 
long heritage within Europe prior to this time, this was a particularly crucial period 
for understanding how this concept crystallised in relation to inter-state dispute 
settlement; even more significant in light of Brownlie’s comment noted in Chapter 1 
that title to territorial sovereignty is best understood through how respective claims 
have been adjudged. 
10 Shaw 
later notes that the notion of a boundary was closely connected with “the concepts of 
territory and territorial sovereignty”11
                                                 
7 S.B. Jones, ‘Boundary concepts in the setting of place and time’ Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers 49, no. 3 (1959): 241-255. 251-252. 
 and indicates that, within modern international 
law, states have given pre-eminence to the “stability and finality” of territorial 
8 N.J. Spykman, ‘Frontiers, security and international organisation’ Geographical Review 32, no. 3 
(1942): 436-447. 
9 Lord Curzon highlighted the constitution of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 1899 as one of the 
key ‘evidences of progress’ in boundary dispute resolution (G.N. Curzon, Frontiers The Romanes 
Lecture 1907 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908), 53). 
10 M. Huber and M. van Verduynen, ‘Judgement Rendered in Conformity with the Special Agreement 
Concluded on January 23, 1925 between the United States of America and the Netherlands Relating to 
the Arbitration of Differences Respecting Sovereignty over the Island of Palmas (or Miangas)’ 
American Journal of International Law 22, no. 4 (1928): 867-912. 875. 
11 M.N. Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa: International Legal Issues (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1986), 221. 
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boundaries: “the element of stability in the determination and maintenance of 
boundaries has been consistently emphasised.”12
Although the crystallisation of this model for the institutionalisation of 
international law hoped to separate disparities in state power from their respective 
(recognised) territories, this model was not new to Europe in 1919 nor did it develop 
in isolation from the exercise of state power; in fact within its historical context quite 
the opposite is true. This is certainly a long and complex story well beyond the scope 
of this work, but elements of its evolution will be important in distinguishing the 
characteristic of boundaries being fixed; a characteristic that continues to inform 
demarcation practices along the DRC-Zambia boundary.  
 In essence, the nature of boundaries 
being ‘fixed’ is inextricably linked to the state model based on territorial sovereignty 
that international law sought to codify against other state models in order to prevent 
territorial expansionism, particularly in the wake of the First World War.  
Max Weber famously defined the ‘state’ as: “a human community which 
within a defined territory successfully claims for itself the monopoly of legitimate 
physical force; and ‘territory’ it should be noted is a characteristic of the state.”13 The 
three attributes of the modern state including structure, legitimacy and spatiality can 
be discerned from this general definition of the European state model. A state must 
possess the structure by which to wield a monopoly of force (government), the 
legitimacy to use that force (sovereignty) and the spatial field on which to use force 
(territory).14
In his oft-cited discourse, Weber examined the history of state development 
based on ‘three pure types of legitimate rule’: legal rule, traditional rule and 
 How these features of the modern state model came into being is 
complex, and although it is problematic to take such a de-contextualised approach, the 
interest here is to understand if and how territory gained predominance among those 
features; how it became constitutive of a state, rather than simply a ‘characteristic’. 
                                                 
12 Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa, 222. 
13 M. Weber, The Essential Weber: A reader, ed. S. Whimster (London: Routledge, 2004), 131. 
14 Michael Mann’s review of what he refers to as Weber’s institution view of the modern state includes 
four elements: 1) differentiated set of institutions, 2) centrality, whereby political influence radiates 
from the centre outwards, 3) “a territorially demarcated area over which it exercises” and 4) a 
monopoly of authoritative binding rule-making, backed up by a monopoly of the means of physical 
violence (M. Mann, ‘The autonomous power of the state: Its origins, mechanisms and results’ in 
State/Space: A Reader, eds. N. Brenner et al. (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003), 53). My view essentially 
follows these elements but eliminates the notion of radiating political influence since any notion of 
centrality must follow a posteriori from a designated territory. In other words, to understand influence 
radiating out towards the periphery, there must be a pre-existent distance from the centre, a defined 
territory. 
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charismatic rule.15 Legal rule is the modern concept of state government, as a 
bureaucratic body which can create, enact and enforce laws through an administrative 
apparatus marked by defined roles. Traditional rule is rooted in what Weber described 
as “the sanctity of orders”16 whereby command is fixed by tradition. Here a lord is 
endowed with power through the rules of tradition, which can be amended by his rule 
but cannot stray far from that tradition. Application of rule is through direction of the 
lord, and administration is not based on defined bureaucracy as in legal rule. 
Charismatic rule is based effectively on the obedience to a leader chosen by distinct 
charismatic traits (e.g. great warrior, religious figure or other). Administration of 
charismatic rule is largely through the obedience of the followers, where application 
is based on the level of devotion and again there is no regimented bureaucratic 
structure. The ascendancy of ‘legal rule’, with its trappings of bureaucratic 
administration, gained legitimacy based on law, rather than legitimacy based on 
custom (traditional rule) or prestige (charismatic rule),17
Some political geographers have emphasised the role of the European secular 
monarchs increasing their capacity for war as a key development to more complex 
state institutions.
 and can be traced through the 
history of European political development. 
18 In the early French context, an effective administrative 
bureaucracy had better capacity to raise the funds necessary to equip large military 
forces. Charles Tilly places emphasis on the role of “coercion and capital” in the 
development of the state as a war-making institution. Prefacing what he describes as 
Weber’s “historically contestable definition the state,” Tilly established that as ‘state’ 
military weapons/force gradually replaced reliance on other forms of domestic militia 
or external mercenaries in Europe, “The distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ 
politics, once quite unclear, became sharp and fateful. The link between war-making 
and state structure strengthened.”19
Revenue collection was essential to maintain coercive means, and European 
states required a monetized economy and capitalist credit to finance such means.
 
20
                                                 
15 Weber, The Essential Weber, 133. 
 
Tilly observes that state revenues were broadly generated in five categories: tribute, 
16 Weber, The Essential Weber, 135. 
17 Weber, The Essential Weber, 141. 
18 J. Painter, Politics, Geography and ‘Political Geography’ (London: Arnold, 1995), 43. 
19 C. Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States AD 990-1992 (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1995), 69-70. 
20 Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, 85-86. 
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rent, payments of flows (e.g. customs, excise, tolls), payment on stocks (e.g. land, 
property) and taxes (e.g. income tax).21 Certainly revenue generated by flows such as 
customs required defined and fixed territorial boundaries: “customs revenues depend 
on the existence of well-defined and well-defended borders; smuggling – the evasion 
of internal or external customs duties – became a crime precisely to the extent that 
European states attempted to define and defend their boundaries.”22
In contrast, Marxist theories trace the origins of modern state territorial 
sovereignty to the overall economic conditions in Europe during the decline of 
feudalism. The absolutist state emerged to mediate the tension between the landed 
aristocracy and the growing influence of the urban middle class.
 Boundaries (or 
“borders” to use Tilly’s term) may seem at first glance to be associated only with the 
determination of where customs houses would be located to generate revenue from 
flows across it. However, on closer inspection, the concept of boundaries can be seen 
to play a role in Tilly’s other forms of state revenue since they determined the limits 
of property in borderland areas. This might have generated rent and determined who 
was responsible to pay taxes to which sovereign. 
23 European absolute 
monarchs created the institutional characteristics of the state (standing armies, 
taxation and codified law), not to defend against competing monarchs, but to assist in 
mediating this domestic class tension. Marxist theories recognise that the central 
component in feudalism (aristocratic land ownership) was inhibiting the ascendant 
free market and labour mobility.24 For Anderson, as the power of the absolute 
monarch increased, it freed the aristocracy to dispose of property, essentially 
exchanging political power for economic power.25
1. Notion of absolute property rights 
 Roman law gradually re-emerged 
around the absolute monarchies of Europe to address this new trade in property and 
the growth of free capital. According to Anderson, Roman law was more appropriate 
to address the economic conditions of urban mercantilism than feudal law, due to four 
aspects: 
2. Tradition of equity 
3. Canons of evidence 
                                                 
21 Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, 87. 
22 Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, 88. 
23 P. Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: Verso, 1974), 14. 
24 Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State, 17. 
25 Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State, 20. 
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4. Emphasis on professional judiciary26
The post-feudal growth of private property demanded the re-imposition of Roman 
legal tenets to do away with the multiplicity of property rights and bring forward the 
equitable nature of contracts. 
 
 Private property was also a theme that influenced political theorists who were 
both reflective and contributory to burgeoning notions of state sovereignty in post-
feudal Europe. In his influential work “Les Six Livres de la République” of 1576, 
Jean Bodin defined “La souverainté” as “the absolute power of a state held in 
perpetuity.”27 For Bodin, sovereignty was best exercised with a clear distinction 
between the ruler and subjects. This power was best invested in the figure of the 
absolute monarch since any sharing of power with the subjects would erode the 
ruler’s possession of sovereignty. Absolute monarchs could not even be bound be 
previous laws or customs, which Bodin also saw as restrictions on absolute 
sovereignty. However, Bodin crucially added several restrictions to the absolute 
power of the sovereign. According to Beaulac, Bodin saw the sovereign as still 
subject to a number of higher laws which he categorised as the laws of God, laws of 
nature and “even to certain human laws common to all nations.”28 A sovereign still 
had to honour contracts, respect private property and could not derogate from the 
primacy of male succession and the “inalienability of the public domain.”29
Bodin’s theory appears to stand at the threshold between Weber’s pure forms 
of traditional rule and legal rule. While stating that the sovereign was not subject to 
custom, in retaining the primacy of male succession Bodin reflected an important 
aspect of Weber’s traditional rule. However, in outlining the restrictions on a 
sovereign’s absolute power, Bodin was also leading towards a system of legal rule. 
This is particularly evident in the transcendent nature of Bodin’s restrictions on 
absolute sovereign power. Note especially how the ‘certain laws common to all 
nations’ include the legal concepts of contracts and private property that are 
mentioned in the same breath as the laws of God.  
 
Within his famous 1651 work Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes shared Bodin’s 
belief that an absolute monarch was the most effective form of government since 
                                                 
26 Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State, 26. 
27 Translation by the author “la puissance absolute et perpétuelle d’une République.” cited in S. 
Beaulac, The Power of Language in the Making of International Law: The word sovereignty in Bodin 
and Vattel and the myth of Westphalia (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhof, 2004), 107. 
28 Beaulac, The Power of Language in the Making of International Law, 110. 
29 Beaulac, The Power of Language in the Making of International Law, 110. 
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there was no division of sovereign power. However, Hobbes believed that the 
individuals of a society had to enter into a pact which would endow the sovereign 
with that right of absolute power.30 Hobbes recognised that the ‘covenant’ “being but 
words, and breath, have no force to oblige, contain, constrain or protect any man,” 
therefore enforcement was the necessary alter ego of the covenant.31
This is more than Consent or Concord; it is a reall Unitie of them all, in one 
and the same Person, made by Covenant of every man with every man, in such 
a manner, as if every man should say to every man, I Authorise and give up my 
right of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this 
condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his Actions in 
like manner.
 But the covenant 
itself, as described by Hobbes, still had a distinctly legalistic tone:  
32
Although the term ‘men’ referred to a very distinct section of society, what is 
interesting about Hobbes’ covenant are the echoes of legal contract whereby each 
‘man’ is recognised as an equal. It reflects how construction of the multitude was 
idealised by Hobbes as a bilateral arrangement; an oath sworn “every man with every 
man.” 
 
The basis of legal equity at the micro-territorial scale, in the sense of private 
property being ‘mine’ as opposed to ‘yours’ established through title (e.g. contract), 
can be seen to have influenced the macro-territorial scale with the resultant influence 
of Roman legal principles. While not using the term ‘sovereignty’ specifically, Scott 
believes that John Locke effectively did address the issue in his discourse on power. 
For Locke, individuals in the “politic society” have supreme power which is then 
granted by their consent to a legitimate government.33 So while a legitimate 
government may have supreme power, when it is dissolved that power reverts back to 
the people.  “The right of the individual to judge the ‘supreme power’ of government 
ensures that the individual remains ‘sovereign.’”34
                                                 
30 T. Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. R. Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 121. 
 Locke may have espoused that 
every individual was ‘sovereign’, but there had to be a spatial dimension to the group 
of individuals who formed the ‘body politic’ and would then consent to yielding that 
power to a legitimate government. In other words, from a Hobbesian perspective, 
31 Hobbes, Leviathan, 123. 
32 Hobbes, Leviathan, 120. 
33 J.T. Scott, ‘Sovereignless state and Locke’s language of obligation’ The American Political Science 
Review 94, no. 3 (2000): 547-561. 550. 
34 Scott, ‘Sovereignless state and Locke’s language of obligation,’ 551. 
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there had to be a defined corpus to the ‘multitude’ who acted as the other individual in 
the bilateral contract with the absolutist government. 
Within his Second Treatise on Government, Locke effectively skirted around 
the territorial definition of the state when addressing this contract or ‘consent’ 
between subject and government. Locke considered all men to be naturally free but 
each placed himself under the laws of a government either through direct or tacit 
consent.35
I say that every man that hath any possessions or enjoyment of any part of the 
dominions of the government, doth thereby give his tacit consent, and is as far 
forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government during such 
enjoyment as any one under it… (that consent) in effect reaches as far as the 
very being of anyone within the territories of that government.
 Direct consent was a straight-forward declaration to become a subject of a 
government, but Locke found tacit consent more difficult to explain: 
36
In effect, the spatial extent of the state is pre-existent; so for Locke while a man might 
be born naturally free, the geographic placement of that birth already implies tacit 
consent to a government. Locke does suggest that if someone (who has given only 
tacit consent) decides to sell or quit his land, he can “go and incorporate himself into 
another commonwealth, or to agree with others to begin a new one, in vacins locis, in 
any part of the world they can find free and unpossessed.”
 
37
Intriguingly, Locke’s suggestion here is that those individuals who seek to 
establish another commonwealth, must find an area that is ‘free and unpossessed’. 
Clues about Locke’s understanding of what areas are ‘free and unpossessed’ can be 
found in his ideas related to property. Locke held that “every man has property in his 
own person” and that by applying one’s labour to land left in what Locke calls “the 
state of nature” becomes his property.
 
38 “Land left wholly to nature, that hath no 
improvement of pasturage, tillage or planting, is called, as indeed it is, ‘Waste’…”39 
Locke argued that land scarcity caused by population increase added value to territory 
and required communities to settle the boundaries of their territories through legal 
“compact and agreement.”40
                                                 
35 J. Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration Third Edition, 
ed. J.W. Gough (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966), 60. 
 Locke’s concepts clearly prejudiced settled, agrarian use 
36 Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government, 60. 
37 Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government, 62. 
38 Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government, 15. 
39 Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government, 22-23. 
40 Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government, 24. 
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of land over movable, nomadic activities;41
Cara Nine explains that there are two approaches towards applying Lockean 
principles of land and property to the concept of state’s territorial rights.
 the former required fixed and settled areas 
of land while the later did not.  
42 The 
individualistic approach suggests that individuals who gained property over land 
through the application of their labour, contracted together to establish a state with 
territorial jurisdiction over their individual properties.43 The collectivist approach 
suggests that a group (such as a state) creates title to territory by their collective 
labour over certain areas of land. As Tamar Meisels describes this application of 
Locke’s argument: “The fact that national members have toiled on a parcel of 
territory, thus altering it significantly from its previous form, may supply us with 
substantial (though not necessarily conclusive) moral reasons to favour their 
ownership of the territory in question over that of others.”44 Nine explains that there 
must be a distinction between Locke’s property rights, where an owner has rights to 
use and control the land, as long as it doesn’t violate “laws of nature or civil laws.”45 
This then implies that there is a jurisdiction (civil laws) or territorial rights that pre-
exist in order to mediate those property rights. Buchanan challenges the 
individualistic approach and explains that a jurisdictional authority must exist to 
“create and define property rights.”46
Providing further critique, Nine believes that the only way for the 
individualistic approach to work is if property rights can be created without state 
jurisdiction. In other words, can individuals have ‘meta-jurisdictional’ rights? If so, 
then it would effectively extinguish state’s territorial rights since any property holder 
could leave a state with his/her property at any time.
 
47 Therefore, “if individuals do 
not retain meta-jurisdictional authority, then social contract theory cannot explain 
territorial rights.”48
                                                 
41 See especially Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government, 20. para 37. 
 Nine believes that the collectivist approach can be applied as an 
analogy between Locke’s property rights and state territorial rights because a state as 
42 C. Nine, ‘A Lockean theory of territory’ Political Studies 56 (2008): 148-156. 148-149. 
43 Nine, ‘A Lockean theory of territory,’ 148. 
44 T. Meisels, 'Liberal Nationalism and Territorial Rights' Journal of Applied Philosophy, 20, no. 1 
(2003): 31–43. 35. 
45 Nine, ‘A Lockean theory of territory,’ 149. 
46 A. Buchanan, 'Boundaries: What Liberalism Has to Say' in States, Nations, and Borders: The Ethics 
of Making Boundaries, eds. A. Buchanan and M. Moore (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003): 231–61. Cited in Nine, 2008. 150. 
47 Nine, ‘A Lockean theory of territory,’ 152. 
48 Nine, ‘A Lockean theory of territory,’ 153. 
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a ‘collective’ can acquire rights over land “without prior reference to property rights 
or to individual consent.”49 This approach is perhaps more appropriate for imperial 
contexts. Most importantly, Nine sees Locke’s principles used to define territorial 
rights since states can act as “agents capable of changing the land” and the 
relationship between owner (state) and land “must be morally valuable” applying 
Locke’s values of liberty, desert and efficiency.50 For states, territorial rights 
determine jurisdiction which helps realise the same values even though the state does 
not perform the exact same acts of the land as individuals.51
It is also possible to discern Locke’s theory of property in Robert Sack’s 
understanding of territoriality explained in Chapter 1. Locke states: “it is very easy to 
conceive without any difficulty how labour could at first begin a title of property in 
the common things of nature and how spending it upon our uses bounded it.”
  
52
This was the case with territorial imperialism in the Americas that, in turn, 
came to influence African imperialism. For example, the Louisiana Purchase set a 
fixed limit to the territorial title of the United States in 1803, (based on the extent of 
Spanish lands transferred to France in the 1800 Franco-Spanish treaty of St. Ildefonso 
and re-stated in Article 1 of the 30 April 1803 Treaty of Cession between France and 
the U.S.) long before any labour or state administration came to be applied with any 
consistency across its full geographic breadth. Nevertheless, clarifying the legal title 
over territory provided the over-riding jurisdiction to facilitate the creation of property 
from ‘waste’ and to mediate the conflicts between land claimants. This created the 
‘free land’ that Frederick Jackson Turner persistently referred to as the basis for the 
American frontier which was the advancing edge of settlement.
 Locke 
goes on to suggest that this leads to no quarrelling over the extent of property because 
an individual only holds the property which he (she) can use. This can be related to 
Sack’s understanding that territory is only created through control, but it is 
insufficient to explain how states have historically possessed territory without 
exercising effective control over claimed land. 
53
                                                 
49 Nine, ‘A Lockean theory of territory,’ 155. 
 “The purchase of 
Louisiana was perhaps the constitutional turning point in the history of the 
(American) Republic, inasmuch as it afforded both a new area for national legislation 
50 Nine, ‘A Lockean theory of territory,’ 155. 
51 Nine, ‘A Lockean theory of territory,’ 156. 
52 Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government, 26. para 51. 
53 Settlement here refers to the westward movement of the largely white, European settlement.  
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and the occasion of the downfall of the policy of strict constriction.”54 Removing any 
question of disputed sovereignty or title over this vast area, the boundary of legal 
jurisdiction far preceded the application of recognised ‘labour’ and state 
administration; boundary preceded frontier.55
This is not dissimilar to imperial practice in Africa where in essence title over 
territory was generated by the perceived future use of territory and only those states 
recognised as familiar with the notion of fixed territorial sovereignty (e.g. recognised 
by European imperial powers themselves) could engage in the boundary-making 
processes to define territory. 
 
56 While there were many examples of defined political 
space in pre-colonial Africa, Achille Mbembe suggests that a “multiplicity of 
allegiances and jurisdictions itself corresponded to the plurality of the forms of 
territoriality” with political entities more or less defined by “boundaries capable of 
infinite extension and abrupt contraction.”57
 
 Locke’s advocacy of agrarian economic 
production required individual private property rights over a fixed area of land (fixed 
through one’s labour) would have been in tension with these observed divisions of 
pre-imperial political entities in Africa. Likewise boundaries could only be defined by 
neighbouring political entities with the same conception of territorial sovereignty; 
read the European imperial powers. 
Boundaries as bilateral: exclusive to neighbouring sovereigns  
 
The notion that state sovereignty is fixed to static territory does not explain the second 
key characteristic of boundaries, that they are bilateral. However, the inherent 
bilateral nature of boundaries is again rooted in that development of territorial 
sovereignty. Although he uses the term ‘border’ in place of boundary, Giddens 
                                                 
54 F.J. Turner, The Turner Thesis Concerning the Role of the Frontier in American History: Third 
Edition, ed. G.R. Taylor (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1972), 19. 
55 “Evidence for thinking of territory as emptiable space is indicated early on in North American 
charters and grants which delimited their claims by using the abstract metrical lines of latitude and by 
their provision for a hierarchy of administrative sub-territories long before the land was surveyed and 
settled.” R.D. Sack, Human Territoriality: Its theory and history (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1986), 88.  
56 This will be developed in greater depth in later in this chapter and in Chapters 5 and 6, but an 
excellent review of the literature related to this subject in the African context can be found in A.I. 
Asiwaju, ‘The conceptual framework’ in Partitioned Africans: ethnic relations across Africa’s 
international boundaries 1884-1984, ed. A.I. Asiwaju (Lagos: University of Lagos Press, 1985). 
57 A. Mbembe, A. ‘At the edge of the world: boundaries, territoriality and sovereignty in Africa’ trans. 
S. Rendall Public Culture 12, no.1 (2000): 259-284. 263-264. 
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concludes “As demarcations of sovereignty, they have to be agreed upon by each of 
the states whose borders they are.”58
Recalling early imperial practice, the territorial extent of the Roman Empire 
itself was defined by its limes, (e.g. Hadrian’s Wall, the Rhine and Danube rivers). 
These military-based limes were not agreed with neighbouring political entities of 
equally recognised political status but marked the limits of Roman administration.
 Here the distinction can be made with borders, 
taken to be associated with acts of state control, that are the limits of unilateral state 
enforcement. 
59 
Beyond the limes was simply territory that had not yet been brought fully under 
Roman control. Similar imperial examples of unilaterally claimed territory can be 
seen in the early claims to ‘spheres of influence’ in Africa by the European colonial 
powers during the last decades of the nineteenth century. To use an example that will 
be examined more closely in Chapter 4, the Congo Free State effectively claimed all 
of the territory of the Congo river basin in Article 1 of the 1885 Berlin Act.60
Within the Roman tradition, boundaries only “existed in private legal matters, 
where they governed property rights.”
 This 
declaration claimed the limits of Congolese territory but it did not establish the 
boundaries of the Congo Free State made with neighbouring imperial claimants. 
These would emerge later in bilateral agreements. 
61 Brownlie admits that, with certain 
reservations, territorial sovereignty as conceived within modern international law, is 
analogous to private property ownership.62 Shaw also draws parallels between the 
legal ownership of territory in international law and municipal law, but indicates that 
the transfer of sovereignty entails a change in the whole legal system under which the 
territory is controlled, whereas a transfer of property in municipal law does not 
change the legal system under which ownership is held.63
                                                 
58 Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence, 51. 
 Indeed, Shaw confirms that: 
“The international rules regarding territorial sovereignty are rooted in Roman law 
provisions governing ownership and possession, and the classification of the different 
methods of acquiring territory is a direct descendant of the Roman rules dealing with 
59 Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence, 50-51; F. Kratochwil, ‘Of Systems, Boundaries, and 
Territoriality: An Inquiry into the Formation of the State System’ World Politics 39, no. 1 (1986): 27-
52. 35-36. 
60 E. Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty Vols. I and II (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1894), 24. 
61 Kratochwil, ‘Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality,’ 36. 
62 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law Fifth Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998), 106. 
63 M.N. Shaw, International Law Fourth Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 333. 
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property.”64
As a ‘contract’ within international law, treaties that define boundaries are 
agreed between entities with equal legal personality. To recall a partial quote by Shaw 
noted in Chapter 1: 
 As with the application of Locke’s theories of property to state 
sovereignty, the presence of over-arching Roman legal jurisdiction that mediated 
property ownership makes it difficult to draw analogies with modern international law 
that is based on state consent and state practice. However, recalling Anderson’s view 
that Roman law emerged as a better mechanism for dealing with exclusive private 
property rights in post-feudal Europe, what is important is that property holders were 
viewed as equal legal personalities. 
The state in its turn lies upon the foundation of sovereignty, which expresses 
internally the supremacy of the government institutions and externally the 
supremacy of the state as a legal person. But sovereignty itself, with its retinue 
of legal rights and duties, is founded upon the fact of territory. Without territory 
a legal person cannot be a state.65
Shaw’s definition makes it clear that within international law a state’s ‘personality’ is 
based exclusively on territory rather than on any distinctive social characteristic. This 
provides for the exercise of sovereign equality that is essential for resolving bilateral 
disputes through a formal (and peaceful) adjudicated settlement. Brownlie echoes 
Shaw’s definition, concluding that: 
 
The state territory and its appurtenances (airspace and territorial sea), together 
with the government and population within its frontiers, comprise the physical 
and social manifestations of the primary type of international legal person, the 
state. The legal competence of states and the rules for their protection depend on 
and assume the existence of a stable, physically delimited, homeland.66
In stark contrast to Foucault’s understanding that territory is simply one of the 
“components” of governance,
 
67
                                                 
64 Shaw, International Law Fourth Edition, 333; M.N. Shaw, ‘Territory in international law’ 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 13 (1982): 74. 
 international law views the other characteristics of 
statehood, including governance and population, as being situated within the a priori 
fixed territorial boundaries. Therefore, territory is seen in international law as the 
constitutive requirement of statehood. 
65 Shaw, International Law Fourth Edition, 331. 
66 Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law Fifth Edition, 106. 
67 M. Foucault, Power: Essential Works of Foucault Vol. 3, ed. J.D. Faubian and trans. R. Harley et al 
(London: Penguin, 2002), 221. 
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 Foucault’s distinction between the exercise of disciplinary power inside and 
security from external threats can of course be seen as a consequence of the staticity 
of state legal personality; the classic, absolutist view of the Janus-faced domestic and 
external nature of a state’s legal personality. Emerrich de Vattel’s 1758 work Le Droit 
des Gens effectively personified the figure of the state by externalising the internal 
governing authority.68 According to Beaulac, personification of the state again had its 
roots in Roman civil law in terms of the “fictitious judicial person”69 that re-emerged 
in post-feudal Europe to address the emerging free market economies (private 
property). For Vattel, sovereignty also entailed independence of power whereby the 
moral personality of a state had to be respected by other states. “The natural society of 
nations cannot subsist, unless the natural rights of each be duly respected.”70 Within 
ideological traditions of humanism in the nineteenth century, Georg Hegel’s 1821 
Philosophy of Right suggested that the state gained a moral personality beyond its 
legal personality, drawing on the moral will of the multitude.71
 In the wake of the religious wars of the Middle Ages with conflicting ideas 
about the “supremacy of the universal imperium (or sacretorium)” and the nationalist 
expansionism during the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, 
modern international law “favoured the emergence of national states with sovereign 
territory bound by an internationally-recognized and inviolable boundary.”
 
72 Of 
course such a sweeping historical overview covers a broad chronological period, 
specific to the European context, which is better addressed by Agnew and 
Corbridge.73 In reviewing Bull’s (1977) work on the contrast between geopolitical 
‘systems’ and ‘societies’, Agnew and Corbridge explain that after 1815 Europe sees 
the rise of the society “of territorial states based around the modern conventions of 
state recognition and diplomacy, balance of power, and war prosecuted to enforce 
‘community norms.’”74
                                                 
68 Beaulac, The Power of Language in the Making of International Law, 133. 
 They suggest that while the notion of a ‘society’ of states after 
1815 did not prevent conflict even within that society, after this period “there were 
69 Beaulac, The Power of Language in the Making of International Law, 137. 
70 Beaulac, The Power of Language in the Making of International Law, 150. 
71 See especially G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1967), 181 and 212. 
72 L.K.D. Kristof, ‘The Nature of Frontiers and Boundaries’ Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers 49, no. 3-1 (1959): 269-282. 278. 
73 J. Agnew and S. Corbridge, Mastering Space: hegemony, territory and international political 
economy (London: Routledge, 1995): 49-56. 
74 Agnew and Corbridge, Mastering Space, 18. 
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now ‘entrance requirements’ for statehood not found in the older ‘system’ of states” 
where interaction, according to Bull, was marked by war.75
Agnew and Corbridge make the connection that within this understanding of 
state development a state could provide the security (through legal structure) for the 
‘self fulfilment’ of its subjects only on the basis of defined territory:  
 As Wilson pointed out in 
1919, by the first decades of the twentieth century one of those ‘entrance 
requirements’ for statehood was static bounded territory agreed with neighbouring 
territorial sovereigns. This was important since the expansion and contraction of 
territorial limits was by that time considered unstable and casus belli.  
Security is only possible for a tightly defined spatial unit endowed with 
sovereignty. Hence, politics, in the sense of the pursuit of justice and virtue, 
could exist only within territorial boundaries. Outside is danger, realpolitik 
and the use of force. Security is then, by definition, the defence of a particular 
spatial sovereignty and the politics within it.76
Within the emerging ‘society’ of states of the nineteenth century, and premised on the 
responsibility for security, it is logical that states would want neighbours who were 
equal members in this society, respectful of their respective sovereign territories. 
Political entities that did not possess legal personality or respect the ‘natural rights’ of 
other states were potentially dangerous and could not engage with other states on an 
equitable basis. 
 
This was a major justification for the European imperial appropriation of 
territory around the world; that primitive political entities were marked by constant 
conflict and had not advanced to this stage of territorial sovereignty. Locke suggested 
that while the “kings of Indians in America” held absolute authority in wartime, “in 
peace they exercise very little dominion, and have but a very moderate sovereignty.”77
                                                 
75 Agnew and Corbridge, Mastering Space, 18. 
 
With no subtle hint of racism, Lord Curzon drew on his experiences in south Asia to 
conclude: “In Asia, the oldest inhabited continent, there has always been a strong 
instinctive aversion to the acceptance of fixed boundaries, arising partly from the 
nomadic habits of the people, partly from the dislike of precise arrangements that is 
typical of the oriental mind, but more still from the idea that in the vicissitudes of 
76 Agnew and Corbridge, Mastering Space, 86. 
77 Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government, 55. para. 108. 
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fortune more is to be expected from an unsettled than from a settled Frontier.”78 He 
concluded that “the more scientific character of which (the frontier or boundary), 
particularly where it rests upon treaty stipulations, and is sanctified by International 
Law, is undoubtedly a preventive of misunderstanding, a check to territorial cupidity, 
and an agency of peace.”79
Of course the subtext to Curzon’s comment is that only sovereign states, 
equally recognised under international law, could enter into ‘treaty stipulations’. The 
key point is that a boundary
 
80, as the division of territory, had to be undertaken 
through agreement by two ‘states’ with mutually respected legal personality; what 
Jones later referred to as the contractual concept of boundaries: “The essence of the 
contractual concept of boundaries is that two countries should agree on a line and 
stick to it.”81 Within the world-systems view and drawing on Jones’ 1959 piece, 
Taylor and Flint argue that because of what they refer to as its ‘peripheral’ position 
within the world economy at the time: “The most competitive arena of all, Africa in 
the late nineteenth century, has the most ‘contractual international boundaries.’”82
Those ‘true international subjects’ have enshrined their respect for states’ 
dualistic personality through the concept of “territorial integrity” that is codified in 
Article 10 of the 1919 Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 2 in the 1945 
Charter of the United Nations, and outlined in detail in the 1970 UN Declaration on 
the Principles of International Law concerning the friendly relations and co-
operation among states in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (it has 
also been cited in numerous bilateral and multilateral treaties as well as resolutions of 
the UN since 1945.) From a more realist international relations perspective, it is clear 
 
                                                 
78 Curzon, Frontiers, 49. 
79 Curzon, Frontiers, 48. 
80 It is interesting to note that Curzon uses the term ‘boundary’ quite distinctly in the above quote, 
while the terms ‘frontier’ is used more widely throughout the lectures. 
81 Jones, ‘Boundary concepts in the setting of place and time,’ 251. Stephen Jones admits in 1959 that 
his 1945 guidelines on boundary-making processes that will be examined in greater depth below, were 
based on what he called the “contractual concept.” Jones notes that the contractual concept certainly 
did not imply equilibrium of power between the parties, and could often be used as a façade for power 
politics, but that it was the most pragmatic way to achieve agreement between neighbouring states and 
prevent conflict. Jones himself later criticised his own thinking as being somewhat naïve (Jones, 
‘Boundary concepts in the setting of place and time,’ 252) and Minghi suggests that Jones’ advocacy of 
the contractual concept was expectant of a change in the very concept of sovereignty and a stronger 
super-state governance post-1945 (J. Minghi, ‘Boundary studies in political geography’ Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers 53, no. 3 (1963): 407-428. 413; see also J.W. Donaldson and A. 
Williams, ‘Delimitation and demarcation: analysing the legacy of Stephen B. Jones’ Boundary-
Making’ Geopolitics 13, no. 4 (2008): 676-701.) 
82 P. Taylor and C. Flint Political Geography: World Economy, Nation-State and Locality, Fourth 
Edition (Harlow, Essex: Pearson Education Ltd., 2000), 163. 
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that the notion of sovereign equality and territorial integrity have not prevented states 
from interfering in the domestic personality of other states. Indeed, the absolutism of 
sovereignty has never really been reflected in the exercise of state power. State 
actions have always been curtailed by some external force such as hegemonic 
coercion, alliances, bilateral agreements or multi-lateral conventions.83 However, for 
international law, that absolutism continues to be reflected in the concentration (not 
exclusive) of jurisdictional rights over two-dimensional land territory and reflects 
what Taylor calls, “the conservatism of the inter-state system succeeding in blocking 
change in the pattern of the world political map.”84
Any extension of states’ rights into spatial dimensions beyond two-
dimensional territory is restricted by other states’ rights. Air space jurisdiction is 
legislated by rights and responsibilities dictated by bilateral and multilateral 
agreements such as the 1971 Montreal Convention. Although Article 2, Part II of the 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) indicates that a 
coastal or island state’s “sovereignty” extends into the 12 nm territorial sea, Section 3 
of Part II provides the important restriction that coastal states cannot inhibit the right 
of innocent passage. In both geographic spaces, the exercise of state power and 
control is derogated by overlapping rights and jurisdictions of other states. These 
restrictive mechanisms might be eroding due to state practice (the concept of creeping 
jurisdiction in maritime space especially), but more fundamentally, states rights to air 
and maritime space under international law are entirely dependant, and generated by, 
their sovereignty over land. Brownlie hints at this above, when stating that 
international law views multi-dimensional extensions of state jurisdiction over air and 
maritime space as “appurtenances” to territory.  
 
While analogous to property title, a state’s territorial sovereignty is contingent 
on having its ‘title’ to territory recognised as valid by other sovereign states. Brownlie 
points out that recognition has generated much debate among international legal 
theorists who have argued either that recognition is simply a declaratory act with little 
legal weight, or a constitutive act that is a “pre-condition of the existence of legal 
rights.”85
                                                 
83 S.D. Krasner, ‘Compromising Westphalia’ International Security 20, no. 3 (1995-96): 115-151. See 
especially 117. 
 This presents something of a logical, chicken-and-the-egg dilemma in 
84 P. Taylor, Political Geography: World-Economy, Nation-State and Locality, Third Edition (Harlow, 
Essex: Longman Scientific & Technical, 1993), 161. 
85 Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law Fifth Edition, 87-88. 
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relation to boundary treaties in that if the existence of a state is predicated on 
sovereignty held over defined territory, how can it agree a boundary treaty prior to its 
existence? 
Imperial practice eased this logical dilemma through its use of terms such as 
‘spheres of influence’ or ‘protectorates’ which Curzon saw as the powerful states 
protecting weaker local rulers; although he admitted “that the uniform tendency is for 
the weaker (forms of protectorates) to crystallize into the harder shape (territorial 
incorporation).”86
The process is not so immoral as it might at first sight appear; it is in reality an 
endeavour, sanctioned by general usage, to introduce formality and decorum 
into proceedings which, unless thus regulated and diffused, might endanger 
the peace of nations or too violently shock the conscience of the world.
 Yet in an almost apologetic tone, Curzon stated: 
87
As explained in Chapter 1, the agreements made between the imperial powers and 
local political rulers in Africa may have determined commercial rights and/or political 
allegiance (dependant on the imperial power’s interpretation of the agreement), but 
the agreements were certainly not treated by European imperial powers as being 
concluded between political equals, both with knowledge of the concept of fixed 
territorial sovereignty. In this context, the contracts recognising the extent of fixed 
territorial title (boundary treaties) were not negotiated between state and subject, but 
between states who claimed, and were recognised to have, exclusive understanding of 
that very concept of a fixed and static territorial sovereignty: “The legal status of 
African communities, as traditionally defined in the writings of classical jurists, has 
been that of mere objects of international law whose disposition was controllable only 
by recognized states that alone constituted true international subjects.”
 
88
 
 
Boundaries as linear: from frontiers to boundaries   
 
In The Production of Space, Henri Lefebvre notes that one of the key architectural 
expressions of modernity was the reduction of exterior walls from the practical 
“massiveness” of supportive walls to “mere membranes barely managing to 
                                                 
86 Curzon, Frontiers, 47. 
87 Curzon, Frontiers, 47. 
88 A.C. McEwen, International Boundaries of East Africa (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 16. 
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concretize the division between inside and outside.”89 Instead of reducing the inside-
outside distinction, Lefebvre suggested that just the opposite happened.90
Numerous boundary scholars, international lawyers and political geographers 
throughout the twentieth century have made the clear distinction between the zonal 
‘frontier’ and the linear ‘boundary.’
 In the 
context of state-defined space, the similar distillation of boundaries into ever-
narrowing linear constructs was also a derivative of the increased distinction in 
territorial personality of neighbouring states.  
91 In his 1959 article ‘Boundary concepts in space 
and time’, Stephen Jones outlined the distillation of the modern territorial boundary, 
as a linear entity, from the zonal entity of the frontier through a number of historical 
contexts.92 Kristof sees the etymology of the terms indicating a relationship between 
the frontier as outer oriented and the boundary as inner oriented.93 Prescott notes that 
boundaries were distilled from frontiers as the width of separation between 
neighbouring political entities decreased and the amount of contact increased.94 
Ruggie concludes that in Europe “The notion of firm boundary lines between major 
territorial formations did not take hold until the thirteenth century; prior to that date 
there were only ‘frontiers’ or large zones of transition.”95
                                                 
89 H. Lefebvre, The Production of Space trans. D. Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991): 146-
147. 
 The consensus throughout 
these studies has been that zonal separations of political entities, referred to as 
frontiers, are aspects of pre-modern political structures, while linear boundaries are 
relatively recent political constructs that developed alongside the modern territorial 
state model. Although this distinction has been examined by these and other scholars, 
it is still worth tracing the heredity of the term ‘boundary’ particularly within the 
Anglo-American and French historical traditions, to identify key signposts for 
understanding why boundaries must be linear. 
90 Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 147. 
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First Century eds. G. Demko and W.B. Wood (Boulder, CO and Oxford: Westview, 1994). 
92 Jones, ‘Boundary concepts in the setting of place and time.’ 
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Anglo-American tradition 
‘Boundary’ and ‘frontier’ concepts within British imperial practice are particularly 
important since they both informed and were informed by the historical context of the 
DRC-Zambia case study. Discussions on boundaries and boundary-making within 
British academic and government circles reached its zenith in the first decades of the 
twentieth century, influenced by practical boundary-making throughout the Empire. 
They emerged as a core subject in the burgeoning academic field of political 
geography.96 When commenting on a presentation made by Thomas Holdich in 1899 
concerning the role of geographic knowledge in boundary-making, Halford 
Mackinder explained that the growing academic field of geography in Britain was 
necessarily influenced by the pragmatics of imperial rule.97
As early as 1891, the influential work of the soldier-surveyor Thomas Holdich 
saw boundaries as defined lines that could be defended; like a fence that must not 
have ill-defined or ‘weak’ links.
 From this practical (and 
imperial) perspective, British boundary scholarship clearly elucidated how boundaries 
must be linear, but the linguistic distinction between frontiers and boundaries 
remained somewhat blurred.  
98 Holdich was steadfast throughout his works on 
practical boundary making in his advocacy of linear topographical features such as 
mountain watersheds or stable rivers as the ‘best’ forms of boundaries, both for their 
defensive capabilities and their cartographic distinctiveness. In the introduction to his 
1916 Political Frontiers and Boundary Making, Holdich outlined his belief “that the 
first and greatest objective of a national frontier is to ensure peace and goodwill 
between contiguous peoples by putting a definite edge to the national political 
horizon, so as to limit unauthorised expansion and trespass.”99
                                                 
96 The participation of boundary commissions as both “soldiers” and “geographers” in the imperial 
project will be explored in greater depth in Chapter 4. Here the emphasis is on the linguistic 
determination of the boundary concept. 
 Although he uses the 
term frontier, Holdich clearly indicated that the limits of state territory must be a 
“definite edge” rather than an indeterminate zone that was difficult to defend. Another 
British soldier-surveyor E.H. Hills began his 1906 presentation on ‘The geography of 
97 P. Lumsden, H. Leverson and H.J. Mackinder 1899 ‘The use of practical geography illustrated by 
recent frontier operations: discussion’ The Geographical Journal 13, no. 5 (1899): 477-480. 479. 
98 T.H. Holdich, ‘African boundaries, and the application of Indian systems of geographical survey to 
Africa’ Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and the Monthly Record of Geography 13, no. 
10 (1891): 596-607. 597. 
99 Holdich, Political Frontiers and Boundary Making, x. 
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international frontiers’: “The importance of clearly defined boundary-lines between 
the territorial possessions of rival nations is too obvious to require any labouring.”100
The objective to ensure peace and goodwill reflected how linear frontiers or 
boundaries were a key element to the Pax Britannia of late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century imperial expansion. In his famous lectures on ‘Frontiers’, Lord 
Curzon drew on his experience in India and believed that imprecise ‘frontiers’
 
101 were 
the cause of conflict and that by clearly defining frontiers, they would be “capable of 
being converted into instruments of peace.”102 Curzon dismissed the use of buffer 
zones as temporary or expedient separations of political entities, and believed their 
use in Asia was “apt to foster intrigue outside, apathy and often anarchy within.”103 
As Jones points out, Curzon’s belief espoused British imperial intentions, in that 
Britain was capable of creating stable ‘frontiers’ around its empire through precise 
definition, even if such exercises were imposed unilaterally.104
British academic geographers gave further support to the supremacy of linear 
boundaries over zonal separations, particularly in the role of conflict prevention after 
the First World War. Writing in the same year as Wilson (1919), Brigham described 
three stages of boundary development. At the most primitive stage was ‘tribal’ 
boundaries that were not defined in any document and had a zonal quality.
 
105 Brigham 
noted that in “hunter-nomadic” world economy, there was plenty of territorial 
fluctuation between groups and “the limits of ownership were vague.”106 The second 
stage of development was ‘transitional’ boundaries occurring when developed, urban 
civilisations existed in large areas alongside primitive civilisations.107
                                                 
100 E.H. Hills, ‘The geography of international frontier’ The Geographical Journal 28, no. 2 (1906): 
145-155. 145. 
 Brigham 
believed the world in 1919 was in the transitional stage, where both ‘frontiers’ and 
‘boundaries’ still existed. “Frontiers of the modern and definite kind abound in more 
101Colonial and Foreign Office officials in the British government involved in imperial boundary-
making during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries often used terms such as ‘boundary’ 
and ‘frontier’, and ‘delimitation’ and ‘demarcation’ simultaneously even though their distinction had 
been already made by boundary scholars and experts, most notably by Thomas Holdich in 1916 (as 
noted in chapter 1). (See also Curzon, Frontiers, 51 and J.W. Donaldson, ‘Pillars and perspective: 
demarcation of the Belgian Congo-Northern Rhodesia boundary’ Journal of Historical Geography 34, 
no. 3 (2008): 471-493. 478. 
102 Jones, ‘Boundary concepts in the setting of place and time,’ 250. 
103 Curzon, Frontiers, 32-33. 
104 Jones, ‘Boundary concepts in the setting of place and time,’ 250. 
105 A.P. Brigham, ‘Principles in the Determination of Boundaries’ Geographical Review 7, no. 4 
(1919): 201-219. 
106 Brigham, ‘Principles in the Determination of Boundaries,’ 201. 
107 Brigham, ‘Principles in the Determination of Boundaries,’ 202. 
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advanced regions, which shade off into penumbras of spheres of interest, spheres of 
influence, protectorates and buffer states.”108
Although the terms ‘frontiers’ and ‘boundaries’ were used interchangeably, 
Brigham was quite clear that the concept of linear ‘boundaries’ was already well-
established: “Boundaries as we know them, as the schoolboy learns them, strict lines 
of separation are therefore features of maturing civilisation, with growing densities 
and increasing pressures on natural resources.”
 
109 The last stage of development was 
the ‘ideal’ boundary which is permanently fixed and “at the same time of diminished 
importance save for the convenience of administration.”110 Writing in 1919, 
Brigham’s ‘ideal’ boundaries as permanently fixed was self-admittedly a product of 
the post-war environment: “If victory had rested with the enemy, we well know on 
what principles boundaries would have been drawn. Victory being where it is, just 
and rational boundaries, we may safely hope, will safeguard peace in our time.”111 For 
British imperial interests in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 
terminology ‘boundaries’ or ‘frontiers’ was less important than their characteristic of 
being a complete and definite line, clearly dividing what was British from what was 
not. Zonal forms of political separation were less civilised, unclear and indefensible, 
leaving room for multiple claims and prone to territorial conflict.112
Within the American vocabulary during the same period, the terminological 
distinction between boundary and frontier was much more pronounced.
  
113
                                                 
108 Brigham, ‘Principles in the Determination of Boundaries,’ 202. 
 In his 
influential 1928 work The New World, the American political geographer Isaiah 
Bowman related to Holdich’s notion of a boundary as a line of defence:  
109 Brigham, ‘Principles in the Determination of Boundaries,’ 202. 
110 Brigham, ‘Principles in the Determination of Boundaries,’ 201. 
111 Brigham, ‘Principles in the Determination of Boundaries,’ 203. 
112 Perhaps contrary to popular perception, colonial boundaries in Africa had a pacifying affect in some 
local areas, as was the case with the Hausa along the Niger-Nigeria boundary. In his work on the 
division of Hausaland, William Miles quoted a Yekuwa farmer who said: “When the Europeans came, 
they split the country, but pacified it. There was no more war, no more slavery. Just peace.” W.F.S. 
Miles Hausaland Divided: Colonialism and Independence in Nigeria and Niger (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1994), 75. This sentiment may not have been shared across the whole of Africa but 
provides a relevant local context in contrast to some of the more generalised notions about African 
boundaries that will be examined in more depth in Chapter 6. 
113 J. Reeves, ‘International Boundaries’ American Journal of International Law 38, no. 4 (1944): 533-
545. 533. 
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Vague general frontier zones are now the exception rather than the rule. A 
line of defense must be defined exactly and of course it must be reasonably 
regular.114
Yet Bowman brought a touch of realism to his discussion of boundaries. While 
recognising that there was a range of human geographical factors that influenced 
boundary positioning and that would overlap boundaries, Bowman felt these factors 
should not affect the linear and stable nature of the boundary as a line. 
 
But when a line is to be run it must run upon the ground; that is it must be 
definite and continuous. It cannot alter its position with every minor 
circumstance. It must have the advantages, even while recognizing the 
defects, of the broad and the general.115
Bowman associates the term ‘frontier’ with a vague zone, but the term 
‘frontier’ itself had a much more pronounced meaning in the North American 
historical narrative. Not only did it differ from the legal understanding of linear 
boundaries agreed through bilateral treaties, the ‘frontier’ was not static and came to 
be seen as a shifting region or area that was unsettled, undeveloped and ‘destined’ to 
be integrated into the American nation. In his well-known 1893 Frontier Thesis, 
Frederick Jackson Turner defined the frontier as the progressing edge of settlement or 
“the hither edge of free land.”
 
116 Turner saw the frontier as an “organic perimeter in a 
constant state of motion, leaving behind in its wake a succession of marginal zones 
demarcated by particular modes of social occupance and economic activity.”117 It was 
the historical experience of the “primitive conditions on the continually advancing 
frontier line” that Turner linked with what he saw as the development of America’s 
unique brand of democracy.118
With such a distinct understanding of the ‘frontier’, it is in the American 
context that Jones believed the separation between the terms ‘boundary’ and ‘frontier’ 
became pronounced in their English usage.
 
119
                                                 
114 I. Bowman, The New World: Problems in Political Geography (London: George G. Harrap & Co 
Ltd., 1928), 31. 
 As Turner suggested: “The American 
frontier is sharply distinguished from the European frontier – a fortified boundary line 
115 Bowman, The New World, 32. 
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running through dense populations… The term is an elastic one, and for our purposes 
does not need sharp definition.”120
French tradition 
 As noted in Chapter 1, the Louisiana Purchase may 
have set a linear territorial limit or ‘boundary’ that provided the necessary title to U.S. 
territory in 1803, but the American ‘frontier’ came to be determined by settlement and 
enshrined in the collective American cultural imagination as an advancing area where 
the individual (or ‘frontiersman’) could not yet rely on the trappings of fixed state 
administration.  
Sahlins argues that the French linguistic distinction between boundaries (limites) and 
frontiers (frontières) dates from the late thirteenth century with the frontiers of the 
kingdom becoming distinct from jurisdictional boundaries.121 Territorial expansion in 
the following three centuries meant that France needed new arguments to justify its 
claims. By the early modern period, some French boundaries were well marked, but 
most of the French borderlands constituted a jumbled of “incoherent provinces” with 
disputed jurisdictions.122 As a result of this confused set of French frontiers, the 
concept of ‘natural frontiers’ emerged in the seventeenth century. Lucien Febvre 
noted that “the limit or demarcation line between lands recognizing separate 
authorities tend to become more precise at the same time as it becomes more 
simplified through the elimination of the many ‘enclaves’ and ‘exclaves’ which make 
it irregular, the frontière is organised according one or more lines which refer to it 
alone…”123
While Cardinal Richelieu is credited with famously proclaiming that nature 
had traced the limits of the French state (bounded by the Atlantic, the Rhine, the Alps 
and the Pyrenees), Zeller believed that this rhetoric may have been more propaganda 
to give Richelieu’s policy a public goal than the actual driving concept of French 
foreign policy.
 
124 Sahlins reviews Zeller’s arguments that the ‘natural frontiers’ 
concept was the “offspring of cartography” of the time which stylised mountains and 
rivers respectively as distinct chains and lines.125
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purported goal of French policy in the seventeenth century, France was negotiating 
jurisdictional settlements that were beginning to draw distinct boundaries on the 
ground.126 Most notably was Article 42 of 1659 Peace of the Pyrenees between 
France and Spain which called for the Pyrenees to form the “division of the two 
kingdoms”. At face value this description of the Pyrenees may not appear to be linear, 
but when understood in reference to the hyper-stylised depiction of mountain ranges 
in contemporary cartography of the time, it is likely that the diplomatic understanding 
was to have essentially a linear boundary between the respective territories along a 
line of watershed.127
While some of these agreements in the seventeenth century called for 
demarcation of boundaries, Sahlins argues that the complete shift from ‘natural 
frontiers’ to ‘natural boundaries’ did not appear until the eighteenth century.
 
128 This 
may have been a linguistic shift, but in practical application it was understood by the 
eighteenth century that boundary lines on the ground were necessary for efficient 
administration. Specifically, the French government believed that clear boundaries 
were essential for state administration and especially to settle local jurisdictional 
disputes.129 Sahlins cites the actions of the French foreign minister Bonneval in 1772 
who sent commissioners out to “purge the kingdom of foreign enclaves” and outlined 
that delimitation of territorial boundaries (limites) was essential to “suppress 
enclaves”, facilitate communication, end disputes among frontier inhabitants and give 
the French government the ability to combat “desertion and smuggling.”130
By the time of the French revolution in 1789, les limites naturelles had gained 
further intellectual support by French natural law theorists, most notably Rousseau 
and Carnot, in relation to self defence. Pounds believes that natural law theorists 
rejected the notion of expanding state territory through conquest as Montesquieu 
 For the 
French, there could be no clearer (and easily defensible) linear boundary than one 
following a river or along a mountain range, and this was reflective in the practice of 
negotiating and delimiting ‘les limites naturelles’. 
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argued in 1748 that each state had ‘limites naturelles’ for the purpose of defence and 
states could only expand out to these limites.131 After the French revolution, Carnot 
advocated that changes to a state’s frontiers by force were only justified by security 
concerns (and by the acquiescence of inhabitants), since he felt that natural law 
directed a state to defend itself.132 Carnot believed that France was allowed to expand 
to her “limites anciennes et naturelles…le Rhin, Les Alpes et les Pyrénées,”133
Lucien Febvre also believed that the evolution from zonal to linear divisions 
between political entities must be viewed in association with the defence of the state 
along a line.
 but the 
growth of French imperial power in the early eighteenth century meant that the 
defensive characteristics of these limites became less important, superseded by 
territorial expansion.  
134 However, Febvre noted that after the French Revolution “the various 
countries are [sic] tending to unite within limits that are increasingly strictly 
defined.”135 Even prior to the French Revolution, that link between boundaries and 
defence in the French tradition was beginning to wane. As Sahlins points out, by 1775 
the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs had assumed responsibility for boundary 
issues from the war ministry and created departments to negotiate and demarcate 
boundaries.136
Within contemporary French scholarship, the term ‘frontière’ is now treated as 
functionally equivalent to the English terms ‘boundary’ and ‘border’, which Foucher 
believes provides a less restrictive scope for studying other political aspects of 
borderland regions.
 Defining boundaries through negotiation rather than brute force may 
have been partly the result of weakening French power, but placing responsibility for 
boundary definition within the realm of diplomacy rather than war-making reveals a 
paradigm shift towards respecting the territorial sovereignty (and legal personality) of 
neighbouring states. 
137
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both convey that, whatever the term used (and in English both Prescott and House 
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among others make it clear that the term is ‘boundary’)138
Alongside the position of linear boundaries as the narrowing division of 
territorial states within European political developments through modernity was the 
significance of technological advancements in the field of cartography. Linear 
boundaries were part of modern cartography that Raffestin argues gave expression to 
the compositions of political space: “Cette cartographie a privilégié une ‘syntaxe’ 
euclidienne qui n’a certainement pas peu contribué a modeller les comportements du 
pouvoir.”
, the division between 
modernity’s territorial states is a linear construct.  
139 This syntax included three foundational elements, the plane, the line and 
the point, allowing state actions to be planned and coordinated.140 Over a century 
earlier, Ratzel had observed that “the mathematical precision of boundaries is a 
special characteristic of higher civilisation; the progress of geodesy and cartography 
have permitted the making in Europe of political boundaries as well as geographical 
abstractions.”141
In fact, beyond just being part of the Euclidean syntax of modern cartography, 
Thomas Holdich remarked at the height of imperial boundary-making in 1916 that the 
survey of boundaries formed the very “basis for future map making on either side (of 
the boundary).”
 
142 One of the first and most popularised example of this was the 
1763-1782 Mason-Dixon survey of the boundary between the colonies of Maryland 
and Pennsylvania that served as the geodetic basis for later mapping.143 So not only 
was the linear definition of territory politically and economically expedient on the 
ground, it also coincided with technological advances in the perceptions of space that 
privileged the two-dimensional understanding of territory.144
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critical element when comparing the two demarcation practices in the historical 
narrative of the DRC-Zambia boundary and will be examined in greater detail within 
chapters 4 and 5. 
 
Boundary-making processes or practices?      
 
Having distinguished the three characteristics of a boundary as it became cemented in 
the lexicon of the territorial state model of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, it is necessary to identify those practices related directly to boundary-
making. To use an appropriately modernist analogy, if boundary was held to be the 
conceptual product, what processes were put in place to ‘make’ that product? This 
takes a warning from Lefebvre who argues in The Production of Space that analysis 
of a product should entail examination of both the raw materials and labour used in its 
production. While the product may be completely different from its constituent parts, 
analysis of the product itself yields traces of the original raw materials.145 However, 
Lefebvre warns that the labour used in the production process is often forgotten, 
leading to the product being “fetishised” and implications drawn based only on the 
constituent materials.146 Lefebvre recommends that to understand the true nature of an 
object, it is necessary to return to its “genesis and the development of its meaning.”147
At the core of his thinking on the production of space, Lefebvre applies this 
thinking to the analogy of a civic monument which has an inherent “creative 
capacity” that cannot be attributed simply to the specific dates that the monument was 
commissioned or built (aspects of command aspect), or to the moment when an 
organisation requested the monument (aspects of demand).
 
148 While these aspects of 
command and demand may involve anthropological factors, Lefebvre concludes that 
no specific individual or group can be pinpointed as being “culturally responsible for 
production itself: such responsibility may be attributed only to a social reality capable 
of investing a space – capable given the resources (productive forces, technology and 
knowledge, means of labour etc.) of producing that space.”149
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 For Lefebvre, the production of space, as a social reality, should not be 
approached as an inventory of things in space, but as a discourse about space.150 The 
symbolism that often imbues things makes this difficult. Lefebvre states that at the 
primitive level in the history of space, early “demarcations” and markers of hunters 
and nomads would become “memorized, designated and invested with symbolism” 
and “Thus mental and social activity impose their own meshwork upon nature’s 
space, upon the Heraclitean flux of spontaneous phenomena, upon the chaos that 
precedes the advent of the body.”151 Given the above discourse, the territorial state 
model being exported to Africa in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by 
the European powers was conceived as a legal person with a defined territorial ‘body’ 
based on boundaries that were fixed, bilateral and linear. This might be seen as 
illustrative of Lefebvre’s point in the history of space when “the production of space 
which is expressly industrial in nature – a space in which reproducibility, repetition 
and the reproduction of social relationships are deliberately given precedence over 
works, over natural reproduction, over nature itself, over natural time.”152
It is this point in Lefebvre’s history of space where my research seeks to 
engage in the reproducibility of boundaries. As distinct ‘products’ of modernity, 
boundaries required a system or process through which they could be reproduced. The 
two best known and most cited works on boundary-making processes are Paul de la 
Pradelle’s 1928 work La Frontière
 
153 and Stephen Jones 1945 Boundary-Making154, 
both produced rather late in modernity but reflected prior practices. Taking a 
distinctly legalistic approach, Foucher argues that De la Pradelle viewed the boundary 
as essential for the stability of legal jurisdiction: “(it is) the objective and static reality 
of the boundary that permits the jurisdictional discipline.”155 Likewise, De la 
Pradelle’s work provided a reductive look at the system through which a boundary 
was produced, through the stages of preparation, decision and execution.156
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 Jones’ 
systematic boundary-making process from his 1945 work Boundary-Making was 
heavily influenced by De la Pradelle’s work, but his terminology has been more 
151 Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 117. 
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influential throughout subsequent scholarship and state practice so the focus will be 
more on his understanding of boundary-making.157
 Kristof criticised the systematic boundary-making advocated by de la Pradelle 
as pursuing boundaries in an objective sense and advocated instead that boundaries 
should be addressed as subjective.
 Jones established four stages of 
boundary-making including the allocation of territory where sovereignty over the 
territory is determined, delimitation of a boundary through a legal text or map, 
demarcation as the marking of the boundary on the physical landscape and 
administration of the boundary. 
158
Rumley and Minghi explain that “One of the limitations of previous research 
is that it has tended to be overly descriptive and classificatory, preferring to pursue a 
conceptually narrow approach which has been primarily concerned with physical 
artefacts (for example, boundary markers).”
 The impact of Kristof’s warning to avoid a 
technical or mechanistic approach to boundary practices without critique of those 
actual practices, can be seen in the first of two tendencies of more contemporary 
political geography discourses when approaching boundary-making. First, given the 
emphasis in early boundary scholarship towards categorisation, the vocabulary of 
boundary-making practices has tended be used retrospectively, as an analytical gauge; 
measuring the ‘development’ of boundaries as distinct products, rather than 
examining the practices themselves. Second, if not cast as an analytical gauge, the 
objective approach at the other end of the spectrum has tended to fuse the two most 
important boundary-making practices, delimitation and demarcation, into a single 
systematic production. This makes it difficult to isolate demarcation as a practice 
itself, rather than simply as a stage within a single technical production.  
159 This is perhaps a residual practice of 
early British boundary scholars who debated the respective merits of specific 
boundary types, such as the functionality of rivers as boundaries160 or Curzon’s 
advocacy of mountain crests as boundaries.161
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hallmark of Whittemore Boggs’ 1940 work International Boundaries162, and, 
although more sympathetic to historical contexts, so were the categories outlined by 
Richard Hartshorne.163
Boundaries are therefore an essential element of the modern world economy. 
But the process of boundary making is different in various sections of the 
world economy.
 Even contemporary political geography tends to place 
boundary-making into this retrospective restriction. For example, Taylor and Flint 
hold that as divisions of sovereign states: 
164
Problematically, they outline the “process of boundary making” by using Jones’ 1959 
five concepts of boundary: natural, national, contractual, geometrical and power-
political.
 
165
Similarly, when the boundary-making terms ‘delimitation’ and ‘demarcation’ 
are cited, they are used descriptively: a boundary is delimited by treaty x or was 
demarcated in year x. This can be seen especially in the more encyclopaedic boundary 
works such as the works by Brownlie and Biger.
 Jones does not explicitly refer to these five concepts as distinct categories 
but he does use them to differentiate individual political and geographical contexts of 
boundaries. Why Taylor and Flint did not describe ‘boundary-making’ using the terms 
and concepts in Jones’ 1945 work of the very same title is not clear. However, their 
choice to describe the active “process of boundary-making” with those five 
descriptive concepts of boundaries again reflects the tendency to approach boundaries 
retrospectively, with language that is descriptive and exclusive (for example: a 
specific boundary is either geometrical or natural), rather than looking at the actual 
practices of boundary-making.  
166
                                                 
162 S.W. Boggs, International Boundaries: a Study of Boundary Functions and Problems (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1940). 
 Given the political, cultural and 
geographical uniqueness and diverse history of each boundary, it is understandable 
that this approach provides a useful tool for analysing historical empiricism across a 
number of specific contexts. However, using the terms of boundary-making simply as 
163 R. Hartshorne, 1936 ‘Titles and abstracts of papers St. Louis 1935: Suggestions on the terminology 
of international boundaries’ Annals of the Association of American Geographers 26, no. 1 (1936): 56-
57.  
164 Taylor and Flint, Political Geography, 162. 
165 Jones, ‘Boundary concepts in the setting of place and time.’ 
166 Such as Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty; I. Brownlie, African Boundaries: A legal and 
diplomatic encyclopaedia (London: C. Hurst, 1979); G. Biger, ed., The Encyclopaedia of International 
Boundaries (New York: Facts on File, 1995). 
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analytical tools is reactive to the practices that actually occurred during boundary-
making and makes it difficult to address them within specific contexts.  
The tendency is to succumb to Lefebvre’s warning about looking at the 
production of space simply as an inventory of things (boundary treaties and 
demarcation pillars). Kristof’s warning does not reflect the inter-temporality of both 
De la Pradelle and Jones’ works which were both intended to be distinctly objective 
as describing the ‘ideal’ systems of boundary-making. Taken as ‘ideal’ objective 
systems, the constituent raw materials of a boundary appear to be easily discerned 
within the individual stages: allocation – sovereignty, delimitation – legal texts such 
as treaties or exchange of notes, and demarcation – boundary pillars, marks, fencing 
or vistas.167 This is the popularised view of the ideal sequence of boundary-making; 
that the combination of these raw materials, usually in that order, yields a boundary as 
a discrete product.168 However, even Jones was quick to point out that his 1945 work 
was intended to provide guidelines, and that the practices, particularly of delimitation 
and demarcation, did not always follow in discrete succession.169
Perhaps in response to what appears to be a de-contextualised system of 
boundary-making, more contemporary political geography has given short shrift to 
these processes by often conflating the terms. Within their warning about 
containerisation of the territorial trap as introduced in Chapter 1, Agnew and 
Corbridge describe boundaries as being “defined and demarcated.”
 
170 More tellingly 
is the quote from Newman also cited in Chapter 1 concerning the recent shift towards 
‘bordering’: “Any attempt, therefore, to create a methodological and conceptual 
framework for the understanding of boundaries must be concerned with the process of 
‘bordering’, rather than simply with the means through which physical lines of 
separation are delimited and demarcated.”171
                                                 
167 Jones briefly indicates that demarcation be followed by maintenance, which entails the maintenance 
of the physical boundary marks or tracks. From Jones’ methodology this can be seen as a separate 
process within boundary-making, but from the theoretical lens used in this work it can be conceived as 
a continuation of demarcation since it entails keeping the boundary visibly known on the physical 
landscape. 
 From this continual compressing of 
‘delimitation and demarcation’ into an almost inextricable relationship, it might be 
168 Curzon, Frontiers. 51; M.I. Glassner and H.J. de Blij Systematic Political Geography (New York: 
Wiley, 1989), 80; R. Muir, Modern Political Geography, Second edition (London: MacMillan, 1981), 
130; Thomas, 1994. 94.  
169 Jones, Boundary-Making, 5 and 165. 
170 Agnew and Corbridge, Mastering Space, 95. 
171 D. Newman, ‘From the International to the Local in the Study and Representation of Boundaries: 
Theoretical and Methodological Comments’ in Holding the Line: Borders in a Globalized World eds. 
H. Nicol and I. Townsend-Gault (Vancouver: University of British Colombia Press, 2005), 400. 
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inferred that boundary-making is a single production system. This is highly 
problematic in that it conflates the small scale, ‘high’ political/strategic practices 
related to delimitation with the large scale and localised practices related to 
demarcation. It is possible to see how boundary studies has been associated with the 
territorial trap and how demarcation practices have been masked by the shadow of the 
high political relationship between abutting sovereign territorial ‘persons.’ 
Jones’ boundary-making must not be considered simply as a single production 
system with compartmentalised raw materials, but as distinct practices of their own. 
What are outlined above as the ‘raw materials’ of a single boundary-making process 
(e.g. treaties, boundary pillars), are in fact elements created through their own 
practices. These practices are often intertwined and certainly influence one another, to 
a greater or lesser extent depending on their historical contexts. However, reducing 
them to the role of stages within a single boundary-making system overlooks 
distinctive aspects of the ‘labour’ involved in the ‘production’ cycle. Victor Prescott 
tries to get around this deterministic view of boundary-making by breaking it into 
what he calls three notions of boundary ‘evolution.’ This includes evolution of 
definition, evolution in position and evolution in functions applied at the boundary,172
Delimitation and demarcation 
 
which effectively integrates Jones’ processes of demarcation and delimitation. 
Prescott’s use of the term ‘evolution’ can be inferred somewhat problematically as a 
developmental advancement, but my approach takes a cue from this approach since it 
suggests that boundary-making includes performed practices, rather than categorical 
descriptions. 
In order to avoid using boundary-making simply as an analytical tool, and to see how 
it is not a single system made up of finite stages but a collection of overlapping but 
distinct practices, my approach to boundary-making concentrates on how the 
boundary becomes known through geographic scales. As mentioned above, the 
process of boundary delimitation according to Jones is the choice of a boundary site 
and the legal definition of the boundary, usually in verbal terms within a treaty text or 
as depicted on a map.173
                                                 
172 Prescott, Political Frontiers and Boundaries, 63-68. 
 In some cases, delimitation of a boundary may emerge 
173 Jones, Boundary-Making, 57; Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa, 228; B.L. Thomas, ‘International 
boundaries: Lines in the sand (and the sea)’ in Reordering the World: Geopolitical Perspectives on the 
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through a gradual process of mutual recognition or prescription, but Shaw indicates 
that this was not the case with African boundaries that were delimited largely by 
European treaties.174
Boundaries produced through the practice of delimitation by treaty alone are 
made known only to the two neighbouring sovereigns as legally-binding, textual or 
cartographic abstractions. Knowledge of the boundary produced through delimitation 
alone is privileged on numerous levels and may only be communicated to borderland 
populations through unilateral exercises of state control. Only those who could access 
the treaty documents (e.g. government officials), read the language of the treaty text 
and/or understand the cartographic representation are able to ‘know’ the boundary and 
actuate it on Newman’s “functional continuum” through acts of control.
 
175
 Based on a term originally elucidated in 1897 by Henry McMahon, Jones 
described demarcation as the physical marking of a boundary on the ground, usually – 
but not always – prefaced by delimitation.
 Sack’s 
understanding of territory can be discerned in social practices on the land (economic 
and political) that flow from delimitation since knowledge of a boundary location 
becomes more certain depending on the level of state activity (e.g. direct control). But 
these do not always conform to the three characteristics of boundaries and do not 
necessarily coincide with the geographic area where a state is ‘entitled’ to assert direct 
control. Boundaries have another unique practice that can best be understood as the 
link between delimitation and the practices of direct control; a practice that physically 
defines the boundary at the lived geographic scale (on the ground) and helps facilitate 
the resultant state activity. 
176 The boundary produced through the 
practice of demarcation is made known very differently, along the physical landscape 
through the establishment of visible markers or visible geographic features. This 
remains privileged knowledge (being visible and requiring an understanding of the 
consequences of crossing), but less so than in delimitation. In spite of Holdich’s 
determination in 1916 that demarcation was “the crux of all boundary-making,”177
                                                                                                                                            
Twenty-First Century eds. G. Demko and W.B. Wood (Boulder, CO and Oxford: Westview, 1994), 94; 
Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law Fifth Edition, 122. 
 
most boundary scholarship has endorsed the notion that delimitation precedes 
174 Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa, 230. 
175 Newman, ‘From the International to the Local in the Study and Representation of Boundaries,’ 400. 
176 Jones, Boundary-Making, 165; Donaldson and Williams, 2008. 684. 
177 Holdich, Political Frontiers and Boundary Making, 179. 
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delimitation.178 However, they have also been keen to stress, as did Jones himself, 
that when using the terms to assess the historical context of a specific boundary, they 
may not have occurred in systematic order.179 Most importantly, I have examined the 
terms used by Jones in greater detail with Alison Williams and we conclude that as a 
self-titled ‘guidebook,’ his 1945 work Boundary-Making was intended as “an ideal 
guide for making and adjusting future boundaries, not simply as a framework on 
which existing boundaries could be analysed.”180
The conflation of ‘delimitation and demarcation’ by some in political 
geography makes it difficult to isolate demarcation as the act of making a boundary 
‘known’ locally, from the high political and diplomatic performances of delimitation. 
This makes it difficult to discern the actual practices of boundary-making from the 
small scale understanding of territorial state model (the territorial trap). Although 
visibly known, demarcation of a boundary predicated on legally binding delimitation 
takes a very different form from the visible, defensive barriers of early imperial 
practice such as the Great Wall of China or Hadrian’s Wall. Imperial Rome may not 
have seen its external, territorial limits as boundaries with neighbouring socio-
political entities, but modern demarcation does have roots in Roman internal 
administrative practice with legal title preceding property marking: “taking the idea 
from private property and the exact knowledge necessary of the confines of a private 
holding of land.”
 
181 Reeves points out that Roman worship of the god Terminus 
developed from the understanding that tampering with the boundary stones of 
someone else’s private property would incur supernatural penalty.182
Today, the fencing and barriers that have been built along many international 
boundaries
 
183
                                                 
178 Glassner and de Blij, Systematic Political Geography, 80; McEwen, International Boundaries of 
East Africa, 42-43; J.R.V. Prescott, The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries (London: Hutchinson 
& Co, 1965), 70; Prescott, Political Frontiers and Boundaries; Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa, 248 
 may appear as ‘demarcation’, but they are usually unilateral methods of 
administration erected within sovereign territory. These may influence activity along 
and across a boundary, but they usually do not mark precisely where the territorial 
179 Jones, Boundary-Making, 5; I. Brownlie, African Boundaries: A Legal and Diplomatic 
Encyclopaedia (London: C. Hurst and Co. 1979), 4; Donaldson and Williams, ‘Delimitation and 
demarcation,’ 688. 
180 Donaldson and Williams, ‘Delimitation and demarcation,’ 688. 
181 Reeves, ‘International boundaries,’ 534. 
182 Reeves, ‘International boundaries,’ 534. 
183 See especially J.W. Donaldson, ‘Fencing the line: analysis of the recent rise in security measures 
along disputed and undisputed boundaries’ Global Surveillance and Policing: Borders, Security, 
Identity eds. E. Zureik and M.B. Salter (Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 2005). 
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sovereignty of a state ends; the division to two legal persons. 184
These concepts of how a boundary is known will re-emerge throughout the 
historical narrative of demarcation along the DRC-Zambia boundary in understanding 
what issues influenced knowledge of the boundary becoming less privileged. Moving 
beyond the process of delimitation, whereby the legal abstraction of the boundary is 
known to respective ‘sovereigns’, the focus of this work is on how the knowledge of 
the boundary exposed through demarcation was illustrative of a very strict vision of 
two dimensional territory; of sovereignty fused to land. In the preliminary remarks to 
his review of the boundaries in East Africa, A.C. McEwen noted: “Human importance 
attached to territorial ownership needs little demonstration and, as the value of land 
increases, the need for greater precision in determining the extent of territory becomes 
more apparent.”
 Nevertheless, control 
is certainly not absent from any discussion of boundary demarcation, since boundary 
pillars are visual symbols of where a state can assert its control and in turn may 
influence (indirectly) social activity along the boundary. The residual effects of the 
boundary on the landscape in terms of both direct and indirect control enters into the 
‘borders’ and bordering discourse which will emerge later in this work. However, at 
this point it detracts from focusing the conceptual lens here on those practices that are 
unique to the boundary. 
185 Similarly, in one of Prescott’s early assertions, he said that it is 
“meaningless to consider the boundary outside the context of the flanking state 
areas.”186 More importantly, he suggested “it is possible to draw from the nature of 
demarcation certain inferences about the nature of state functions and the relations 
between separated states.”187
1. the states may not feel it necessary, or “of high financial priority” 
as was the case in some colonial contexts 
 If a boundary is or was not demarcated, Prescott offers 
three suggestions: 
                                                 
184 There are a few exceptions in current international practice. Malaysia and Thailand have bilaterally 
erected a security fence along their land boundary across the Malay Peninsula that also marks the 
boundary. Previously both states had erected two separate fences/walls and it was discovered that the 
area between the two (a ‘stateless space’) became a corridor for smuggling. The boundary fence along 
the Botswana-Namibia boundary also marks the land boundary in some sections. This fence was 
erected as a veterinary barrier to prevent the spread of livestock diseases (foot-and-mouth especially) 
from one state to the other. 
185 McEwen, International Boundaries of East Africa, 4. 
186 Prescott, The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries, 90. 
187 Prescott, The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries, 92. 
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2. the exact boundary position may be in dispute, or there may be 
military positions in the border landscape 
3. the difficult physical environment dissuades demarcation which 
may be regarded as unnecessary for security or not financially 
viable.188
It is the influence of the ‘value of land’ in the process of demarcation that will be 
exposed most clearly in the context of the DRC-Zambia boundary, through both the 
colonial and post-independent periods. It will reveal how land is not simply an inert 
canvas on which lines are drawn, but an active participant in demarcation practices. 
The goal of this research is to examine how some social contexts influenced 
demarcation methodology along the DRC-Zambia boundary, while others did not. 
The progression from legal abstraction to visually demarcated line will expose some 
of the prejudices of the territorial state model imposed through colonial practice, 
especially the influence of economic resources. To achieve this, it was necessary to 
understand the DRC-Zambia boundary demarcation not as part of a systematic 
production, but as a historical narrative that can be exposed to contemporary critique. 
 
At the very outset of their work on regional border landscapes, Rumley and 
Minghi suggest that the study of international boundaries has “traditionally tended to 
be more concerned with the international scale,” remarking that “as a de jure 
expression of the spatial ‘limits of state power, the location of international political 
boundaries has been subject to changes in that power with resultant conflict between 
and within states.”189
Alternatively, more contemporary theoretical studies on bordering practices 
have taken a more ‘bottom-up’ approach, beginning with the large-scale narratives on 
the ground and critiquing the real or imagined exercises of power at a variety of 
 This is a key criticism of ‘traditional’ boundary studies and 
international law’s approach to boundaries, that not only is the boundary viewed from 
a technically objective sense but that it is only seen as the product of a single, specific 
level of political interaction (inter-state). Within this approach, the demarcation 
practice can be cast as a technical exercise unworthy of greater analysis since the 
central decisions on boundary definition (the object) were completed at delimitation, 
between the most immediately apparent power players.  
                                                 
188 Prescott, The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries, 92-93. 
189 D. Rumley and J. Minghi, eds., The Geography of Border Landscapes (London: Routledge, 1991), 
2. 
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geographic, political and social scales. As explained in Chapter 1, a deficiency of the 
contemporary theoretical approach is that the boundary itself (as a fixed, linear and 
bilateral construct) is often treated as a preconceived idea and associated exclusively 
with that single level of political power interaction. Here the tendency has been to cast 
all boundary-making practices in the high-political or diplomatic narratives and 
dismiss demarcation as simply a technical practice.  
Methodologically, my research sought to combine strategies from the 
‘traditional’ legal/technical approaches to boundaries with the contemporary 
theoretical approaches to bordering and borderland studies by focusing on 
demarcation. Demarcation effectively brings the two approaches together, initiating 
with the abstraction of a diplomatically defined line but then materially constructing 
that line through large scale practices on the ground. The objectiveness of a 
legal/technical approach provides the object of the practice, while the subjectiveness 
of theoretical border discourses indicates that the practice can be read and critiqued as 
a narrative. Combining the two approaches avoids the tendency of both to limit 
analysis of boundary practices to a single level of political power relations and to 
discount the narratives of so-called ‘technical’ practices as unworthy of more 
theoretical critique. As the DRC-Zambia narrative will illustrate, demarcation 
involves far more expressions and operations of power with a much broader cast of 
characters through the narrative than the simplified image of diplomats sitting over a 
map with pencil and rulers in hand might convey. 
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3. Recovering narratives of boundary 
demarcation 
 
 
“Memory of the Nation.” 
Sign outside the National Archives of Zambia 
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Introduction          
 
As a distinct practice, I wanted to address demarcation of the DRC-Zambia boundary 
as a historical narrative. Rather than taking an objective course that would be content 
with assembling the ingredients of a single boundary production system, my research 
focuses on the practice itself. The aim is to understand how demarcation actually took 
place in various time periods, and what elements motivated the authorities involved to 
utilise that practice of materially constructing (or not) a boundary on the physical 
landscape; a practice so elemental to territorial governance. In this regard, the DRC-
Zambia boundary demarcation narrative reveals exercises of power from a much 
wider cast of actors than just the relevant diplomats whose names adorn the ratified 
treaties. Who were those actors? What techniques for materially constructing the 
boundary on the physical landscape did they use and why? What influenced their 
particular practice of defining boundaries? 
To achieve this, my research involved two elements. First, in order to recover 
the historical narrative of demarcation the primary material for this study was 
uncovered in four government archives: The National Archives (Kew), Archives of 
the Royal Geographical Society (London), the African Archives of the Belgian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Brussels) and the National Archives of Zambia (Lusaka). 
Second, due to the limitations of material post-1967 in the National Archives of 
Zambia and in order to complete the narrative up to the present day, field work in 
Zambia included interviews with officials responsible for boundary issues and a site 
visit to two boundary pillars. This chapter explains why this methodology was 
appropriate and details the specific methods used in examining the empirical material 
and constructing the historical narrative of demarcation along the DRC-Zambia 
boundary. 
 
Previous use of government archives for boundary research   
 
Approaching archive research from a post-colonial perspective 
Just off Independence Avenue a few blocks away from the central bus station in the 
heart of Lusaka stands a massive, angular statue of a man tearing apart a chain that 
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binds his torso. The Freedom Statue symbolises Zambia’s breaking of the yoke of 
British colonialism and commemorates those who lost their lives during the struggle 
for independence. Less than a mile away, the sign outside the National Archives of 
Zambia on Government Road reads “The Memory of the Nation”, while inside the 
vast majority of material held in the archives is from the eight decades of British 
administrative rule (1884-1964) rather than the forty years since Zambian 
independence. These symbols reflect the tension in many post-independence African 
states between the desire for statehood identity and the administrative heredity of 
colonialism. In few areas is this subject more abrasive than in the relationship 
between post independent African states and the colonial boundaries that still define 
their territorial extent. 
 The concept of ‘memory’ in relation to government archives has been the 
subject of intense debate in recent years. As the sign outside the Zambian National 
Archives indicates, government archives are intended to preserve the administrative 
‘memory’ of a defined political entity, but whose ‘memory’ is being retained in the 
archive material? What stories are retained as constituting ‘memory’ and what stories 
are discounted? Until relatively recently, government archives have been seen as the 
neutral venue for the retention of administrative record, as “archivists and their 
materials seem to be the very antithesis of power.”1 However, this perspective 
changed dramatically in the last two decades of the twentieth century as the archives 
have come to be seen inherently as a site of power. In his etymology of the term 
‘archive’ from the Greek ‘arkheion’, Derrida reflects on the concept of archive within 
the codification of political power into law2 and on the concept of archives as 
providing presupposed assurances of “a closed heritage.”3
Schwartz and Cook encapsulate this new perception of power within the 
archive by stating that:  
  
Archives – as records – wield power over the shape and direction of historical 
scholarship, collective memory, and national identity, over how we know 
ourselves as individuals, groups and societies.4
                                                 
1 J.M. Schwartz and T. Cook, ‘Archives, records and power: The making of modern memory’ Archival 
Science 2, no. 1-2 (2002): 1-19. 1-2. 
  
2 J. Derrida, Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 1-2. 
3 Derrida, Archive Fever, 33. 
4 Schwartz and Cook, ‘Archives, records and power: The making of modern memory,’ 2. 
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This has been of particular concern in the post-colonial African context, where the 
power of the colonial archivist has been able to fashion a very specific ‘memory,’ 
preserving some narratives of specific social groups while excluding (in many cases 
deliberately) the narratives of other social groups.5 Ann Laura Stoler argues that: 
“Colonial archives were both sites of the imaginary and institutions that fashioned 
histories as they concealed, revealed, and reproduced the power of the state.”6 In 
attempting to administer one of the largest and geographically disparate empires in 
history, Thomas Richards views archives as the essential administrative technology of 
the British Empire “it was much easier to unify an archive composed of texts than to 
unify an empire made of territory.”7
This operational field of projected total knowledge was the archive. The 
archive was not a building, nor even a collection of texts, but the collectively 
imagined junction of all that was known or knowable, a fantastic 
representation of an epistemological master pattern, a virtual focal point for 
the heterogeneous local knowledge of metropolis and empire.
 Recording comprehensive knowledge of far-
flung imperial ‘territories’ was the ultimate expression of nineteenth-century 
Victorian power, and Richards explains how the very idea of the archive fulfilled an 
imagined utopia of imperial organisation:  
8
Government archives are essential when assembling as complete a narrative as 
possible of boundary practices, because these practices are (and have been) 
monopolised by the ‘sovereign’ power within the territorial state model. In recovering 
a narrative of boundary demarcation practices there are many actors, such as the local 
carriers involved in colonial boundary commissions, whose individual stories have 
been excluded from the written record. These perspectives would form their own 
insightful narratives, but as the focus here is to use demarcation practice as a lens to 
view the relationship between state and territory. Therefore, it is those operations of 
power captured by the colonial archives that are of greatest interest. It is precisely 
because government archives provide the ‘memory’ of the ‘state’ (probably a more 
 
                                                 
5 Cheryl McEwan has examined this especially in relation to the exclusion of female narratives in 
South African archival records. C. McEwan, ‘Building a post-colonial archive? Gender, collective 
memory and citizenship in post-apartheid South Africa’ Journal of Southern African Studies 29, no. 3 
(2003): 741-759. 
6 A.L. Stoler, ‘Colonial archives and the arts of governance’ Archival Science 2, no. 1-2 (2002): 87-
109. 97. 
7 T. Richards, The Imperial Archive: Knowledge and the Fantasy of Empire (London: Verson, 1993), 4. 
8 Richards, The Imperial Archive, 11. 
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appropriate term than ‘nation’ in the Zambian context) that they are the appropriate 
place to uncover a narrative of boundary demarcation, to reveal the various operations 
of power, assessing the knowledge that was considered worthy of retention and how it 
was acted upon. As Premesh Lalu states in the preface to his investigation into the 
killing of the Xhosa chief Hinsta by British forces in 1835: “the dismissal of colonial 
records as biased limits the possibilities of understanding the interior logic and effects 
of domination and unnecessarily suggests the possibility of an objective history of the 
event.”9
Certainly government archives cannot provide an absolutely complete 
historical narrative of policy decisions made, exact rationales behind those decisions 
and the precise ways in which they were implemented. They are limited by prejudicial 
issues related to the expression of power by the ‘archons’ or those who decided what 
documentation should be retained. They are also limited by practical issues that have 
affected the materiality of the files, from water damage and wood lice (as at the NAZ) 
to aerial bombardment (as was the case at the National Archives/Public Record Office 
during the Second World War). My research discovered that archival material related 
to boundaries is actually well-placed to avoid issues of relative completeness 
precisely because the perceived ‘sovereign’ character of the subject has made 
documentation related to its practices less likely to be culled or limited by the 
‘archons.’  
 In addition, this research discovered that there are an extraordinary number 
of often over-looked ‘micro-narratives’ captured within the colonial archive that 
contribute to the overall ‘macro-narrative’ of demarcation practice.  
In general, the perceived ‘sovereign’ character of boundaries means that all 
correspondence and reports from a wide range of administrative levels were retained. 
Information related to a boundary issue derived from non-government entities such as 
companies, private individuals and even ‘statements’ from local populations were 
usually retained by government archivists. This was found to be the case particularly 
in relation to the nineteenth-century British imperial obsession with archival 
documentation10
                                                 
9 P. Lalu, ‘The grammar of domination and the subjection of agency: Colonial texts and modes of 
evidence’ History and Theory 9, no. 4 (2000): 45-68. 48. 
 and its later devolved colonial administrations in Africa. The 
importance of geographic survey and its engagement with boundary practices was a 
critical component of the epistemological construct of the British Empire, making the 
10 Richards, The Imperial Archive. 
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archiving of geographic knowledge of the Empire’s remote landscapes an essential 
exercise.11
However, as noted in Chapter 2, ‘traditional’ boundary research into archive 
material has often focused on the end results of boundary-making as a finite system 
rather than as separate discursive practices, and has tended to limit investigation into a 
very specific level of power relationships. My research went beyond the products of 
the demarcation practice to uncover the narrative of that practice. The narrative could 
then be read from a critical perspective, taking one of Jonathan Crush’s four 
suggested elements of writing geography from a post-colonial perspective, that of 
exposing “the character of geographical representation in colonial discourse.”
 From formal inter-state diplomatic correspondence to seemingly minor 
local incidents, documentary material was conveyed to government departments 
precisely because boundaries are, and historically have been, considered of high 
political importance. This has led to huge volumes of retained documentation, much 
of which is duplicated several times at different archives thus providing better chance 
of its relative completeness in the face of material threats. 
12
International law 
 The 
perception of territory by different political actors and through different geographical 
scales is exposed as a key element that both determined and was represented by 
colonial demarcation practices in the historical narrative of the DRC-Zambia 
boundary. It was found that this continues to be reflected in present-day practices. 
With its focus on inter-state relations, the use of archival material has been a core 
method of research in international boundary studies, particularly within international 
law and political geography.13
                                                 
11 When examining Edwin Abbott’s 1884 novel Flatland, Richards explains: “In Flatland, geography, 
unquestionably the queen of all imperial sciences in the nineteenth century, is especially inseparable 
from the domain of official and unofficial state knowledge (in fact, in Flatland as in England all applied 
geography was state policy).” Richards, The Imperial Archive, 14. 
 Archival research has been used in the formal (legal) or 
informal (diplomatic) settlement of boundary disputes. In many cases, land boundary 
disputes arise when an existing boundary that was defined in the past has disappeared 
from the landscape or has multiple interpretations derived from early, ambiguous 
definition. This is often the case with former European colonies or protectorates 
where the international boundaries of the independent states gained recognised 
12 J. Crush, ‘Post-colonialism, De-colonization and Geography’ In A. Godlewska and N. Smith, eds., 
Geography and Empire (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1994), 36-38. 
13 See especially J.R.V. Prescott, The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries (London: Hutchinson 
University Library, 1965), 59-62. 
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definition during the colonial period. In such disputes, the disputant states often seek 
to ‘recover’ the boundary as it was defined at a specific date. This technique involves 
using archive material to gain an understanding of the boundary as it existed at a 
specific moment in time, often referred to as the ‘critical date’ in international 
jurisprudence, or what the International Court of Justice recently called a “photograph 
of the territory.”14
The settlement of many recent boundary disputes in Africa has involved 
research in the archives of the former colonial powers in an attempt to ‘recover’ the 
boundary at a critical date, since this often occurred during the colonial period. This 
has been the case in both adjudicated/arbitrated boundary settlements such as Benin-
Niger (2005), Botswana-Namibia (1999), Chad-Libya (1994) and Eritrea-Ethiopia 
(2002). In all of these cases, the disputant states asked the respective court or tribunal 
to decide the position of the boundary at a specific date, or based on specific treaties 
or maps. For example, Benin and Niger requested the ICJ to define their boundary as 
it existed on their respective dates of independence 1 and 3 August 1960.
 Effectively, the critical date is the occasion when a boundary gains 
legal validity, whether by delimitation treaty, physical demarcation or administrative 
act. 
15 Botswana 
and Namibia requested the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to define their disputed 
boundary in the Chobe river based on the 1 July 1890 Anglo-German treaty and 
relevant international law.16 Article 4 of the 12 December 2000 agreement between 
Eritrea and Ethiopia constituting the boundary commission (as arbitral tribunal) 
requested that the commission be “established with a mandate to delimit and 
demarcate the colonial treaty border based on pertinent colonial treaties (1900, 1902 
and 1908) and applicable international law.”17
                                                 
14 International Court of Justice (ICJ) 2005 Frontier Dispute (Benin/Niger) Judgment, ICJ Reports 
2005. para. 26. 
 Even boundary cases not involving 
post-colonial states have centred on archival materials, such as the 1957 case between 
Belgium and the Netherlands when the two states asked the ICJ to determine 
15 International Court of Justice (ICJ) 2005 Frontier Dispute (Benin/Niger) Judgment, ICJ Reports 
2005. para. 24. 
16 International Court of Justice (ICJ) 1996 Special Agreement between the government of the Republic 
of Botswana and the government of the Republic of Namibia to submit to the International Court of 
Justice the dispute existing between the two states concerning the boundary around Kasikili/Sedudu 
island and the legal status of the island of 29 May 1996. ICJ General List No. 98. Article 1. 
17 Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) 2000 Agreement between the Government of the 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Eritrea. http://www.pca-
cpa.org/upload/files/E-E%20Agreement.html. Article 4. (1 December 2009) 
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sovereignty over parcels of land along their boundary that had been surveyed from 
1836 to 1843.18
Within formal arbitration/adjudication settlement of boundary disputes, 
archive material for boundary recovery usually forms the majority of written 
pleadings presented by the two parties because it contributes a corpus of primary, 
written, documentary evidence. The primacy of the territorial integrity concept and 
the legal mechanism of uti possidetis in the de-colonisation context, reinforced in 
many judgments of the ICJ, instils archival material with a high degree of evidentiary 
value when proving valid title to territory, whether that be examples of actual 
boundary treaties, pillars on the ground or evidence of administrative control 
(sovereign acts). In its now oft-cited decision in the Frontier case between Burkina 
Faso and Mali, the ICJ elucidated succinctly the influence of colonial boundary-
making on post-independent states, stating that: 
 
By becoming independent, a new State acquires sovereignty with the territorial 
base and boundaries left to it by the colonial power. This is part of the 
ordinary operation of the machinery of State succession. International law and 
consequently the principle of uti possidetis applies to the new State (as a State) 
not with retroactive effect, but immediately and from that moment onwards.19
The ICJ’s comment recognises that from an international legal perspective, archival 
material related to boundary delimitation and demarcation has an extra-temporal 
influence. It is of perennial relevance until such time as the two states agree to change 
boundary definition.  
 
Archival material has been widely consulted in settlement negotiations for on-
going boundary disputes throughout Africa outside of adjudication/arbitration, such as 
those currently between Angola-DRC, Sierra Leone-Guinea and DRC-Uganda. In 
March 2007, the DRC accused Angola’s armed forces of occupying eleven Congolese 
villages along their boundary in the Kahemba region. In October 2007, officials from 
both states met with mapping experts from the former colonial powers (Belgium and 
Portugal respectively) in Brussels and resolved the status of ten villages based on 
                                                 
18 International Court of Justice (ICJ) 1957 Case concerning sovereignty over certain Frontier Land 
(Belgium/Netherlands) ‘Special Agreement’ of 7 March 1957, ICJ General List No. 236. 8. Article 1. 
19 International Court of Justice (ICJ) 1986 Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali) Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports 1986. 568. 
Chapter 3 – Recovering narratives of boundary demarcation 
76 
colonial records.20 Similarly, in February 2006 Guinea and Sierra Leone called on 
advisors from their former colonial powers (France and the UK) to review the 1912 
Anglo-French protocol and map of their disputed boundary on the Sierra Leonean 
bank of the Makona river.21 In the 8 September 2007 Arusha Agreement signed by 
the presidents of DRC and Uganda to address their boundary dispute in the Lake 
Albert area, the two states agreed to re-mark the boundary based on the 1915 Anglo-
Belgian boundary agreement and annexed maps.22
Further discourse on the evidentiary value of archival material in adjudicated 
international boundary dispute settlement is well beyond the scope of this thesis, but 
the state-centric bias favouring written and cartographic (in many cases colonial) 
records is clear. This tends to reinforce a perception that boundaries are only related 
to the diplomatic level of inter-state interaction, as in the legal resolution of a dispute 
both states must be considered homogenous legal persons. Archive material presented 
within boundary negotiations or arbitration by one party is under the collective label 
of the ‘state,’ usually without analysing the context of the narrative and the varying 
political and social scales of discourses involved. More importantly, the significance 
of the ‘critical date’ within adjudicated settlement reinforces a systematic approach to 
boundary-making within international law; that there is a finite ‘end’ to a single 
production process, with each stage contributing discreet ingredients into the end 
product. In other words, documentary evidence is used in these contexts to recover 
‘what’ was produced by the critical date rather than how and why it was produced. 
  
Political geography 
This systematic approach to the historical, legal and political lineage of boundaries is 
evident in the well-known encyclopaedic works on boundaries such as: Hertslett’s 
Map of Africa by Treaty23 and Map of Europe by Treaty24 and Brownlie’s African 
Boundaries.25
                                                 
20 G. Selassie, 'Angola and DRCongo Edge Closer towards Resolving Border Dispute' Global Insight 
Daily Analysis, 12 October 2007; 'DR Congo and Angola narrow down border dispute' Agence France 
Presse, 11 October 2007. 
 Similar regional boundary works within political geography such as 
21 I. Seibure, ‘The fate of Yenga still indecisive’ Concord Times (Sierra Leone)/AllAfrica Global Media 
6 February 2006. 
22 Arusha Agreement on Bilateral Cooperation New Vision/All Africa Global Media via COMTEX, text 
published on-line 13 September 2007. Article 3. 
23 E. Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty Vols. I and II (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1894). 
24 E. Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1891). 
25 I. Brownlie, African Boundaries: A Legal and Diplomatic Encyclopaedia (London: C. Hurst & Co., 
1979). 
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McEwen’s International Boundaries of East Africa26 and Prescott’s Map of Mainland 
Asia by Treaty27 provide more historical context for each boundary, although their 
regional scope limits the scope for each individual case. In addition, there is a distinct 
legal emphasis on tracing the historical narratives, in particular highlighting 
deficiencies that create dispute.28
 Anthony Asiwaju reinforces this criticism in the context of African boundary 
studies, arguing that until the more recent ethnographic and anthropological studies of 
borderland populations “scholars engaged in African boundary studies invariably 
confined themselves to diplomatic archives either of the former colonial powers or of 
the African successor-states and to the documentation centres of relevant international 
organisations.”
 These works are good examples of what more 
recent ‘border’ scholarship in political geography refers to as ‘traditional’ boundary 
studies, the distinction made clear in Chapter 1.  
29 He prefaced this criticism by saying that “International law, 
international relations, political geography and diplomatic history are all, by 
definition, studies of states and not of ethnicities or peoples.”30 In his early 1965 work 
The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries, Prescott surmised that research into the 
relationship between boundaries and border landscapes could not be taken in isolation 
from the relationship between the boundary and the state, stating it is “not easy or 
profitable to distinguish the influences of the boundary from the influence of the state 
with which the boundary is drawn.”31 To analyse this relationship in more depth, 
beyond using inferences from secondary resources and particularly in the context of 
inter-state and inter-colonial boundaries, Prescott suggested: “it seems likely that 
more concrete examples will have to be derived from historical studies in political 
geography using first hand material in archives.”32
 More recent border studies have moved away from the systematic approach to 
the boundary-making processes. Although his synonymous use of the terms border 
  
                                                 
26 A.C. McEwen, International Boundaries of East Africa (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971). 
27 J.R.V. Prescott, Map of Mainland Asia by Treaty (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 
1975). 
28 McEwen makes this explicit in his ‘Preliminary Remarks’ when introducing the main body of his 
work: “It undertakes to show the historical background, legal origin, and present legal status of each of 
the fifteen international East African boundaries, and to discuss in detail any disputed or problems 
areas.” McEwen, International Boundaries of East Africa, 6. 
29 A.I. Asiwaju, Partitioned Africans: ethnic relations across Africa’s international boundaries 1884-
1984 (Lagos: University of Lagos Press, 1985), 10. 
30 Asiwaju, Partitioned Africans, 10. 
31 Prescott, The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries, 103. 
32 Prescott, The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries, 103. 
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and boundary provides (perhaps deliberately) an overly broad space for interpretation, 
Anssi Paasi’s approach to the Finnish-Russian boundary rightly suggests that “The 
production of territories, boundaries and their symbolic representations are always 
spatially and historically contingent processes” and emphasises that the “study of 
boundaries should be contextual.”33
   
 Paasi’s approach places this ‘context’ within the 
greater process of nation building, especially in terms of national identity, which 
makes it difficult to translate in the colonial context where issues of ‘national identity’ 
played far less of a role in boundary-making than in Europe. Nevertheless, his 
emphasis on understanding the production of boundaries as contextualised processes 
is instructive in moving away from the systematic view of boundary production. 
 The use of archival material within a systematic or legal/technical 
understanding of boundary ‘production’ does not allow it to be examined as a 
contextual narrative. Instead, the focus is usually on identifying the legally-definitive 
constituent parts of the boundary product such as the wording of delimitation treaties, 
the lines on boundary maps and the agreed results of demarcation. This provides only 
limited insight into the motivations and influences behind boundary-making, and in 
the case of demarcation, those motivations, influences and practice of materially 
marking a boundary on the ground. 
By isolating demarcation as a practice rather than a constituent part of a single 
boundary production system, my research used archival material to construct the 
narrative of demarcation rather than simply to provide the inter-colonial agreements 
or exchanges of notes that were the abstract parts of a single boundary-making 
system. This perpetuates the notion that boundary practices must be approached in the 
context of inter-state power relations, recalling Curzon’s most famous assertion that 
boundaries “are indeed the razor’s edge on which hang suspended the modern issues 
of war or peace, of life or death to nations,”34
                                                 
33 A. Paasi, Boundaries, Territories and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies of the Finnish-
Russian Border (Chichester: J. Wiley and Sons, 1996), 28. 
 as opposed to approaching boundary 
practices as administrative responsibilities involving many other layers of government 
engagement. My concern was not with finding the results of demarcation, lists of 
pillars and documenting map series, but with assembling the story of demarcation: 
34 G.N. Curzon, Frontiers: The Romanes Lecture 1907 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908), 7. 
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why it was undertaken? How it was undertaken and by whom? What influences the 
actual practice of marking a boundary? 
Although the archival material is still drawn largely from colonial government 
records, the narrative of the DRC-Zambia boundary demarcation requires material far 
beyond the inter-colonial “diplomatic” discourse highlighted by Asiwaju. Instead, the 
narrative extends deep within the administrative hierarchy of the state (and empire), 
viewing demarcation as an administrative practice with numerous actors and 
influences functioning at various geographic and political scales. Archive material 
provides evidence of the reasoning behind, and the experience of, the material 
production of boundaries as limits of sovereign (or imperial) territory; the moment 
when the abstract boundary definition becomes ‘known’ on the physical and human 
landscape.  
 
Archive research for boundary research as narrative    
 
Archives consulted and access 
The majority of the empirical research concentrated on document and map material 
found in the following archives: The National Archives (Kew), Archives of the Royal 
Geographical Society (London), the African Archives of the Belgian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (Brussels) and the National Archives of Zambia (Lusaka). While the 
core case study of this work is the boundary between DRC and Zambia, archival 
material relating to several other boundaries of former British colonial territories in 
southern Africa (particularly the former inter-colonial boundaries of Northern 
Rhodesia) was also examined in the National Archives (Kew), the Archives of the 
Royal Geographical Society and the National Archives of Zambia in order to place 
the case study in a regional and temporal context. Research at the African Archives at 
the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs focused exclusively on the 1911-14 and 1927-
33 Anglo-Belgian boundary commissions. 
The National Archives at Kew is the repository for all British government 
documents with material being organised by department. Of particular interest for this 
research was documentation pertaining to inter-colonial boundary commissions, 
especially the two Anglo-Belgian boundary commissions. The departments with files 
that were of interest included: the records of the Foreign Office (FO) the Colonial 
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Office (CO) and records from other departments dealing with boundary commissions 
such as the War Office (WO) and Treasury (T). The National Archives at Kew is 
accessible to anyone who has registered as a reader. Research was undertaken in the 
National Archives on various occasions including September-October 2005, February 
2006 and May 2007.  
The Archives of the Royal Geographical Society with the Institute of British 
Geographers (RGS-IBG) contain a range of map and document material related to 
many British colonial boundary commissions including the relevant Anglo-Belgian 
boundary commissions. Many British boundary commissioners were members of the 
RGS and published articles in the Geographical Journal. Research in the Archives of 
the RGS was undertaken on various occasions in November 2006 and May 2007. The 
African Archives of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Brussels) contains 
material relating to the administration of the Independent State of Congo and the 
colonial administration of the Belgian Congo, 1885-1962. Research in the African 
Archives was undertaken in October 2006. 
The National Archives of Zambia holds the records of the colonial 
administration of Northern Rhodesia, including its administration by the British South 
Africa Company (1891-1924), as Northern Rhodesia under the Colonial Office (1924-
1953), and as part of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953-1963), as well 
as the records of the Zambian government post-1964. Although the National Archives 
of Zambia have a 20 year closure rule, there are very few Zambian government files 
dated after 1973. It is unclear exactly why files have not been transferred to the 
National Archives since that time, although many documents may have been retained 
by government departments. Research was undertaken at the National Archives of 
Zambia during July and August 2007. 
The private archives of the late Sir Stewart Gore-Browne, a member of the 
1911-14 Anglo-Belgian boundary commission on the Belgian Congo-Northern 
Rhodesia boundary, are located in northern Zambia at Sir Stewart Gore-Browne’s 
estate ‘Shiwa N’gandu’. This private archive includes Sir Gore-Browne’s private 
diaries covering his period with the boundary commission, and a number of 
photographs taken during the boundary commission’s time in the field. Sir Gore-
Browne also authored a journal article in 1964 recalling his time with the boundary 
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commission, which proved a valuable secondary source.35 The diaries and 
photographs of his time with the commission may yield a more personalised narrative 
of the boundary commission’s work and perception of their responsibilities. However, 
this material was not considered essential in addressing the research questions since 
Sir Gore-Browne was not the chief British commissioner and therefore did not act as 
the liaison between ‘sovereign’ and ‘boundary’. In addition, with a self-effacing 
manner, Sir Gore-Browne said of his archive material related to the Anglo-Belgian 
boundary commission “I have got diaries I used to keep in Boundary Commission 
days, and a few extracts may be of interest, though the sameness of the entries makes 
them monotonous reading en masse, to anyone but the nostalgic reader.”36
As noted above, contemporary discourses no longer view government archives 
as simply inert spaces. Access to those archives consulted in this research was not 
open to anyone and the restrictions illustrate that clearly archives are still privileged 
spaces with entry requirements. Application for a reader’s pass at both the National 
Archives (Kew) and the British Library includes a formal interview procedure, with a 
battery of questions and stringent identification check. The Archives of the RGS-IBG, 
located in the Foyle Reading Room at its facility in central London, is open to the 
general public (over the age of 16). Registration for non-members of the RGS-IBG 
does require formal identification as well as a recent utility bill (presumably to 
confirm address). Registration is free to all members and fellows of the RGS-IBG, 
and any researchers formally affiliated with an academic institution, but for non-
members the current daily fee for access is £10. Researchers at the African Archives 
of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs are asked to complete a registration card 
including personal details, institutional affiliation and research aim 
(
 
http://www.diplomatie.be/en/archives/archivesdetail.asp?TEXTID=2295). Visits to 
the archive need to be pre-booked, specifying the research question. 
Research access to the National Archives of Zambia for non-Zambian citizens 
requires sponsorship from a Zambian institution and payment of a research fee to the 
National Archives. My research was sponsored by the University of Zambia under its 
research affiliation scheme which required a written application outlining the 
proposed research. This application was forwarded by the University’s Department of 
                                                 
35 S. Gore-Browne, ‘The Anglo-Belgian Boundary Commission: 1911-14’ The Northern Rhodesia 
Journal 5, no. 4 (1964): 315-329. 
36 Gore-Browne, ‘The Anglo-Belgian Boundary Commission,’ 321. 
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Research and Postgraduate Studies to a relevant department (in this case the 
Department of Geography) which endorsed the research and approved the application. 
A separate fee is charged by the University of Zambia for research affiliation for 
external applicants, dependent on the duration of research in Zambia. As required 
under the research affiliation scheme, a copy of this thesis will be forwarded to the 
University of Zambia for inclusion in their library.  
In spite of what the seemingly inviting sign “memory of the nation” may 
suggest, the registration procedures at these archives reinforce the notion that the 
archives themselves are highly restrictive spaces. Certainly protection of the 
substantive nature of the documents requires some form of exit controls at least, but 
the identification checks and complex restrictions on access tend to reinforce the 
notion that archives contain ‘confidential’ information that is potentially politically 
explosive. This is particularly the case with colonial archives where restrictions on 
access, including institutional affiliation and ability to pay the appropriate fees, could 
be inferred as keeping the methodologies of colonial domination ‘top secret.’ Stoler 
remarks that “there remains the shared conviction that such guarded treasures are the 
sites where the secrets of the colonial state are really stored.”37
 
 This is also especially 
true of research into boundary practices because of their association with high level 
political relations rather than being seen as banal administrative responsibilities. 
Organisation of archive material 
Even once inside the archive space the acts of actually searching and requesting 
material are heavily influenced the archivist. While catalogues may be available either 
inside the archives or openly outside via the internet, research is reliant on the 
description of each document or piece. In some archives, such as the African Archives 
at the Belgian Foreign Ministry, the researcher may not have access to the catalogue 
and is therefore totally dependent on the archivist to retrieve material appropriate to 
the subject. The bound catalogues at the National Archives of Zambia are kept at the 
desk of a staff member. These could only be consulted, and documents requested, at 
that staff member’s discretion.   
Boundary-related material appears to have been considered subject-specific by 
government departments and archivists because it was often concentrated in distinct 
                                                 
37 A.L. Stoler, ‘Colonial archives and the arts of governance,’ 90. 
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files within the consulted archives. It is likely this was an effort to make boundary 
material more easily consulted by government officials. Within some British 
government files, all correspondence or information relating to a specific boundary 
from a variety of administrative levels across a defined period of time was collected 
and re-published in a distinct collection, referred to as a ‘Confidential Print’ series. 
For British inter-colonial boundaries in southern Africa, these series tended to 
coincide with a specific boundary dispute or arbitration such as the 1905 Barotseland 
arbitration (FO 881/7552) and the 1898 Marue arbitration (FO 63/1435). However, 
they sometimes related to a particular boundary commission such as the 1899 Anglo-
German boundary commission between Lakes Nyassa and Tanganyika (FO 64/1549). 
Even for boundaries that did not garner a Confidential Print series, the subject-
specific concentration of documents was consistent across the different archives. This 
made it relatively straight-forward to identify relevant files in the various catalogues. 
However, while boundary files were distinct in various catalogues, the geographic 
names used in file titles were very inconsistent. Some files were identified by a 
regional, provincial or local name, rather than by the names of the neighbouring 
colonial territories. For example, files in the National Archives of Zambia relating to 
the Belgian Congo-Northern Rhodesia boundary had various headings including: 
‘Anglo-Belgian’ boundary (such as RC/33 and RC/34), ‘Northern Rhodesia-Belgian 
Congo’ boundary (such as RC/609, RC/821 and RC/341), local geographic names 
such as ‘Mokambo’ (NR 11/93) and specific agreements related to the boundary such 
as the ‘Pedicle Road’ agreement (550 FA 1/1/90). This was also the case in the 
National Archives at Kew where files related to the Angola-Northern Rhodesia 
boundary were also found under the names of specific sections such as ‘Barotseland’ 
(FO 881/7552) and ‘Kwando’ river (FO 179/581). Inconsistent spellings of 
geographic names were also problematic in all the archives, so a range of spellings 
was used to search catalogues and indices. 
The catalogues of both the National Archives (Kew) and the Archives of the 
Royal Geographical Society are held as searchable on-line databases, providing a 
remotely accessible method of identifying relevant files. This allowed relevant files 
numbers to be identified prior to visiting the archives. However, the on-line 
catalogues were not relied upon exclusively and the hard copy catalogues in both 
archives were also consulted in situ.  
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When researching material at the African Archives at the Belgian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, an approach was first made to the archivist by email before visiting. 
The relevant files based on the supplied criteria were then retrieved on arrival. The 
card catalogues at the African Archives were not consulted due to the vast amount of 
relevant material that had already been retrieved by the archivist. The material 
researched at the African Archives related exclusively to the 1911-14 and 1927-33 
Anglo-Belgian boundary commissions and did not encompass Belgian participation in 
other colonial boundary commissions. 
The catalogues at the National Archives of Zambia are divided into bound 
volumes based on colonial/central government departments and provincial 
governments. The files are organised within the volumes based on subject and then 
chronologically within the subject index.38
Department of Lands 
 Files related to boundary issues were 
generally confined to governmental records and finding relevant files was a process of 
working through all of the potentially relevant catalogues. Those catalogues consulted 
include: 
Department of Foreign Affairs (1935 – c. 1971) 
Office of the President (post-1964) 
Northern Rhodesia Administrator (including the British South Africa Company) 
Records of the Crown Colony (1924-1933 
Secretariat Series Section 2 and 3 (1925-1965) 
Cabinet Office 
Northern Province 
Luapula Province 
Copperbelt Province 
The catalogue of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) archives in Lusaka 
was also consulted but no relevant files were identified. 
Archive research questions 
The archive material researched in this study provides narratives into how the 
boundary-territory relationship has been conceived at a variety of geographic scales, 
by a broad cross-section of people, at various levels of administration, and across a 
defined period of time including both the colonial and post-independence periods. But 
the focus of the thesis is very much on the practice of boundary demarcation. In order 
                                                 
38 An excellent guidebook to the non-governmental records held in the National Archives of Zambia 
was compiled by Marja Hinfelaar and Giacomo Macola in 2004. M. Hinfelaar and G. Macola National 
Archives of Zambia: A First Guide to Non-Governmental Archives in Zambia (Lusaka: National 
Archives of Zambia, 2004). 
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to maintain this focus, precise research questions were kept in mind when reviewing 
the vast amount of archival material. 
 
Question 1: What motivated or influenced governments involved to advance the 
boundary-making process into the demarcation phase?  
As already discussed, demarcation is considered a later stage within the boundary-
making practices, presupposing some kind of a priori territorial allocation or 
boundary delimitation. However, archival material related exclusively to the initial 
diplomatic allocation or delimitation of colonial boundaries in Africa was not part of 
this research.39
Oftentimes, demarcation was motivated by local administrative problems 
arising from poor boundary identification on the ground, such as confusion over 
which colonial administration taxed which villages in the borderland area. In the case 
study of the DRC-Zambia boundary, correspondence from Native and Provincial 
Commissioners located in the National Archives of Zambia was particularly useful to 
understand local borderland administration. In other cases, the lack of boundary 
demarcation proved problematic during the construction of physical infrastructure 
such as the Stephenson Road located along the Anglo-German boundary between 
Lakes Nyassa and Tanganyika. In these cases, documents from private companies 
such as the African Lakes Company, the British South African Company, and various 
mining companies were found to be useful to understand how the private sector 
influenced boundary demarcation. 
 Instead, this research analysed the conditions that motivated colonial 
governments in Africa to advance the progression from that initial boundary 
definition (representation of space) through the practice of demarcation (production of 
place) along the DRC-Zambia boundary and other boundary sections in southern 
Africa. Archival documents and correspondence were reviewed to understand what 
characteristics of the human and physical border landscapes drew administrative 
attention to a specific boundary section. At issue was how some aspects of the 
landscape required physical demarcation of the boundary on the ground while others 
did not. Important in this regard was the duration between the time territory was 
originally allocated or a specific boundary delimited, and the time of actual 
demarcation. 
                                                 
39 Much of this material can be found in Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty (and later editions) and 
Brownlie, African Boundaries. 
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Question 2: What emphasis did the government administration give to the 
demarcation process?  
The colonial demarcation of boundaries throughout Africa was found to be widely 
inconsistent, particularly from the British perspective, and another key research 
question was how to measure the relative importance of demarcation in specific 
boundary contexts. This was achieved by examining a number of variables.  
First, using correspondence and reports to gauge the levels of administration 
that became responsible for boundary demarcation revealed how far up the 
political framework a certain boundary section rose. This was particularly acute 
within the more devolved structure of British colonial administration in Africa 
where correspondence and reports could be positioned within the administrative 
hierarchy. 
Second, the relative volume of correspondence concerning a specific boundary 
section that was generated within intra-imperial government departments and 
between the neighbouring colonial power/state was another good measure of a 
boundary’s respective political importance.  
Third, the most important gauge of a specific boundary section’s political 
importance was the amount of resources (funding, personnel, duration in the 
field, and so forth) that were allocated to demarcation activities. This research 
concentrated on both the inter-colonial boundary commissions in southern 
Africa that varied in number of personnel and respective budgets, as well as the 
resources dedicated to British intra-colonial boundaries in southern Africa. 
Archival documents outlining the specific allocation of resources towards 
boundary demarcation were often the most difficult to uncover. However, 
Treasury Office files occasionally included this information for specific 
boundary commissions (such as National Archive files T 161/1017 and T 
161/1018 for the 1927-33 Anglo-Belgian boundary commission). 
 
Question 3: What did the demarcation practice actually entail?  
To address this key research question, the instructions given to boundary commissions 
by their governments were analysed to reveal the forces that influenced those 
instructions and how the commissions undertook their work in the field. Of greatest 
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interest was the relative energy/priority given to the three main activities undertaken 
by boundary commissions:  
a. geodetic and topographic survey 
b. geographical ‘exploration’ (see especially Chapter 4)  
c. physical boundary demarcation 
Research then focused on the role played by inter-colonial boundary commissions, as 
well as local government surveyors in demarcating boundaries around Northern 
Rhodesia in particular. 
 
Question 4: What were the perceptions of borderland territory during demarcation and 
how did this influence the materialisation of the boundary on the landscape? 
Rarely have the records and correspondence from boundary commissioners or 
surveyors in the field been examined as narratives and used to obtain a more 
personalised understanding of how the territory being demarcated was being 
perceived.40
Archive material related to boundary commissions 
 However, this was crucial in understanding how the instructions issued 
by the ‘sovereigns’ were applied in the field. 
The records of colonial boundary commissions are of particular interest to this 
research because they represent the first collision between the legally-defined, linear 
division of imperial/colonial territory with the human and physical border landscape. 
Again, material related to boundary commissions was found to be concentrated 
largely in distinct files at the National Archives (Kew), the National Archives of 
Zambia and the African Archive of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While 
this made it relatively simple to identify relevant files, it also resulted in extremely 
large files with a vast amount of information related to a variety of issues, often 
including: the appointment and pay of members of the boundary commission, 
logistical information regarding travel and supply, geodetic and topographic survey 
data, as well as the correspondence and reports from the chief boundary 
commissioners in the field. The archive material was supported by the secondary texts 
written by the boundary commissioners, such as articles in the Geographical Journal. 
                                                 
40 One notable exception is H.H. Kelly Imperial Boundary-Making: The Diary of Captain Kelly and the 
1913 Sudan-Uganda Boundary Commission of 1913 edited by G. Blake (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997). 
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 The specific archive research questions were used to extract the relevant 
information and understand exactly how a boundary was materially constructed on the 
physical landscape and how these imperially-mandated officials perceived the 
territory they were dividing. Of particular interest in this respect were the official 
instructions given to the boundary commissioners and the field 
reports/correspondence from the boundary commissioners themselves. The official 
instructions provided insight into what the imperial/colonial governments wanted to 
achieve with the specific boundary commissions. Information relating to the 
respective amount of time, energy and funding allocated to different 
activities/responsibilities was also applicable. Obviously the reports and personal 
correspondence from boundary commissioners in the field were invaluable in 
understanding how the official instructions were implemented. However, this material 
also provided a rich source of narrative geographical discourses about how territory 
was conceived and enframed for imperial consumption.41
The archival research also sought to understand the motivations and influences 
behind decisions to create boundary commissions in colonial southern Africa 
(particularly around Northern Rhodesia). Usually this information was not included in 
files relating to the specific commissions. Instead it was a process of working 
backwards through other files related to the specific boundary and uncovering why 
the imperial/colonial/national governments desired to have that specific boundary 
section demarcated. Material in the National Archives of Zambia was particularly 
useful in tracing the motivations for demarcation because it contained more localised 
information from various levels of colonial administration in Northern Rhodesia.   
 This is explored in more 
depth in Chapter 4 which addresses the shifting emphasis that was given to survey 
versus demarcation by a number of early British colonial boundary commissions in 
Africa. 
Maps produced by colonial boundary commissions also provided insight into 
how a boundary was marked on the ground and how the newly-defined territory was 
perceived by these imperial representatives. For this research, maps produced by 
colonial boundary commissions were considered only as supplementary to the textual 
                                                 
41 This process of ‘enframing’ is in reference to Timothy Mitchell and Derek Gregory’s description of 
the late-nineteenth century Eurocentric perspective of ‘world-as-exhibition’ which will be examined in 
more depth later in Chapter 4. T. Mitchell, ‘The world as exhibition’ Comparative Studies in Society 
and History 31, no. 2 (1989): 217-236. 220; D. Gregory, D. 1994 Geographical Imaginations 
(Cambridge, MA and Oxford: Blackwell, 1994): 34. 
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narratives and were critically assessed. For example, boundary commission maps 
often indicated where a boundary mark was placed, but did not reveal the precise 
nature of that mark. Was it a concrete cairn, a telegraph pole, or a heap of stones? 
Why was that particular method of marking chosen? Early boundary commission 
maps in colonial Africa are often of small scale so the distance between adjacent 
boundary marks may be perceived as being relatively small. 
Boundary commission maps were also illustrative of what features of the 
landscape were considered important enough to be depicted. This again provided 
insight into how the border landscape was perceived by the boundary commissions. 
These aspects of cartographic perception and the geopolitical gaze are addressed in 
more detail in Chapter 4. The organisation of boundary commission maps in the 
archives consulted was somewhat problematic in that most maps had been removed 
from the text files and catalogued separately. As with other archive material related to 
boundary commissions, these maps are catalogued either by boundary name or 
geographic area which allowed them to be identified easily. 
Research collection and organisation 
The non-map files researched were composed mainly of correspondence and report 
documents. Every piece of material in each consulted document file was reviewed and 
comprehensive notes were taken on every file and map consulted at the various 
archives. For relevant correspondence documents, the name of the author, the 
recipient and date was recorded. Due to the vast amount of duplication and draft 
material in the files, the sent versions of correspondence or final draft of reports were 
cited wherever possible. Some quotes were transcribed verbatim in the notes where a 
comment was found to be particularly relevant.42
 The notes and photocopies/digital photographs of archival material were first 
organised by geographic boundary rather than by respective colonial power. For 
example, the Anglo-Portuguese boundaries in southern Africa were reviewed 
separately (Angola-Northern Rhodesia boundary and Portuguese East Africa-
Rhodesia). Material was then organised chronologically with material relating to 
specific boundary commissions forming distinct blocks. This method of organisation 
was utilised in order to provide a coherent narrative for each boundary section and to 
  
                                                 
42 It was felt that comprehensive note-taking was the best way to address the sheer volume of archival 
material and deal appropriately with the significant duplication within files and across archives. 
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help identify any commonalities or differences across different boundaries during 
specific eras. However, the chronological organisation did not impede the ability to 
analyse other thematic trends that may have been identified during the research and 
were considered in their respective context. 
 
Zambia fieldwork        
Recent borderland studies have advocated using more anthropological and 
ethnographic methods to examine, experience and understand borders and bordering 
practices in the everyday lives of borderland populations.43 However, the tendency of 
these approaches in borderland studies is to treat the boundary line as a pre-existent 
feature of the landscape, concentrating “on the effects of (inter)national boundaries on 
the formation and spatialization of political forms, and vice versa.”44 Given the strict 
focus of this research on the historical narrative of demarcation practice, archival 
material did form the majority of the empirical material. However, bringing that 
narrative through to the present day required fieldwork outside of the archives. While 
the everyday practices of bordering on the DRC-Zambia boundary were of interest, 
this fieldwork did not attempt any quantitative anthropological techniques such as 
collecting crossing data or surveying of borderland population. Instead, loosely 
following Megoran’s methodology in analysing the boundary dispute between 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, the fieldwork in Zambia worked to supplement and 
reinforce the material drawn from textual resources.45
Interviews 
 
No documents were found in the National Archives of Zambia concerning boundary 
practices post-1967. Likewise two additional research strategies were adopted during 
fieldwork in Zambia through July and August 2007. This included: interviews with 
survey officials currently responsible for international boundary demarcation and 
maintenance (particularly along the boundary with DRC) and a site visit to two of the 
                                                 
43 H. Donnan and T.M. Wilson, Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State (Oxford: Berg, 1999); 
N. Megoran ‘For ethnography in political geography: Experiencing and re-imagining the Ferghana 
Valley boundary closures’ Political Geography 25, 6 (2006): 622-640; P. Nugent, Smugglers, 
Secessionists and Loyal Citizens on the Ghana-Togo Frontier: The Lie of the Borderlands since 1914 
(Oxford: James Currey, 2002). 
44 T. Raeymaekers, ‘The silent encroachment of the frontier: A politics of transborder trade in the 
Semliki Valley (Congo-Uganda)’ Political Geography 28 (2009): 55-65. 56-57. 
45 N. Megoran ‘The critical geopolitics of the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan Ferghana Valley dispute’ 
Political Geography 23, (2004): 731-764. 738-739. 
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boundary pillars themselves. Two in-depth but unstructured interviews were 
conducted with Mr. Ed Kateka, Deputy Surveyor General of Zambia responsible for 
international boundary issues, in his office at the Ministry of Lands, Lusaka on 24 and 
30 July 2007. These interviews lasted for approximately one hour on each occasion 
and Mr. Kateka agreed not to be interviewed anonymously. No recording device was 
used.46
a. how is international boundary demarcation and maintenance treated in 
Zambia today?  
 Informal discussion and comments that Mr. Kateka asked not to be cited were 
withheld from the interview notes. The questions posed to Mr. Kateka focused on the 
following:  
b. what emphasis, in terms of financial resources and political interest, is 
currently given to boundary demarcation and maintenance in Zambia?  
c. are there any problems relating to poor boundary definition on the ground 
along the boundary with DRC in particular?  
d. what form of contact and cooperation concerning boundary demarcation and 
maintenance is there with DRC? 
Again, Mr. Kateka has served with the Zambian Survey Department for several 
decades and has been involved in all boundary-related issues with neighbouring 
states. This experience made him the official best-placed to provide information about 
Zambian government practice in relation to the maintenance and marking of the 
boundary with DRC.  
Discussions were also held with Mr. Danny Mubanga, Surveyor General of 
Zambia, in his office at the Ministry of Lands, Lusaka on 30 July 2007 for 
approximately 30 minutes. These were informal discussions, mainly related to my 
proposed site visit to the boundary with DRC with some discussion of the questions 
mentioned above. This was not considered a formal interview and again no recording 
device was used. As Surveyor General, the responsibility for international boundary 
demarcation and maintenance is under Mr. Mubanga’s jurisdiction and he leads 
Zambia’s delegation in the recently constituted African Union Border Programme 
(AUBP).47
                                                 
46 Due to the perceived political sensitivity of boundary issues, my experience speaking with many 
government officials around the world about boundary issues I have found it best not to use a recording 
device as it makes interviewees reluctant to speak candidly. 
 
47 Mr. Mubanga attended the Second International Symposium on Land, River and Lake Boundary 
Demarcation and Maintenance held in Maputo, 16-19 December 2009, sponsored by the AUBP. The 
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On 2 and 3 August 2007, discussions were held with Mr. John Mwanakasale, 
chief surveyor in the Ministry of Lands at Ndola, Zambia. These were informal 
discussions related to the topics addressed above, to his responsibilities with regard to 
the DRC boundary and to the logistics of a site visit to the boundary pillars. These 
discussions were not cited as official interviews. If any of the topics discussed 
informally were considered important enough to be included in this thesis, I have 
contacted Mr. Mwanakasale directly and asked for his clarification of certain 
statements and his permission to include such information in this thesis. Mr. 
Mwanakasale was instrumental in organising transport and guides to the sites of two 
boundary pillars along the DRC boundary. 
The information gained during these interviews provided greater 
understanding of issues that affect current Zambian boundary practice, including 
budgetary and personnel issues. Of particular interest in assessing this information, as 
suggested by the allocated resources, was the relative priority given to boundary 
demarcation by the Zambian government. 
Further supplementing discussions with officials in the Zambian survey 
department, my work with the International Boundaries Research Unit has led to 
discussions with other survey officials responsible for boundary issues across Africa. 
This has included work with two regional organisations and participation in 
workshops concerning boundary delimitation and demarcation (under the aegis of the 
African Union Border Programme) including: Inter-Governmental Authority for 
Development (IGAD)48, Entebbe, 19-22 May 2008 and the Economic Community of 
Central African States (ECCAS)49
                                                                                                                                            
AUBP and its role in current African boundary demarcation, including the DRC-Zambia boundary, will 
be addressed in greater detail in Chapter 6. 
, Libreville, 21-23 May 2009. In addition, IBRU 
acted as co-facilitator with the African Union Border Programm Second International 
Symposium on Land, River and Lake Boundary Demarcation and Maintenance held 
in Maputo, 16-19 December 2008. Through both the formal presentations and 
informal discussions with practitioners and officials, I was able to understand more 
about how African states currently undertake boundary delimitation and demarcation 
practices. 
48 Regional organisation of East African states including: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Somalia 
and Uganda. 
49 Regional organisation of central African states including: Angola, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and 
Sao Tome and Principe. 
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Site visit to boundary pillars 
The information gained from the interviews with Mr. Kateka and Mr. Mubanga 
indicted that no consistent boundary demarcation regime had been put in place by the 
Zambian government since independence. Given this inconsistency and in order to 
understand exactly how the boundary was currently ‘known’ on the physical 
landscape, I felt it necessary to observe it myself in the field. I had originally hoped to 
observe boundary pillar 1, located at the important turning point of the boundary 
south of Lake Bangweulu and nearby the main east-west road through northern 
Zambia (the ‘Great North Road’ or T2). Because of its position at a turning point, I 
believed that observing this section of the boundary would be most representative of 
other boundary sections. Its situation near the Great North Road also made it fairly 
accessible. However, the surveyor general advised against journeying to this part of 
the boundary because of security concerns given the unpredictable activities of 
Congolese border authorities and advised that the Survey Department would not have 
been in a position to support or endorse such a site visit. He suggested instead that I 
consult with the Chief Surveyor in Ndola which is the second largest city in Zambia 
and is located close the watershed section of the boundary with DRC. The support of 
the Survey Department in this area offered much safer access to the boundary pillar 
sites. 
On 3 August 2007, accompanied by a surveyor and a guide from the Ministry 
of Lands, Survey Department office in Ndola, I proceeded by government-registered 
vehicle to two boundary pillar sites along the DRC-Zambia boundary, BPs 16 and 18. 
During these site visits, I examined the physical state of the boundary pillars and any 
other marks on the physical landscape used to physically define the boundary. I was 
less concerned with the actual position of the boundary pillars themselves, although a 
rough GPS reading of Boundary Pillar 18 was taken. I also observed how the 
boundary pillars fit into the surrounding landscape, including what kind of impact 
they had on land use and if/how the boundary as a linear construct was defined on the 
ground (e.g. by clearing of vegetation between pillars). The local guides who 
accompanied us to Boundary Pillar 18 provided some degree of insight into how local 
people ‘understand’ the position of the boundary but no formal interviews were 
conducted. Due to the short duration of these visits, I was unable to undertake more 
quantitative research on local knowledge of the boundary position.  
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Although the two boundary pillars are not positioned at major boundary 
turning points, they are located in an accessible, populated area near a major 
administrative centre. In this respect, the two boundary pillars provided a good 
representation of how the boundary pillars have been treated by the DRC and 
Zambian government in the recent past. They also provided two contrasting human 
and physical border landscapes. One located near an important border crossing where 
there is substantial population and settlements and the other located in a more remote 
setting. 
 
Overview           
 
The archive material, supplemented by information derived from the fieldwork in 
Zambia, was considered the best methodology for producing a clear historical 
narrative of demarcation along the DRC-Zambia boundary through to the present-day. 
As noted above, this unique technique of isolating the practice of demarcation as a 
narrative allowed me to draw on the empirical richness of traditional boundary 
studies, but not to fall into a systematic approach which has been the tendency of 
determinist international legal methodology. Constructing a historical narrative 
allowed me to expose aspects of demarcation to contemporary critique, from political 
geography and geopolitics especially, that could not be applied if the DRC-Zambia 
boundary was examined as a single boundary production system.
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4. Mapping over Marking: the Belgian Congo-
Northern Rhodesia boundary 1894-1914 
 
“‘[we] have been engaged in drawing lines on maps where no white man's foot ever 
trod; we have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other, only 
hindered by the small impediment that we never knew where the mountains and rivers 
and lakes were.” 
Lord Salisbury 18901
                                                 
1 H.S. Wilson, The Imperial Experience in Sub-Saharan Africa Since 1870 (St. Paul: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1977), 95. 
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Introduction          
 
It was revealed in Chapter 2 how the theoretical concept of boundaries is intrinsically 
embedded within the development of the territorial state model and how boundaries, 
as products, have been conceived within a series of distinct practices. Given that 
European imperialism across Africa during the last decades of the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries was predicated largely on the importation of the territorial 
state model to bring peace and order to the continent2
 In the vast majority of cases throughout colonial Africa, the survey and 
demarcation of inter-colonial boundaries was undertaken by bilateral boundary 
commissions. While the distinction between delimitation and demarcation had been 
made clear for British boundary practitioners by Henry McMahon in 1897 and again 
reiterated by Lord Curzon in 1907,
, at first glance the demarcation 
of inter-colonial boundaries would appear to have been a key priority for the imperial 
powers. Rejecting the zonal and moveable frontiers that were believed to separate 
primitive pre-colonial political entities, boundary demarcation would have provided 
clear symbols of the fixed, linear bounds of territorial sovereignty to local borderland 
populations. However, the historical narrative of the Belgian Congo-Northern 
Rhodesia boundary reveals that in practice boundary demarcation was not as 
systematic as it might seem. Nor can it be considered a single standardised process. 
Instead it will be shown through this narrative how boundary demarcation was 
contingent on the way territory itself was perceived by the imperial powers who 
claimed sovereignty, most importantly through economic lenses. 
3 within British imperial government departments 
this distinction was less well known and the terms were often used synonymously by 
officials in inter-department and inter-colonial correspondence.4
                                                 
2 There are numerous texts analysing of this notion. For a more generalised examination see Davidson 
1992, and for an analysis more closely linked to boundaries see A. Mbembe, ‘At the edge of the world: 
boundaries, territoriality and sovereignty in Africa’ translated by S. Rendall Public Culture 12, no. 1 
(2000): 259-284. 
 This makes it 
3 S.W. Boggs, S.W. 1940 International Boundaries: a Study of Boundary Functions and Problems 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1940), 32; J.R.V. Prescott and G. Triggs 2008 International 
Frontiers and Boundaries: Law, Politics and Geography (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2008), 59; See 
also J.W. Donaldson and A. Williams 2008 ‘Delimitation and demarcation: Analysing the legacy of 
Stephen Jones’ Boundary-Making’ Geopolitics 13, no. 4 (2008): 676-700. 
4 Just some of the numerous examples can be found in the 1907 British Foreign Office (FO) 
Confidential Print “Part 1: Correspondence respecting boundaries in Africa” in FO 403/391 that 
includes archival material related to the Congo-Uganda and Yola-Cross (Nigeria-Kameroon) 
boundaries where the terms delimitation and demarcation are used synonymously throughout the 
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difficult to place the work of colonial boundary commissions strictly within a 
systematic boundary development rubric. Therefore, it is more important to analyse 
the role of boundary commissions in the process of demarcation by the way in which 
the boundaries they were responsible for defining became ‘known’ on the physical 
landscape, taking clues from the three theoretical characteristics of territorial 
boundaries outlined in Chapter 2. 
The historical narrative of demarcation along the Belgian Congo-Northern 
Rhodesia boundary is divided into two parts over this and the following chapters. This 
reflects what will emerge as the clear disparity in priorities and techniques between 
the two Anglo-Belgian boundary commissions. Both boundary commissions were 
responsible for boundary demarcation, but the difference in how the boundary was 
made ‘known’ presents crucial insight into the way the British imperial project 
perceived (and conceived) African territory. This chapter will examine the reasoning 
behind the creation of the first Anglo-Belgian boundary commission, its mandate and 
its actual work in the field from 1911 to 1914. Although dispatched to undertake 
demarcation, this analysis will reveal how the Belgian Congo-Northern Rhodesia 
boundary was made ‘known’ only through the privileged medium of maps. This 
reflected a perpetuation of the small scale ‘geopolitical gaze’ that was such an integral 
part of the early decades of British imperialism in Africa.5
As representative of early British colonial boundary commissions throughout 
Africa, the 1911-14 Anglo-Belgian boundary commission prioritised mapping and 
geographic survey at small scale over the task of boundary demarcation. The 
boundary pillars/beacons/marks that were meant to symbolise the more advanced 
political division of territory in the lived landscape were considered of minor 
importance by the imperial governments who claimed territorial sovereignty. Instead, 
cartographic knowledge of the boundary was preferred, placing those symbols within 
the lexicon of maps that was considered at the time to be indicative of European 
superiority, both political and technological. Taking Brian Harley’s cue, the maps 
produced by early colonial boundary commissions to illustrate demarcation, and the 
 
                                                                                                                                            
correspondence. See also E. Hertslet’s 1906 ‘Table showing the progress made in the delimitation of 
British frontiers in Africa’ which includes demarcation within the overall title of ‘delimitation’ in R. 
Robinson and J. Gallagher with A. Denny Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism 
(London: Macmillan, 1981). Map annex. 
5 G. Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics (London: Routledge, 1996), 69; See also T.J. Bassett, 
‘Cartography and empire building in Nineteenth Century West Africa’ Geographical Review 84, no. 3 
(1994): 316-335. 
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surveys that informed them, must be deconstructed “to discover the silences and 
contradictions that challenge the apparent honesty of the image.”6
The very composition of the Anglo-Belgian boundary commission and its 
contemporaries in Africa, personified the imperial nexus between military and 
scientific superiority, perfectly fulfilling Michael Mann’s defined role of the imperial 
‘geopolitician.’
  
7 Their surveys did not simply entail that required for representing 
boundaries and borderland areas on topographical maps, but encompassed a broad 
range of geographic survey. Although tasked with boundary demarcation, the 
‘exploratory’ nature of geographic survey undertaken by the 1911-14 Anglo-Belgian 
boundary commission (and many of its predecessors in southern Africa) clearly 
constituted what Edward Said referred to in defining imperialism as the “acts of 
geographic violence through which virtually every space in the world is explored, 
charted and finally brought under control.”8 In explaining the notion of ‘Tropical 
Geography’, Marcus Power reflects that “Geographic practices and knowledge 
provided a set of lenses through which ‘The Tropics’ were known.”9
The contribution of colonial boundary commissions in Africa to geographic 
knowledge at the time extended far beyond any perception of their work within 
political geography and geopolitics as merely technical cogs in the more minor stage 
of boundary development (demarcation). As examined in Chapter 2, the presumption 
that boundary practices are related to a single level of power-relations (inter-imperial 
in this case) tends to overshadow demarcation and cast it as a practice that follows 
discreetly from the ‘higher’ political stages of territorial allocation and boundary 
delimitation. Within the historical narrative of the Belgian Congo-Northern Rhodesia 
boundary, it will be seen how colonial boundary commissions in Africa acted as the 
eyes of the British sovereign, contributing what was perceived to be reliable 
geographic knowledge to the “imperial mind” by its trained and trusted servants.
  
10
                                                 
6 J.B. Harley, ‘Deconstructing the map’ in Writing worlds: Discourse text and metaphor in the 
representation of landscape eds., T. Barnes and J. Duncan (London: Routledge, 1992), 233. Also cited 
in D. Gregory, Geographical Imaginations (Cambridge, MA): Blackwell, 1994), 74. 
 
More importantly for this study, it will be shown how the role as ‘imperial eye’ 
7 M. Mann, The Sources of Social Power Vol. II: The rise of classes and nation-state, 1760-1914 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 746-747. 
8 E. Said, ‘Yeats and decolonization’ In Nationalism, Colonialism and Literature T. Eagleton, F. 
Jameson and E. Said, eds., (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990), 77. 
9 M. Power, Rethinking Development Geographies (London: Routledge, 2003), 47. 
10 F. Driver, Geography Militant: Cultures of exploration and empire (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
2001), 84. 
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affected the practices by which the Belgian Congo-Northern Rhodesia boundary 
became ‘known’ on the physical landscape. 
 
 
 
Allocation of imperial territory and delimitation    
 
Although the stated focus of this research is on the demarcation of the Belgian Congo-
Northern Rhodesia boundary, it is necessary first to examine briefly the delimitation 
instruments that gave the boundary de jure status between the neighbouring colonial 
powers, Belgium and Britain, who claimed territorial sovereignty. As recognised in 
Chapter 2, boundaries are inherently bilateral and although in that respect the DRC-
Zambia boundary did not gain de jure existence until the 1894 Anglo-Congolese 
treaty, it roots can be traced in the territorial claims of the two neighbouring ‘states’ 
(colonial powers). Certainly this is not to imply that the region was devoid of politico-
territorial entities prior to European imperialism but given the stated scope of this 
work and the theoretical characteristics of ‘boundaries’ developing at the time, this is 
Map 1: Overview map of the Belgian Congo-Northern Rhodesia boundary 1894 
(Source: Design and Imaging Unit, Durham University) 
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where the chronology is most appropriately begun. The general overview map (Map 
1) provides some regional context for the geographic position of the Anglo-Congolese 
boundary and should serve simply as a small scale, supplementary aid for following 
the historical narrative. 
The territory of what became the Belgian Congo took shape at the conclusion of 
the Berlin Conference 1884-85, although Belgian agents had secured agreements with 
local leaders for at least two years prior. 11
 Basin of the Congo Defined 
 The government representatives in 
attendance at the Conference agreed in the first article of the first chapter of the 1885 
Berlin Act that the territory to be administered by the International Association of the 
Congo should incorporate all the territories of the Congo river basin. More 
specifically: 
1. In all the regions forming the basin of the Congo and its outlets. This basin 
is bounded by the watershed (or mountain ridges) of the adjacent basins, 
namely, in particular, those of the Niari, the Ogowé, the Schari, and the Nile, 
on the north; by the eastern watershed line of the affluents of Lake 
Tanganyika on the east; and by the watershed of the basins of the Zambesi 
and the Logé on the south. It therefore comprises all the regions watered by 
the Congo and its affluents, including Lake Tanganyika, with its eastern 
tributaries. 
Southern Boundary 
2. The southern boundary will follow the course of the Logé to its source, and 
thence pass eastwards till it joins the geographical basin of the Congo. 
Eastern Boundary 
3. In the zone stretching eastwards from the Congo basin as above defined, to 
the Indian Ocean from 5 degrees of North latitude to the mouth of the 
Zambesi to 5 mile above its confluence with the Shiré, and then follow the 
watershed between the affluents of Lake Nyassa and those of the Zambesi, 
                                                 
11 See especially the ‘List of treaties (contracts) between the Belgian Expedition to the upper Congo 
and Native Chiefs 1882-1884’ transcribed below in Appendix 1, section 8.2. The Berlin Conference 
from November 1884 to February 1885 included representatives from Austria-Hungary, Belgium, 
Denmark France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey 
and the United States of America. Many of those in attendance did not have claims to territory in 
Africa. 
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till at last it reaches the watershed between the waters of the Zambesi and 
the Congo.12
 
 
Prior to the Berlin Conference the International Association of the Congo had already 
gained recognition as a sovereign state by the international community13 and was re-
named the L’Etat Indépendant du Congo (Independent Congo State or Congo Free 
State as it became popularly known) on 1 July 1885. Although recognised as a 
sovereign state, the Congo Free State was ostensibly run by King Leopold II of 
Belgium who privately funded its administration. The Belgian Parliament also 
legitimated his authority by investing state funds in the Association and by allowing 
the use of Belgian staff and resources for its administration.14 Initially, the Congo 
Free State was administered from the small trading station of Vivi that “constituted 
the territorial embryo of the young Congolese state, the political and military base 
from which Belgian expeditions set about the occupation of central Africa.”15 
Nevertheless, Jentgen stated that “the recognition of the new state by the United 
States of America assumed the pre-existence of a state-like entity.”16
On 1 August 1885 the Independent State of the Congo issued (from Brussels) 
the Circular of the Administrator-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs of the 
Independent State of the Congo, declaring the neutrality of the State, within its Limits 
as defined by Treaties that defined its territorial limits in more detail than had been 
expressed in the 1885 Berlin Act. The relevant clauses in the 1885 Declaration of 
Neutrality that would go on to determine the future DRC-Zambia boundary included: 
  
 
To the East 
The 30th degree of longitude east of Greenwich up to the 1° 20’ of south 
latitude; 
                                                 
12 Full text is transcribed in Appendix 1, section 8.1. 
13 The International Association of the Congo was first recognised as a sovereign state by the United 
States on 22 April 1884. 
14 For more information on Belgian involvement in the Congo Free State, see especially A. Hochschild, 
King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror and Heroism in Colonial Africa (London: Pan 
Macmillan, 2006). 
15 Translation by the author “a constitué l’embryon territorial du jeune État congolais, la base politique 
et militaire d’où sont parties les expéditions belges qui ont abouti à l’occupation de l’Afrique 
Centrale.” P. Jentgen, P. 1952 Les Frontières du Congo Belge (Brussels: Mem. Institut Royal Colonial 
Belge, 1952), 10. 
16 Translation by the author “la reconnaissance du nouvel Etat par les Etats-Unis d’Amerique suppose 
la préexistence du premier comme entité étatique” Jentgen, Les Frontières du Congo Belge, 10. 
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A straight line drawn from the intersection of the 30th degree of longitude by 
the parallel of 1° 20’ of south latitude as far as the northern extremity of Lake 
Tanganyika; 
The median line of Lake Tanganyika; 
A straight line drawn from Lake Tanganyika to Lake Moero by 8° 30’ south 
latitude; 
The median line of Lake Moero; 
The watercourse which unites Lake Moero with Lake Bangweolo 
 
To the South 
A line drawn from the southern extremity of Lake Bangweolo until it meets 
the 24th degree of longitude east of Greenwich, and following the watershed 
between the Congo and the Zambezi;17
 
 
 
The Charter of the British South Africa Company (BSAC) granted by Queen 
Victoria and the British government in October 1889 to administer the British-
claimed areas in southern Africa north of the Limpopo river did not specify a northern 
limit to the Company’s area of operation;18 a discrepancy noted by King Leopold who 
feared the BSAC would encroach on southern territory of the Congo Free State, a 
region known as Katanga. His concern was exacerbated by the aggressive concession 
dealings near Katanga of the BSAC representative Alfred Sharpe that were, close to, 
and possibly at times within, the limits of the Congo Free State defined in the 1885 
Declaration of Neutrality.19 While the territorial limits outlined in the 1885 Congolese 
Declaration of Neutrality included Katanga, little effort had been made by the 
Belgians to control the area outside of the initial expedition that had concluded 
treaties or conquered local rulers.20
                                                 
17 Transcribed in Appendix 1, section 8.2. 
 Leopold considered the area his for the taking and 
18 Transcribed in Appendix 1, section 8.3; See also G. Macola, The Kingdom of Kazembe: History and 
Politics in North-eastern Zambia and Katanga to 1950 (Münster: Lit, 2002), 161. 
19 Macola, The Kingdom of Kazembe, 162. 
20 For a general historical overview of events leading up to recognition of the Congo Free State see 
especially Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost. 
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Sharpe’s treaty-making expeditions hastened the sending of Congolese expeditions to 
show ‘effective occupation’21
 In late 1891, a Belgian expeditionary force acting on behalf of the Congo Free 
State killed the Katangan leader M’siri, whose widespread authority soon dissolved 
throughout Katanga, leaving a power vacuum that was seized on by the Congo Free 
State administration.
 in Katanga.  
22 To the east of the Luapula river23, the Lunda leader Mwata 
Kazembe X had already paid tribute to Sharpe in 1890 after resisting several BSAC 
approaches in previous years.24 Although Kazembe continued to resist BSAC 
administration25 on occasion until 1899,26
 
 in 1894 the BSAC and British government 
presumably felt their claim to sovereignty over Kazembe’s Lunda kingdom was 
suitably strong enough to negotiate a bilateral boundary treaty with the Congo Free 
State. The boundary between the British sphere of influence (the area of activity of 
the BSAC north of the Zambezi) and the Congo Free State was delimited in Article I, 
paragraph (b) of the 12 May 1894 Anglo-Congolese Agreement: 
Boundary. North of the Zambesi. Luapula River. Lake Moero to Lake 
Bangweolo. 
  b. The frontier between the Independent Congo State and the British 
sphere to the north of the Zambesi shall follow a line running direct from the 
extremity of Cape Akalunga on Lake Tanganyika, situated at the 
northernmost point of Cameron Bay at about 8° 15’ south latitude, to the 
right bank of the River Luapula, where this river issues from Lake Moero. 
The line shall then be drawn directly to the entrance of the river into the 
lake, being, however, deflected towards the south of the lake so as to give 
the Island of Kilwa to Great Britain. It shall then follow the ‘thalweg’ of the 
Luapula up to its issue from Lake Bangweolo. Thence it shall run 
                                                 
21 The term ‘effective occupation’ was of course the catch phrase introduced in the 1884 Berlin 
Conference as the rule by which the European powers could claim sovereignty over territory in colonial 
Africa. 
22 D. Gordon, ‘Owners of the land and Lunda lords: colonial chiefs in the borderlands of Northern 
Rhodesia and Belgian Congo’ The International Journal of African Historical Studies 34, no. 2 (2001): 
315-338. 320. 
23 Part of the defined limit of the Congo Free State, the Luapula is the watercourse referred to in the 
1885 Declaration as uniting Lakes Mwero (Moero) and Bangweulu. 
24 Gordon, ‘Owners of the land and Lunda lords,’ 320-321; See also Macola, The Kingdom of 
Kazembe, 162-163. 
25 Kazembe even repulsed an armed expeditionary force led by the local BSAC administration in 1897 
(Gordon, ‘Owners of the land and Lunda lords,’ 321). 
26 Gordon, ‘Owners of the land and Lunda lords,’ 321; Macola, The Kingdom of Kazembe, 186-189. 
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southwards along the meridian of longitude of the point where the river 
leaves the lake to the watershed between the Congo and Zambesi, which it 
shall follow until it reaches the Portuguese frontier.27
 
 (See Map 1) 
The boundary defined in the 1894 treaty is nearly identical to the territorial limits of 
the Congo Free State outlined in the 1885 Declaration of Neutrality. Recognising the 
British claim to Kazembe’s kingdom east of the Luapula, the only differences 
between the two were the specification of the section between Lake Tanganyika and 
Lake Mweru, the deflection around Kilwa island in Lake Mweru and the naming of 
the Luapula river as the watercourse uniting Lakes Mweru and Bangweulu. 
Since the focus of this research is on boundary demarcation, further analysis 
of the diplomatic and geopolitical context of the 1894 Anglo-Congolese boundary 
treaty is beyond its scope. Indeed, from an international law perspective this is where 
the story of the DRC-Zambia boundary effectively ends. The 1894 Anglo-Congolese 
treaty provided the binding de jure delimitation of a linear, fixed and bilaterally 
agreed boundary between two recognised sovereigns that remains effectively 
unchanged from its definition within the text even today. However, it is at this point 
where the empirical narrative of this work begins. While the 1894 Anglo-Belgian 
treaty established a legal territorial boundary, known only to those very few in power, 
it was far from a reality on the physical landscape. 
 
Prelude to demarcation        
 
Making the case   
With the northern boundary of its territory defined in the 1894 treaty, the BSAC 
administration gradually penetrated into the borderland areas, especially after the final 
conquest of the Lunda kingdom in 1899.28 Even without physical definition on the 
landscape, the first question relating to the alignment of the Congo-Northern Rhodesia 
boundary was not raised until 1901 when a local trader Mr. Teixiera de Mattos 
complained to BSAC authorities in Fort Roseberry about the seizure of his rubber-
carrying canoes on the Luapula river by Congolese police.29
                                                 
27 Transcribed in Appendix 1, section 8.4. 
 That same year, the 
28 Macola, The Kingdom of Kazembe, 190-223. 
29 NRA 3/3/1 vol. I 3950, Various correspondence concerning complaints by Teixiera de Mattos, 1901. 
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BSAC administration noted an outbreak of sleeping sickness along the Luapula river 
which prompted BSAC officials to impose travel restrictions.30 Because these issues 
were largely related to the boundary along the Luapula river (which was assumed to 
be clearly visible on the ground), they did not require the authorities to more clearly 
define the boundary on the ground.31
The geographic situation of the 1894 boundary created an awkward 
‘appendage’ of Congolese territory often referred to as the Katanga ‘pedicle’ that 
effectively divided North Eastern and North Western Rhodesia Protectorates (See 
Map 1).
 
32 Katanga was administered as part of the Congo Free State by the 
Compagnie du Katanga from 1891 to 1900, and from 1900 by the Comité Spécial du 
Katanga.33 As traffic between North Eastern and North Western Rhodesia increased 
in the first years of the twentieth century, Congolese police in the Katanga region, led 
by a notorious Belgian official Monsieur Declerq, were blamed for frequent abuse and 
even killings of mail carriers travelling across the Katanga pedicle.34 These problems 
continued for many decades and are examined in detail by Musambachime.35 By 1903 
the situation along the still undemarcated boundary was becoming more strained, 
particularly in the populated areas south of Lake Bangweulu. Congolese police made 
frequent raids on villages they claimed to be in Congolese territory. On one occasion 
in 1903, armed and uniformed Congolese police were detained by BSAC authorities 
when recruiting for labour in the village of Kapopo, situated southeast of Serenje.36
The main concern for BSAC officials in North Eastern Rhodesia was the 
position of the boundary south of Lake Bangweulu, in particular whether the village 
of Chongolo (Tshongolo/Tshongola, near to the present village of Mukuku) lay to the 
 
                                                 
30 NRA 3/3/1 vol. I 3950 Various correspondence; see also Gordon, The Kingdom of Kazembe, 322. 
31 Rivers were often chosen as boundary sections because they were believed to possess the key 
characteristics of being linear, fixed and known on the landscape. See especially J. Donaldson, ‘Where 
rivers and boundaries meet: building the International River Boundaries Database’ Water Policy 11 
(2009): 629-644. 
32 The term pedicle usually refers to the stalk or stem of a plant or flower. Largely due to their 
geographic separation, the North Eastern and North Western Rhodesia Protectorates were under 
separate BSAC administrations until 1911 when they were combined to form the Protectorate of 
Northern Rhodesia. North Eastern Rhodesia was administered from Fort Jameson (Chipata) and North 
Western Rhodesia from Livingstone (after 1907). 
33 M.C. Musambachime, ‘The social and economic effects of Sleeping Sickness in Mweru-Luapula 
1906-1922’ African Economic History 10 (1981): 151-173. 151. 
34 NRA 3/3/1 vol. II 3950 Various correspondence; Also NRA 3/1/1 vol. II 3948 Letter Codrington to 
A. Weyns (Comité Special du Katanga), 3 November 1902. 
35 See M.C. Musambachime, M.C. 1990 ‘Military violence against civilians: the case of the Congolese 
and Zairean military in the Pedicle 1890-1988’ The International Journal of African Historical Studies 
23, no. 4 (1990): 643-664. 
36 NRA 3/3/1 vol. I 3950. 
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east (in Northeast Rhodesia) or west (Congo Free State) at the northernmost point of 
the meridian boundary section (see Map 2, p. 94). Chongolo was located near a ford 
across the Luapula river southwest of Lake Bangweulu. This ford provided a direct 
transport link from the two administrative outposts of Serenje and Fort Rosebery on 
firm ground through the swamps south of the lake. The local BSAC commissioners, 
Harrington in Fort Rosebery and Hector Croad in Serenje, constructed roads to the 
ford in 1901, but it was unclear whether or not the route passed through Congolese 
territory.37
It had also emerged that the western end of the boundary section between 
Lakes Mweru and Tanganyika left the Congolese village of Mpweto effectively cut 
off from the northern shoreline of Lake Mweru where Congolese officials were 
constructing a harbour just south of Mpweto. On 5 November 1903, the BSAC 
Secretary in London, H. Wilson Fox, with the consent of Sharpe (by this time, British 
Commissioner of Nyasaland and British Central Africa) suggested that the 
administrator of North East Rhodesia, Robert Codrington, should “sound (out)” 
Congolese officials about a potential boundary adjustment or territorial swap that 
would ensure the Chongolo ford fell east of the meridian boundary south of 
Bangweulu in exchange for giving Congo the small wedge of territory south of 
Mpweto to the lake shore.
 The only alternative routes between the two towns were the lengthy trek 
north around Lake Bangweulu and the more direct route through the Katanga pedicle. 
Given the poor treatment of carriers by Congolese police when travelling through 
Katanga, the BSAC administration hoped that the Chongolo ford would provide a 
direct route that avoided passing through Congolese territory.  
38 Fox advised Codrington first to find out the “exact 
geographic position” of the boundary south of Bangweulu before negotiations could 
begin.39
The 1894 treaty specified that the meridian section of the boundary should be 
determined from the point where the Luapula exits Lake Bangweulu at a place called 
 It is clear at this point that the BSAC administration was just gathering 
information about the proposed adjustments and was not undertaking direct 
negotiations with the Congolese outside of British imperial government involvement. 
                                                 
37 Musambachime ‘Military violence against civilians,’ 650-652. 
38 NRA 1/4/4/3 3936 Cablegram from Fox to Codrington, 5 November 1903. 
39 NRA 1/4/4/3 3936 Cablegram from Fox to Codrington, 5 November 1903. 
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Mpanta.40 However, the area south of the lake was covered by dense swamps from 
which the Luapula river emerges near Chongolo. The Luapula river may have 
appeared to exit from the lake clearly on the small scale mapping used by diplomats 
to negotiate the 1894 Anglo-Belgian treaty41, but the local geography was much more 
complicated. In August 1904 Captain R.G.T. Bright, commandant of the North 
Eastern Rhodesia constabulary, led a canoe expedition up the Luapula to identify the 
exact point where the river met the lake in order to determine the meridian and 
confirm if the “wedge of Congolese territory did indeed block access to Chongolo.”42 
After a difficult journey through the swamps filled with dense papyrus, Bright 
identified the position of “Panta” (Mpanta) where the river exited the lake, taking 
latitude by observations and longitude by time.43 Given the importance of Mpanta for 
the boundary negotiations, the chief surveyor of North Eastern Rhodesia L.A. Wallace 
journeyed to Mpanta in October 1904 to verify Bright’s findings and, in the words of 
the BSAC assistant secretary in London Douglas Brodie, to confirm if the Congolese 
‘wedge’ had “any real geographical existence.”44
Wallace confirmed Bright’s position of Mpanta and established, as a result, 
that the meridian boundary did lie some 3 miles east of Chongolo and the road was 
therefore effectively ‘blocked’ by Congolese territory.
 
45 In his October 1904 report 
that was forwarded to the BSAC offices in London on 6 January 1905, Wallace noted 
an additional complication. He established that the Luapula actually intersected the 
meridian three times before the boundary reached Mpanta and proposed adjusting the 
boundary to place a permanent ford across the Luapula in British territory.46
                                                 
40 It is likely that this place-name was taken from David Livingstone’s account of the area south of 
Bangweulu. See W.V. Brelsford, W.V. 1945 ‘Making an outlet from Lake Bangweulu in Northern 
Rhodesia’ The Geographical Journal 106, no. ½ (1945): 50-58. 52. 
  
41 Although never made explicit, the description of the eastern endpoint of boundary at “Cape 
Akalunga” suggests that negotiators consulted the 1890 map “The Tanganyika-Nyassa Plateau” from: 
Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography 12, no. 12. 776 
(also produced for the War Office as I.D.W.O. 796) and the maps ‘Lake Tanganyika’ and ‘The 
Southern Part of Lake Tanganyika’ in E.C. Hore, ‘Lake Tanganyika’ Proceedings of the Royal 
Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography 4, no. 1 (1882): 1-28. 
42 L.A. Wallace, ‘North-Eastern Rhodesia’ The Geographical Journal 29, no. 4 (1907): 369-395. p. 
373. 
43 NRA 2/4/3/3 3944 Report, R. Bright 13 September 1904. The report of Bright’s journey was 
forwarded on to the BSAC offices in London on 4 October 1904 and passed along to the War Office 
(NRA 2/4/3/3 3944 Letter Codrington to Brodie, 4 October 1904). 
44 NRA 1/4/4/3 3936 Letter Douglas Brodie BSAC to the Under Secretary of State CO, 23 August 
1904. 
45 NRA 2/4/3/3 3944 Memorandum, L.A. Wallace, 3 October 1904. 
46 NRA 2/4/3/3 3944 Report, L.A. Wallace, October 1904 – submitted 6 January 1904. 
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More importantly for this study, Wallace proposed that the overland section of 
his adjusted boundary south of Bangweulu would be easy and inexpensive to 
demarcate. He suggested that the two endpoints of this section should be demarcated 
and “as they would be only 55 miles apart the line between them could be cleared, 
and if necessary, intermediate beacons could be placed on the line each of which 
would be visible from the next.”47 Wallace estimated that “final demarcation” of this 
boundary section from Lake Bangweulu to the watershed (if entrusted to him) would 
total £800, including £600 for salaries and £200 for transport.48 Codrington forwarded 
Wallace’s suggestions on to the BSAC office in London on 9 January 1904. Almost a 
decade after the 1894 Anglo-Congolese treaty, this was the first serious discussion 
about having any section of the Northern Rhodesia-Congo Free State boundary 
demarcated on the ground. It had been prompted more by the need to ensure a 
transport corridor through British territory than by any administrative problems with 
local populations arising from the lack of boundary identification on the ground.49
Wallace went on to detail his proposals for boundary adjustments in meetings 
with BSAC, Colonial Office (CO) and War Office (WO) officials in London during 
the summer of 1905.
  
50 The discussions continued to centre on trading the British 
territory south of Mpweto on the north shore of Lake Mweru for an adjustment along 
the meridian section to ensure the all-British transport route south of Bangweulu.51 
But as discussions continued, Codrington intimated that the area south of Mpweto 
was far more valuable to the Belgians (Congolese) than the area south of Bangweulu 
was to the BSAC and proposed additional boundary changes to give North East 
Rhodesia more territory along the Lake Tanganyika shoreline.52
                                                 
47 NRA 2/4/3/3 3944 Report, L.A. Wallace, October 1904 – submitted 6 January 1904. p. 6. 
 On 9 January 1906, 
Fred Graham (writing on behalf of the Secretary of State for the CO Lord Elgin) 
submitted these proposals to the newly-appointed British foreign minister Sir Edward 
Grey in the Foreign Office (FO) suggesting that negotiations should begin with the 
48 NRA 2/4/3/3 3944 Letter, R. Codrington to secretary of the BSAC London, 9 January 1904. 
49 A local BSAC administrator Frank Melland later recalled that the ‘hut tax’ was only enforced in 
North East Rhodesia after 1901 and even then without a population census it was difficult to enforce on 
the ground. He noted specifically that local populations in the swamps south of Lake Bangweulu would 
“take to the waters” when he approached to collect hut taxes (F. Melland, ‘Northern Rhodesia: 
retrospect and prospect’ Journal of the Royal African Society 29, no. 117 (1930): 490-498. 491-493). 
50 These meetings were attended by Major Charles F. Close (later Sir Charles Arden-Close) then of 
Military Intelligence who had led the British section of the 1898 Anglo-German boundary commission 
along the North Eastern Rhodesia-Tanganyika boundary just four years prior. 
51 NRA 3/1/1 vol. II 3948 Letter Graham CO to BSAC London, 31 August 1905. 
52 NRA 3/1/1 vol. II 3948 Letter Codrington to BSAC London, 19 September 1905. 
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Congolese government on boundary adjustments.53 In a stunning rebuke passed on to 
the BSAC by the CO on 3 February 1906, Grey said it was “useless” to approach the 
Congolese government on boundary adjustments and instead suggested: “it is 
desirable in the first place to determine by actual survey the position of the boundary 
as laid down by the [1894] Treaty.”54
Without any additional explanation it is difficult to understand why the FO 
responded so coldly to the BSAC’s request for boundary adjustments. Perhaps the FO 
was reluctant to negotiate with a Congolese government that was rapidly losing 
credibility with the international community?
 
55
 
 However, the wording of the FO 
response suggested that perhaps it was unwilling to expend significant diplomatic 
effort simply to secure the BSAC a few additional square miles of unknown African 
territory. Whatever the case, it was clear at this point that any adjustment or 
demarcation of the Congo-Northern Rhodesia boundary was effectively shelved by 
the British government.  
Continued administrative problems 
However, the lack of boundary demarcation became increasingly problematic for 
local administrators in the border areas, as both sides accused each other of territorial 
violations. In April 1907 a local Congo Free State official complained about the 
actions of the British assistant magistrate of the Serenji district south of Lake 
Bangweulu, Hector Croad, accusing him of harassing several local chiefs on the 
Congolese side of the boundary.56 When writing to the North East Rhodesia Secretary 
for Native Affairs to justify has actions, Croad remarked that Congolese police had 
been active building posts in British territory near the Luombwa river since 1901, up 
to 20 miles east of where he believed the boundary to be located.57 He wrote “During 
the last six years the work [Congolese police activity] has been greatly increased, and 
the west of the district kept in a continual state of unrest by the unsettled nature of the 
boundary.”58
                                                 
53 NRA 3/1/1 vol. II 3948 Letter Fred Graham CO to Sir E. Grey FO, 3 January 1906. 
 The Governor of Katanga, Monsieur E.J. Wangernicé, detailed the 
54 NRA 3/1/1 vol. II 3948 Letter Fred Graham CO to BSAC London, 3 February 190. 
55 The Casement Report on the dreadful treatment of local populations in the Congo Free State, largely 
as a result of the rubber trade, had been made public less than two years prior in 1904. 
56 NRA 3/3/1 vol. II 3950, Letter E. Wangernicé to Codrington, 4 April 1907. 
57 In his October 1904 report, Wallace mentioned that the Luombwa river had been used as the 
“working boundary” (NRA 2/4/3/3 3944 Report L.A. Wallace, October 1904 – submitted 6 January 
1905. 7). 
58 NRA 3/3/1 vol. II 3950 Letter H. Croad to the Secretary for Native Affairs, 18 April 1907.  
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accusations of Croad’s activities in a letter to Robert Codrington on 18 July 1907.59 
Codrington responded to Wangernicé’s complaints in December 1907 saying that 
Croad was censured for undertaking official duties so close to the boundary, even 
though, from the North East Rhodesia administration’s perspective, these activities 
were most likely exercised within what it believed to be British territory.60
Whilst the exact position of the boundary is undefined it is certain that 
disaffected natives will bring complaints to what they consider to be in their 
case the opposition ‘Boma’, and difficulties must present themselves to those 
officials immediately concerned whose great desire, whether Congolese or 
English, is to prevent disorder. It is in order to avoid these difficulties that our 
officials have always endeavoured to make some working arrangement with 
those of the Congo Free State but except with Mr. Massart that has been 
impossible; such an arrangement made even verbally between two neighbouring 
and friendly officials would prevent disorder and friction and could not have 
least effect on the ultimate delimitation of the originally agreed boundary line, 
nor could it in a country where authority is only exercised to keep order amongst 
the natives, have any disagreeable after affect.
 
Codrington also noted that Congolese activity was jeopardising peace in the area, and 
recommended that CFS officials should be given similar orders not to undertake 
administrative duties so close to the unmarked boundary, as a working arrangement:  
61
Wangernicé responded in January 1907 saying that he had issued orders for local 
authorities not to undertake activities so near the boundary but that he was still 
convinced Croad had crossed into Congolese territory, according their maps.
 
62
                                                 
59 NRA 3/3/1 vol. II 3950 Letter Wangernicé to Codrington, 18 July 1907. 
 Map 2 
illustrates the approximate geographic extent of the zone west of the Luombwa river 
that was to be avoided by administrators from both sides along the undefined 
meridian section south of Bangweulu.  
60 NRA 3/3/1 vol. II 3950 Letter Codrington to Wangernicé, 9 Dec. 1907.  
61 NRA 3/3/1 vol. II 3950 Letter Codrington to Wangernicé, 9 Dec. 1907. 
62 NRA 3/3/1 vol. II 3950 Letter Wangernicé to Codrington, 14 January 1908. 
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Map 2 Meridian section problems 
(Source: Design and Imaging Unit, Durham University) 
 
It was obvious that the ‘working arrangements’ of restricting administrative 
actions along the un-defined boundary or observing the Luombwa river as the de facto 
boundary were clearly not preventing administrative problems. This put serious 
pressure on the North East Rhodesia administration to get the de jure boundary 
marked on the ground. In late 1907 the BSAC made yet another attempt to facilitate at 
least better mapping of the boundary by suggesting to the CO that the Congo-Uganda 
boundary commission might travel south to survey the Congo-North East Rhodesia 
boundary after completing its work.63
                                                 
63 NRA 3/1/2 3949 Correspondence BSAC-CO November-December 1907. The 1906-08 Uganda-
Congo boundary commission mapped the southern section of the Uganda-Congo boundary on either 
side of Lake Edward and erected a total of 12 boundary pillars (IBS No. 108 1970). Ironically, the 
British section of the Uganda-Congo boundary commission was led by (then) Lt. Col. R.G.T. Bright, 
formerly of the North Eastern Rhodesia Constabulary, who had explored Mpanta point in August 1904, 
as mentioned above (C.M. Watson, History of the Corps of Royal Engineers (Chatham: Institute of 
Royal Engineers, 1915 reproduced 1954), 213. 
 The CO was receptive to this idea but 
Chapter 4 – Mapping over marking 1894-1914 
112 
commented that the BSAC would need to bear at least part of the cost of the survey. 
This was something that the BSAC was reluctant to do until a full cost estimate of 
such a survey could be obtained from North East Rhodesia.64
It is clear from the wording of Codrington’s 27 January 1908 memorandum 
that the commission’s ‘survey’ of the boundary would be a pre-requisite for 
demarcation; in other words, based on the maps produced by this survey, local 
officials could subsequently erect boundary pillars.
 In a January 1908 
memorandum, Codrington (now entitled Governor General of North East Rhodesia) 
endorsed the idea of having the Uganda-Congo boundary commission survey the 
Congo-North East Rhodesia boundary.  
65 However, Codrington noted that 
sleeping sickness was prevalent along the Mweru-Tanganyika boundary section and 
that cross border travel restrictions were in place that might have impeded the survey 
Congo-Uganda boundary commission. Nevertheless, he felt that the commission 
could journey farther south and survey the boundary south of Bangweulu where 
sleeping sickness was not prevalent, concluding that there was no reason these two 
sections (the meridian section and the Mweru-Tanganyika section) needed to be 
surveyed together.66
 
 It is likely that the presence of sleeping sickness and the cost of 
extending the Uganda-Congo boundary commission proved prohibitive as this 
commission was never sent to the Congo-North East Rhodesia boundary. In addition, 
international support for the independent Congo Free State was rapidly dissolving in 
1908. The territory became a formal colony of Belgium on 15 November 1908 and 
was re-named the Belgian Congo. 
A boundary commission at last 
After these abortive attempts, demarcation of the Belgian Congo-North East Rhodesia 
boundary finally gained momentum in the summer of 1910 when the BSAC directors 
met with L.A. Wallace (the former surveyor general who had become acting 
administrator of North Western Rhodesia) to discuss the ‘delimitation’ of all Northern 
                                                 
64 NRA 3/1/2 3949 Correspondence H.W. Just CO and D.E. Brodie BSAC, 26 November 1907 and 12 
Dec 1907. 
65 NRA 3/1/2 3949 Memorandum from Codrington, 27 Jan 1908. 
66 NRA 3/1/2 3949 Memorandum from Codrington, 27 Jan 1908. 
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Rhodesia’s boundaries.67
Mr. Wallace states that it is particularly desirable that frontiers which are 
described as parallels of latitude and meridians, or as straight lines between 
known points, should be demarcated and beaconed since until this is done it is 
impossible for officials of the Administrations concerned to know with any 
accuracy the limits of their respective territories. Uncertainty as to boundaries is 
liable at any time to cause friction between neighbouring Administrations, and 
the existence of considerable areas which must be regarded as debatable 
territory has a tendency to unsettle the minds of the natives who inhabit these 
districts.
 Subsequently, the BSAC made a dramatic appeal to the CO 
on 28 June 1910, to facilitate boundary demarcation around Northern Rhodesia:  
68
The BSAC specifically pressed the CO for demarcation of the Belgian Congo-
Northern Rhodesia boundary between lakes Mweru and Tanganyika and the meridian 
section south of Bangweulu, as well as the lengthy boundary with Portuguese West 
Africa. Although stating that the “delimitation of the portions of the Rhodesian 
frontier which are defined by rivers and watersheds is not urgent as a rule”, the BSAC 
did request that the Belgian Congo-Northern Rhodesia boundary section along the 
Congo-Zambezi watershed should be beaconed since it was not distinctly visible on 
the ground.
  
69
Apart from a vague letter by H.W. Just (on behalf of the Earl of Crewe CO) to 
the FO on 9 July 1910
 Just a month after this letter from the BSAC, the FO approached the 
Belgian government about the creation of an inter-colonial boundary commission to 
demarcate the Congolese-Northern Rhodesia boundary. 
70
                                                 
67 It is likely this was prompted by BSAC plans to unite North East and North West Rhodesia 
Protectorates which came about less than a year later in 1911 when the two were combined to form the 
Northern Rhodesia Protectorate, administered from Livingstone. 
 supporting the BSAC request for assistance with boundary 
issues, there is little archival material that reveals why this 1910 request had such an 
immediate impact, seizing the attention of the British government when so many 
previous attempts had failed. Although the Congo Free State had been considered 
something of a pariah state, Britain had not shied away from undertaking bilateral 
boundary demarcation as illustrated by the work of the 1906-08 Uganda-Congo 
boundary commission. Perhaps the input of L.A. Wallace was particularly influential 
with British imperial government officials. In his capacity as North Eastern 
68 NRA 1/4/4/3 3936 Letter from D.E. Brodie BSAC to Under Secretary of State CO, 28 June 1910. 
69 NRA 1/4/4/3 3936 Letter from D.E. Brodie BSAC to Under Secretary of State CO, 28 June 1910. 
70 NRA 3/1/1 Vol. II 3948. 
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Rhodesia’s surveyor general, Wallace had shown himself to be capable in the field, as 
his survey of the Luapula river had been published in the Geographical Journal in 
1907.71
Perhaps the most intriguing clues lie within the text of the 28 June 1910 letter. 
Distancing itself from earlier discussions about boundary adjustments, Brodie made it 
clear that the BSAC recognised the British government’s responsibility for the survey 
and demarcation of colonial boundaries: “My directors presume it will be necessary to 
appoint an International Commission and to select British officers to represent Great 
Britain.”
 In addition, Wallace may have made influential contacts when meeting with 
CO, FO and WO officials in the summer of 1905 to discuss boundary adjustments. 
They included Major Charles Close (later Sir Charles Arden-Close), a former 
boundary commissioner in Africa who had been chief of the Geographical Section of 
the General Staff in 1905 and was poised to become Director General of the Ordnance 
Survey in 1911.  
72
 
 This signalled supplication by the BSAC to the imperial government; 
recognising that demarcation of Northern Rhodesia’s boundaries were strictly an 
imperial concern and were content to let “Great Britain” take the lead. Although the 
BSAC held administrative control over Northern Rhodesia, the British government 
was recognised as territorial sovereign and therefore responsible for boundary issues. 
Other circumstances such as the unification of North East and North West Rhodesian 
administration may have drawn British government interests to the subject of 
Northern Rhodesia’s boundaries, but the speed of developments that immediately 
followed the 28 June 1910 BSAC letter indicate that it must have served as something 
of a catalyst.  
 
1911-14 Anglo-Belgian boundary commission     
 
Getting instructions 
The British FO contacted the Belgian Foreign Ministry on 26 July 1910 and proposed 
that an Anglo-Belgian mixed commission be dispatched to survey part of the Belgian 
Congo-Northern Rhodesia boundary. It was proposed that the commission begin at 
the point where the newly laid railway line intersected the watershed boundary and 
                                                 
71 Wallace, ‘North-Eastern Rhodesia,’. 369-395. 
72 NRA 1/4/4/3 3936 Letter from D.E. Brodie BSAC to Under Secretary of State CO, 28 June 1910. 
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work east along the eastern part of the watershed section of the boundary to the 
meridian section and then north to Lake Bangweulu.73 The request was also kept 
deliberately vague on the subject of demarcation, leaving open the possibility for 
boundary adjustments.74 The Belgian government was amenable to the idea of a 
boundary commission, but proposed instead that the entire length of the Belgian 
Congo-Northern Rhodesia boundary be both surveyed and demarcated on the ground, 
commencing at the tripoint with Portuguese West Africa (Angola) and working 
eastward.75
The British Director of Military Operations Brigadier Wilson, who drew up 
the initial June 1910 recommendations, had restricted his proposal to the boundary 
just along the eastern watershed section (near the railhead) and along the meridian 
section because those appeared to him to be the most important sections due to the 
administrative problems, and because the railway provided easy access.
 
76 He 
conceded that if the Belgians wanted the full boundary demarcated then practically 
speaking the commission should begin at the railhead, survey westward along the 
watershed to the tripoint with Angola located at the 24° E meridian and return east 
“erecting boundary beacons as they retrace their steps.”77 He estimated that this 
operation would take two years to complete. The British Treasury agreed in late 
March 1911 to fund inter-colonial commissions along Northern Rhodesia’s 
boundaries with the Belgian Congo and with Portuguese West Africa.78 Funding for 
the British contingent of the commissions was to come from the 1911-12 Colonial 
Services Vote and the CO indicated that the BSAC should “see no objection” at the 
very least to providing an escort since the commission itself was being funded entirely 
by the imperial government.79
Negotiations between the British and Belgian governments continued over the 
exact wording of the instructions for the Anglo-Belgian boundary commission and in 
January 1911 a Belgian representative met with Brigadier Wilson and officials from 
 
                                                 
73 NRA 1/4/4/3 3936 Letter Granville to Sir E. Grey, 16 August 1910. 
74 NRA 1/4/4/3 3936 Letter Granville to Sir E. Grey, 16 August 1910. 
75 NRA 3/1/1 Vol. II  Letter J. Davignon Belgian Foreign Minister to Sir A. Hardinge, British 
ambassador in Brussels, 11 August 1910.  
76 NRA 3/1/1 Vol. II 3948 Memorandum by Brigadier Wilson to FO, 7 September 1910.  
77 NRA 3/1/1 Vol. II 3948 Memorandum by Brigadier Wilson to FO, 7 September 1910. 
78 NRA 3/1/1 Vol. II 3948 Letter H.W. Just CO to BSAC, 29 March 1911. Demarcation of the 
Northern Rhodesia boundary with Portuguese West Africa was confined to the overland section from 
the tripoint with the Belgian Congo south to the Kwando river. The negotiations and preparations for 
this commission were slightly behind those for the Anglo-Belgian boundary commission. 
79 NRA 3/1/1 Vol. II 3948 Letter H.W. Just CO to BSAC, 29 March 1911. 
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the FO and CO in London. According to the final instructions agreed at these 
meetings, the Anglo-Belgian boundary commission was due to meet at the railhead on 
the Congo-Zambezi watershed on 1 September 1911 and divide into two groups. The 
main group, including the two commissioners, was to address the watershed and 
meridian sections while the second group (operating separately but still under the 
authority of the two commissioners) would address the Mweru-Tanganyika section.  
Mapping was the key priority for the commission which was given explicit 
instructions to survey and produce maps of the borderland area along the full length of 
the boundary.80 It was also instructed to gather information about the two 
controversial endpoints of the Mweru-Tanganyika section, the unknown position of 
“Cape Akalunga” on the southwest shore of Lake Tanganyika and the position of the 
boundary in relation to the Belgian town of Mpweto on the north shore of Lake 
Mweru.81 These two endpoints were to be mapped at a large scale in order “to give a 
very good idea of the ground.”82
Crucially, the only part of the boundary to be demarcated was the watershed 
section. Questions over the endpoints of the Mweru-Tanganyika section meant that 
the boundary commission’s maps and recommendations would inform additional 
negotiations on potential adjustments. However, it is puzzling that the instructions did 
not call for demarcation along the meridian section, since, according to Wilson’s 
explanation of the original proposal, this was the central area of concern due to the 
persistent administrative problems. It is likely the British government hoped to keep 
the meridian section open for potential adjustment and did not want to prejudice any 
future negotiations by marking it on the ground. While the commission’s final 
instructions included detailed references to topographic survey throughout (such as 
recommended elevation intervals noted in Article VII), the instructions for actual 
demarcation were much less specific.  
 
                                                 
80 Along the watershed section, mapping was to extend 10 km on either side of the boundary. Along the 
Mweru-Tanganyika section, mapping was to extend 10 km north and 25 km south of the perceived 
boundary line. Along the meridian section from Lake Bangweulu south to the watershed, mapping was 
to extend to the Munyangashi (a tributary of the Luapula) and 10 km to the east of the meridian 
(Instructions for the Anglo-Belgian commission appointed to demarcate the Rhodesia-Congo 
boundary, 1911, copy included in RC 609 Report by R. Walker, 15 January 1914.) 
81 For example, a 1:20,000 scale map of Mpweto was produced by the British commission in 1913 (CO 
1047/784). 
82 Article IV, Instructions for the Anglo-Belgian commission appointed to demarcate the Rhodesia-
Congo boundary, 1911, copy included in RC 609 Report by R. Walker, 15 January 1914. 
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The commission was instructed to erect boundary pillars along the ideal 
watershed “where necessary to show the line adopted.”83 The instructions did 
stipulate that if villages were found situated directly on the watershed, the boundary 
should deflect around the village lands at a distance of not more than 2 km to keep it 
solely situated in one territory.84 The only instructions on pillar construction stated 
that: “The frontier posts will be made of masonry or cement and will be numbered. 
The numbers will be given in the maps and protocols.”85
 
 This statement clearly 
conveys the importance of mapping over actual demarcation for the two governments. 
Without providing more instructions on the dimensions of, or distance between, 
boundary pillars, it was left up to the commission to mark the boundary on the ground 
as they saw fit, as long as the pillars were “numbered” for the “maps and protocols”. 
The actual marking of the boundary on the ground was of much less concern than its 
depiction through the imperial lens of mapping, a theme consistent with other British 
colonial boundary commissions throughout Africa at this time. 
Work in the field 
Because the Belgian and British contingents of the boundary commission effectively 
worked in separate groups, along three distinct boundary sections (watershed, 
meridian and Mweru-Tanganyika) it is difficult to piece together a complete narrative 
of the commission’s work. The main sources on the activities of the British section 
include Major R. Walker’s 1914 reports in the National Archive of Zambia file RC 
60986
                                                 
83 Article IIIb, Instructions for the Anglo-Belgian commission appointed to demarcate the Rhodesia-
Congo boundary, 1911, copy included in RC 609 Report by R. Walker, 15 January 1914. 
, E.A. Steel’s 1917 article in the Geographical Journal entitled ‘Congo-Zambezi 
watershed’ and the recollections of Sir Stewart Gore-Browne, a British officer on the 
84 Article III, Instructions for the Anglo-Belgian commission appointed to demarcate the Rhodesia-
Congo boundary, 1911, copy included in RC 609 Report by R. Walker, 15 January 1914. This 
seemingly pragmatic solution to the allocation of straddling villages was used along many other inter-
colonial boundaries such as the French Soudan-Gold Coast boundary (now the Burkina Faso-Ghana 
boundary) where the boundary was originally delimited along the 11° N parallel. However, the 1904 
Anglo-French boundary commission frequently deviated the boundary, mostly along right angles, to 
include villages either in British or French territory (FO 93/194). 
85 Article VII, Instructions for the Anglo-Belgian commission appointed to demarcate the Rhodesia-
Congo boundary, 1911, copy included in RC 609 Report by R. Walker, 15 January 1914. 
86 Some of the archive material related to the 1911-14 Anglo-Belgian boundary commission kept in the 
British Public Records Office (now the National Archives) may have been destroyed during the Second 
World War. The records of the boundary commission are also held in files CART 2071, 2073 and 2078 
(B15) at the African Archives of the ex-Ministry of African Affairs, Belgian Foreign Affairs, Brussels. 
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boundary commission, published in his 1964 article ‘The Anglo-Belgian boundary 
commission, 1911-14’ in the Northern Rhodesia Journal.87
The commission began its work in September 1911
  
88, and its progress was 
delayed (as was the case throughout its time in the field) by a lack of ‘carriers’ 
recruited from throughout Northern Rhodesia.89 With the single rail line being the 
only transport link (see Map 3, p. 102), carriers recruited from local districts were 
essential for supplying the commission in the field. The armed escort accompanying 
the commission was used largely for keeping discipline amongst the carriers.90 
Mapping was the clear priority as the commission’s first task through the autumn of 
1912 was to survey a series of triangles from what was at the time the northernmost 
point of the 30° E meridian triangulation chain.91 Although the Belgian and British 
parties worked separately, they kept in communication, comparing survey results and 
jointly constructing survey beacons.92
                                                 
87 Sir Stewart Gore-Browne later settled in Northern Rhodesia and became a prominent politician in 
Northern Rhodesia and the first years of Zambian independence. He kept diaries during his time on the 
boundary commission which are held in his private archives at his estate Shiwa N’gandu near the town 
of Mpika. See Chapter 3 pp. 66-67 for more information. 
  
88 The two contingents first met at the village of Sakania, located just north of Ndola and the site of the 
boundary visit in August 2007. 
89 RC 609 ‘Narrative’ section, Report by R. Walker, 15 January 1914. See also NRA 1/2/2 vol. II 6025 
Correspondence March 1912 between FO, CO, BSAC and Belgian Foreign Ministry, and NRA 2/1/12 
6030 Correspondence May-July 1914. 
90 RC 609 ‘Overall Observations’ section, Report by R. Walker, 15 January 1914. 
91 E.A. Steel, ‘Zambezi-Congo watershed’ The Geographical Journal 50, no. 3 (1917). 180-193. 180. 
92 The instructions had been silent about how the two sides would cooperate on surveys, and each side 
produced its own boundary maps. Discrepancies between the two map series would cause problems 
later. 
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Map 3: 1911-14 demarcation overview, pillars along the watershed 
(Source: Design and Imaging Unit, Durham University) 
 
In February 1913, the commission divided into two groups, with one group 
dispatched to survey the Mweru-Tanganyika section93 and the second continuing 
along the watershed aiming to meet the Anglo-Portuguese boundary commission at 
the tripoint with Angola in the spring of 1913. This would allow the Anglo-
Portuguese commission to connect with the British triangulation chain surveyed along 
the watershed.94 It was only at the end of February 1913 that the subject of actual 
demarcation gained attention. On 28 February 1913, the Belgian ambassador Lalaing 
in London sent a note to Sir Edward Grey suggesting that the task of demarcation 
might be left up to the local officials, with the boundary commission only marking the 
boundary in areas where local officials might find it difficult to identify the line.95
                                                 
93 Detailed survey instructions for the boundary commission along the Mweru-Tanganyika section were 
issued in November 1912 (NRA 1/1/7 6004 Letter WO to CO, 29 November 1912). 
 In 
spite of the British government’s initial lack of enthusiasm for having the boundary 
commission actually demarcate the boundary, Grey recoiled at the Belgian 
interpretation of the agreed instructions and provided extraordinary insight into the 
British imperial understanding of boundary demarcation: 
94 NRA 1/1/8 6004 Letter L. Harcourt CO to Gladstone,14 February 1913. 
95 NRA 1/1/8 6004 Letter Lalaing to Sir E. Grey, 28 February 1913.  
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It will be remembered that both the agreement and the instructions lay down 
that the duty of the Commissioners, as regards the frontier where it is formed 
by the Congo-Zambesi watershed, is to map the frontier and to mark the 
adopted line by boundary pillars. 
 His Majesty’s Government would also draw attention to the fact that it 
has been for long an accepted principle that, in cases where the Boundary 
Commissioners have to lay out the line of frontier, it is also part of their duties 
to mark it in its entirety. To lay out a frontier line correctly and represent it 
accurately on the map requires technical knowledge which local officials do 
not as a rule possess. It is only when the Boundary Commissioners are 
instructed to survey a zone, and possibly recommend a frontier but not to lay it 
out on the ground, that local officials are deputed to carry out the work of 
marking the line; and even then this is only done when the line adopted is 
marked by clear natural features, and technical knowledge is not required to 
identify it.96
According to Grey, only imperially-mandated boundary commissioners had the 
“technical knowledge” to identify complex, linear geographic features such as 
watersheds and meridians. While local officials only had the knowledge to identify 
“clear natural features”; presumably Grey was referring to features such as rivers or 
prominent ridgelines that were evident as linear, fixed and known to the ‘less 
knowledgeable’ surveyor. 
 
A premature end? 
Throughout 1913-1914, the boundary commission surveyed along the watershed and 
finally reached the tripoint with Angola at the 24° E meridian in early spring 1914. 
Survey work had been extremely difficult since the flat terrain, especially along the 
watershed west of Ndola, had required the commission to mount survey beacons and 
plane table platforms on numerous wooden structures.97 These structures required 
substantial manpower to build which, along with the seasonal rains and persistent 
transport problems, slowed survey progress considerably.98
                                                 
96 NRA 1/1/8 6004 Letter Sir E. Grey to Lalaing, 22 March 1913.  
  
97 Triangulation requires visible beacons usually located on higher elevations (e.g. hilltops) so that the 
angles and rays of the triangles can be accurately measured. 
98 See especially the photos and text in Steel, ‘Zambezi-Congo watershed,’ 181-182. Steel also notes 
that the Balunda people who lived in the tripoint area, had originally fled upon hearing the approach of 
the two boundary commissions. “However, when they heard we were only there to fix their boundaries 
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After fixing the tripoint with the Anglo-Portuguese boundary commission, the 
Anglo-Belgian boundary commission returned eastward and erected 35 boundary 
pillars (BPs 46-11, west to east)99 along the watershed. Although the original 
instructions had called for the marks to be built of “concrete or masonry”, most of the 
boundary pillars consisted of “5 to 6 foot lengths of 6-inch iron piping with a flange at 
the end” driven into the ground.100 These pipes were used normally as the bases for 
wooden telegraph poles and had been used as boundary pillars by numerous other 
colonial boundary commissions.101 Other pillars along the watershed section were 
made of 10 ft iron rails, set in a 2 ft concrete base with a wooden board bolted at the 
top.102
By April 1914 the boundary commission completed demarcation to BP 11, but 
this was the end of contract period for many of the recruited carriers. Without 
adequate transport to complete demarcation of the watershed section east from this 
point to the Mpanta meridian, the British contingent would have had to wait three 
months before new carriers could be recruited from other parts of Northern 
Rhodesia.
  
103 One of the British commissioners, Major Steel, had not won any friends 
among local officials in Northern Rhodesia whose complaints about his treatment of 
carriers had reached even the desk of the British High Commissioner in Cape 
Town.104
                                                                                                                                            
and make life more secure for them, they soon began to return and rebuild their villages and grow food, 
though it was some time before they could be prevailed upon to believe that people who were always 
climbing trees and building houses in the air, as they termed some of our beacons, could be up to any 
good” (Steel, ‘Zambezi-Congo watershed,’ 186). 
 In addition, with the First World War beginning in Europe, the WO was not 
keen for British army officers to remain idle in remote Africa for three months in 
order to demarcate a short stretch of colonial boundary that the Director of Military 
Operations did not feel was worth the trouble of demarcating: “Major General Wilson 
99 Similar to Map 1, the general overview provided by Map 3 shows the geographic position of 
boundary pillars erected by the 1911-14 boundary commission as an illustrative aid to follow the 
narrative. 
100 E.R.L. Peake, ‘Northern Rhodesia, Belgian Congo boundary’ Geographical Journal 83, no. 4 
(1934): 263-277. 264. 
101 W.F.S. Miles, Hausaland Divided: Colonialism and Independence in Nigeria and Niger (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1994), 4. Miles notes that the local people along the Niger-Nigeria boundary 
refer to the boundary posts as “tangaraho” which means telegraph pole in the Hausa language (Miles, 
Hausaland Divided, 1). 
102 RC 609 Memorandum by Fairweather, 30 Sept 1924. 
103 NRA 1/1/13 6006 Letter WO to CO, May 1914 and NRA 1/1/14 6007 Letter Steel to WO, 16 July 
1914.  
104 NRA 1/1/13 6006 Letter High Commissioner in Cape Town to NR Administrator, 11 June 1914.  
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is of the opinion that the beaconing of this portion of the boundary is of very small 
importance and that it is not worth any great expense.”105
Nevertheless, the British government agreed with Belgian recommendations 
that the remaining portion of the watershed boundary should be beaconed on the 
ground.
  
106 Since the watershed section was already surveyed, and the exact 
coordinates of the Mpanta meridian (29° 48’ 52.75 E) had been agreed jointly in 
1912, the WO had no objections for a Belgian survey party to complete demarcation 
of the watershed section eastward from BP 11 to the meridian and later send local 
BSAC authorities to verify the positions of the pillars.107 This plan was agreed by the 
Belgian government and a Belgian survey party from the boundary commission 
erected ten boundary pillars (BPs 11-1) in June 1914, including BP 1 that was 
positioned at the meridian turning point.108
It is unclear why the Anglo-Belgian commission erected pillars at certain 
locations along the watershed and not others, but the interval between the pillars 
varied considerably from 5 to 25 miles.
 
109 On average, the pillars were located 
approximately 15 miles apart.110
 
 A few of the triangulation beacons were sited on the 
watershed and were accepted as boundary pillars, but many pillars were not tied into 
the triangulation network, meaning that their positions could not be accurately 
identified by coordinates. Certainly with the pending exodus of carriers, the British 
contingent would have been eager to demarcate the watershed as quickly as possible 
as they returned eastward from the Angola tripoint. But beginning with their 
instructions and continuing through the fieldwork, actual demarcation of the 
watershed boundary was a low priority for the Anglo-Belgian boundary commission. 
Of much greater importance was the identification and mapping of the watershed, a 
task that, according to Sir Edward Grey, required the technical knowledge of an 
imperial boundary commission. 
                                                 
105 NRA 1/1/13 6006 Letter WO to CO, May 1914.  
106 NRA 1/1/13 6006 Correspondence between Lalaing and Sir E. Grey, 26 March 1914 and 22 April 
1914. 
107 NRA 1/1/14 6007 Letter WO to CO, 16 July 1914.  
108 NRA 1/1/14 6007 Letter J. Davignon Belgian Foreign Minister to Villiers British ambassador in 
Brussels, 26 June 1914. 
109 Peake, ‘Northern Rhodesia, Belgian Congo boundary,’ 264. See also the Anglo-Belgian Boundary 
Commission maps in CO 1047/355. 
110 RC 609 Memorandum by Fairweather, 30 Sept 1924. p. 2. Map 3 gives a general, small scale 
impression of the distances between many of the boundary pillars along the watershed. 
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Early African colonial boundary commissions    
 
Maps over marks 
To anyone even standing next to one of the 46 pillars erected by the 1911-14 Anglo-
Belgian boundary commission, the exact position of the boundary would have been 
impossible to visualise on the ground. The commission did clear a narrow path 
through the bush between the pillars for their traverse survey, but this would have 
quickly become overgrown and indistinct on the ground. However, when depicted on 
a map, the boundary was indicated and perceived visually as a distinct line running 
between clearly identifiable pillars.111 Knowledge of the boundary in its pure form as 
a fixed, linear and bilateral entity was available only to those who possessed and 
could understand the maps on which it was inscribed. This is not to mention the 
complexities of encoding maps based on the perception of spatial reality by the 
surveyor in the field through the communication of such codes to map readers. Such 
relationships are charted by Thongchai Winichakul in the Siamese tradition.112
As one of the last British colonial boundary commissions in Africa prior to the 
First World War, the 1911-14 Anglo-Belgian boundary commission was indicative of 
previous commissions in its prioritisation of boundary mapping over boundary 
marking.
 
113 Many other colonial boundary commissions were also given little 
instruction on how and where to construct boundary marks. The 1898-1899 Anglo-
German boundary commission along the North East Rhodesia-Tanganyika boundary 
between Lakes Nyassa and Tanganyika was given only one instruction for the 
construction of boundary marks: “beacons should be constructed as permanently as 
may be possible with the material obtainable.”114 On the ground, these turned out to 
be wooden posts approximately 3 metres in height surrounded by stone heaps at the 
base.115
                                                 
111 CO 1047/355, Anglo-Belgian Boundary Commission maps. 
 The 1898-1904 Anglo-German boundary commission along the 
Bechuanaland-South West Africa boundary was given detailed instructions on 
triangulation survey but only one instruction related to demarcation: 
112 T. Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 1994), 52-53. 
113 J.W. Donaldson, ‘Pillars and perspective: demarcation of the Belgian Congo-Northern Rhodesia 
boundary’ Journal of Historical Geography 34 (2008): 471-493. 478-482. 
114 FO 64/1549 S.C.N. Grant and D. Von Dankelman 1898  
115 Pictures of the boundary posts can be found in CO 1069/104. 
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6. After the completion of the triangulation, and the computation of the 
Latitudes and Longitudes of the points, permanent beacons should be erected 
to define the boundary. The number and distance apart of these beacons 
should be arranged according to local requirement.116
The instructions given to the Congo-Uganda boundary commission in 1910 specified 
that boundary pillars should be made of stone, but more importantly, should be 
numbered for “maps and protocols.”
 
117 Although the lack of stone along the Angola-
Northern Rhodesia boundary made demarcation difficult for the 1912-15 Anglo-
Portuguese boundary commission, the British WO recommended – and reiterated by 
the Portuguese government to its commissioner – that “any beaconing, even if not of a 
permanent character, is useful.”118 More tellingly, Brigadier Wilson followed this 
recommendation by saying: “It is quite doubtful if a second commission will ever be 
sent out to mark the boundary more permanently.”119
Given little direction, boundary pillars erected by early boundary commissions 
throughout Africa prior to 1914 were remarkably crude and unlikely to remain visible 
on the physical landscape for any great length of time. The iron pipes used by the 
Anglo-Belgian boundary commission were popular with other early boundary 
commissions, likely because they were easily acquired (since they were also used at 
the time as the bases for telegraph poles) and easy to erect. However, the local people 
along the Sudan-Ethiopia boundary found that the iron pipes could be used to make 
knives, arrowheads and other tools so they were quickly dismantled from the 
landscape.
   
120 The traditional cairn of heaped stones was another popular method for 
boundary markers. However, Al-Nur notes that again along the Sudan-Ethiopia 
boundary local people removed the stones soon after the cairns were erected, not in 
protest to the imperially-imposed boundary, but in order to be used for sharpening 
tools.121 Perhaps the least permanent of boundary markers was the popular method of 
simply ‘blazing’ or marking tree trunks. 122
                                                 
116 H. Laffan, H. Wettstein, Doering and D. Gill Report: The Boundary Survey between British 
Bechuanaland and German South West Africa (Berlin: Government publisher, 1904), 4. 
  
117 FO 93/1/22, Instructions for the German-British-Belgian boundary commission, 26 August 1910.  
118 NRA 1/1/7 6004 Memorandum WO, 14 Nov 1912. 
119 NRA 1/1/7 6004 Memorandum WO, 14 Nov 1912. 
120 T.H. Al-Nur, The Sudan-Ethiopia boundary: a study in political geography PhD thesis, University 
of Durham (1971), 116. 
121 Al-Nur, The Sudan-Ethiopia boundary, 116. 
122 Trees were usually marked either by burning or ‘branding’ symbols on their trunks, or by carving 
letters and filling them with tar (See Inclosure in No. 3, BFSP 1905-06). 
Chapter 4 – Mapping over marking 1894-1914 
125 
With limited time and resources, early colonial boundary commissions often 
deviated from the original description of the boundary in delimitation treaty texts in 
order to save the expense of erecting pillars. When suggesting to the German 
government in 1908 that portions of the Yola-Cross River section of the Nigeria-
Kameroon boundary should be adjusted to follow natural features, Sir W.E. Goschen 
argued: “The selection of natural features such as streams and rivers has many 
advantages, not the least of which is that far fewer boundary pillars are required.”123
…the frontier line should be drawn along the Jei River rather than that a line 
should be found east of that river, and at a distance of not less than 40 miles 
from the Nile. To mark out a line of this nature in an unexplored tropical 
country is a notoriously difficult, expensive and laborious task…His Majesty’s 
Government are unable to believe that the tract of country to be gained or lost 
by either party is of sufficient value to justify rectification of a plan which 
provides a distinct frontier easy both to ascertain and observe.
 
McEwan uncovers 1902 correspondence from Lord Landsdowne during negotiations 
with King Leopold II concerning the Uganda-Belgian Congo boundary: 
124
 
  
The 1898-99 Anglo-German boundary commission made numerous 
adjustments to the boundary between Lakes Nyassa and Tanganyika, originally 
defined in the 1 July 1890 treaty, in order to create a “workable boundary-line.”125 In 
his final report on this boundary commission, Close emphasised that natural features 
formed all but 29 miles of the 250 mile boundary agreed with the German 
commissioner.126 The 29 miles of what was called ‘artificial boundary’ was marked 
by just 23 pillars. One of these ‘artificial’ sections was changed from an indistinct 
watershed to follow straight-lines between the widely-spaced pillars, in order “to 
avoid the delay which would have been caused by exact investigation.”127
The northern section of the Angola-Northern Rhodesia boundary was 
originally delimited in a 1901 arbitral award (the Barotse Award) along the 24° E 
meridian extending north to the tripoint with Belgian Congo on the Congo-Zambezi 
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watershed. However, the 1912-15 Anglo-Portuguese boundary commission that met 
the Anglo-Belgian boundary commission in the field was instructed to propose any to 
adjustments to the line as long as they were within 10 miles of the meridian.128 
Likewise, the Anglo-Portuguese boundary commission shifted this northern section to 
a complex series of numerous local streams, and was marked on the ground by just 13 
pillars.129
In his influential 1906 article on boundaries, Major E.H. Hills
 
130 encapsulated 
the British attitude to early colonial boundary demarcation, saying “the question then 
to be answered is not, what is the best possible frontier line to select, but what is the 
best line that can be surveyed and laid out within a stated period of time and with a 
definite limit of cost?”131 Natural features, especially rivers/streams and watersheds, 
were considered preferable to the original delimitation treaties because they were 
believed to offer the three key characteristics of boundaries, being linear, fixed and 
visibly known. While some watersheds (as sharply defined ridgelines) and rivers may 
have constituted fixed, linear entities that could be visually recognised on the physical 
landscape, knowledge of their condition as ‘boundaries’ still had to be communicated 
to the borderland populations.132 Along the Angola-Rhodesia boundary north of the 
13° S parallel, it would have been difficult for the 1912-15 Anglo-Portuguese 
boundary commission to explain the complex course of the boundary following some 
20 river/stream sections and numerous overland sections, all of varying lengths, to the 
local population. In addition, recent research reveals that while boundary 
rivers/streams may appear as fixed and distinct blue lines on boundary maps, their 
observed nature on the physical landscape, particularly in areas with seasonal or 
erratic rainfall, is often much less distinct.133
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129 MR Zambia S.24; See also International Boundary Study (IBS) series, No. 119 Angola-Zambia 
Boundary Office of the Geographer, United State Department of State (1972), 4. 
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The impermanent and crude nature of boundary demarcation can be contrasted 
with the pains-taking effort that was expended erecting triangulation beacons. Like 
the 1911-14 Anglo-Belgian boundary commission, many other early colonial 
boundary commissions expended the vast majority of their time and effort on geodetic 
survey through triangulation and topographic plane-tabling. The un-scientific 
mechanics of building boundary marks would have taken valuable time and resources 
away from the more sophisticated activities of topographic survey. From 1898 to 
1902, the Anglo-German boundary commission working along the meridian and 
parallel boundary sections between British Bechuanaland and German South West 
Africa surveyed a lengthy chain of complex triangulation that skirted the western 
edges of the Kalahari Desert but erected just 41 pillars along the 817 km boundary 
north of the Nossob river.134 Accurate geodetic survey was such a priority for this 
boundary commission that the British party, led by H.D. Laffan, was under the direct 
control of Sir David Gill rather than through CO or WO officials. Gill was then HM 
Astronomer in Cape Town and architect of the 30° E meridian survey that was being 
heavily supported (politically and financially) at the time by Cecil Rhodes.135
The disparity between efforts towards demarcation and towards survey within 
the work of early boundary commissions in colonial Africa reveal how knowledge of 
boundaries was privileged to what Pickles described as the ‘cartographic gaze.’
  
136
As long as the map is accepted as a window on the world, these lines must be 
accepted as representing things in it with the ontological status of streams and 
hills. But no sooner are maps acknowledged as social constructions than their 
contingent, their conditional, their…arbitrary character is unveiled. Suddenly 
the things represented by these lines are opened to discussion and debate, the 
interest in them of owner, state, insurance company is made apparent. Once it 
 The 
pre-eminence of boundaries known on maps rather than known on the lived 
landscape, shows the inherent trust the British Empire had in the accuracy of these 
boundary maps; in the objective science of cartography at the time. In his work The 
Power of Maps, Denis Woods reveals how trust in the presumed objectivity of maps 
disguises their inherent subjectivity as social constructs: 
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is acknowledged that the map creates these boundaries, it can no longer be 
accepted as representing these ‘realities,’ which alone the map is capable of 
embodying (profound conflict of interest).137
The perceived ‘reality’ expressed on the maps produced by early colonial boundary 
commissions was the extent of recognised territorial sovereignty. Therefore, the 
accuracy of the map depended on the reliability of the surveyors in the field which is 
why the British imperial government entrusted boundary mapping only to military 
personnel, trained in the latest surveying techniques, male and disciplined in the 
military traditions of the British army and salaried by the imperial government. 
 
The privileged place of maps and mapping within British imperialism has 
been examined in other contexts. In his discourse on the role of the trigonometrical 
surveys in British India during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
Matthew Edney suggests the relationship between territory and maps was negotiated 
through surveying.138 He argues that British triangulation was “the key to the 
conceptual consolidation of a pre-existent ‘India.’”139 But even more crucially, Edney 
argued that surveying and mapping was a key expression of British superiority, “a 
principal means by which the British held themselves to be superior to the Indians and 
therefore worthy of the territorial sovereignty which they had acquired.”140 Taking 
this concept even farther, John Pickles challenges what he refers to as the ‘power 
knowledge’ interpretation of maps as instruments of power and calls for “some way 
of understanding the constitutive role maps play in shaping identity and practice.”141 
Boundary maps were not representing fact (the boundary as it appeared on the 
landscape) but rather a performance of the stylised model of territorial boundaries, 
again taking Harley’s call to interpret maps as texts rather than as mirrors of reality.142
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Simply gaining cartographic knowledge of the Belgian Congo-Northern Rhodesia 
boundary was a sufficient expression of sovereignty, known and recognised by the 
neighbouring imperial powers whose concept of ‘territory’ required linear and fixed 
boundaries. 
138 M.H. Edney, Mapping an Empire: The Geographical Construction of British India 1765-1843 
(Chicago-London: The University of Chicago Press, 1997), 21. 
139 Edney, Mapping an Empire, 21. 
140 Edney, Mapping an Empire, 32. 
141 Pickles, A History of Spaces, 114. 
142 J.B. Harley, ‘Historical geography and the cartographic illusion’ Journal of Historical Geography 
15, no. 1 (1989): 80-91. 84. 
Chapter 4 – Mapping over marking 1894-1914 
129 
In the same way, the penetrative indications of triangulation chains surveyed 
by colonial boundary commissions exposed the ‘blank spaces’ across the African 
continent.143 Triangulation platforms afforded European boundary commissioners 
with an elevated position that created distance between the subject and object that was 
indicative of the perceived supremacy of Cartesian perspectivalism.144 Positioned 
with scientific accuracy, triangulation positions, rather than boundary pillars, were the 
(seemingly) fixed points from which the topographic landscape could be accurately 
mapped; a fixed foundational web of triangles on which to overlay objective 
geographic knowledge.145
 
  
Early African colonial boundary commissions and British geographical 
science 
The field activities of British boundary commissions in Africa extended beyond 
geodetic and topographic survey to encompass a wide range of geographic interests. 
This reflects what Mary Louise Pratt calls the European “anti-conquest” of colonial 
territory, or the European benign intellectual possession of the world, largely through 
natural history discourses, that “differed sharply from overtly imperial articulations of 
conquest, conversion, territorial appropriation and enslavement.”146 Analysing the 
relationship between geography and empire, Felix Driver described how geographers 
of the late nineteenth century came to distinguish their subject “as one of synthesis, 
drawing together a range of different kinds of knowledge in order to construct 
accounts of particular places, regions or landscapes.”147 Borrowing the term from 
Joseph Conrad, Driver examined the myth of ‘Geography Militant’ that encompassed 
the romance and heroism of exploration: “the explorer as a missionary of science, 
extending the frontiers of (European) geographical knowledge.”148
                                                 
143 See especially the map entitled ‘Triangulations in East Africa’ in H.S.L. Winterbotham and G.T. 
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 While the writings 
of more traditional, imperial ‘explorers’ and ‘travellers’ of the late nineteenth century 
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have been critically examined in this vein149
British boundary commissions throughout colonial Africa were almost 
exclusively led by officers from the Royal Engineers, military men who conveyed 
masculinity and discipline, but trained in the ‘science’ of geographical survey, 
fulfilling the concept of the nineteenth-century ideal expeditionary traveller as 
described in Galton’s 1855 work The Art of Travel and examined by Driver.
, a similar critique must inform analysis 
of the first Anglo-Belgian boundary commission.  
150
The British Commissioners have nearly always been appointed from the Corps 
of Royal Engineers, and as in many cases the first reliable information of the 
geography of the African Colonies has come form the labours of the 
Commissions, it will be seen how important a part the Corps has taken in 
developing those parts of the Empire. No development can regularly proceed 
until sufficient and accurate maps have been obtained.
 Their 
contribution to the British imperial project was defined by Colonel Sir Charles 
Watson in his 1915 (reproduced 1954) History of the Corps of Royal Engineers: 
151
Similarly, Thomas Holdich saw both the processes of “exploratory” and 
“geographical” surveying as part of “the general art of topography” and was clear on 
the role of early boundary commissions in colonial Africa:  
 
All those surveys in Africa which have been carried out for boundary 
purposes…rank as geographical surveys in so far as they have been conducted 
for the production of maps on a small scale for illustration of the features of 
the country as a whole.152
When commenting on the 7 May 1907 presentation by Captain Smith to the RGS 
concerning the work of the Anglo-German boundary commission that demarcated the 
British-German East Africa boundary between Lake Victoria and Mt. Kilimanjaro, 
then Major Charles Close remarked: 
 
Our explorers and surveyors, like Captain Smith, do their best to make Africa 
uninteresting. We have every year a great succession of elaborate surveys – 
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and how elaborate, I suppose, only those know who are, so to speak, in the 
technical world – which are gradually reducing Africa to a place as well 
known as the United Kingdom.153
Yet in spite of their clear representation of ‘geography militant’, the records of 
colonial boundary commissions have rarely been subject to this critique. One notable 
exception is Graham Burnett’s examination of Robert Schomburgk’s exploration of 
British Guiana in the 1830s and 1840s which provides insight into the role of 
exploration and imperialism with regard to colonial boundary definition (Burnett 
2000). He describes how after four years of exploration in the interior of British 
claimed Guiana during the 1830s, Schomburgk passionately lobbied the British 
government to clearly define the boundaries of the colony.
 
154 In April 1840, the 
British government instructed Schomburgk himself to undertake this responsibility, 
including demarcation of boundary markers.155 Burnett describes how Schomburgk’s 
unilateral activities were at odds with the traditional boundary development rubric, 
since: “Schomburgk was instructed, in effect, to demarcate the boundary that he 
himself had delimited.”156 More importantly, when Schomburgk arrived in British 
Guiana in 1841 armed with an arsenal of instruments for geographic survey, Burnett 
poses the key question “Was he installing a boundary or merely making a 
topographical survey of the boundary areas in order to form the ‘base map’ for future 
negotiations?”157
As a private civilian acting unilaterally, certainly Schomburgk’s 1841-43 
boundary expedition was different from the later bilateral boundary commissions in 
Africa under discussion here. Indeed, Schomburgk was reprimanded by the British 
government for his demarcation efforts after protests were received from the Brazilian 
government and ordered to remove boundary marks that had been made in the field 
and refrain from making any boundary marks without the express consent of 
neighbouring government officials.
  
158
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entrusted Schomburgk159
Boundary commissions played an influential role in the perpetuation of “the 
contemporary myth of the imperial explorer” by the Royal Geographical Society 
(RGS) through the early decades of the twentieth century.
, as a robust explorer and scientist, to provide an accurate 
depiction of the British Guiana territory. Just as Sir Edward Grey noted above that 
only boundary commissioners possessed the “technical knowledge” to be entrusted 
with demarcation of the Belgian Congo-Northern Rhodesia boundary.  
160 Driver notes that the 
long-time president of the RGS, Clements Markham, was the most energetic 
supporter of this myth, but even in his wake: “Many of the presidents of the RGS 
during the first half of the twentieth century – notably Goldie, Curzon, Holdich, 
Younghusband and Close – had held high military or political office, and were happy 
to endorse the public image of the geographical tradition bequeathed to them by 
Markham and his predecessors.”161 Of the five presidents mentioned by name, Curzon 
was a vocal proponent of boundary commissions162, and both Holdich and Close had 
been boundary commissioners themselves. Close compiled his influential 1905 
Textbook of Topographical and Geographical Surveying based on the experiences of 
Royal Engineer officers in the field, largely on duty with boundary commissions.163
The reports of African boundary commissions reveal a much broader interest 
in geographic survey and exploration, beyond simply mapping the topographical 
terrain.
 
164
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 British boundary commissioners were often asked to present detailed 
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their fieldwork, which engendered a sense that their work was contributing to the 
burgeoning field of geography that, especially from the 1880s, was seeking to define 
itself as a scientific discipline.165 As Driver points out “To the explorer in search of a 
reputation, meanwhile, the picture of the traveller as merely the fact-gathering 
functionary of metropolitan science was anathema. Explorers like Livingstone, Burton 
and Speke fashioned themselves as the proud makers of geographical science rather 
than its humble employees.”166
The official reports from boundary commissioners in Africa during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries also included page upon page of geographic 
description, usually divided into sections covering categorised features of the physical 
and human landscape.
 
167 Walker’s report on the activities of the Anglo-Belgian 
boundary commission is a good example. The longest section of the report is the 
‘General Description of the country mapped, together with some general remarks on 
the climate, natives, game and outlook for the future.’168 As noted above, while 
Walker’s report did not document the actual positions of boundary pillars (only the 
positions of triangulation points were recorded), this ‘General description’ addressed 
issues from detailed descriptions of “Swamp birds” and wildlife to crude 
anthropological assessments of “The native”, “Native’s who work” and “Woman’s 
duties.”169
This multiplicity of geographic survey was also reflected in presentations 
before the RGS that were often given by boundary commissioners on their return and 
(many times) drawn directly from their official reports. The title of Steel’s 1917
  
170
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presentation to the RGS concerning the work of the Anglo-Belgian boundary 
commission was in reference to a geographic region, ‘Congo-Zambezi Watershed’ 
rather than to the boundary (Belgian Congo-Northern Rhodesia). The text centred 
almost exclusively on narrative descriptions of the physical and human geographies of 
166 Driver, Geography Militant, 67. 
167 Two examples particularly relevant for this case study include: FO 64/1549 Confidential Report 
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the borderland area, touching on geographic subjects as diverse as geology, 
meteorology, transport and communication.171 For several pages Steel even ventured 
an anthropological glimpse at the spirituality of people in the borderland, drawing on 
various encounters during his other travels and un-cited studies, and concluded: “It is 
impossible to describe or even imagine the tremulous condition of the savage mind, 
yet it is easy from their aspect and manners that they dwell in a state of never-ceasing 
dread.”172 Oddly ignoring the 35 pillars that had been erected by his commission, 
Steel’s only mention of the boundary stated: “The sketch-map illustrating this paper 
shows the line of watershed. Though the survey is complete delimitation is not 
complete, and the boundary is not demarcated.”173
Lt. (later Lt. Col. Sir) Raymond Boileau’s 1899 presentation on the work of 
the 1898-1899 Anglo-German boundary commission was taken, often verbatim, from 
Close’s 5 January 1899 official report on the boundary commission.
  
174
1. Racial features of the border tribes “The Balegga and Bavira are closely 
allied. Their physique is finer than the natives of either Ankoli of Toro; they 
belong to the Bantu race”
 Boileau’s 
presentation went into great detail about the flora, fauna and climate of the borderland 
area; the state of the Stevenson road between Lakes Nyassa and Tanganyika; and the 
‘customs and attitudes’ of the native populations, but there was no mention of the 
commission’s role in boundary demarcation. Bright’s 1908 presentation to the RGS 
on the work of the Congo-Uganda boundary commission is another good example. In 
three dizzying paragraphs Bright discussed three diverse geographic issues:  
175
2. Geology of the border area “The high plateau to the east of Lake Albert 
Edward and Ruwenzori consists mainly of gneiss, with intercalations of 
schistose rocks of various kinds and bands of quartzite”
 
176
3. Fauna of the border area “In the thick forest west of the Semliki valley 
elephant and buffalo were plentiful, but excepting parrots, there was very little 
bird life.”
 
177
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 Another major theme predominate within both the official reports of many 
British boundary commissioners and their RGS presentations was the ‘value’ of the 
colonial territory being surveyed. These assessments were largely indicative of the 
economic leanings of John Scott Keltie’s contributions to the RGS Hints to Travellers 
series in the last decade of the nineteenth century.178
Collier points out that when surveying a section of the Anglo-Portuguese 
boundary along the watershed of the Shire and Zambezi rivers, the British 
commissioner was keen to highlight a mineral deposit located on the Portuguese side 
of the boundary. The “blue-black” mineral was not identified but was deemed 
valuable enough by the commissioner for him to redefine the line along straight lines 
rather than precisely along the watershed, thus placing part of the deposit within 
British territory.
 The ‘value’ of territory was 
assessed almost exclusively in economic terms, either in relation to the presence of 
valuable natural resources, or the accessibility and suitability of areas for European 
settlement.  
179
In his official report on the Anglo-Belgian boundary commission, Walker 
concluded that the “quality” of the border area along the Congo-Zambezi watershed 
section was poor: 
 
One can only hope that when N.E. Rhodesia is fully opened up to prospectors 
and exploration, minerals (above all tin) will be discovered in workable 
quantities, for without this incentive to progress, this country will remain a 
backwater of empire for several years to come.180
Walker believed that in spite of the obvious fertility of the land in Northern Rhodesia, 
the tsetse fly and mosquito were key impediments to white settlement. He did hold 
that arduous nature of the country could be overcome by a hardy Victorian traveller: 
 
As long as the white man arrives healthy in the country – takes all reasonable 
care to avoid being bitten by blood-sucking flies – has a complete change for 6 
months every 2 years, is temperate in all things (a teetotaller for choice), 
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respects the sun, can stick loneliness, and doesn’t take to drugs, he will, 
barring accidents of the chase, live and enjoy it.181
 
 
Similarly, at the end of his lengthy 1899 confidential report on the Anglo-
German boundary between Lakes Nyassa and Tanganyika, Close remarked that parts 
of North East Rhodesia on the Lower Zambezi river (well south of the boundary with 
Belgian Congo) were fertile and healthy “a country with a future before it, in which a 
white man can live as comfortably as on the Hughli.”182 However, Close repeatedly 
poured scorn on the plateau region between the lakes where the boundary ran, which 
he concluded to be “remote, unhealthy, unprofitable country”183, “an outpost of 
territory of little value.”184 Although he believed the Stevenson road linking the two 
lakes could in future be an important transport artery, Close found that due to 
prevalent diseases “it is, of course, out of the question that this country could ever be 
fit for European colonization” and “it is unlikely, unless the native population largely 
increases in the next generation, that the country will be able to pay for its own 
Administration.”185
 
 
Questions on early colonial demarcation in Africa  
Given the early techniques of boundary demarcation undertaken by the 1911-14 
Anglo-Belgian boundary commission and their predecessors across Africa, two 
questions might be raised about their role in understanding the boundary development 
rubric. First, it might be argued that they were not engaged in demarcation at all, but 
in some kind of more advanced form of delimitation, recalling an earlier stage of 
boundary development. Due to some degree of overlap as noted in Chapter 2, it is 
difficult, and in many ways unhelpful, to define delimitation and demarcation as 
consequential stages in a systematic process, which is why this chapter has found it 
more useful to examine the practices of boundary commissions in how a boundary 
was made ‘known’. Nevertheless, however rudimentary and impermanent the 
boundary pillars may have been, the fact remains that these early boundary 
commissions were instructed by sovereign authorities to make some attempt to 
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indicate boundaries on the physical landscape with visible marks, the key definition of 
demarcation distinguishing it from other processes of boundary development. I do not 
agree with McEwen’s assertion that the distinction between delimitation and 
demarcation is simply “a matter of convenience rather than etymology” although such 
an approach does work around the legalistic/technical assumptions that delimitation 
must precede demarcation As examined in Chapter 2 my view is that these are two 
distinct, albeit often inter-linked, practices and the distinction is useful to analyse the 
different narratives associated with each. However, it is also helpful to take 
McEwen’s hint that while “the expressions Delimitation Commission and 
Demarcation Commission appear in boundary agreements it is necessary to look 
behind the formal title to discover exactly what the commission is required and 
empowered to do.”186
 Second, if it was acceptable for the imperial mind to ‘know’ the position of its 
colonial boundaries only through cartographic representation, why did the early 
boundary commissions undertake any kind of demarcation at all? Despite their 
rudimentary physical composition, the widely spaced pillars provided the ‘dots’ with 
which to connect the linear and fixed boundary when represented on maps, rather than 
on the physical landscape.
 While his point here is that boundary commissions may have 
undertaken survey and mapping duties alongside erecting pillars, my view is that if 
any effort was made to physically mark the boundary on the ground then their duties 
must be construed as demarcation. 
187
Systems of meaning are inscribed in maps through the lines, boundaries and 
symbols that give meaning and reality to the world. These are not mere 
representations of reality but come to represent objects whose existence is in 
part conditioned and produced by their representation.
 It was the boundary commission maps that inscribed 
these boundary pillars with their own reality, irrespective of their permanence on the 
landscape. In his critique of Geoff King’s 1996 work Mapping Reality, Pickles 
suggests: 
188
                                                 
186 McEwen 1971. p. 43. 
 
187 See Burnett, Masters of All They Surveyed, 209-210. 
188 Pickles, A History of Spaces, 32. 
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This is particularly the case on small scale maps where the depicted distance between 
pillars was reduced, again perpetuating the geopolitical gaze through which Africa 
had been seen throughout the original partition.189
However, perhaps the moniker of ‘demarcation’ was simply a guise used to 
mask what were in essence imperially-funded, exploratory expeditions, probing the 
outer limits of imperial territory for anything of economic benefit. The use of 
boundary commissions for exploring remote areas during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries was not limited to Africa. Karl Meyer and Shareen Brysac suggest 
that the 1911-13 expeditions of Frederick M. Bailey and Capt. Henry Morshead into 
the Tibetan borderlands and frontier areas of China was “clearly an intelligence 
mission, linked to British efforts at demarcating India’s North-East frontier.”
 
190 In his 
historical analysis of the Mexico-United States 1848-57 boundary commission, 
Joseph Richard Werne reviews the arduous surveys undertaken by the commission of 
previously unknown terrain in the American southwest.191 As already addressed 
above, Robert Schomburgyk’s efforts to ‘find’ the boundaries of British Guiana in 
1841 could easily be interpreted as an imperially-mandated scientific expedition.192
In addition, perhaps this rudimentary method of demarcating the Belgian 
Congo-Northern Rhodesia boundary was more reflective of the British governments’ 
own perception of territorial sovereignty within the administratively disparate African 
territories. It is important to recall that North East (and later Northern) Rhodesia was 
first administered by the BSAC rather than by the British government directly and at 
the time of the 1911-14 Anglo-Belgian boundary commission it was technically 
considered a protectorate (not a colony). However, British imperial officials were 
under no doubt that whatever their administrative distinction, these were all British 
boundaries as was clear in Edward Hertslet’s multiple editions of Map of Africa by 
Treaty. In his famed 1907 Frontiers lectures, Lord Curzon also made no distinction 
between boundaries around British colonial possessions regardless of their technical 
administrative status; they were all considered British, and therefore British 
territory.
 
193
                                                 
189 Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 24-25. 
 
190 K. Meyerand S. Brysac 1999 Tournament of Shadows: The Great Game and the Race for Empire in 
Asia (London: Abacus, 1999), 431. 
191 J.R. Werne, The Imaginary Line: A History of the United States and Mexican Boundary Survey 
1848-1857 (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 2007), 226-227. 
192 Burnett, Masters of All They Surveyed. 
193 Curzon, Frontiers, 9. 
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Most importantly, while the local and native administrators in Northern 
Rhodesia’s border areas implored their superiors to mark the boundary with Belgian 
Congo clearly on the ground, they were often left with just the opposite; at best, 
widely-spaced pillars and a series of map sheets. It might be construed that easing the 
administration of local ‘native’ borderland populations was not a sufficient cause for 
the expense of clear boundary demarcation. Instead, the division of local colonial 
administration, like that along the meridian section of the Belgian Congo-Northern 
Rhodesia boundary, was often left as tacitly understood zones of non-interference. As 
analysed in Chapter 2, zonal divisions (frontiers) were considered by European 
scholars and government officials as aspects of under-developed, pre-colonial African 
political entities. Indicative of what might be described as the ‘imperial moment’ in 
the narrative of the boundary, cartographic knowledge of the boundary as fixed, 
bilateral and linear was considered a sufficient expression of territorial sovereignty by 
the neighbouring imperial governments. The imagined depiction of a continuous line 
on a map without any perceived overlapping claims or ambiguous gaps, was sufficient 
to prevent major disputes between neighbouring imperial powers. In the context of the 
Belgian Congo-Northern Rhodesia boundary, this changed dramatically following the 
First World War and the discovery of economic resources.
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5. Marking over mapping 1914-1934 
 
“But when a line is to be run it must run upon the ground; that is it must be definite 
and continuous. It cannot alter its position with every minor circumstance. It must 
have the advantages even while recognising the defects, of the broad and the general.” 
Isaiah Bowman, 19281
                                                 
1 I. Bowman, The New World: Problems in Political Geography (London: George Harrap and Co. Ltd., 
1928), 32. 
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Unanswered questions         
 
This chapter returns to the historical narrative of the Belgian Congo-Northern 
Rhodesia boundary in the wake of 1911-14 Anglo-Belgian boundary commission. 
Following events after the First World War, it will be shown how the Belgian Congo-
Northern Rhodesia boundary remained a subject of debate between British and 
Belgian governments as well as within the British colonial administrative hierarchy. 
There was continued confusion between the British imperial and Northern Rhodesian 
governments as to who held the sovereign responsibility for boundary demarcation. 
More significantly, it will be shown how the administrations’ perceptions of the 
boundary itself changed dramatically alongside a change in the economic geography 
of the borderland area. This led to re-demarcation of the boundary by a second Anglo-
Belgian boundary commission, and a complete shift in how the boundary was made 
‘known’. 
There are three progressive questions within this historical narrative that must 
be posed in order to chart the reasoning behind why this second boundary commission 
was dispatched and how its work was exceptionally different from its predecessor. 
First, how did the perception of the Belgian Congo-Northern Rhodesia border 
landscape within the British imperial mindset change after the conclusion of the 1911-
14 Anglo-Belgian boundary commission? Second, what caused this change in 
perception? And third, how did this change in perception manifest itself in the process 
of demarcation and in the way the boundary was made ‘known’? After examining 
these issues through the historical narrative, they are compared with similar situations 
across colonial Africa. These issues are then examined in light of more recent post-
colonial discourses, interrogating the often neglected role economic geography played 
in colonial boundary demarcation throughout British-administered Africa in 
particular. 
 
Aftermath of the 1911-14 boundary commission    
The conclusion of the Anglo-Belgian boundary commission in May 1914 left a 
number of unanswered questions. Most importantly, the lack of demarcation on both 
the Mweru-Tanganyika and Mpanta meridian boundary sections had left them open 
for further negotiations between the Belgian and British governments. The BSAC 
continued to lobby for adjustments along the meridian section, in order to ease the 
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transport issue between the growing administrative town of Ndola and the Luapula 
river as well as Fort Rosebery farther east.2 Proposed boundary adjustments were 
forwarded to the British delegation at the Paris Peace conference in June 1919 for 
negotiation with Belgium. These were reviewed by Major Wynne, a former boundary 
commissioner himself attached to the British delegation in Paris, who formalised the 
proposals and passed them on to Lord Curzon, the then appointed British Foreign 
Secretary.3 But the BSAC heard nothing from the FO until a year later, when under 
Secretary of State Henry Lambert explained that the Belgian Congo-Northern 
Rhodesia boundary had been left out of the territorial discussions at the Paris Peace 
talks and would not be addressed until the fate of ex-German East Africa was 
concluded.4 Nevertheless, the CO again pressed Lord Curzon to address the issue of 
boundary adjustments with the Belgians in April 1921, knowing that negotiations over 
ex-German East Africa were coming to an end.5 In October 1921, after an approach 
by the FO, the Belgian government agreed to re-open talks on the Congo-Rhodesia 
boundary.6
 The British position on adjusting the boundary was based on Major Wynne’s 
1919 proposals, which had been heavily influenced by BSAC requests.
 
7
                                                 
2 See especially M.C. Musambachime, ‘Military violence against civilians: the case of the Congolese 
and Zairean military in the Pedicle 1890-1988’ The International Journal of African Historical Studies 
23, no. 4 (1990): 643-664; and M.C. Musambachime, ‘The role of Kasenga (eastern Shaba) in the 
development of Mweru-Luapula fishery’ African Studies Review 38, no. 1 (1995): 51-68. 
 Throughout 
1922, several proposals and counter-proposals passed between the FO, CO and 
BSAC, the majority of which called for an adjustment of the meridian section to 
provide a more direct territorial link from Ndola to the Luapula river, while 
compensating Belgian Congo with adjustments on the Mweru-Tanganyika line. 
Throughout this internal British correspondence, the existing demarcation along the 
watershed section was never mentioned, indicating that as far as the British and 
Northern Rhodesia governments were concerned, the watershed section, particularly 
from BP 11-46 (less so BP 1-11 since this had not yet been inspected by a British 
3 RC/609 Report accompanying the letter from Henry Lambert FO to BSAC, 1 July 1919. 
4 RC/609 Letter H. Lambert (FO) to BSAC, 13 July 1920. 
5 RC/609 Letter Gilbert Grindle (CO) to FO, 18 April 1921. 
6 RC/609 Letter H. Jaspar, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Sir G. Grahame, British ambassador 
in Brussels, 19 Oct 1921. 
7 RC/609 Letter Millar (BSAC London) to CO, 6 March 1922 and RC/609 Report accompanying the 
letter from Henry Lambert FO to BSAC, 1 July 1919. 
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official8
 
) was effectively a fait accompli. No one questioned the existing work of the 
Anglo-Belgian boundary commission, focusing instead on the two sections that had 
been left undemarcated. This all changed in 1923-24.  
Copper and boundary pillars        
Copper mining had been prevalent along the Congo-Zambezi watershed for centuries, 
but both the Katangan and Northern Rhodesia colonial administrations had little idea 
as to the extent of these deposits. In 1919 the Northern Rhodesia administration had 
even enquired among the local populations about the extent of mineralised areas.9 The 
Belgian Compagnie du Katanga and Union Minière du Haut Katanga had established 
operations along the Congolese side of the watershed in 1906, but full scale copper 
mining did not begin until 1921. By the end of the 1920s the Belgian Congo was the 
world’s third largest exporter of copper with 5.8% of world output of smelter 
production.10
In 1898, George Grey and a group of British prospectors ‘discovered’ the 
Kansanshi copper mine just 12 miles south of the watershed, but there was no 
substantial mining operations on the Northern Rhodesia side prior to 1920. This 
changed dramatically in 1922 when the BSAC, holder of exclusive mining rights over 
all Northern Rhodesian territory, “altered its policy of granting individual prospecting 
licenses to one of granting exclusive prospecting rights to large companies.”
 
11 One of 
the new prospecting licenses was issued to the Rhodesia Congo Border Concession 
Ltd. (RCBC) in 1922, a subsidiary of Minerals Separation Ltd.,12
On 16 August 1923, the RCBC approached Northern Rhodesia’s chief 
surveyor William Fairweather for more information regarding the boundary pillars 
 and covered a 
52,000 sq mile area that was located directly along the Congo-Zambezi watershed.  
                                                 
8 Although none of the archival material suggests that the British deliberately entrusted demarcation of 
BPs 1-11 to the Belgians in order not to prejudice their negotiating position on boundary adjustments, it 
is interesting to note that while most sources indicate the British section of the 1911-14 boundary 
commission on the watershed was recalled to Britain as a result of the First World War, BPs 1-11 were 
located along precisely the section of the boundary that the BSAC was eager to shift the meridian 
section. 
9 RC/609 Letter Matthews (Asst. Native Commissioner Mporokoso) to Native Commissioner in 
Abercorn, 26 March 1919. 
10 B. Fetter, ‘If I had known that 35 years ago: contextualizing the copper mines of central Africa’ 
History in Africa 26 (1999): 449-452. 450. 
11 C.E. Harvey, The Rio Tinto Company: An Economic History of a Leading International Mining 
Concern 1873-1954 (London: Alison Hodge Publishers, 1981), 228. 
12 Minerals Separation Ltd. was acquired in 1929 by the mining super-giant Rio Tinto (Harvey 1981, p. 
230). 
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along the watershed.13 Previously, the Northern Rhodesia survey department had 
supplied the RCBC with maps and survey data from the 1911-14 boundary 
commission, but the company found that the survey data documented the position of 
triangulation beacons and not the boundary pillars. “It is extremely important to us to 
establish accurately the boundary on the ground at various points between beacon 16 
and beacon 29, N.W. of Elisabethville as well as elsewhere, because our prospecting 
work may disclose deposits very close to the line….”14
First, it emerged that the British section of the 1911-14 boundary commission 
had never produced a definitive list of the boundary pillars on the ground.
 This request for more 
information about the watershed boundary was passed on to the BSAC offices in 
London in September 1923 which then made enquiries with the CO. Acting on the 
advice of the CO, the top officials of Minerals Separation in London were put in 
contact with the WO, more specifically with Colonel Harold St. John L. 
Winterbotham, who had become director of the Geographical Section of the General 
Staff in military intelligence (MI4). After what was perhaps quite literally a shuffling 
of papers, a number of problems were uncovered.  
15 However, 
the Belgian commission had produced a lengthy draft report defining the position of 
all 46 boundary pillars by coordinates and geographic description.16 The CO feared 
that because both the lead British commissioners (Gilliam and Walker) had died 
during the First World War, there was little hope of obtaining the survey details for 
both the boundary pillars and triangulation beacons.17
Second, because the British and Belgian contingents had surveyed separately, 
they produced two different sets of maps for the watershed and meridian sections, the 
British at 1:250,000 scale and the Belgian at 1:200,000 scale.
 
18
                                                 
13 RC/609 Letter R. Brooks to Fairweather, 16 August 1923. 
 It also emerged that 
the British maps had never actually been produced (printed) and “the only map in 
existence is the one which has been made by the Belgian government, which has been 
14 RC/609 Letter,R. Brooks to Fairweather, 16 August 1923. 
15 RC/609 Letter C.T. Davis CO to BSAC London, 9 January 1924. 
16 Trans. ‘Descriptive Rough Draft of the Frontier between the Belgian Congo and Rhodesia 
constituted by the water parting of the basins of the Congo and Zambesi rivers’ in WO 181/187 and 
accompanying RC/609 RCBC Memo and cover letter by H.C. Hankins, Minerals Separation to the CO, 
29 November 1923. This Belgian report appears to have been forwarded to the FO in 1918 with the aim 
of having the results and maps of the commission being formally accepted in a ‘proces-verbale’. (See 
RC/609 Letter C.T. Davis CO to BSAC London, 9 January 1924.) 
17 RC/609 Letter C.T. Davis CO to BSAC London, 9 January 1924. 
18 British maps of 1911-14 boundary commission CO 1047/355, 1:250,000 produced 1924 sheets 1-5 
cover watershed (starts at BP 11, 29° E); Belgian maps 1:200,000 meridian section only CO 1047/782. 
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practically accepted by the Rhodesian authorities and by the public as representing 
what the boundary is between Belgian Congo and Northern Rhodesia.”19 Without 
British maps to hand, Northern Rhodesian officials had provisionally accepted the 
boundary as shown on the Belgian maps.20
Perhaps slightly embarrassed that the only depiction of this British colonial 
boundary was on a foreign map, the WO quickly printed the British maps in late 1923 
(reaching full production in 1924)
  
21 and compared them with the Belgian maps and 
draft report on the boundary pillars. This comparison revealed many discrepancies 
between the Belgian and British maps, even in relation to the boundary line along the 
watershed.22 In discussing the Belgian depiction of the boundary with a CO official in 
November 1923, Col. Winterbotham noted that “it certainly appeared that the 
Belgians had taken full advantage of the situation so as to place the Border as far to 
the South as possible at points where minerals were known to exist.”23
Minerals Separation was unimpressed with the British government’s lack of 
coherent information about the boundary, and its chairman Francis Gibbs sent a 
sternly worded letter to the CO on 14 March 1924 with the clear aim to focus imperial 
attention on this boundary, since knowledge of its position on the ground was rapidly 
growing in importance: 
 
The whole question of the boundary between the two countries is one of 
greatest importance from an Imperial point of view as well as from the point 
of view of my Company holding as it does a Concession of all the mineral 
rights in Northern Rhodesia. It is further of vital importance that a settlement 
of a fair boundary between the two countries should be arrived at at the 
earliest possible opportunity, in view of the copper and other mineral 
potentialities of Northern Rhodesia, which have become prominent and the 
value of which until quite lately has not been appreciated. Several of the 
valuable mineral discoveries made on the Belgian Congo side undoubtedly run 
into Northern Rhodesia and now that my Company have fortunately been able 
to place before the Colonial Office our knowledge regarding the potential 
                                                 
19 RC/609 RCBC Memo and cover letter by H.C. Hankins, Minerals Separation to the CO, 29 
November 1923. 
20 RC/609 Letter C.T. Davis CO to BSAC London, 9 January 1924. 
21 CO 1047/355. 
22 RC/609 Report by Captain Knox accompanying the RCBC Memo and cover letter by H.C. Hankins, 
Minerals Separation to the CO, 29 November 1923. 
23 RC/609 Letter by H.C. Hankins, Minerals Separation to the CO, 29 November 1923. 
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mineral resources of Northern Rhodesia, it seems very necessary that the 
boundary should be so definite that an absolutely fair division between the two 
countries should be arrived at. 
 It is, of course, common knowledge that frequently the failure to define 
boundaries exactly between two nations has caused international trouble and 
there appears to be a situation existing between Belgian Congo and Northern 
Rhodesia which at any moment might involve a dispute arising as to where the 
boundary between the two countries actually is.24
What is remarkable about Gibbs’ letter is that it represents a complete shift in 
geographic perspective on this territory. Despite being the subject of so much British 
government interest in previous years, Minerals Separation and the RCBC were 
largely unconcerned about bargaining with Belgium for boundary adjustments; 
trading bits of territory at a small scale perspective. Instead, Gibbs’ primary concern 
was to understand precisely where the boundary ran on the ground. The 46 widely 
spaced pillars left the boundary line, and therefore the division of natural resources, 
indeterminate. 
  
 Fairweather was sympathetic to Gibbs’ concerns about the position of the 
boundary along the watershed: “I do not think the representations of Mineral’s 
Separation Ltd. can be ignored and steps should be taken to more clearly define the 
Boundary on the ground by placing intermediate beacons in such a manner as to leave 
no doubt as to the actual boundary.”25 Having inspected boundary pillars 16 and 17 
himself, he noted that with approximately 15 miles of dense bush between each pillar 
“it is quite an impossibility for any one to determine in which direction to turn so as to 
traverse the actual watershed between the two beacons.”26 His conclusion was that the 
watershed section of the boundary required more thorough demarcation as soon as 
possible, and while he suggested the mining companies could help fund such 
demarcation work, he failed to specify if this should be undertaken by the Northern 
Rhodesia survey department or by another imperial boundary commission.27
                                                 
24 RC/609 Letter Gibbs, Minerals Separation to the CO, 14 March 1924. 
  
25 RC/609 Memorandum, William Fairweather to Chief Secretary, Northern Rhodesia, 30 September 
1924. 
26 RC/609 Memorandum, William Fairweather to Chief Secretary, Northern Rhodesia, 30 September 
1924. 
27 RC/609 Memorandum, William Fairweather to Chief Secretary, Northern Rhodesia, 30 September 
1924. 
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The governor of Northern Rhodesia, H.J. Stanley passed Fairweather’s 
recommendations along to the CO in a confidential dispatch on 6 October 1924. After 
several months, the newly installed Secretary of State for the Colonies, Leo Amery, 
responded in June 1925 when forwarding the recently-published British boundary 
commission maps. Amery was largely unmoved by Stanley’s request for demarcation, 
and instead was more concerned with verifying the accuracy of the Belgian and 
British boundary maps so they could be ratified in a proces verbale.28 In addition, he 
was still interested in negotiating a boundary adjustment to permit access from 
Serenje to Fort Rosebery across the Luapula (see Map 2, p. 94). Amery suggested that 
the first priority should be the survey of BPs 1-10 along the watershed. These had 
been erected unilaterally by the Belgian commission and were particularly important 
because this was the area of interest to Minerals Separation Ltd.29 Such a survey was 
to be carried out by “a qualified officer” who could then suggest if additional 
demarcation was necessary.30 Amery felt additional demarcation of other parts of the 
watershed boundary was unnecessary “except in any part where mining or agricultural 
operations are probable in the near future.”31
In August 1925, E. Eccles, acting as director of surveys in Fairweather’s 
absence, responded to Amery’s comments in a memo to the chief secretary of 
Northern Rhodesia and agreed it would be advantageous to shift the meridian 
boundary section to the Luombwa river in order to provide access across the Luapula. 
However, he believed this would first require a report on “the nature of the country 
and the number of natives affected.”
 Amery’s comments hinted at the 
imperial government’s prioritisation of colonial territory based on economic 
geography. The clear demarcation of Northern Rhodesian territory was reserved for 
those areas that possessed some kind of economic benefit, an issue that will be 
analysed from recent postcolonial critique at the end of the chapter.  
32 Eccles shared Fairweather’s desire for re-
demarcation along the watershed boundary and stated “it is to be regretted that it is 
not deemed necessary to define more clearly the whole boundary.”33
                                                 
28 RC/609 Letter Amery to Stanley, 30 June 1925. para. 6. 
 Nevertheless, 
Eccles felt it was at least necessary to re-demarcate from BP 1-27 but said his 
department did not have the staff even to review the existing pillars, much less 
29 RC/609 Letter Amery to Stanley, 30 June 1925. para. 6. 
30 RC/609 Letter Amery to Stanley, 30 June 1925. para. 7. 
31 RC/609 Letter Amery to Stanley, 30 June 1925. para. 8. 
32 RC/609 Memorandum Eccles to Chief Secretary, 5 August 1925. para. 3. 
33 RC/609 Memorandum Eccles to Chief Secretary, 5 August 1925. para. 6. 
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conduct full demarcation.34 Governor Stanley passed Eccles’ memo on to Amery in 
September 1925, re-emphasising the key points, and estimated that the cost of 
Northern Rhodesian officials erecting more boundary pillars between BPs 1-17 would 
cost £5,500 and require at least two additional surveyors.35
Fairweather had recommended in his June 1925 memo that there were two 
alternatives for additional demarcation along the watershed section. First, additional 
boundary pillars could be erected and the boundary would follow the exact line of 
watershed on the ground between the pillars. Second, additional pillars would be 
erected and the boundary would follow ‘straight’ lines
 Stanley suggested that the 
BSAC should be asked to contribute funding for demarcation and, as an almost off-
hand suggestion, assumed that the British government would need to approach the 
Belgians for their participation. 
36 between the pillars rather 
than the watershed line itself.37
 
  
 
 
Figure 1 Model showing disparity in ‘straight’ v watershed lines between boundary pillars 
 
                                                 
34 RC/609 Memorandum Eccles to Chief Secretary, 5 August 1925. para. 7. 
35 RC/609 Letter Stanley to Amery, 4 September 1925. 
36 N.B. Because the Earth’s surface is not flat, no lines on its surface can be deemed ‘straight’. In this 
context, the term straight line is meant to be a line of constant bearing between two identified points.  
37 RC/609 Memorandum William Fairweather to Chief Secretary, Northern Rhodesia, 30 September 
1924. para. 10. 
Chapter 5 – Marking over mapping 1914-1964 
  149 
The farther apart the boundary pillars, the more potential discrepancy there could be 
between a boundary following the watershed and a boundary following ‘straight’ lines 
(see Figure 1). The presence of copper deposits along the watershed made every 
square inch of territory potentially valuable.38 With reports reaching Livingstone in 
June 1925 of a local Belgian administrator having moved BP 40 to Belgian Congolese 
advantage39
Concern about the mineral deposits in relation to the boundary was the main 
subject of correspondence between the Director of Military Operations, Major 
General Sir John Burnett-Stuart and the CO between October 1925 and February 
1926.
, the Northern Rhodesian and British governments were becoming more 
and more anxious about the exact position of the watershed boundary on the ground.  
40 Both agreed that inspection of the BPs 1-10 was an absolute priority. Even 
more so, Sir Burnett-Stuart raised concerns about the ownership of the mineral 
resources with the Belgian and British concessions located so close to the watershed 
and recommended that any new mining developments should be kept at some distance 
from the boundary.41 Amery forwarded these comments on to Stanley in March 1926 
and posed the question at the heart of the matter: “I shall be glad if you will inform 
me whether you consider that there is any likelihood of difficulties arising in the 
immediate future owing to the lack of a well defined boundary in the mineralised 
districts…”42
 No doubt exasperated with pressing his case, Fairweather made an 
unequivocal response to Amery’s question just two weeks later: “I consider there is 
every likelihood of difficulties arising on the question of ownership owing to the lack 
of a well defined boundary between the two Territories.”
 
43
                                                 
38 A memorandum written after a combined meeting of FO, CO and WO officials in July 1926 stated: 
“It may be mentioned that between pillars XXII and XXIX, where important mineral operations are at 
present in progress, the average distance between the pillars is about 20 miles, a distance which clearly 
does not allow of sufficiently accurate demarcation of the frontier in a mineralised area where even a 
few square yards may be of great value.” RC 33 Memorandum accompanying Letter Stratchey CO to 
FO, 13 July 1926. 
 He noted that the lack of 
boundary definition between the boundary pillars made it difficult to even restrict 
39 The Chief Secretary of Northern Rhodesia sent a protest to the Governor of the Belgian Congo 
province of Katanga, G. Hennen, in December 1925 complaining about the shifting of BP 40. The 
governor of Katanga apologised for the incident in June 1926, saying that it had been a mistake by a 
young and inexperienced local agent. The pillar was re-sited to its original position in September 1926. 
RC 610 Correspondence, G. Hennen, Governor of Katanga - Elisabethville and H. Stanley, Chief 
Secretary NR – Livingstone, 9 Dec 1925, 13 Jan 1926 and 29 June 1926. 
40 RC 33. 
41 RC 33 Letter Sir John Burnett-Stuart to CO, 12 January 1926. 
42 RC 33 Letter Amery to Stanley, 22 February 1926. 
43 RC 33 Letter Fairweather to Stanley, 6 April 1926. 
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mining with some kind of buffer zone (read ‘frontier’) and re-emphasised that his 
1924 suggestions for demarcation should be implemented immediately. Once again 
Amery passed Fairweather’s thoughts directly on to the CO, adding his own 
emphasis: “Strongly urge earliest possible steps should be taken to demarcate and 
beacon boundary by either of methods suggested in paragraph 10 of enclosure in my 
dispatch of 6th October 1924 confidential.”44 After a high level meeting of officials 
from the CO, FO and WO, the FO was asked on 13 July 1926 to approach the Belgian 
government “with the proposal that a supplementary Anglo-Belgian boundary 
commission should be constituted immediately for the purpose of conducting an 
intensive survey of the whole boundary between pillars I and XXIX and of 
demarcating the Congo-Zambesi watershed there by intermediate beacons or by some 
other means, in view of the mineral possibilities of the adjoining areas.”45 This 
request was quickly forwarded to the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the 
British ambassador in Brussels, George Grahame, on 17 July 1926.46
 
 
The 1927 Brussels conference and agreement  
The Belgian government responded favourably to British requests for a new boundary 
commission in August 1926 but stated that they did not have adequate personnel 
available to carry out the work.47 By December 1926 the Belgian government still 
could not put together enough trained surveyors for the commission, so in order to 
make use of the delay they proposed that “competent authorities” from both states 
should meet to agree common instructions to direct the boundary commission.48
This was accepted by the British government departments and the WO 
nominated Colonel Winterbotham to be the British representative. A prominent fellow 
of the RGS, Colonel Winterbotham was a well-known military surveyor who had 
championed advances in topographic surveying for artillery range-finding during the 
First World War.
  
49
                                                 
44 RC 33 Confidential telegram, Stanley to CO, 8 April 1926. 
 Winterbotham met with CO and FO officials on 24 January 1927 
45 RC 33 Letter CO to FO, 13 July 1926. 
46 RC 33. 
47 RC 33 Letter Grahame to Chamberlain FO, 27 August 1926. 
48 RC 33 Letter Knatchbull-Hugessen, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to FO, 9 December 1926. 
49 Winterbotham served on the Council of the RGS from 1923-29 and 1930-31. His obituary in 1947 
was authored by none other than his colleague and former African boundary commissioner Sir Charles 
Close (Arden-Close). (C.F. Arden-Close, ‘Obituary Brigadier Harold St. John L. Winterbotham C.B., 
C.M.G., D.S.O.’ The Geographical Journal 109, no. 1/3 (1947), 153-154.) 
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and authored a memo that outlined the key points to be discussed with the Belgians.50 
This memo is noteworthy because it makes no mention of any adjustments to the 
Belgian Congo-Northern Rhodesia boundary. In fact, it did not even mention the as-
yet undefined boundary section between lakes Mweru and Tanganyika. It clearly 
conveyed the British government’s belief that the primary concern was the course of 
the boundary between the 1911-14 boundary pillars.51 The CO was keen to emphasise 
that the meeting should stick solely to the subject of demarcation and warned 
Winterbotham not to negotiate any exchanges of territory.52
The Brussels Conference, as it became known, was held from 16-19 March 
1927. In his personal report on the conference, Winterbotham explained how the 
1911-14 boundary commission had been given leverage to deviate the boundary along 
the watershed up to 2 km.
 
53 However, given the value of the mineralised areas along 
the watershed, the new Anglo-Belgian boundary commission would only be allowed 
to deviate a maximum of 200 metres from what it could identify as the ‘ideal 
watershed.’ “Now the principle of leaving small encroachments undivided where 
good faith and economic interest dictate, is qualified by the expressed intention of 
getting within 200 metres of the ideal watershed.”54
Not only was the second boundary commission instructed to survey and 
identify the watershed boundary cartographically, so important was the identification 
of a linear boundary that the instructions called for demarcation of pillars at 500 metre 
intervals. Six months prior to the Brussels Conference, a Northern Rhodesia surveyor 
A. Godwin-Austen had been dispatched to review boundary pillars 1-11, trace the 
watershed between the pillars and compare his survey with the Belgian and British 
 In other words, whereas the 
actual identification of a linear boundary in the context of the 1911-14 boundary 
commission was relatively unimportant and a zone of 2 km was effectively adequate, 
the presence of “economic interests” shifted the scale of British geographical 
perspective on this territory, quite literally, by a factor of ten. 
                                                 
50 RC 33 Winterbotham H., Memorandum on the Rhodesia-Congo boundary, from meeting held 24 
January 1927. 
51 RC 33 Winterbotham H., Memorandum on the Rhodesia-Congo boundary, from meeting held 24 
January 1927. paras. ii and iii. 
52 RC 33 Letter Strachey CO to FO, 3 March 1927. 
53 RC 33 Winterbotham, H. Zambesi-Congo watershed boundary. Personal report on the meeting of 
16-19 March 1927. section 3. 
54 RC 33 Winterbotham, H. Zambesi-Congo watershed boundary. Personal report on the meeting of 
16-19 March 1927. section 3. 
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boundary commission maps.55 Fairweather had also instructed Godwin-Austen to 
place beacons along his interpretation of the watershed “for the relocation of your line 
and as a guide for District Officials etc.”56 Having a British surveyor unilaterally 
demarcate an international boundary was kept quiet during the Brussels Conference 
and Winterbotham noted “It is obvious that the subsidiary beacons inserted during the 
course of this investigation can have no present international authority.”57
The representatives at the conference enshrined the instructions for the second 
Anglo-Belgian boundary commission in what would become known as the Brussels 
Agreement (BFSP 1931, pp. 218-224). It stands as one of the most detailed set of 
instructions ever given to a colonial boundary commission and was later cited many 
times in Stephen Jones’ Boundary-Making.
  
58 The detailed agreement outlined 
everything from instructions for triangulation survey to the exact dimensions for 
boundary pillars. Unlike the majority of previous instructions issued to British 
colonial boundary commissions throughout Africa, the Brussels agreement was 
actually ratified by both states as a binding treaty.59
 
 
The 1927-34 Anglo-Belgian boundary commission   
 
Inauspicious start         
As with the 1911-14 boundary commission, a detailed chronological narrative of 
every move of the 1927-33 Anglo-Belgian boundary commission is largely outside 
the focus of this work. The inter-colonial dynamics expressed in the negotiations for 
boundary adjustments, as well as the inter-personal drama within the boundary 
commission itself would be well worth its own historical review. However, this work 
concentrates on boundary demarcation so that element of the commission’s work will 
remain in focus. 
 Considering the Brussels Agreement was only concluded in March 1927, and 
the Belgian government had delayed progress by six months due to a lack of trained 
personnel, the second Anglo-Belgian boundary commission took to the field 
                                                 
55 RC 33 Letter Fairweather to Godwin-Austen, 2 September 1926. 
56 RC 33 Letter Fairweather to Stanley, 6 April 1926. 
57 RC 33 Winterbotham, H. Zambesi-Congo watershed boundary. Personal report on the meeting of 
16-19 March 1927, section 4. 
58 S.B. Jones, Boundary-Making: A Handbook for Treaty Editors, Statesmen and Boundary 
Commissioners (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1945). 
59 Transcribed in Appendix 1, section 8.5. 
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remarkably quickly in July 1927.60 Throughout April and May 1927 there was furious 
correspondence between British government departments and with Northern 
Rhodesian officials concerning funding, logistics and personnel of the British 
commission.61 The British commissioner chosen was Lt. Colonel D. Cree, who had 
recently been attached to the Hungarian-Yugoslav boundary commission from 1924 
to 192562 and was to prove a disastrous choice. The Belgian contingent was led by the 
veteran boundary commissioner F. Gendarme who had served on the 1911-14 
boundary commission and had more recently led the Belgian contingent of the Anglo-
Belgian boundary commission along the Rwanda-Burundi boundary with 
Tanganyika.63
Cree’s relationship with Gendarme was fractious from the start and the survey 
progress was extremely slow.
 
64 Cree’s correspondence from July to November 1927 
mainly dealt with difficulties related to the Northern Rhodesian police escort65 and 
one incident when a member of the Belgian police escort was detained by local 
Northern Rhodesia officials.66 There was little information about the actual progress 
of the survey fieldwork. Cree was particularly anxious about having to negotiate any 
boundary adjustments with the Belgians and asked the Northern Rhodesian 
administration for its position as early as 12 August 1927.67 After receiving comments 
from the Northern Rhodesia administration in October 1927, Cree wrote back in 
November stating that given the mineral prospects all along both the watershed and 
Mweru-Tanganyika boundary sections, he believed options for adjustment were very 
limited since both sides would be reluctant to cede large areas.68
                                                 
60 The speed with which the commission took to the field may be partly explained by the fact that the 
RCBC had agreed to pay £2000 toward the cost of the commission if its work began promptly at the 
site of their mining operations. RC 33 Letter Strachey CO to FO, 13 July 1926. 
 
61 RC 36 Various correspondence. 
62 D. Cree, ‘Yugoslav-Hungarian boundary commission’ Geographical Journal 65, no. 2 (1925): 89-
110. 
63 After the First World War, the German territory of Tanganyika was divided so that Rwanda and 
Burundi were administered by Belgium and Tanganyika became a British protectorate. 
64 CO 795/23/9 Correspondence 1927-1928. 
65 RC 36 Letter Cree to NR Chief Secretary, 20 September 1927. Cree complained when the askari 
(soldiers) of the Northern Rhodesia police escort brought their wives with them to the boundary 
commission camp. The Northern Rhodesia Police and administration assured Cree that this was the 
normal procedure when the askari were dispatched to the field (RC 36 Letter Police commandant to 
NR chief secretary, 1 November 1927). 
66 RC 36 Letter Cree to NR Chief Secretary, 12 December 1927. 
67 RC 36 Letter Cree to NR Chief Secretary, 12 August 1927. 
68 RC 36 Letter Cree to NR Chief Secretary, 7 November 1927. 
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By December 1927, Cree’s relationship with Gendarme and the Belgian 
commission had become so difficult that Gendarme sent a written letter to him about 
various Rhodesian mining concessions being posted on the Belgian side of the 
boundary, even though the two men were living in the same camp.69 Cree’s 
relationship with his own commission was also at breaking point. With morale at rock 
bottom, survey progress slow and many of the members of the British commission 
threatening to leave, Cree was recalled on 28 February 1928.70 The medical officer 
attached to the British commission, Dr. Luner, later wrote that Cree’s behaviour may 
have been caused by his “continental period” and he had apparently been advised not 
to return to Africa prior to joining the commission.71
Cree was replaced in April 1928 by Lt. Col. Arthur B. Clough, a veteran of 
boundary commissions in Albania and a close personal friend of Winterbotham.
 
72 
Clough was meant to be a temporary appointment since he had only served one year 
out of a promised four year posting to the WO and had spent very little time in 
England since the end of the First World War.73 Clough also had unspecified “private 
reasons” that made him reluctant to undertake fieldwork in Africa. However, 
Winterbotham did eventually convince Clough to serve out Cree’s normal tour and, in 
effect, get the British section of the boundary commission back on track.74
 
 
Pressure for progress        
Meanwhile, pressure to demarcate had been building from mining interests. One 
company, Mineralize Ventures in Ndola, had approached Cree directly in November 
1927 to enquire making minor adjustments to the boundary in the Mokambo area.75 
N.A. Dumbleton of the same company later begged the Northern Rhodesia survey 
department for coordinates of the new boundary pillars in April 1928, but Fairweather 
could only send revised figures for the 1911-14 pillars.76
                                                 
69 RC 36 Letter Gendarme to Cree, 1 December 1927 and CO 795/23/8 Correspondence between 
Gendarme and Cree, December 1927. 
 In March 1928 the RCBC 
and the BSAC paid the Colonial Office their £2000 contribution towards the cost of 
70 CO 795/27/9 Winterbotham, H. Tour Report, 4 June 1929. section 5. 
71 CO 795/23/9 and CO 795/23/10 Letter Luner to CO, 16 March 1928. 
72 Their correspondence always had a very personal tone and began “My dear Clough”/“My dear 
Colonel”. 
73 CO 795/27/9 Winterbotham, H. Tour Report 4 June 1929. p. 5. 
74 CO 795/27/9 Winterbotham, H. Tour Report 4 June 1929. p. 5. 
75 RC 36 Letter Parker to Cree, 14 Nov 1927. 
76 SEC 3/291 vol. 1 Correspondence between Dumbleton and Fairweather, 12 and 13 April 1928. 
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the boundary commission that had ensured the commission first demarcated their 
mineralised section of the watershed boundary between BPs 22 and 29.77 The 
Northern Rhodesia Secretary for Mines, Tudor G. Trevor, was also being pressed by 
yet another company, the Bechuanaland Exploration Company (agents for the 
Northern Rhodesia Company) who initially enquired about the boundary in June 1927 
and enquired again, less politely, in December 1928: “will you kindly let me know if 
the Boundary Commission has yet completed sufficient work to determine whether 
these claims are in Northern Rhodesia or otherwise.”78
It had not just been the poor leadership of Cree that held up the commission’s 
progress. Clough arrived in May 1928 to find the British and Belgian survey results 
completely incompatible. The two sides found it difficult to recover the triangulation 
points established by the first boundary commission. This required a completely new 
triangulation network to be surveyed in order to lay the topographic mapping and 
identify the geographic position of the boundary pillars. According to Clough, the 
Belgians were using less accurate triangulation methods and not undertaking adequate 
topographical survey as had been specified in the Brussels convention instructions.
  
79 
Gendarme had defended his methods by stating that he was using the original 
instructions as a guide. Just as the 1911-14 Anglo-Belgian boundary commission had 
discovered, the rate of triangulation was painstakingly slow in the relatively flat 
landscape of the watershed that was covered by forest canopy. This meant that trees 
and brush to be cleared along the rays of triangles so distances and angles could be 
observed.80
Clough raised his concerns over the survey methods with Winterbotham in 
May 1928. After consulting with his counterpart in the Belgian survey department 
Commandant Maury, Winterbotham wrote back to Clough on 25 June 1928 and 
amended the original instructions. Given the difficulties in triangulation, 
Winterbotham and Maury agreed that, contrary to the Brussels Agreement, not every 
main boundary pillar needed to be tied to the ruling triangulation system.
  
81
                                                 
77 CO 795/23/8 Letter BSAC to CO, 12 March 1928. 
 Instead 
they suggested that the less accurate but more rapid traverse method of survey could 
78 CO 795/23/8 Letter Trevor to NR Chief Secretary, 29 December 1928. 
79 SEC 3/290 Clough, C. Report on activities of the British Section 11 Apr-30 June 1928. pp. 2-3. 
80 SEC 3/290 Clough, C. Report on activities of the British Section 11 Apr-30 June 1928. p. 9. 
81 CO 795/23/8 Letter Winterbotham to Clough, 25 June 1928. 
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be undertaken.82 Winterbotham emphasised that Clough should regard the instructions 
as guidelines and not follow them strictly if they were found to impede demarcation 
progress.83 More remarkably, Winterbotham emphasised that boundary demarcation 
was much more important than the survey: “In all questions of boundaries it is the 
actual position of the stones and of the cleared line on the ground which is of most 
immediate importance. The actual survey of them is not so important and is indeed 
not a direct matter of the treaty (Brussels convention).”84
The second Anglo-Belgian boundary commission intended to replace all 46 of 
the old boundary pillars and build new ones after triangulation was complete. But 
while observing rays for triangulation, the survey teams also identified and cleared the 
ill-defined watershed line through the thick bush. As the first boundary commission 
discovered, the watershed proved extremely difficult to identify:  
 This change of instruction 
was a remarkable turn-around from the practice of the 1911-14 Anglo-Belgian 
boundary commission whose priorities were exactly the reverse, accuracy of 
topographic and geodetic survey was of far greater concern than demarcation. 
the Watershed ridge itself is very ill defined. It is, in most parts, very flat and, 
by eye, it is quite impossible to say in which direction the ground is falling the 
gradients are so slight. Hence the necessity of the slow and tedious method 
adopted, that of running cross levels at intervals of 100 yards or so in order to 
decide where exactly the top of the ridge actually is.85
 
 
Clough was successful in hastening the commission’s work and by the end of 
June 1928 he reported that approximately 36 miles of the watershed between BPs 23 
and 26 had been surveyed and cleared.86
In spite of much thought, no quicker or more satisfactory method of fixing the 
boundary has yet been devised. Assuming, therefore, that the remainder of the 
 However, he concluded that there was no 
way of increasing progress:  
                                                 
82 Instead of surveying a network of triangles to identify distances from a fixed point as in 
triangulation, traverse surveying involved measuring short lines (approx. 300 feet) along fixed 
azimuths from a fixed starting point. This was much slower than triangulation because the area covered 
was much smaller and was also more prone to error. It was used in flat and heavily wooded terrain 
devoid of hill tops or high elevations that could be used for triangulation (Personal correspondence 
with Alastair MacDonald FRGS, former surveyor in Africa with the British Directorate of Overseas 
Survey, July 2008). 
83 CO 795/23/8 Letter Winterbotham to Clough, 25 June 1928. 
84 CO 795/23/8 Letter Winterbotham to Clough, 25 June 1928. para. 3 
85 SEC 3/290 Clough, C. Report on activities of the British Section 11 Apr-30 June 1928. p. 9. 
86 SEC 3/290 Clough, C. Report on activities of the British Section 11 Apr-30 June 1928. p. 9. 
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boundary is similar in character and that there is the same necessity of 
defining it with similar accuracy, it may be forecast that it will not be 
completed until the end of 1931 or possibly sometime in 1932. This is 
assuming that the rate of progress is as at present.87
In addition, the survey progress of the Belgian contingent was much slower. In his 
second quarterly report documenting work up to the end of September 1928, Clough 
reported that the British section had identified and cleared 105 miles of the watershed 
between BPs 20 and 27, while the Belgian section had only identified and cleared 25 
miles from BPs 11 to 20 and 35 miles between BPs 26 and 27.
 
88 Jointly, the two 
parties had built a total of 21 main pillars (concrete) and some 225 stone auxiliary 
pillars along these sections of the watershed boundary.89
With such slow progress, Clough and Winterbotham discussed the advantage 
of having the two governments ratify demarcation results as they were completed, 
rather than waiting to ratify the entire boundary demarcation all at once.
 
90 
Winterbotham passed this recommendation on to the CO, stating that among the many 
advantages of ratifying the boundary bit-by-bit: “d) It would add to the prestige of the 
Commission among the local industrial interests.”91 The WO echoed Winterbotham’s 
sentiment and told the CO “Important financial interests appear to be involved and a 
final agreement might add confidence to development.”92 Maury had advocated this 
type of ratification during the 1927 Brussels conference and in June 1929 the Belgian 
foreign minister Paul Hymans agreed to ratify the results of demarcation as they were 
completed, with the condition that “the ratification in question should not suspend the 
delimitation work of the Commission which should again proceed under the terms of 
the March 1927 agreement.”93
                                                 
87 SEC 3/290 Clough, C. Report on activities of the British Section 11 Apr-30 June 1928. p. 9. 
 With even more mining interests and production on 
their side of the watershed boundary, the Belgian government was also keen to see the 
demarcation progress as quickly as possible. 
88 SEC 3/290 vol. 1 Clough, C. Report on activities of the British Section 1 July-30 September 1928. p. 
5. 
89 SEC 3/290 vol. 1 Clough, C. Report on activities of the British Section 1 July-30 September 1928. p. 
5. 
90 CO 795/23/11 Correspondence between Clough and Winterbotham, November 1928. 
91 CO 795/23/11 Letter Winterbotham to J. Frederick Green, 22 November 1928. 
92 CO 795/27/9 Letter Widdows WO to CO, 3 January 1929. 
93 Trans. “la ratification en question ne fasse pas suspender l’exécution de travaux auxquels la 
Commission de délimitation doit encore procéder, aux termes de l’arrangement de mars 1927” SEC 
3/289 vol. I  Letter Hymans to Knatchbull-Hugesse, 17 June 1929. 
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The commissioners themselves were well aware of the potential value of the 
territory they were demarcating. The British section of the boundary commission 
included a geologist Dr. James W. Lunn whose extensive geological survey of the 
primary copper workings along the watershed was completed on 30 September 
1928.94 Lunn’s findings greatly influenced Clough’s negotiating strategy. When the 
Belgian section asked Clough to consider adjusting the boundary near Mokambo to 
prevent the Belgian railway from encroaching on Northern Rhodesia territory, Clough 
consulted with the CO stating “I am now in a position to state definitely that, in my 
opinion, it would be unwise to agree to any modification of the boundary in the 
present state of our knowledge of the mineral value of the land in the area 
concerned.”95 Clough admitted that the watershed line had been altered slightly to 
accommodate some very minor encroachments by the Belgian railway and a Northern 
Rhodesia road, but this proposed adjustment in Mokambo included an area of around 
100 acres which was considered too large for him to agree.96
Clearly the earlier (pre-1920s) ideas of making substantial boundary 
adjustments trading large tracts of territory between Belgian Congo and Northern 
Rhodesia were never going to be agreed by the Belgian and British governments, 
given the economic interests at stake. With the geographic configuration of the 
Katanga pedicle, Belgium effectively had the territorial upper hand and British 
officials were concerned that any territorial swaps might result in losing valuable 
mining prospects. Indeed, both sides recognised that mineral prospects along the 
boundary made every inch of territory potentially valuable. No longer could the 
decisions over colonial territory be negotiated with regard to European interests alone, 
based on small scale (imperial) geographical perspective. This land was becoming 
extremely valuable to the economies of the colonial powers so neither side was 
willing to risk losing economic benefits by changing definition of their territories 
from the 1894 boundary delimitation. Similarly, such valuable territory required 
demarcation at a local scale that would make the division of territory clearly visible 
on the ground. 
  
 
                                                 
94 CO 795/23/11 Full report by James W. Lunn PhD, 30 September 1928. 
95 CO 795/23/8 Letter Clough to CO, 22 September 1928. 
96 SEC 3/290 vol. 1 Clough, C. Report on the British section 1 October 1928 – 15 January 1929. p. 4 
and accompanying letter Clough to NR Chief Secretary, 23 Jan 1929. 
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Financing the boundary commission  
By January 1929 the exhausted British section was desperate for a period of leave.97 
Having focused exclusively on the watershed boundary section between BPs 11 and 
27 at the request of the RCBC, the Anglo-Belgian boundary commission had 
traversed, located and cleared the watershed for 203 miles.98 The commission had 
driven pipes 2-3 feet into the ground to mark spots along the watershed where the 
main and auxiliary pillars would be located; the British having placed 498 pipes and 
the Belgians 297. Main pillars were built of concrete over these pipes and for 
auxiliary pillars the pipes were covered by heaps of large stones.99 By the time of 
Clough’s January report, 21 main pillars and 253 auxiliary pillars had been built with 
a further 34 main and 487 auxiliary pillars under construction.100
 This painstaking detail in identifying and marking the watershed was not only 
taking its toll on the personnel of the commission, it was also becoming very 
expensive. Stepping down from his role as head of the Geographical Section of the 
General Staff in 1928, (by this time) Brigadier Winterbotham decided to tour colonial 
survey departments throughout the Empire before taking on his new position as 
Director General of the Ordnance Survey. Winterbotham included a visit to the 
Anglo-Belgian boundary commission in the field on his itinerary. He reached 
Elisabethville in Katanga on 25 May 1929 and spent the next few days in discussion 
with both sides of the commission, reviewing their work and meeting with local mine 
managers.
 
101 In his report, Winterbotham admitted that he and his Belgian colleague 
Maury had seriously underestimated the time involved in the boundary commission’s 
work. They had originally estimated 2 years of work, but given the difficulties with 
locating, clearing and surveying the visibly ill-defined watershed line, Winterbotham 
estimated that this section alone would require an additional 2 ½ field seasons; an 
estimate did not include demarcation of the Mpanta meridian section or the disputed 
section between Lakes Mweru and Tanganyika.102
                                                 
97 SEC 3/290 vol. 1 Evans, H. Silvester Medical report, 10 January 1929. 
 
98 Clough specified that the British section had located and cleared 106 miles of the watershed and the 
Belgian section, 97 miles, although the Belgian section was believed to be a month behind on the 
traverse survey. (SEC 3/290 vol. 1 Clough, C. Report on the British section 1 October 1928 – 15 
January 1929. p. 4 and accompanying letter Clough to NR Chief Secretary, 23 Jan 1929.) 
99 SEC 3/290 vol. 1 Clough, C. Report on the British section 1 October 1928 – 15 January 1929. p. 4 
and accompanying letter Clough to NR Chief Secretary, 23 Jan 1929. 
100 SEC 3/290 vol. 1 Clough, C. Report on the British section 1 October 1928 – 15 January 1929. p. 5 
and accompanying letter Clough to NR Chief Secretary, 23 Jan 1929. 
101 CO 795/27/9 Winterbotham, H. Tour Report 4 June 1929. Note 65 
102 CO 795/27/9 Winterbotham, H. Tour Report 4 June 1929. p. 3. 
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 Winterbotham once again endorsed the idea of having the governments ratify 
the demarcation work already completed by the commission. Although the recently 
completed section of the boundary between BPs 11 and 27 had been considered the 
most important, Winterbotham concluded in no uncertain terms that the commission 
should continue with its painstaking demarcation work no matter the time or cost 
involved. 
There is reason to suppose, however, even if there is at present no direct proof, 
that copper astride the watershed will be roughly on the arc of a circle whose 
centre may be approximately at Broken Hill. Mining developments, physical 
features and geological probability support this view. It is then at least 
probable that questions of international ownership may soon become as 
important between pillars 1 to 11 and 30 to 47 as they have already proved 
between 12 and 29. While the commission is at work it should continue to 
beacon as close, and demarcate as clearly as has been done hitherto, in order to 
provide a permanent settlement and prevent the necessity of sending out a 
fresh commission.103
With (later un-substantiated) reports of ore deposits found along the Mweru-
Tanganyika section, Winterbotham recommended that this section also be demarcated 
with precision once its alignment was settled by the two governments.
 
104
The CO had estimated in October 1926 that this second Anglo-Belgian 
boundary commission would last two years and the British section would cost 
approximately £15,000 per annum, based on the £14,300 annual budget of the Anglo-
Italian Jubaland boundary commission that was in the field at roughly the same 
time.
 Depending 
on the boundary chosen between the lakes, Winterbotham estimated that the Anglo-
Belgian boundary commission should complete demarcation of the entire boundary 
within 4 to 5 years.  
105 A review of the finances in 1929 revealed that costs were rapidly spiralling 
out of control: from £13,220 in 1927-28 to £15,070 in 1928-29 and a projected budget 
of £17,500 in 1930-31.106
                                                 
103 CO 795/27/9 Winterbotham, H. Tour Report 4 June 1929. p. 4. 
 Even these figures may have been underestimating reality, 
as one Treasury official noted that the actual cost for 1928-29 reached £19,600, which 
104 CO 795/27/9 Winterbotham, H. Tour Report 4 June 1929. p. 4. 
105 T 161/1017 Letter CO to Treasury, 14 October 1926. 
106 CO 795/34/7 
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itself did not include travel costs for the personnel’s leave in England.107 These costs 
per annum were slightly greater than comparable British colonial boundary 
commissions working at the same time, for example the 1931-32 per annum budget of 
the British section of the Abyssinia-British Somaliland boundary commission was 
£15,000.108
Winterbotham convinced the CO that the demarcation work was worth the 
increased cost and his recommendations from the field were forwarded on to the 
Treasury.
 However, it was the duration of the Anglo-Belgian boundary commission 
that was really driving costs up; a direct result of the detail with which the boundary 
was being marked on the ground. 
109 The Treasury agreed that demarcation should continue “due largely to the 
fact that the frontier runs through important mineralised areas, necessitating very 
careful demarcation”, but felt it was reasonable that because demarcation was related 
to the development of copper mining, and in turn adding to the local revenue, that 
“the total cost might fairly be divided equally between the Imperial Government and 
the Protectorate.”110 It was suggested that Northern Rhodesia, by this time under CO 
administration, could charge their portion of the funding to a development loan fund 
through the CO.111
Requesting local British colonial administrations to foot part of the bill for a 
boundary commission poses interesting questions about responsibility for the 
sovereign act of boundary demarcation. Already it has been shown that the British 
imperial government felt prior to the First World War that only British military 
personnel were suitably knowledgeable to address inter-colonial boundary issues. Yet 
the Treasury justified its 1929 request for funding from Northern Rhodesia by quoting 
a 1907 letter from the CO to the BSAC: 
 
The principle hitherto followed in connection with the delimitation of the 
boundaries of Colonies and Protectorates administered under this Department 
has been that all expenditure incurred primarily a charge on the local 
administration; but it has sometimes happened that, owing to the international 
questions involved and other considerations, His Majesty’s Government have 
themselves sent out an expedition to undertake the necessary work, and have 
                                                 
107 T 161/1018 Handwritten note by Reynolds, 8 November 1929, advising on drafts of letter Treasury 
to CO, 20 November 1929. 
108 T 161/750 Report on the final costings of the Abyssinia-British Somaliland boundary commission. 
109 T 161/1018 Letter Treasury to Green, 20 November 1929. 
110 T 161/1018 Letter N.V. Nind-Hopkins (Treasury) to Green, 20 November 1929. 
111 T 161/1018 Letter N.V. Nind-Hopkins (Treasury) to Green, 20 November 1929. 
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relieved the Colony or Protectorate, as the case may be, of part or even the 
whole of the cost.112
In essence, the Treasury was throwing the CO’s own argument back in its face. In 
reality, the vast majority of inter-colonial British boundary commissions were funded 
by the imperial government because they were considered international concerns; a 
fact only vaguely hinted at within the 1907 letter. The draft text of the 1929 letter 
from the Treasury to the CO generated a substantial amount of comment within the 
Treasury department, and one keen-eyed official cited a much more recent letter from 
the CO to the Treasury in 1922 stating:  
 
that the delimitation and demarcation of boundaries in Africa as the result of 
international treaties and arrangements has always been regarded as an 
Imperial concern, the funding being usually embodied in a formal agreement 
between the Powers concerned. Therefore, the expense has in the main been 
bourne on Imperial estimates with Treasury consent.113
Nevertheless, the Treasury’s attitude was that because Northern Rhodesia was now 
financially self-supporting as a result of the copper mining, it should also bear some 
of the financial responsibility for boundary demarcation;
 
114
 Northern Rhodesia reluctantly agreed to pay half of the boundary commission 
costs using money from the development loan fund as suggested by the Treasury.
 even though demarcation 
was being undertaken exclusively, and explicitly, by Imperial authorities. 
115 
However, Northern Rhodesia did not let the issue lie and in December 1931 Governor 
J.C. Maxwell, responding to complaints made in Northern Rhodesia’s Legislative 
Council, demanded to know why the costs of the boundary commission were running 
at £19,000 annually, when he had estimated the Northern Rhodesia survey department 
could have undertaken the work at a much lower cost.116
                                                 
112 T 161/1018 Letter N.V. Nind-Hopkins (Treasury) to Green, 20 November 1929. 
 The Secretary of State for 
the Colonies, Philip Cunliffe-Lister responded to Maxwell’s complaints with a stern 
and considered rebuke in March 1932. This letter from Cunliffe-Lister did more than 
simply counter Maxwell’s argument, it was a remarkable statement on the relationship 
113 T 161/1018 Handwritten letter Reynolds to Skerington, 8 November 1929, advising on drafts of 
letter Treasury to CO, 20 November 1929. 
114 T 161/1018 Handwritten letter Reynolds to Skerington, 8 November 1929, advising on drafts of 
letter Treasury to CO, 20 November 1929. 
115 SEC 3/291 vol. II Letter Maxwell (NR Governor) to Passfield (Secretary of State CO), 21 January 
1930. 
116 SEC 3/291 vol. II Letter Maxwell to Phillip Cunliffe-Lister (CO), 14 December 1931. 
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between the British Empire and colonial boundary commissions and is worth 
examining in more detail.  
Estimates from the Northern Rhodesia survey department called for the use of 
four European survey staff, which Cunliffe-Lister argued would be difficult to spare 
from the local survey department and would take much longer to complete the 
demarcation than the imperial commission already at work.117
Full allowance does not appear to have been made in that estimate for the 
special character of the work of boundary demarcation, which is not ordinary 
surveying but has a technique of its own. Boundary demarcation frequently 
involves technical problems of an unusual character and of considerable 
difficulty. Apart from questions of finding alignment of the boundary, the 
identification of the line itself may present difficulties.
 Cunliffe-Lister 
indicated that colonial surveyors focused primarily on cadastral survey and did not 
possess the skills to address boundary issues. 
118
He suggested that the special character of boundary work required military personnel, 
and specifically the Royal Engineers: “The Royal Engineers personnel engaged for 
the technical work on Boundary Commissions are picked men, and in them the 
Governments concerned secure personnel whose qualifications could hardly be 
matched by personnel obtainable elsewhere…”
 
119
The Chief of a Boundary Commission is, in a sense, a representative of His 
Majesty’s Government, even if he is not actually a plenipotentiary he is often 
called upon to conduct delicate negotiations, and in cases of dispute it is 
usually upon his advice that the Government has to make its decision. For this 
reason it is desirable to select for employment on Boundary Commissions 
persons who have not only experience dealing with men and affairs, but also 
some previous knowledge of boundary demarcation and who are detached 
from local interests and influences, since experience has shown that the 
possibility of attempts to prejudice or compromise the work of the 
Commissioners by intimidation or otherwise cannot be altogether ignored, and 
 Even more tellingly, Cunliffe-
Lister stated: 
                                                 
117 SEC 3/291 vol. II Cunliffe-Lister (CO) to Maxwell, 30 March 1932. para. 3. 
118 SEC 3/291 vol. II Cunliffe-Lister (CO) to Maxwell, 30 March 1932. para. 3. 
119 SEC 3/291 vol. II Cunliffe-Lister (CO) to Maxwell, 30 March 1932. para. 3. 
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that it is desirable to employ on boundary demarcation only well-disciplined 
parties on a military or semi-military basis.120
It was made absolutely clear to Maxwell that boundary demarcation remained the 
responsibility of the sovereign. The sovereign could only entrust this important 
responsibility with its military men whose discipline and commitment inoculated 
them from local influences that might prejudice their decisions on the sacrosanct act 
of demarcating territory. 
 
 
Completing demarcation   
With financing finally resolved, the Anglo-Belgian boundary commission returned to 
the field in March 1930, authorised to take as long as necessary to demarcate the 
boundary. Almost the entire staff of British officers and NCOs was replaced while on 
leave in early 1930, with Lt. Col. E.R.L. Peake of the Royal Engineers taking over for 
Lt. Col. Clough. Peake had no previous experience of boundary commissions but 
proved to be a good choice. He formed a good working relationship with Gendarme 
whom he praised at length in his 1934 Geographical Journal article.121 While in 
England at the War Office, Clough and his second-in-command Lt. Stainer continued 
to work through March 1933, computing the survey data for the maps and plans 
covering their demarcation work from BP 11 to 33. These results were ratified in an 
Anglo-Belgian exchange of notes on 7 April 1933.122
Although not completed in time to be ratified with the initial work, Clough 
and Gendarme had surveyed and demarcated the watershed between BP 33 and 34 so 
the new members of the boundary commission re-started work at BP 34 in March 
1930. Unlike the 1911-14 boundary commission which surveyed the watershed first 
and demarcated on their return from the Angola tripoint, this later boundary 
commission first identified and demarcated the watershed boundary before then tying 
the boundary pillars into their triangulation network. From March 1930, the 
commission continued the same process of demarcation westward from BP 34. First, 
the ‘ideal’ watershed was painstakingly identified by levelling and a 5 metre wide 
clearing was cut through the bush along the line. Peake described how the 
commission would then use the same pillaring techniques as had been undertaken 
 
                                                 
120 SEC 3/291 vol. II Cunliffe-Lister (CO) to Maxwell, 30 March 1932. para. 4. 
121 E.R.L. Peake, ‘Northern Rhodesia, Belgian Congo boundary’ Geographical Journal 83, no. 4 
(1934): 263-277. p. 265. 
122 Transcribed in Appendix 1, section 8.6. 
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previously, driving 2 foot pipes flush with the ground, filling them with concrete and 
embedding a empty cartridge casing in the centre as the survey point (See Figures 2 
and 3).  
 
 
Figure 2 Diagram of boundary pillar and trench dimensions along the watershed section123
 
 
                                                 
123 SEC 3/289 vol. I and CO 795/67/6 Diagrams 1 and 2 in Appendix 1 ‘Triangulation data’ in Peake, 
E. Final Technical Report on BPs 1-11, 33-46 and 1-XXVIII, 1 Mar 1934; see also Peake 1934. p. 266. 
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Figure 3 Diagram of main boundary pillars along the Mpanta meridian section124
 
 
Again, main pillars were built as square, tapering concrete pillars 
approximately 1.5 metres in height (above ground) and auxiliary pillars were heaped 
stones placed over the buried pipes.125
                                                 
124 SEC 3/289 vol. I and CO 795/67/6 Diagrams 1 and 2 in Appendix 1 ‘Triangulation data’ in Peake, 
E. Final Technical Report on BPs 1-11, 33-46 and 1-XXVIII, 1 Mar 1934; see also Peake 1934. p. 266. 
 There was no more than 500 metres between 
pillars, making them inter-visible with the bush cleared between them. Having 
boundary pillars or marks inter-visible means that when standing at one pillar, the two 
pillars on either side can be seen, and the boundary ‘line’ can be visualised in the 
mind’s eye. Even more than clearing the sight-lines between pillars, the Anglo-
125 SEC 3/289 vol. I and CO 795/67/6 Diagrams 1 and 2 in Appendix 1 ‘Triangulation data’ in Peake, 
E. Final Technical Report on BPs 1-11, 33-46 and 1-XXVIII, 1 Mar 1934; see also Peake 1934. p. 266. 
Chapter 5 – Marking over mapping 1914-1964 
  167 
Belgian boundary commission dug a ½ metre deep trench along the watershed 
between each of the pillars, in addition to a circle around each auxiliary pillar and a 
square around every main pillar.126 This was a rare demarcation technique and quite 
literally carved the linear boundary onto the land itself, making it unmistakably 
‘known’ in the physical landscape (See Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4 Boundary trench just south of Luapula river127
 
 
Only once the pillars were in place were they then surveyed. As Winterbotham 
had advised Clough, the boundary commission only tied every other main boundary 
pillar into the triangulation network. However, as the 1911-14 boundary commission 
had discovered, the flat watershed terrain from BP 36 to BP 46 made triangulation 
impossible without the construction of towers.128 Again with speedy demarcation the 
priority over strict cartographic accuracy, the boundary commissioners agreed to 
survey the watershed boundary exclusively by catenary traverse method, a less 
accurate and tedious technique using short lengths of suspended steel tape.129 
Working through the rainy season, the boundary commission completed demarcation 
and survey of the watershed from BP 34 to BP 46 in March 1931.130
                                                 
126 SEC 3/289 vol. I and CO 795/67/6 Diagrams 1 and 2 in Appendix 1 ‘Triangulation data’ in Peake, 
E. Final Technical Report on BPs 1-11, 33-46 and 1-XXVIII, 1 Mar 1934; see also Peake 1934. p. 266. 
 The commission 
then returned to BP 11 and demarcated along the watershed southeast to BP 1. This 
section of the watershed was ideal for triangulation and the topography in many 
127 Peake, ‘Northern Rhodesia, Belgian Congo boundary,’ 276. 
128 Peake, ‘Northern Rhodesia, Belgian Congo boundary,’ 267. 
129 Peake, ‘Northern Rhodesia, Belgian Congo boundary,’ 267. 
130 Peake, ‘Northern Rhodesia, Belgian Congo boundary,’ 268. 
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places made the watershed line itself more visible than on the flat terrain farther 
west.131
By September 1931, Peake and Gendarme were negotiating the Mpanta 
meridian section. As had emerged earlier, the Luapula river crossed and re-crossed the 
meridian several times south of Mpanta point
  
132 leaving small pockets of Belgian 
territory east of the meridian but west of the Luapula. Gendarme proposed that, in 
exchange for Belgium renouncing any claim to these areas east of the meridian, 
Britain should transfer sovereignty of Kilwa Island in Lake Mweru.133 Oddly, Peake 
referred this proposal to the Chief Secretary of Northern Rhodesia, rather than to the 
CO, who scoffed at the idea: “It is obvious that Kilwa island in Lake Mweru would be 
of considerable value to the Belgian Congo but the adjustment of the Mpanta 
meridian, which the Belgians offer, is worth nothing to us.”134 Even Gendarme must 
have believed there was no chance that Northern Rhodesia would agree to give up a 
strategically important island in Lake Mweru for two small areas of inaccessible 
swampland south of Lake Bangweulu. Instead, the boundary commission demarcated 
the meridian boundary section from BP 1 north to its first intersection with the 
Luapula river, as had been serving as the observed boundary.135
…I can see no advantage in disturbing a boundary, artificial though it may be, 
which has become known to the native population and is accepted by 
them…Tribal and family divisions have now adjusted themselves to the 
Mpanta meridian.
 Opposed to any 
adjustments along the meridian section, Governor Maxwell had observed back in 
1928: 
136
With the Belgian party demarcating southward from the Luapula and the British 
section working north from BP 1, the boundary commission continued from March to 
July 1932, erecting 28 main pillars.
 
137
                                                 
131 Peake, ‘Northern Rhodesia, Belgian Congo boundary,’ 271-272. 
 This concluded one of the most detailed 
132 Recall that the 1911-14 boundary commission had established the meridian of what was referred to 
as Mpanta point. However, several surveys had found that the Luapula river did not exit into Lake 
Bangweulu and instead disappeared into the swamps south of the lake. See especially Peake, ‘Northern 
Rhodesia, Belgian Congo boundary,’ 273 and W.V. Brelsford, ‘Making an outlet from Lake 
Bangweulu in Northern Rhodesia’ The Geographical Journal 106, no. ½ (1945): 50-58. 
133 RC/1348 Letter Peake to Chief Secretary NR, 2 September 1931. 
134 RC/1348 Letter Kennedy (NR Chief Secretary) to Peake, 24 September 1931. 
135 RC/1348 Letter Fairweather (NR Director of Surveys) to NR Chief Secretary, 12 March 1929. 
136 RC/1348 Letter Maxwell (NR Governor) to Amery (CO), 28 August 1928. 
137 SEC 3/289 vol. I and CO 795/67/6 ‘Triangulation data’ in Peake, E. Final Technical Report on BPs 
1-11, 33-46 and 1-XXVIII, 1 Mar 1934; see also Peake 1934. p. 266 and 274. 
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demarcation exercises ever seen in colonial Africa. The Belgian Congo-Northern 
Rhodesia boundary from the tripoint with Angola to the Luapula river south of Lake 
Bangweulu was so clearly ‘known’ on the physical landscape that one could not fail 
to visually identify it and, if not careful, could have easily tripped over it if passing 
from one territory into the other. 
 
Mweru-Tanganyika section       
 
The complex dispute over the straight line boundary section between Lakes Mweru 
and Tanganyika continued for many years as the two sides failed to agree on the 
position of the eastern terminus at so-called ‘Cape Akalunga’ on the western shore of 
Lake Tanganyika. The borderland area along this section had never been closely 
administered by Northern Rhodesia and in the autumn of 1929 the Northern Rhodesia 
district commissioner based in Chiengi, J.B. Thomson, travelled through the border 
area and found that numerous villages located within the British-claimed territory, 
were being administered and taxed by Belgian authorities.138 Thomson revealed that 
the tribes inhabiting these villages were under the control of chiefs located in the 
Belgian Congo, although noted: “Tribal organisation is lax all along the border and it 
is admitted that tribal boundaries were in a state of constant flux before European 
occupation of the country.”139 Nevertheless, Thomson concluded that given the choice 
of moving to Belgian Congo territory or staying and coming under British 
administration, most of the villages would have preferred the former.140 Not wanting 
to upset the situation on the ground, and aware that the Anglo-Belgian boundary 
commission was to address this section in the near future, Governor Maxwell 
informed the Colonial Office at the end of 1929 “that the matter be left in obeyance 
until the boundary is definitely fixed.”141
In October 1931, Peake and Gendarme had jointly re-surveyed the area 
between the lakes
  
142
                                                 
138 RC/1355 Report by J.B. Thomson to Provincial Commissioner, Fort Rosebery, 14 October 1929. 
paras. 1 and 4. 
 and together they sketched out an entirely new boundary that 
followed a complex series of natural features, largely small streams and minor 
139 RC/1355 Report by J.B. Thomson to Provincial Commissioner, Fort Rosebery, 14 October 1929, 
para. 4. 
140 RC/1355 Report by J.B. Thomson to Provincial Commissioner, Fort Rosebery, 14 October 1929, 
para. 4. 
141 RC/1355 Letter Maxwell (NR Governor) to CO, 30 December 1929. 
142 Peake, ‘Northern Rhodesia, Belgian Congo boundary,’ 274. 
Chapter 5 – Marking over mapping 1914-1964 
  170 
watersheds.143 The Peake-Gendarme line, as it became known, gave each side largely 
an equal amount of territory when compared with a hypothetical mean straight line 
between the two claimed lines144, but also involved Northern Rhodesia ceding Kilwa 
Island to Belgian Congo.145
If the arrangements proposed by the Senior British Commissioner are carried 
out, the advantage will be entirely with the Belgians who will secure the bulk 
of the native population on the boundary line and the most habitable portions 
of the territory. Unless Northern Rhodesia is to gain advantages elsewhere, I 
do not recommend the acceptance of the proposals submitted. The straight line 
from Pweto to Cape Kipimbi [the original Belgian claim] would be better, so 
far as this Territory is concerned, in the matter of cultivable land and 
population.
 The proposal was studied in detail by the Northern 
Rhodesian Department of Native Affairs which fervently rejected the idea: 
146
Based on this advice, Maxwell informed the CO in December 1931 that Northern 
Rhodesia could not approve the Peake-Gendarme proposal, unless the Belgians could 
be persuaded to make major territorial adjustments to the Katanga pedicle; the long-
held desire of Northern Rhodesia.
 
147 But Peake was adamant that the Belgians’ would 
not agree to any adjustments: “As the Belgians appear to be quite averse to giving up 
any part of the ‘Toe’ [Katanga pedicle], in fact the Comite Special have been 
remapping that part of the Katanga and their prospectors have been busy in that area 
for some time, and in view of the above dispatch, I advocated the retention of the 
Mpanta Meridian as the Eastern boundary of the ‘Toe’.”148
                                                 
143 RC/1349 vol. II 1:250,000 ‘Anglo-Belgian boundary, Proposed Adjustment’ Sketch map illustrating 
the various proposed line adjustments and RC 1349 vol. II 1:200,000 ‘Commission de Delimitation, 
Moero-Tanganyika’ Sketch map illustrating the Peake-Gendarme line. 
 Given the mineral 
interests in Katanga, the Northern Rhodesia administration knew the Belgian 
government would not be persuaded to part with major areas in the Pedicle. 
144 The eastern terminus of the Mweru-Tanganyika line was specified in the 1894 treaty at a place 
called ‘Cape Akalunga’ that neither administration was able to locate. Belgian officials believed that 
this was in reference to Cape Kipimbi at the north of Cameron Bay, while British officials claimed that 
‘Akalunga’ refered to Cape Pungu located several miles north of Kipimbi. 
145 The Belgian Congo was eager to acquire Kilwa Island because the lake area west of the island was 
silting up requiring any boats to navigate through Northern Rhodesian waters to the east of the island. 
However, the island had a large population who were “especially attached to their British sovereignty, 
and who are presented with a British flag every year as an emblem of this loyalty” (RC/1349 CO Note 
on the Anglo-Belgian boundary question, November 1932). 
146 RC/1349 vol. II Report ‘Anglo-Belgian Mweru-Tanganyika Boundary’ Secretary of Native Affairs 
to NR Chief Secretary, 13 November 1931. para. 12. 
147 RC/1349 vol. I Letter Maxwell (NR Governor) to P. Cunliffe-Lister (CO), 8 December 1931. 
148 RC/1349 vol. I Letter Peake to Kennedy (NR Chief Secretary), 10 January 1932. 
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After completing demarcation of the meridian section in July 1932, Gendarme 
was instructed by the Belgian government to demarcate the Mweru-Tanganyika line 
in accordance with the October 1931 Peake-Gendarme proposal.149 However, Peake 
had received no orders from the CO and was cognisant of the fact that Gendarme 
could not demarcate the boundary without his presence.150 Confusing the situation 
further, the CO finally sent a telegram to Livingstone in early September stating that 
the British government was trying to negotiate with Belgium for a boundary 
adjustment in the pedicle area, but wanted to know which line the Belgian 
commission had been instructed to demarcate between the lakes.151
if it is not found possible to secure arrangement as to a major exchange 
question must be considered whether demarcation of northern boundary would 
be of sufficient utility to justify cost of further work.
 The CO then 
noted: 
152
In other words, if Belgium would not agree to adjustments in the pedicle area, the 
British government saw no point in demarcating this remote northern section. 
Crucially, by the time this message was sent, Peake and Gendarme had already 
completed demarcation of the Mpanta meridian, therefore any adjustments along the 
Pedicle would have required up-rooting the boundary pillars already in place and 
going against the express advice of local administrators.  
 
 The Northern Rhodesia administration still believed the Mweru-Tanganyika 
section should be demarcated (especially considering the encroachment by Belgian 
administration) but “in view of the uncertainty as to the result of negotiations which 
are now proceeding regarding proposed major exchanges and the fact that acceptance 
of the Belgian Government of such proposals as might receive your approval might 
now be agreed upon, it would be a waste of time and money to proceed further with 
the demarcation of that boundary.”153 With the British section already fully supplied 
for several months’ fieldwork, Peake was instructed to continue surveying the area for 
three months while awaiting orders to demarcate.154
                                                 
149 RC/1349 vol. I Peake, E. Report on activities and progress for the period 6 May 1932-25 July 1932, 
25 July 1932. 
 The CO agreed to this suggestion 
150 RC/1349 vol. I Letter Peake to Kennedy (NR Chief Secretary), 5 August 1932. 
151 RC/1349 vol. I Letter Kennedy (NR Chief Secretary) to P. Cunliffe-Lister (CO), 6 September 1932. 
152 RC/1349 vol. I Letter Kennedy (NR Chief Secretary) to P. Cunliffe-Lister (CO), 6 September 1932. 
153 RC/1349 vol. I Letter Kennedy (NR Chief Secretary) to P. Cunliffe-Lister (CO), 6 September 1932. 
para. 2. 
154 RC/1349 vol. I Letter Kennedy (NR Chief Secretary) to P. Cunliffe-Lister (CO), 6 September 1932. 
para. 2. 
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but then through a series of telegrams it squabbled with Northern Rhodesia over who 
was to fund what had become simply survey work.155
At the same time, the FO was conducting complex but largely unproductive 
negotiations with Belgium. At one point in September 1932, Belgium did agree to 
cede a small corner of the pedicle in return for acceptance of the Peake-Gendarme line 
between Mweru and Tanganyika. However, since Northern Rhodesia had already 
rejected the Peake-Gendarme line, and the small area of the pedicle along the 
meridian being offered was of little use for improving transportation routes, the FO 
could not agree.
 With the boundary commission 
just surveying the area for maps (that would primarily benefit the local 
administration) and not actually demarcating the boundary, the Colonial Office felt 
Northern Rhodesia should fund the entire cost of the commission during this period. 
Northern Rhodesia countered that the survey was simply a preface to boundary 
demarcation so it should continue to be funded evenly between the two 
administrations. 
156 These negotiations continued to drag on through the mid-1930s, 
but no agreement on the Mweru-Tanganyika section, or on any adjustments to other 
sections was ever reached.157
 The calamitous narrative of the Mweru-Tanganyika boundary section 
highlights two very important issues. First, the correspondence between the FO, CO 
and the Northern Rhodesia administration reveals the inherent tension in dealing with 
boundary issues within a British colonial system that gave significant autonomy to 
local administrations. The issue of who was sovereign authority and able to make 
decisions on boundary demarcation seemed to get lost. The CO kept requesting 
information and opinions from Northern Rhodesia, but the administration in 
Livingstone felt it could not instruct Peake without express consent from London. The 
issue of funding the boundary commission highlighted this tension most clearly. If the 
boundary commission was only undertaking topographic survey for mapping, then the 
 They are interesting in their own right and might 
warrant additional analysis, but since the discussions never affected the physical 
demarcation of the boundary they are beyond the scope of this research.  
                                                 
155 RC/1349 Correspondence between CO and Northern Rhodesia, September 1932. 
156 RC/1349 CO ‘Note on Anglo-Belgian boundary question’, November 1933. 
157 So complex were these negotiations that the correspondence was collected and bound by the 
Colonial Office in two Confidential Print series. ‘Northern Rhodesia-Belgian Congo Boundary 
Commission and Proposals for Exchange of Territory 1925-37’ located in CO 879/131 and ‘Northern 
Rhodesia-Belgian Congo Boundary Commission and Proposals for Exchange of Territory 1937-38’ in 
CO 879/140. 
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imperial government felt the Northern Rhodesia administration should cover the bill. 
If the boundary commission was undertaking boundary demarcation of sovereign 
territory, then the funding should be shared between them.  
 Second, and more significantly, the vignette perfectly illustrates a complete 
disparity in geographic perspective when compared with the other boundary sections. 
The great emphasis on clearly demarcating the boundary along the watershed and 
meridian sections was tied directly with the economic resources in the border 
landscape. The border area between Lakes Mweru and Tanganyika did not possess 
any proven mineral resources158 and the only appeals for boundary demarcation came 
from the local administrators. Indeed, the Northern Rhodesia Secretary for Native 
Affairs advised Governor Maxwell that even the ‘straight line’ advocated by Belgium 
would have sufficed as long as it was demarcated, even though “the cost of surveying 
a straight line might cost more than the land in dispute is worth.”159
Recalling the long history of negotiations going back before the 1911-14 
boundary commission, the Colonial Office still saw major territorial concessions in 
the Katanga pedicle as the primary goal in order to alleviate the transport issues 
between the two territorial ‘halves’ of Northern Rhodesia. The only perceived ‘value’ 
of the Mweru-Tanganyika borderland was as a bargaining chip for gaining the more 
‘valuable’ area in the Pedicle. This reflects the retention of the small scale, imperial 
perspective whereby the pedicle appeared as a territorial wedge disturbing what might 
be perceived on a small scale map as the territorial cohesion of eastern and western 
Northern Rhodesia. 
 
The Northern Rhodesia administration certainly would have preferred to have 
had major territorial adjustments in the pedicle, but it knew, just as well as Peake, that 
there was no chance of Belgium agreeing any major adjustments given the presence 
of copper resources. Instead, Livingstone was more concerned with getting a 
workable and demarcated boundary between the lakes, to the point of accepting the 
Belgian claim of the straight line from Lake Mweru to Cape Kipimbi, which it 
believed gave better quality land for future settlement when compared with the Peak-
Gendarme line. This perspective was of a larger scale, informed by an understanding 
                                                 
158 RC/928 Letter J. Austen Bancroft (Rhodesia Anglo-American Ltd.) to Baird (local BSAC 
secretary), 9 July 1930. 
159 RC/1349 Vol. I Draft letter from Maxwell (NR Governor) to Cunliffe-Lister (CO), 20 November 
1931. 
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of where villages were positioned, the tribal connections in Belgian Congo, 
existing/observed de facto boundaries and the responsibility of local administration.  
 
Influence of economic geography on colonial boundary demarcation 
in southern Africa         
 
An underestimated influence  
Most boundary studies, especially of African boundaries, only hint at the role 
economic geography played in boundary demarcation. Confusingly, Prescott and 
Triggs cite Laws160 and Peake161 in their recent work and state “how the boundaries 
separating the former Belgian Congo from British Northern Rhodesia and Tanganyika 
were only delimited when copper and tin deposits were discovered in the borderland 
and companies needed certainty about the extent of Belgian and British authority.”162 
This is an overly simplistic statement that actually dates back to a 1965 quote by 
Prescott where in fact the phrase was originally worded “…the boundaries separating 
the former Belgian Congo from Northern Rhodesia and Tanganyika remained 
undemarcated until copper and tin mining made demarcation essential if major 
disputes were to be avoided.”163 It seems remarkable that Prescott and Triggs should 
have used the term ‘delimited’ when clearly Prescott’s earlier use of these citations 
was in describing ‘demarcation’, two terms that he has clearly elucidated.164
                                                 
160 J.B. Laws, ‘A minor adjustment to the boundary between Tanganyika territory and Ruanda’ 
Geographical Journal 80, no. 3 (1932): 244-247. 
 The 
statement also overlooks the initial demarcation of the Belgian Congo-Northern 
Rhodesia that was not motivated by mining interests. Perhaps the re-phrasing and 
dismissal of the initial demarcation were in error, but Prescott and Triggs do not give 
justice to the complexity of the historical narratives of the specific cases and the 
theoretical underpinnings of boundary-making processes. Significantly, they also miss 
the opportunity to reflect in more detail on the influence that economic resources had 
on those processes, particularly in the colonial context. 
161 Peake, ‘Northern Rhodesia, Belgian Congo boundary.’ 
162 J.V. Prescott and G. Triggs International Frontiers and Boundaries: Law, Politics and Geography 
(Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2008), 67. 
163 J.R.V. Prescott, The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1965), 
70. 
164 Prescott, The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries, 70-71. 
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In truth, across British colonial territories in southern Africa, the influence of 
mineral deposits on boundary demarcation was pervasive. The BSAC appealed to the 
FO in 1902 for demarcation of the boundary between North Eastern Rhodesia and 
Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique) arguing: “This line passes through mineralised 
areas and the North Charterland Exploration Company cannot tell where limits of 
their concession.”165
Having regard to the possibility that a diamond or gold mine might be found 
near the boundary, the existence of which might lead to the most serious 
disputes if any but a really definitive and final method of demarcation were 
resorted to, we are further confirmed by this consideration in the plan which 
we have recommended. 
 As the highest ranking British surveyor in colonial Africa, Sir 
David Gill along with his German counter-part A.V. Danckelman made the 
connection between mineral resources and boundary demarcation absolutely explicit 
in their Explanatory Memorandum that accompanied the instructions given to the 
1898-1902 Anglo-German boundary commission in South West Africa: 
In Article 6 however, we have avoided defining the distance apart of the 
beacons which are to be erected on the boundary, - and we understand that in 
the desert region of the boundary such beacons are to be placed only at very 
wide intervals but such that in the event of valuable mines being found near 
the boundary there would be no difficulty in beaconing it more closely.166
 
 
 As Prescott and Triggs indicate, the 1931 Anglo-Belgian demarcation of the 
Kagera river section of the Ruanda-Tanganyika boundary was instigated by the 
presence of the Ankole-Karagwe tinfield.167
                                                 
165 NRA 3/1/2 3949 Letter J.F. Jones (BSAC) to FO, 24 March 1902. 
 Laws outlined how the commission 
altered the delimited boundary from the indistinct course of the Kagera river through 
dense swamps, to a series of ‘straight lines’ between observable pillars located on 
islands or high ground within the swamps. In addition to giving “assurance” to local 
populations that one side of the swamp was Belgian and the other British, Laws 
concluded “the line joining the intervisible pillars provides the owner of a mining 
166 H. Laffan, L. Wettstein, Doering and D. Gill, Report: The Boundary Survey between British 
Bechuanaland and German South West Africa (Berlin: Government publisher, 1906), 6. 
167 Prescott and Triggs, International Frontiers and Boundaries, 67. See also A.C. McEwen, 
International Boundaries of East Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 156. 
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concession a permanent boundary which he can re-establish at any point when it is 
required.”168
When the BSAC obtained an estate property along the boundary between 
Northern Rhodesia and Tanganyika in 1934, it was discovered that the old Anglo-
German boundary had effectively disappeared from the landscape. Northern 
Rhodesia’s director of surveys, William Fairweather placed blame squarely on the 
1898 Anglo-German boundary commission having left “indefinite, impracticable and 
almost wholly valueless demarcation of the watershed portions where the boundary in 
addition to being that between two territories is also that of a privately owned 
estate.”
 
169 In approving plans for more rigorous demarcation, the British Army 
Council indicated that “The British South Africa Coy. [sic] Boundary coincides with 
the inter-colonial boundary, and they are, therefore, unable to sell any land adjacent to 
their boundary with any degree of certainty as to its extent in a northerly direction.”170
The Manica section of the boundary between Southern Rhodesia and 
Portuguese East Africa (Moçambique) was first surveyed by an Anglo-Portuguese 
boundary commission in 1892, precipitated by white mining and farming in the 
area.
 
Although Fairweather had condemned the 1898 demarcation of the entire boundary, 
only the section that coincided with the BSAC estate was re-surveyed and demarcated 
in 1937 by a BSAC surveyor. Although there were no mineral resources involved, the 
fact that the BSAC estate was being apportioned to sell white farm properties 
motivated the re-demarcation of the boundary. 
171 A dispute over its alignment prompted international arbitration in 1897, after 
which the BSAC administration in Rhodesia was so eager for demarcation because of 
mining concessions that they offered to use their own surveyors.172 A second Anglo-
Portuguese commission in 1898 failed to demarcate the Manica section clearly, and 
did not demarcate along northern boundary sections primarily because the area had 
not received any applications for white farms.173
                                                 
168 Laws, ‘A minor adjustment to the boundary between Tanganyika territory and Ruanda,’ 247. 
 Finally, from 1933-37 a third Anglo-
Portuguese boundary commission demarcated the Manica boundary section with 
169 SEC 3/263 vol. II Letter Fairweather to Chief Secretary NR, 2 January 1934. 
170 SEC 3/263 vol. II Army Council Memorandum accompanying Letter Widdows (WO) to CO, 3 Nov 
1933. 
171 P. Warhurst, ‘A troubled frontier: North-eastern Mashonaland, 1898-1906’ African Affairs 77, no. 
307 (1978): 214-229. p. 214. 
172 FO 63/1435 Letter Milner to Chamberlain, 
173 Warhurst, ‘A troubled frontier,’ 215-216. 
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some 335 main and auxiliary boundary pillars, most of which were located less than 
500 metres apart.174
In 1939 Northern Rhodesia’s Commissioner for Lands, Mines and Surveys 
commented on proposals for demarcation of Northern Rhodesia’s boundary with 
Angola along the high-water bank of the Kwando river saying: “refinement is not at 
present necessary and would only become necessary in the unlikely even of 
considerable development, such as mineral development, taking place in that 
locality.”
 There is little doubt that the re-demarcation in 1933-37 was a 
direct result of the increasing number of mining concessions and white-owned farms 
in the Manica region, a scenario eerily similar to the situation along the Belgian 
Congo-Northern Rhodesia boundary.  
175 Winterbotham had suggested a decade earlier that the Kwando border 
only required survey by air, concluding “The country is, I understand, of small value, 
but of a kind and climate unsuitable for prolonged survey.”176
 
 In all of these 
scenarios, only those boundary sections in areas that possessed mineral resources or 
white-owned farm properties were subject to rigorous demarcation, making them 
known on the physical landscape. 
Postcolonial reflection on colonial boundary demarcation techniques 
Certainly other factors, such as the more general penetration of colonial 
administration, may have influenced boundary demarcation in other contexts. 
However, the Belgian Congo-Northern Rhodesia context reveals a disparity in 
techniques of demarcating territory when required for the administration of local 
populations and when required by economic interests. If the model of state 
sovereignty that was being exported to colonial Africa contemplated territory as a 
two-dimensional constant, as evidenced by its expression in small scale mapping seen 
in Chapter 4 and whose theoretical underpinnings were examined in Chapter 2, how 
can this disparity in demarcation techniques be interpreted? If territorial sovereignty 
was considered a constant, would not the techniques for boundary demarcation also 
be constant, treating every square inch of territory the same as the next?  
                                                 
174 International Boundary Study (IBS), No. 118 Mozambique-Zimbabwe Boundary Office of the 
Geographer, United States Department of State (1971), 12-17; see also I. Brownlie, African 
Boundaries: A Legal and Diplomatic Encyclopaedia (London: C. Hurst and Co., 1979), 1227-1235. 
175 SEC 3/293 Letter Eccles to NR Chief Secretary, 21 Jan 1939. 
176 RC/1350 Letter Winterbotham to NR Chief Secretary, 7 June 1929. 
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The change in demarcation techniques along the Belgian Congo-Northern 
Rhodesia boundary after the influence of copper production, reveals how the 
perceived economic geography of border landscapes became a dominant influence on 
way the British imperial metropole came to make its inter-colonial boundaries 
‘known,’ thereby reflecting its perception of colonial territory in Africa. The 1911-14 
Anglo-Belgian boundary commission had left a boundary that was known only 
through the privileged medium of cartography, representing territory as a two-
dimensional, constant plane. 
But the disparity goes beyond the difference between the two Anglo-Belgian 
boundary commissions to include the huge difference in the work of the second 
commission alone, which clearly demarcated watershed and meridian sections, and 
left the Mweru-Tanganyika section undemarcated. The border region between Lakes 
Mweru and Tanganyika was of low administrative importance where the only concern 
was administration of ‘native’ populations. Likewise, demarcation of the boundary 
was a low priority; the division of territorial administration remained a nebulous zone 
or frontier. However, in border areas with mining concessions or white-owned 
farming interest, such as the Congo-Zambezi watershed, boundary demarcation 
generated significant attention from the imperial government and the division of 
territorial administration had to be a clearly defined line or boundary. The ‘imperial’ 
moment, with its boundary imagined on small scale maps, gave way to what can be 
described as the ‘colonial’ moment in the demarcation narrative, whereby territory 
required clearly defined jurisdictional limits in order to facilitate more efficient 
exploitation of economic resources. 
 The significance of this disparity in demarcation can be engaged with more 
critically through recent postcolonial discourses. In Mahmood Mamdani’s work 
Citizen and Subject, he refers to the colonial state as “bifurcated,” within which 
white/European settlers were governed under direct rule, participating in their own 
governance with rights of citizenship as well as the benefits of land appropriation.177 
Under the same system, the ‘native’ population was subject to indirect rule marked by 
the imposition of ‘customary law’ where “land remained a communal – ‘customary’ – 
possession.”178
                                                 
177 M. Mamdani, Citizen and Subject (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996) 16-17. 
 However, Mamdani argues that this enforcement of ‘customary’ or 
178 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, 17. 
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communal land holding both reflected and led to three characteristics of institutional 
rule in colonial Africa: 
1. the ‘containerisation’ of the individual whereby identity shifted from a 
‘native’ to being a ‘tribesperson’ as British colonial rule sought to civilise 
African ‘communities’ rather than individuals. 
2. the ‘customary tradition’ or monarchical/patriarchal ‘custom’ privileged 
by colonial administrations was the least deeply engrained in pre-colonial 
Africa and was ill-defined which created disagreement about its definition 
prior to enforcement. 
3. customary rule was marked by force, that could be backed up by the direct 
rule of the colonial administrations that were often de-centralised.179
Mamdani considers that pre-colonial Africa did not have a single model of 
political organisation although “the transition from tribal to state organisation has 
often been conceptualized as one from kinship to a territorially based authority.”
 
180 
Instead, he argues that tension between clan (kinship) and administrative (territorial) 
based political institutions existed long before European involvement in Africa.181 
This meant there were no overriding ‘customary’ centralised institutions with 
exclusive jurisdiction, as was created by the colonial administrations in ‘native 
authority,’ and “like with rights over land and natural resources, jurisdiction over 
persons was likely to be multiple and not exclusive.”182
Achille Mbembe reflects in his 2001 work On the Post-Colony, that the 
imposition of European colonial rationality rested on what he called ‘commandement’ 
which included the classification of people based on their perceived “value.”
 The ‘communal’ rights to 
territory essentially came to be dictated by the ‘customary’ ruler within the auspices 
of indirect rule. 
183
                                                 
179 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, 22-23. 
 In the 
same way people were classified based on their “value”, the narrative of the Belgian 
Congo-Northern Rhodesia boundary suggests so was land and, consequently, the 
perception of territory. Mbembe goes even further in explaining that commandement 
180 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, 41. 
181 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, 42. 
182 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, 48. 
183 A. Mbembe, On the Postcolony (Berkley: University of California Press, 2001), 29. 
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was rooted on “a very specific imaginary of state sovereignty”184
The colonial space had its space, its shape, its borders. It had its geological 
make up and its climates. It had its resources, its soils, its mineral, its animal 
and plant species, its empty lands. In short, it had its qualities.
 not attached to 
people but related solely to territory:  
185
He suggests that while in pre-colonial Africa “the idea that political power and 
sovereignty were closely associated with land was not unknown,” territory was not 
the exclusive mark of sovereignty; that pre-colonial African space was represented in 
other ways relating to notions of exclusion and belonging, often linked to protection 
from capture for slavery.
  
186 In this regard, for pre-colonial African political entities 
“attachment to the territory and to the land was entirely relative”187
This notion recalls a quote by Gathii (see Chapter 2) in his review of the 1999 
Botswana-Namibia case over Kasikili/Sedudu island which outlines the way modern 
international law has developed: “law on title to territory is subtly-laced with an 
implicit evolutionary or hierarchical subtext that characterises non-European relations 
to land as primitive and as such not capable of creating a legal title.”
 while the colonial 
imposed model of territorial sovereignty required this relationship to be exclusive; 
expressed in the form of boundary demarcation when the land possessed economic 
value. 
188 The fact that 
these economic activities in the borderland areas were being conducted by white 
Europeans is certainly influential and worthy of more reflection. But considering the 
focus of this study, the influence was not just who was undertaking these activities on 
the land, it was the nature of the activities themselves. Just as the colonial system 
applied different political systems to people based on ‘value’, boundary demarcation 
reflects that land itself was defined differently based on its proven and perceived 
economic value. This conveys the deep penetration of Lockean concepts of land on 
the British colonial perception of territory, whereby ‘wasted’ land only became 
property through the exclusivity of labour imposed upon it.189
                                                 
184 Mbembe, On the Postcolony, 25. 
 
185 Mbembe, On the Postcolony, 32. 
186 Mbembe, On the Postcolony, 70. 
187 A. Mbembe, ‘At the edge of the world: boundaries, territoriality and sovereignty in Africa’ trans. S. 
Randall Public Culture 21, no. 1 (2000): 259-284. p. 263) 
188 J.T. Gathii, ‘Geographical Hegelianism in territorial disputes involving non-European land relations: 
an analysis of the case concerning Kasikili/Sedudu’ Leiden Journal of International Law 15 (2002): 
581-622. 583. 
189 J. Locke, The Second Treatise of Civil Government (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1946), 25-26. 
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 Prescott and Triggs missed the opportunity to highlight how powerfully the 
economic perception of colonial land in Africa participated in the boundary-making 
practices. The narrative of the Belgian Congo-Northern Rhodesia boundary through 
the two demarcation commissions clearly conveys the predominate influence of the 
Lockean concept of land usage on imperial perceptions of African territory. Land that 
was being productively used for economic gain required linear boundaries that were 
clearly known on the physical landscape; the exclusivity of territorial and property 
rights clearly demarcated to ensure efficient exploitation of resources. Land with no 
economically productive capacity could be left with linear boundaries known only 
through cartographic representation and made known on the ground only in the 
presence of valuable resources. Without economic resources, the local division of 
colonial authority over local populations was left indistinct on the ground, often 
observed as zones, or, to recall the term from Chapter 2, ‘frontiers’ that were assumed 
to be part of ‘traditional’ rule in pre-colonial Africa and believed by boundary 
scholars to be indicative of more primitive politico-geographical entities. 
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6. Boundary demarcation in independent 
Zambia 
 
“We underscore the relevance of the African Union Border Programme based on the 
need: 
a. to address the persistence of the border delimitation and demarcation issue; Subject 
to an inventory to be undertaken, it is estimated that less than a quarter of African 
borders have been delimited and demarcated. This situation is fraught with risks, as 
the lack of delimitation and demarcation gives rise to ‘undefined zones’ within which 
the application of national sovereignty poses problems, and constitutes a real obstacle 
to the deepening of the integration process” 
 
African Union Border Programme (AUBP) 
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Introduction          
 
As revealed in Chapter 4, the early demarcation of the Belgian Congo-Northern 
Rhodesia certainly provided little knowledge of the boundary on the ground and there 
was little administrative influence that might have enforced the boundary through 
actual control across its full length. Quite the opposite, the limited colonial 
administration in border areas often reflected a distinctly zonal character as revealed 
in Chapter 5; administrations separated by spatial frontiers rather than linear 
boundaries. It was shown in Chapter 5 that the later demarcation of the watershed and 
meridian sections certainly exhibited the boundary as a visible characteristic of the 
landscape which, irrespective of acts of actual control, provided knowledge of the 
boundary that was intended to influence activity in the borderland area.  
Clearly, the activity meant to be influenced by the later demarcation of the 
Belgian Congo-Northern Rhodesia boundary was the exploitation of raw natural 
resources. As the post-colonial insights from Mamdani and Achebe suggest, this was 
largely characteristic of British administration over ‘territory’ in colonial Africa. 
Given the model of territorial sovereignty examined in Chapter 2, particularly in the 
post-1945 development of international law, linear boundaries provide for the most 
efficient administration of resources as well as populations. With that model in mind, 
it is reasonable to expect that the early post-independent Zambia government would 
have been eager to maintain the visibly known boundary as definition of its territorial 
inheritance; as an essential component of its introduction into the community of 
recognised modern states. Even if the post-independence motivations for exhibiting 
administrative control were less economically focused, clearly defined boundaries of 
territory could have had indirect influence on borderland administration particularly 
when, as in the case of Zambia, the immediate post-independence administrative 
structure included a limited cadre of experienced staff. However, this chapter will 
show that the maintenance of boundary demarcation after the 1933 Anglo-Belgian 
boundary commission was left largely ignored by subsequent government 
administrations. 
This chapter will begin by reviewing the demarcation maintenance procedures 
undertaken by the Northern Rhodesian (and the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyassaland) colonial administration leading up to independence in 1964. With the 
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lack of available documentary evidence of demarcation methodology post-1964, the 
narrative up to the present day will be constructed from dialogue with relevant 
government officials and a site visit to two boundary pillars as discussed in Chapter 3. 
Not only will this complete the demarcation narrative by understanding how sections 
of the boundary currently appear on the physical landscape, it will also reveal how the 
mining industry continues to participate in the sovereign process of demarcation. It is 
just as valuable to understand why a boundary section has been left undemarcated, so 
this examination of the watershed boundary section will be contrasted with the 
undemarcated section between Lakes Mweru and Tanganyika. Although reportedly 
delimited in 1989, it will be shown how the lack of demarcation has lead to periodic 
disputes, sometimes resulting in violence. 
The lack of demarcation along the DRC-Zambia boundary after 1933 and 
since Zambian independence, either through neglect of inherited colonial demarcation 
or the continued lack of initial demarcation, is generally representative of other post-
independent African state practice. Likewise, the Zambian practice posits valuable 
insight into more general discourses on African boundaries. Examining the issues that 
have affected the on-going process of boundary demarcation particularly in the post-
independence context will help expose some of the issues in the tense relationship 
between independent African political institutions and their inherited territory.  
 
 
Maintaining the boundary line until Zambian independence 
 
When the demarcation results of the second Anglo-Belgian commission for BPs 11-
33 was agreed in the 1933 exchange of notes, the two imperial governments agreed to 
be responsible for annual maintenance of the boundary pillars, and clearing bush to 
keep the pillars inter-visible.1 Because of the dense vegetation along many sections of 
the boundary, particularly in the Copperbelt area, inter-visibility between boundary 
pillars could quickly disappear, obscuring the boundary as a visually perceived line. 
Northern Rhodesia was responsible for boundary maintenance between BPs 11-24 
and 31-33, while Belgian Congo took responsibility for BPs 24-31.2
                                                 
1 See Appendix for full text. 
 It was also 
agreed that the two governments would undertake a joint perambulation of the entire 
2 See Appendix for full text. 
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demarcated boundary every 10 years, beginning in 1938. In spite of these detailed 
provisions, there was a mixed response by the colonial administrations to maintaining 
the boundary pillars and keeping the line cleared of undergrowth. The Northern 
Rhodesia administration appropriated funds for boundary maintenance in 1933 but not 
in 1934, while Belgian Congolese officials undertook clearance in 1935.3
By October 1942 the Northern Rhodesia commissioner of forests, C.E. Duff, 
advocated clearance of the boundary between BPs 20-21 as it had become 
overgrown.
 
4 Duff argued that clearance of undergrowth could be undertaken by a 
forest ranger, but if this was not undertaken soon, the boundary would effectively 
disappear from the landscape requiring a more expensive re-survey.5 Perhaps because 
of events in Europe, the 1938 joint perambulation never took place and any 
maintenance or clearance appears to have been undocumented. However, the issue 
was raised again in early 1956 when officials in the survey department alerted the 
Ministry for External Affairs that there had been reports of broken boundary pillars 
and noted that the next scheduled ten-year joint perambulation was due to take place 
in 1958.6 Although not stated explicitly, the correspondence suggests that no 
perambulation took place in 1948. Another official in the Ministry for Health, Lands 
and Local Government had also noted in November 1954 that several boundary pillars 
were broken and needed replacing. However, it was felt that pillars could only be re-
built after the joint inspection had taken place.7
 Questions over boundary definition with Belgian Congo did perpetuate 
between 1945 and 1964. There were extensive negotiations in the late 1950s about the 
position of the boundary in Lake Mweru, especially around Kilwa island since silt 
was building up on its western side, potentially linking it with the Belgian Congo 
shoreline and requiring Congolese vessels to navigate through Rhodesian waters when 
transiting to Mpweto.
 There is no record in any of the 
archives researched of a joint perambulation ever having taken place prior to Zambian 
independence in October 1964. Given the international nature of such an exercise, it is 
very likely that records would confirm if it had ever taken place. 
8
                                                 
3 SEC 3/293 Prov. Comm to Chief Secretary, 30 October 1942.  
 There were proposals for minor boundary adjustments in the 
4 SEC 3/293 Report by C.E. Duff, 19 Oct 1942. 
5 SEC 3/293 Report by C.E. Duff, 19 Oct 1942. 
6 WP 1/14/36 Letter Federal Survey Adviser to the Minister for External Affairs), 26 April 1956. 
7 WP 1/14/36 Letter P. Bennett to Heathcote, 24 May 1956. 
8 See SEC 3/292 Correspondence between the Federal Ministry of Land and Local Government and the 
Ministry of External Affairs, 1958-59.  
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Mokambo and Nkana areas, as well as extensive negotiations concerning Zambian 
rights along the so-called ‘Pedicle Road’ and the lingering question concerning the 
undemarcated Mweru-Tanganyika section that continued without resolution.9
Maintenance of boundary demarcation only reappears within the colonial 
administrative records in early 1964 when the Senior Provincial Commissioner (SPC) 
in Ndola was approached by R.S.T. Mine Services to clear the boundary between BPs 
15 and 22 along their Mufulira Special Grant area.
 Given 
these continued negotiations about possible boundary adjustments, it is unsurprising 
that no joint perambulation and reconstruction of boundary pillars was ever 
undertaken prior to independence.  
10 The SPC had received a bid from 
a private survey company (C.J. Surveys Ltd) to clear this boundary section for a total 
cost of £626.11 The Northern Rhodesia administration did annually allocate funds for 
boundary clearance and in 1964 that amount was £1,100, divided between the 
provincial commissioners at Ndola (£600) and Solwezi (£500) to clear the entire 
watershed boundary section with Belgian Congo.12
I have been requested by R.S.T. Mine Services Ltd to clear the border in this 
area and funds warranted to me of £600 for the whole of the border are 
insufficient to provide for the standard of clearing required.
 The SPC appealed to Lusaka for 
the £626 on top of the normal £600 budget so that this specific section between BPs 
15-22 could be better cleared by the survey company. He noted in his request: 
13
 
 
But the Northern Rhodesia administration was puzzled why the job could not 
be undertaken with local labour instead of being tendered out to such an expensive 
contractor.14
                                                 
9 For a summary of the situation see SEC 3/292 Meeting minutes, 8 August 1958 ‘to consider proposed 
negotiations with the Belgian government on the question of the Pedicle Road in relation to certain 
matters concerning the Northern Rhodesia/Belgian Congo boundary’ and SEC 3/292 Memoranda 
accompanying A.C. Ganimara, Zambia Chief Secretary to all ministries, 1 July 1958.  
 The Office of the Prime Minister also enquired when the boundary had 
been last cleared and by what method. The Senior Provincial Commissioner 
responded that the meagre budget he was allocated for clearance only provided for the 
burning of brush along the boundary. This technique had been so crude that “in 
10 FA 1/1/3 Letter SPC, Ndola to Permanent secretary, Office of the Prime Minister, Lusaka, 26 
February 1964. 
11 FA 1/1/3 Letter Moses to Senior Provincial Commissioner, Ndola, 21 February 1964. 
12 FA 1/1/3 Letter Finance Office to Under Secretary for Provincial Affairs, 18 April 1964. 
13 FA 1/1/3 Letter SPC, Ndola to Permanent secretary, Office of the Prime Minister, Lusaka, 26 
February 1964. 
14 FA 1/1/3 Notes from Secretary of the Cabinet, Prime Minister’s Office, 9 March 1964. 
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consequence, it can be said that there is no clear definition of the border.”15 The £626 
for the contracted clearance was allocated by the administration but it was unable to 
provide the normal £600 budget allocation, suggesting “Within the limits of the funds 
provided you must decide which particular areas should be given priority for 
clearance.”16
 There are two issues at play in the maintenance regimes put in place by 
Northern Rhodesia between the end of the second Anglo-Belgian boundary 
commission in 1933 and Zambian independence in 1964. First, the clearance of bush 
between boundary pillars to maintain inter-visibility between the pillars was 
established under the 1933 agreement as a unilateral exercise, with each side allocated 
a specific stretch of the boundary. However, it appears that only a very limited 
amount of boundary clearance was undertaken with any regularity by Northern 
Rhodesia and any clearance of a higher ‘standard’ was reserved for areas of mining 
interests. Second, the limited archival material suggests that Northern Rhodesian 
officials were reluctant to repair the boundary pillars themselves, even though the 
1933 treaty explicitly stated that both sides would be responsible for “the boundary 
pillars to be maintained in a proper state of repair” along their respective sections.
 (Letter N. McClelland, Office of the Prime Minister to Senior Provincial 
Commissioner, Ndola 14 July 1964 FA 1/1/3). 
17
 
 
Perhaps such an act was believed to be an inherently bilateral operation, necessitating 
participation of Belgian officials in a joint perambulation. Both operations, the 
clearance of the boundary as a horizontal line-of-sight and the maintenance of the 
verticality of boundary pillars, constructed the theoretical characteristics of the 
boundary as linear and fixed. However, the inherent bilateral nature of boundaries 
may have imbued an almost sacred quality to the pillars themselves; suggesting they 
were the actual physical containers of both neighbouring sovereignties and could only 
be repaired with the consent or direct participation of both states. 
 
                                                 
15 FA 1/1/3 Senior Provincial Commissioner, Ndola to Secretary to the Cabinet, PM Office Lusaka, 3 
April 1964. 
16 FA 1/1/3 Letter N. McClelland, Office of the Prime Minister to Senior Provincial Commissioner, 
Ndola, 14 July 1964. 
17 Art. 10, Enclosure in No. 1, Appendices VI-VIII, 7 April 1933 Anglo-Belgian Exchange of Notes. 
See Appendix for full text. Also reproduced in I. Brownlie, African Boundaries: A Legal and 
Diplomatic Encyclopaedia (London: Hurst and Co., 1979), 729. 
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What can happen without demarcation: the Mweru-Tanganyika 
section after independence       
 
The dispute over the undemarcated Mweru-Tanganyika section of the Belgian Congo-
Northern Rhodesia boundary continued long after the second Anglo-Belgian 
boundary commission was so ignominiously disbanded in 1934. Although interrupted 
by the Second World War, the complex negotiations continued through the 1940s, 
1950s and 1960s. The exact course of these negotiations is well beyond the scope of 
this work, but is documented in various archival files. Both sides retained their 
original claims to the disputed eastern terminus on Lake Tanganyika, while the British 
and Northern Rhodesian administrations continued to press for territorial concessions 
within the Congolese ‘pedicle’. While these negotiations dragged on for decades, this 
boundary section remained undemarcated on the physical landscape. 
 The suppression of revolts in Katanga (also known as Shaba) province in 
1963, 1977 and 1978 often led to minor border problems, caused by refugee 
movements and mistreatment of Zambians travelling through the pedicle by Katangan 
forces who were faced defeats on other fronts.18 But it was the undemarcated Mweru-
Tanganyika section that provoked tension in August 1980 when Zambia accused 
Zaire of establishing a border post some 30 km within Zambian claimed territory in 
the Kaputa area on the western end of the Mweru-Tanganyika section near Lake 
Mweru. The de facto boundary in this area had been observed along the Luchinda 
river since at least 1929, and there were other enclaves of Congolese controlled areas 
all along this section. In 1961 the Provincial Commissioner in the area reported that 
while the Congolese enclaves made the Mweru-Tanganyika boundary section 
“nebulous”, the de facto boundary south of Kaputa and the tolerance of the enclaves 
caused no administrative problems.19 In the context of boundary negotiations he had 
suggested to ‘let sleeping dogs lie.’20
                                                 
18 M.C. Musambachime, ‘Military Violence against Civilians: The Case of the Congolese and Zairean 
Military in the Pedicle 1890-1988’ The International Journal of African Historical Studies 23, no. 4 
(1990): 643-664. 
  
19 FA 1/1/3 Correspondence Button, Provincial Commissioner to Ministry of Native Affairs, March and 
April 1961. 
20 FA 1/1/3 Correspondence Button, Provincial Commissioner to Ministry of Native Affairs, 17 April 
1961. 
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  There were a number of reported problems along the boundary after 196121, 
which even prompted the Zambian Surveyor General and Permanent Secretary in the 
Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources to propose setting up a boundary 
commission in August 1966 to demarcate the disputed Mweru-Tanganyika section.22 
However, no commission was ever established and tensions escalated rapidly again in 
early 1982 when a series of skirmishes erupted in the Kaputa area (Allcock et al 1992, 
p. 321). The tension soon spread to the watershed section where exchanges of fire 
reportedly took place in February and March 1982 including several deaths.23 
Although a prisoner release was organised in April 1982, tensions continued as 
Lusaka radio claimed in June that two more Zairean border posts had been established 
within Zambian territory in the Kaputa area, and in September that tourists had been 
abducted by Zairean forces also in the same area.24
Problems occurred along all Zaire-Zambia borderland areas continued for 
several years, often blamed on the accusations of territorial violations by Zairean 
forces and on increased banditry and smuggling that supposedly prompted increased 
Zambian forces in the border areas.
 
25 Most of the cross-border problems remained 
concentrated around the Kaputa area, but smaller incidents were reported on Kilwa 
island, along the Luapula river and in the Copperbelt area. Some of these skirmishes 
resulted in the sending of troops to the area, but none appears to have escalated into 
large-scale military operations. Although the respective presidents, Mobutu Seso Seko 
of Zaire and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia met several times during the period of 
tensions, no agreement on defining the Mweru-Tanganyika section was reached. 
Documents from the US Department of State indicate that Zaire and Zambia had set 
up a joint technical committee to settle the disputed Mweru-Tanganyika section 
during the tensions in 1982. On 20 December 1987, Zambian cabinet secretary 
Charles Manyema stated that this committee had reached agreement on how the 
Mweru-Tanganyika boundary section should be demarcated, but their 
recommendations still had to be approved by Kaunda and Mobutu.26
                                                 
21 See especially incidents from 1965 to 1967 documented in NAZ file FA 1/1/67. 
 Over the 
22 FA 1/1/67 Letter Copeland, SG to Office of the President, 18 August 1966 and Letter Permanent 
Secretary, Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 November 1966. 
23 J. Allcock, G. Arnold, A. Day, D. Lewis, L. Poultney, R. Rance and D. Sagar, Border and Territorial 
Disputes Third Edition (London: Longman Group, 1992), 321. 
24 Allcock, Border and Territorial Disputes Third Edition, 321. 
25 Allcock, Border and Territorial Disputes Third Edition, 321. 
26 US Department of State communiqué (confidential telegram) from Lusaka embassy, 21 December 
1987. 
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following year, Kaunda was quoted several times saying that the boundary dispute 
was resolved and only required signing the treaty with Mobutu. An official at the 
American Embassy in Lusaka commented on one such quote in January 1989: “We 
suspect Kaunda’s latest announcement, and the attendant front page publicity, might 
have been more an attempt to counteract the recent spate of anti-Zaire newspaper 
reports than an indication the decade-long border dispute has finally been resolved.”27
It was not until 19 September 1989 the treaty was signed by Presidents 
Mobutu and Kaunda in the Zairean town of Nsele near Kinshasa, after what 
unconfirmed sources suggest was a three day party including the presidents of 
Angola, Congo, Sao Tome and Principe and Zimbabwe. President Kaunda proudly 
announced at the time:  
  
The signing of this treaty is truly a proud moment for Africa. It shows that left 
to themselves, African countries are sufficiently mature to resolve even the 
most serious of problems in an amicable manner.28
In spite of all the fanfare, the actual text of this agreement does not appear to have 
ever been made public. 
  
29 Some sources indicate that the treaty addressed frontier 
security, trans-border smuggling as well as supposedly delimiting a new boundary 
along the Mweru-Tanganyika section.30 It was widely reported that the 1989 
agreement may have settled the Tanzania-Zaire-Zambia tripoint in Lake Tanganyika. 
A variety of sources which make this claim all quote the following phrase, which may 
indicate that it was derived from the lone press release: “Tanzania-Zaire-Zambia 
tripoint in Lake Tanganyika may no longer be indefinite since it is reported that the 
indefinite section of the Zaire-Zambia boundary has been settled.” It is still not clear 
if this ‘treaty’ of 19 September 1989 was ever ratified by the respective 
governments.31
 While the 1989 agreement was hailed by the two presidents as a break-
through, minor skirmishes and problems continued. More importantly, it is clear that 
  
                                                 
27 US Department of State communiqué (confidential telegram) from Lusaka embassy, 24 January 
1989. 
28 ‘Border agreement signed with Zaire’ ZANA/PANA – Zambian News Agency, 19 September 1989. 
29 The 1989 treaty was never deposited with the United Nations and is not available in the National 
Archives of Zambia. 
30 Allcock, Border and Territorial Disputes Third Edition, 322. 
31 Note that President Kaunda was voted out of office in October 1991 which may have had some effect 
on ratification of the 1989 agreement. From 1989 until he was removed in 1994, President Mobutu 
reigned over an increasingly chaotic domestic situation in Zaire that may also have affected the 
ratification and implementation of the 1989 agreement. 
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no demarcation of the Mweru-Tanganyika section has ever taken place. In March 
1990, an unnamed Zambian minister was reported as saying “that the demarcation of 
the frontier along the Luapula was not yet complete although ‘considerable progress’ 
in resolving the border dispute between the two countries had been made.”32 In early 
December 1997, the Zambian deputy foreign affairs minister stated in the Zambian 
Parliament that he blamed “the physical non-demarcation of Zambia’s border with the 
Democratic Republic of Congo on the state of insecurity (along the boundary).”33 The 
deputy foreign minister went on to say that Zambia was willing to undertake physical 
demarcation but the state of insecurity along the boundary and “uncooperative attitude 
which characterised the former Zaire”34
 
 had hampered efforts.  
Recovering the post-independence demarcation narrative  
 
As noted in Chapter 3, the government records in the National Archives of Zambia 
are extremely scarce after the early 1970s. In fact, there is no documentation of any 
Zambian government boundary demarcation and maintenance concerning the DRC 
boundary after independence held in the NAZ or the UNIP files that were available in 
August 2007. As noted in Chapter 3, this lack of documentary information 
necessitated a change in research methodology to understand exactly what process 
had been carried out since that time. This included interviews with Survey 
Department officials, to understand official Zambian policy towards boundary 
demarcation and what processes have been undertaken since independence. 
Since independence, the responsibility for demarcation and maintenance of all 
Zambia’s international boundaries has been held by the Zambian Survey Department, 
part of the Ministry of Lands, headquartered in Lusaka. Zambia’s deputy surveyor 
general Ed Kateka has worked in the Survey Department for over twenty years and 
among his many duties is coordinating boundary maintenance with neighbouring 
states. Given his duration of service in the Survey Department, Mr. Kateka was best 
placed to explain Zambian demarcation practice since 1964 that he has negotiated 
himself. He confirmed what the lack of documentation suggested, stating in an 
                                                 
32 Allcock, Border and Territorial Disputes Third Edition, 322. The reference to the “frontier along the 
Luapula” is likely to have been in mistaken reference to the Mweru-Tanganyika section. 
33 ‘Committee to check envoys postings set’ The Times of Zambia (Ndola), 4 December 1997. 
34 ‘Committee to check envoys postings set’ The Times of Zambia (Ndola), 4 December 1997. 
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interview in July 2007 that maintenance of the DRC-Zambia boundary has not taken 
place for many years.35 Although both Mr. Kateka and Zambia’s surveyor general, 
Mr. Danny Mubanga noted having seen several of the boundary pillars along the 
Congolese boundary (particularly in areas north of Ndola), they confirmed that there 
is no consistent regime in place to maintain either the pillars themselves, or clear 
lines-of-sight between pillars through the bush. In addition, Mr. Kateka confirmed in 
July 2007 that while the Mweru-Tanganyika boundary was effectively delimited in 
the 1989 agreement, it still has yet to be demarcated on the ground.36
With no documentary evidence of any boundary demarcation or maintenance 
having taken place since 1964, either under the auspices of the 1933 treaty or in an 
effort to resolve the Mweru-Tanganyika boundary dispute, I wanted to bring the 
narrative up to the present day by viewing the physical condition of the boundary in 
person. As described in Chapters 1 and 3, I was able to view the boundary at two sites 
north of the Zambian city of Ndola (see Map 3, p. 102).  
 
As explained in the prologue, the first boundary pillar to be visited was BP 16, 
located at the Sakania crossing point. Figure 1 shows the current physical condition of 
BP 16 which remains fairly distinguishable as an international boundary pillar, in 
spite of having required quite significant repair. However, the lack of any other 
visible marks or cleared tracks through the bush meant that the boundary as a linear, 
fixed and bilateral entities could not be ‘known’ visually on the physical landscape at 
the lived scale. This resulted in what was perceived as a wide zone of indistinct 
jurisdiction between the widely separated border checkpoints. 
  
                                                 
35 E. Kateka, interview at the Survey Department headquarters, Lusaka, 30 July 2007. 
36 Kateka, Interview. 30 July 2007. 
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Figure 1: BP 16 (2 August 2007) 
 
 
Again recalling the opening prologue in Chapter 1, the second boundary site I visited 
was a section around BP 18. North of BP 16, we were joined by two local guides who 
brought us to what they believed to be a ‘boundary pillar,’ deep in the bush. This 
‘boundary pillar’ turned out to be a concrete block at the base of a large fence (See 
Figure 2). From this supposed boundary pillar we followed the fence (see Figure 3) 
north along the Zambian side for approximately 3-4 km to eventually find BP 18. 
Like BP 16, BP 18 is also visually unmistakable as a symbol of an international 
boundary, with its inscribed number and territorial distinctions by letter (see Figure 
4). What was very different about this boundary section was the presence of the large 
fence that was referred two by two local residents as ‘the boundary’ (See Figure 3).  
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Figure 2: Supposed boundary pillar (2 August 2007) 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The ‘boundary fence’ south of BP 18 (2 August 2007) 
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Figure 4: BP 18 at southeast corner of the Frontier Copper Mine (2 August 2007) 
 
 
BP 18 stood at the junction of two fences: the ‘boundary’ fence that we had 
followed for several kilometres and a perpendicular fence of an almost identical style 
that enclosed a large compound area. Just within the fenced compound at the junction 
of the two fences was a military-style observation post, occupied by armed security 
forces (See Figure 5). The fenced compound is the area of the Frontier copper mine, 
owned with a 95% controlling stake by First Quantum Minerals (FQM) Ltd., a 
Canadian-listed mining company with operations in Zambia, DRC and Mauritania. 
With $226 million invested by FQM, the Frontier mine is an operating open pit 
copper mine that began commercial production on 2 November 2007 with a projected 
twenty year life span.37 Although the mine is technically registered in the DRC 
(whose government owns a 5% stake), according to its 2008 corporate report First 
Quantum acquired mining rights from both DRC and Zambia to land concessions on 
either side of the boundary “to enable the operational work areas to be constructed 
efficiently and effectively.”38
 
  
 
                                                 
37 FQM, Frontier Fact Sheet http://www.first-quantum.com/i/pdf/Frontier_Fact.pdf (24 November 
2009) 
38 FQM 2008 Annual Information Form. p. 22. 
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Figure 5: Zambian survey officials and the security observation post at southeast corner of the 
Frontier mine 
 
Surprisingly, the Zambian survey department officials were completely 
unaware that the ‘boundary’ fence had been erected despite their responsibilities for 
boundary demarcation and maintenance, as well as the close proximity of their offices 
in Ndola only some 35 km away. The style of fencing and lack of knowledge by the 
Survey Department suggests that the fence, identified by the two local 
residents/guides as the ‘boundary’ had been erected and maintained by contractors 
associated with the Frontier mine. Certainly it is possible that another government 
agency in Zambia or the DRC such as the military may have erected the fence, but it 
is implausible that the Zambian survey department, both in Ndola and Lusaka, were 
not notified of the fence construction considering the department is responsible for 
boundary maintenance. 
Because the ‘boundary’ fence extends beyond the actual Frontier mine 
compound, it is also unclear whether or not the fence was intended to demarcate the 
boundary line on the ground.39
                                                 
39 Although there is no mention of the ‘boundary fence’ erection in any of its corporate literature, it is 
worth noting that FQM contributed to the cost of refurbishing the Sakania immigration post on the 
Congolese side of the boundary as part of its ‘corporate responsibility programme’ (See FQM 2008, 
Annual Information Form, Corporate Responsibility photos). 
 This border area is much less densely populated than 
that around BP 16 and the Sakania border post. Without knowing how the boundary 
had been marked just prior to the erection of the fence, or having a comprehensive 
topographic survey of the area, it is impossible to discern if the fence is positioned 
exactly along the Congo-Zambezi watershed (the delimited boundary). Irrespective of 
the motivations for its erection, if the opinions of the two local guides are 
representative, the local Zambian borderland residents consider this fence to be the 
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‘boundary’; a fixed, linear and (seemingly) bilateral entity known on the visible 
landscape. 
 
Wither demarcation on African boundaries?    
 
Impediments to Zambian efforts for boundary demarcation  
Kaunda’s announcement in 1989 concerning agreement on the Mweru-Tanganyika 
section implies that boundary problems have been considered to be the most “serious” 
of bilateral concerns by the Zambian government; still the “razor’s edge on which 
hang suspended the modern issues of war or peace, of life or death to nations.”40
Kateka confirms that the lack of domestic funding for boundary demarcation 
maintenance has hampered efforts on all of Zambia’s international boundaries 
including the recent initiatives with Malawi.
 With 
this in mind, the lack of demarcation along the Mweru-Tanganyika section and lack of 
maintenance along the watershed section by the government in the post-independence 
context seems strange given its ‘seriousness.’ From the Zambian government 
perspective, deputy surveyor general E. Kateka identified two issues that have 
impeded regular maintenance of the boundary demarcation with DRC, lack of 
resources (largely financial) and the relationship with the neighbouring sovereign.  
41 From independence, funding for 
international boundary demarcation and maintenance was included in the Zambian 
government’s ‘capital projects’ budget.42 This placed demarcation activity in the same 
budget category as major infrastructure and transport projects, such as road 
construction and maintenance.43
                                                 
40 G.N. Curzon, Frontiers: The Romanes Lecture 1907 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908), 7. 
 For a landlocked state like Zambia, highly dependent 
on road and rail transport, it is easy to see how international boundary maintenance 
would quickly fall to a very low priority within the ‘capital projects’ budget, in spite 
of Kaunda’s 1989 announcement on the seriousness of boundary concerns. In 
addition, with its population focused mainly in Lusaka and not in the borderland 
areas, it is likely that any funding in the ‘capital projects’ budget would not prioritise 
issues such as boundary demarcation in peripheral areas. 
41 ‘Lack of funds impedes border demarcation of Zambia, Malawi’ Xinhua News Agency, 18 June 
2008. 
42 E. Kateka, interview at the Survey Department headquarters, Lusaka, 26 July 2007. 
43 Kateka, interview. 26 July 2007. 
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The second issue that has impeded Zambia’s efforts to maintain boundary 
demarcation with DRC has been the continued instability within DRC itself. While 
the formal diplomatic relationship between DRC and Zambia has been largely good 
since independence (with a few exceptions including the above mentioned border 
skirmishes), Kateka admits that it has been difficult to engage consistently even with 
provincial officials in neighbouring Katanga because any bilateral issues such as 
boundary demarcation have to be referred to national authorities in Kinshasa where 
they are rarely acted upon.44
 
 Although the budget allocation for boundary 
maintenance within the current Congolese governments could not be ascertained, it is 
likely to be, like Zambia’s funding, very restricted especially considering the 
enormous length of all DRC’s international land boundaries. Nevertheless, given the 
‘seriousness’ of boundary issues, it seems difficult to understand how both states 
could not have allocated adequate initiative and funding to address demarcation in 
forty years of independence. Perhaps the ‘seriousness’ expressed by Kaunda was not 
in reference to political will?  
A ‘tangible’ inheritance? 
These two impediments to demarcation on the DRC-Zambia boundary, lack of 
financial resources and inconsistent relations with the neighbouring state government, 
are frequently cited by officials across post-independence African states as main 
impediments to boundary demarcation and maintenance.45 Most colonial boundary 
pillars have largely disappeared from the physical landscape and undemarcated 
boundary sections have rarely been demarcated by post-independence governments.46
                                                 
44 Kateka, interview. 26 July 2007. This structure may be reflective of the more centralised Belgian 
colonial administration in Congo, compared with more devolved administration in British colonies and 
protectorates. 
 
45 Both issues were cited in discussion of survey officials from across the African Union at the Second 
International Symposium on Land, Lake and River Boundaries Management held in Maputo, 
Mozambique, 17-19 December 2008. 
46 See especially A.I. Asiwaju, ‘The Conceptual Framework’ in Partitioned Africans: ethnic relations 
across Africa’s international boundaries 1884-1984 ed., A.I. Asiwaju (London: Hurst and Lagos: 
University of Lagos Press, 1985), 11; J.V. Prescott and G. Triggs, International Frontiers and 
Boundaries: Law, Politics and Geography (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2008), 69. The recent 
demarcation of the Burkina Faso-Mali boundary (2008), partly funded by Germany’s Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), and the on-going demarcation of the Cameroon-
Nigeria boundary after the 2002 judgment of the ICJ, organized under the United Nations Office for 
West Africa partly funded by a United Nations Special Fund and other donor governments, are recent 
exceptions. These exercises are detailed in the forthcoming work Delimitation and Demarcation: An 
African Union Border Programme Handbook in chapters by I. Coulibaly, former Malian commissioner 
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Uganda’s commissioner for geological survey and mines recently said that Uganda 
alone has had some 1,500 boundary pillars uprooted from its international boundaries 
since independence.47 In justifying the institution of the African Union Border 
Programme (AUBP) in 2007, it was noted that “subject to an inventory to be 
undertaken, it is estimated that less than a quarter of African borders have been 
delimited and demarcated.”48 The exact extent of what is meant by the phrase 
“delimited and demarcated” is unclear as all African boundaries have some form of 
delimitation, to a greater or lesser degree of accuracy.49
 The AUBP has been recently instituted to help African states address the lack 
of demarcation across their boundaries as a result either of the lack of clear boundary 
demarcation during the colonial period or neglect of any existing demarcation. This 
initiative comes forty-three years after the 1964 Cairo Declaration of the Organisation 
of Africa Unity (OAU) famously called on all signatory states to accept the definition 
of the territories by their previous colonial administrative boundaries to avoid 
disputes. The oft-cited relevant clause reads: 
 However, the clear 
implication is that many boundaries across the continent are as visibly unclear on the 
ground as the DRC-Zambia boundary around BP 16. 
BORDER DISPUTES AMONG AFRICAN STATES 
The assembly of Heads of State and Government meeting in its First Ordinary 
Session in Cairo, UAR, from 17 to 21 July 1964, 
Considering that border problems constitute a grave and permanent factor of 
dissention; 
Conscious of the existence of extra-African manoeuvres aimed at dividing 
African States; 
Considering further that the borders of African States, on the day of their 
independence, constitute a tangible reality; 
Recalling the establishment in the course of the Second Ordinary Session of the 
Council of the Committee of Eleven charged with studying further measures 
for strengthening African Unity; 
                                                                                                                                            
to the Burkina Faso-Mali boundary commission, and jointly by S. Issa and A. Toure, the respective 
Nigerian and Cameroonian commissioners to the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission. 
47 B. Okior, ‘1,500 border pillars uprooted’ New Vision/All Africa (Kampala), 04 May 2009. 
48 Declaration of the African Union Border Programme, 7 June 2007. Article 2 para. a. 
49 See especially Brownlie, African Boundaries. 
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Recognising the imperious necessity of settling, by peaceful means and within a 
strictly African framework, all disputes between African States; 
Recalling further that all Member States have pledged, under Article IV of the 
Charter of African Unity, to respect scrupulously all principles laid down in 
paragraph 3 of Article III of the Charter of the Organization of African 
Unity: 
1. SOLEMNLY REAFFIRMS the strict respect by all Member States of the 
Organization for the principles laid down in paragraph 3 of Article III of the 
Charter of the Organization of African Unity; 
2. SOLEMNLY DECLARES that all Member States pledge themselves to 
respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence. 
AHG/Res. 16(I) 
The operative statement in Article 2 “respect the borders existing on their 
achievement of national independence” has been one of the most influential phrases in 
post-independent African administrative and scholarly discourses. However, more can 
be learned about the context of the declaration and the relationship with inherited 
colonial boundaries in the introductory phrases. 
 The first sentence recalls the boundary disputes that were on-going at the time 
of the Cairo assembly, including the Algeria-Morocco conflict and the tensions 
between Somalia and neighbouring Ethiopia and Kenya, both of which led to the 
leaders of Morocco and Somalia boycotting the Cairo meeting. The more minor 
boundary dispute between Burkina Faso and Ghana at the time was actually addressed 
in a separate resolution within the Cairo Declaration (AHG Res 20). As Saadia Touval 
points out, the OAU itself had been helpless to settle these specific disputes and the 
whole focus of the Cairo assembly was to cement the OAU as a mechanism for inter-
state dispute resolution, which was a key incentive for the chief proponent of Pan-
Africanism, Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah, to concede to the Declaration.50 A subsequent 
protocol to the Cairo Declaration would set up the Commission on Mediation, 
Conciliation and Arbitration but this elaborate dispute resolution mechanism never 
gained influence and was eventually disbanded in 1973.51
                                                 
50 S. Touval, ‘The Organization of African Unity and African borders’ International Organization 21:1 
(1967):102-127. pp. 123-124. 
 
51 See especially M. Wolfers Politics of the Organization of African Unity (London: Methuen & Co. 
1976) 106-113. 
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The second sentence hints at the fears held among many African leaders at the 
time of external state influence that might exacerbate disputes. This partly reveals the 
close connection that the burgeoning OAU had with a seemingly strange-bedfellow, 
the global Non-Aligned movement. Dike Nworah explores this connection and saw 
Tanzania’s President Julius Nyerere as the most vocal proponent of the Non-Aligned 
Movement within the OAU, seeing it as an avenue for weaker nations “trying to 
maintain their independence and use it for their own benefit in a world dominated 
politically, economically and militarily by a few big powers.”52
 More insight into the historical context of the Cairo Declaration is beyond the 
scope of this research, however the third introductory clause in resolution relates 
directly to the issue of boundary demarcation. Perhaps overshadowed by the operative 
statement in article 2, the third introductory clause to resolution 16(1) states that “the 
borders of African States, on the day of their independence, constitute a tangible 
reality.” A powerfully explicit phrase, but did the boundaries (to use the more 
appropriate term) between the newly independent African states really “constitute a 
tangible reality” at independence? In Suzanne Lalonde’s study of the international 
legal concept of uti possidetis juris, she makes an interesting comparison between the 
de-colonisation processes in Latin American and Africa. Lalonde suggests that at de-
colonisation in Latin America, there was first the question as to which former colonial 
administrative units would become independent states. Only then was the second 
question “how would those boundaries be determined?”
 It seems somewhat 
paradoxical that an organisation dedicated to inter-state political unity might be 
closely aligned with a movement that was such a proponent of individual state 
independence and based on the notion of sovereign equality and territorial integrity. 
53 In other words: “For Latin 
American republics, it was not simply a question of maintaining the territorial status 
quo but of actually creating the territorial status quo.”54
                                                 
52 D. Nworah, ‘Nationalism vs. Coexistence: Neo-African attitudes to classical neutralism’ Journal of 
Modern African Studies 15, no. 2 (1977): 213-237. 230. 
 The ambiguity of both 
political and territorial distinctions at the moment of de-colonisation led to many 
years of conflict between the emerging Latin American states during the early to mid 
nineteenth century.  
53 S. Lalonde, Determining Boundaries in a Conflicted World: The Role of Uti Possidetis 
(Montreal/Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002): 121-122. 
54 Lalonde, Determining Boundaries in a Conflicted World, 122. 
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In the African context, Lalonde suggests the process was different since the 
political distinction between colonial administrations was more distinct. “Devolution 
occurred within the territorial limits as defined by the metropolitan powers, which 
were at liberty to adjust boundaries and transfer territory right up to the date of 
independence.”55 Lalonde believes that the colonial boundaries across Africa were 
“defined with much greater precision than the Spanish administrative lines.”56 She 
concludes that the concept of uti possidetis juris for Latin American states provided 
entitlement to boundaries of the former Spanish administrative divisions “at law” 
while “the newly independent African states, for their part, merely agreed to accept 
those boundaries, in fact, that existed at the date of independence.”57
Those boundaries that had been established and clearly demarcated were, 
following independence, protected according to general principles of 
international law. Those boundaries that had been unsettled during the colonial 
period remained unsettled.
 This provides 
some indication as to why the Cairo declaration specifically avoids using the term ‘uti 
possidetis’ but Lalonde only hints at the wide variety of boundary definition that 
existed across Africa at the moment of de-colonisation by suggesting that:  
58
 
 
While most boundaries inherited by African states at independence were 
defined with greater geographic precision than the vague limits of Spanish colonial 
administration in Latin America prior to 1810, it could not be concluded even in 1964 
that all African boundaries constituted a ‘tangible reality.’ It has been revealed that 
even sections of the DRC-Zambia boundary, subject to one of the most intensive 
demarcation projects in colonial Africa, may not have been a tangible reality at 
independence. The only distinction Lalonde makes between “established” and 
“unsettled” boundaries does not begin to indicate the wide range of ways that 
boundaries were known to the respective African states at independence. The term 
‘tangible reality’ quite clearly suggests that a boundary can be recognised on the 
physical landscape, implying that one knows precisely when he/she passes across the 
static, fixed and linear limit of one state jurisdiction to another. A boundary may be 
                                                 
55 Lalonde, Determining Boundaries in a Conflicted World, 122. 
56 Lalonde, Determining Boundaries in a Conflicted World, 123. 
57 Lalonde, Determining Boundaries in a Conflicted World, 122. 
58 Lalonde, Determining Boundaries in a Conflicted World, 122. 
Chapter 6 – Boundary demarcation in independent Zambia 
  203 
depicted on a map but that does not that make it a ‘tangible reality.’ A boundary may 
be defined in a legally binding text to a greater or lesser degree of precision, but that 
does not make it a ‘tangible reality.’ 
So did the African leaders at the Cairo assembly believe incorrectly that their 
state boundaries did actually constitute tangible realities? Was this assumed? Was this 
phrase used consciously to deflect attention away from inadequate boundary 
definition that may have led to more disputes? Whatever the case, the statement in the 
Cairo declaration clearly belies clear boundary definition from what was in fact a 
much more haphazard and ambiguous definitions of territorial inheritance. By not 
making any distinction between the varying degrees of boundary clarity, the phrase 
‘tangible reality’ implies that all boundaries could be observed on the physical 
landscape in 1964; that the colonial boundaries across Africa had effectively reached 
the same fait accompli prior to independence. If a boundary can reach fait accompli 
the logical implication is that it has been the product of a distinct and finite process or 
system. 
 
Are critiques over-generalising African colonial boundaries? 
This lack of distinction has led most critiques of the Cairo Declaration to focus on the 
original territorial apportionment of independent African states particularly in the 
more recent so-called ‘failed state’ discourse and debates about de-centralisation.59
For example, Englebert, Tarango and Carter use statistical modelling to 
discount the hypothesis that lack of clear boundary demarcation leads to greater 
likelihood of dispute.
 
Within these discourses, the boundaries of African states become generalised (often 
simply referred to as ‘colonial boundaries’). If African boundaries are considered out 
of context, critiques can fall into the trap of drawing generalisations about territorial 
definition rather than considering how those divisions appear and operate on the 
ground. 
60
                                                 
59 W.I. Zartman, Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority 
(Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1995); B. Davidson, The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the 
Curse of the Nation-State (New York: Three Rivers Press, 1992). 
 Claiming to use Brownlie’s 1979 African Boundaries as their 
source, Englebert et al provide no details about their technique for distinguishing the 
five categories of relative boundary clarity used to analyse this hypothesis. It may be 
60 P. Englebert, S. Tarango and M. Carter ‘Dismemberment and suffocation: A contribution to the 
debate on African boundaries’ Comparative Political Studies 35:10. 1093-1118. 1099 and 1105. 
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assumed, given the scale of such a task, that this research simply assigns a level of 
clarity based on the presence or absence of boundary demarcation. Such a technique 
would fall squarely into problematic assumptions about systematic boundary 
production. Although the lack of clear research methodology makes it impossible to 
be certain, it is likely that the DRC-Zambia boundary ranked high on the level of 
boundary clarity based on its demarcation in 1933. But this does not ensure that the 
boundary was as much of a ‘tangible reality’ in 1964, even less so in 1979 (the date of 
Brownlie’s work). 
While it is certainly true that clear knowledge of a boundary on the physical 
landscape alone does not ensure the prevention of inter-state conflicts, the suggestion 
that lack of demarcation does not contribute to disputes is difficult to sustain when 
compared with actual events. The example of the DRC-Zambia boundary skirmishes 
in the Kaputa area were a direct result of the Mweru-Tanganyika boundary section not 
being demarcated on the ground. Countless localised problems over boundary 
alignment have occurred throughout post-independence Africa, most recent examples 
in 2008 and 2009 include the violent skirmishes between DRC and Uganda over 
Rukwanzi island in Lake Albert, Djibouti and Eritrea’s hostile standoff over the 
boundary along the undemarcated boundary on Doumeirah peninsula and the dispute 
between Kenya and Uganda over Migingo island in Lake Victoria and resultant 
fishing practices. Most of these disputes have not escalated to the scale of the Eritrea-
Ethiopia conflict from 1998-2000 that was initiated by a local boundary dispute and 
which cost hundreds of thousands of lives61
Another example of this more generalised approach has been the prominent 
critique of colonial boundaries in Africa that focuses on their division of pre-colonial 
political and cultural identities.
, and certainly other underlying tensions 
may contribute to the escalation of boundary disputes. However, with their high 
political profile boundary disputes often become the conduits through which other 
political tensions are channelled. 
62
                                                 
61 See especially M. Plaut ‘The conflict and its aftermath’ In D. Jacquin-Berdal and M. Plaut, eds., 
Unfinished Business: Eritrea and Ethiopia at War (Trenton, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 2004): 87-123. 87-
89. 
 For some critics, demarcation of African boundaries 
by the post-independent state is perceived to cement those divisions. Asiwaju cited 
B.A. El-Gaali’s unpublished thesis on Sudan’s boundaries where he concluded that 
African boundaries should not be demarcated because of the prohibitive costs 
62 I.Ll. Griffiths, The African Inheritance (London: Routledge, 1995), 91-93; Asiwaju 1985. 
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involved and “the need to avoid the likely negative reactions not only among states 
themselves but also among partitioned ethnic groups in the border areas.”63 Allott 
echoed El-Gaali’s argument stating that “The general demarcation of boundaries in 
Africa would, however, be enormously costly and quite unjustifiable.”64 He believes 
demarcation would not prevent boundary disputes across Africa, again because of the 
pre-existent cross border links, suggesting instead that regional African communities 
should be enhanced to reduce the significance of boundaries.65 Allott’s comments tie 
the generalised discourses about the claimed artificiality of colonial boundaries with 
the persistence of cross border cultural, political and ethnic identities in Africa, and in 
doing so make a direct link between the boundary demarcation practice and the 
supposed inappropriateness of the territorial state model. The essays in Asiwaju 
(1985) lend support to this notion, suggesting that “border regions in Africa have 
always evolved as special areas of socio-political ambivalence” and “rather than 
develop a strong sense of attachment to either of the states separated by the boundary, 
African border populations have at best evolved attitudes and characteristics 
suggesting a preference for some measure of binationality or dual citizenship.”66
In his work on the Karelian community along the Finnish-Russian boundary, 
Annsi Paasi found that in the wake of Finland’s independence in 1917, identification 
of the boundary on the ground was linked with a concerted effort to ‘nationalise’ the 
peripheral border areas during the 1920s.
  
67
This attitude seemed to be based on the argument that the nation-building 
process calls for complete occupation of the national space, which ends 
expressly at the border line. Thus the boundary was considered to constitute an 
essential element in social integration, one which was necessary for the nation 
building process.
 Paasi reflected that 
68
Paasi’s use of the term ‘nation’ places important emphasis on the link between social 
identity as reinforced by the clear demarcation of territory. In this light, it is not 
unreasonable to suggest that fears may persist that demarcation would press a national 
  
                                                 
63 Asiwaju, ‘The Conceptual Framework,’ 11-12. 
64 A. Allott, ‘Boundaries and the law in Africa’ In African Boundary Problems ed. C.G. Widstrand 
(Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1969), 17. 
65 Allott,‘Boundaries and the law in Africa,’ 17. 
66 Asiwaju, ‘The Conceptual Framework,’ 12. 
67 A. Paasi, Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies of the Finnish-
Russian Border (Chichester: J. Wiley & Sons, 1996), 174. 
68 Paasi, Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness, 175-176. 
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identity that many local African borderland communities feel erodes their local 
identities (political, cultural or ethnic). 
However, the division of local, cross border ethnic and cultural identities by an 
international boundary (even one that was imperially constructed) is certainly not 
unique to Africa, nor is it consistent along every one of Africa’s current international 
boundaries. Concluding that the majority of colonial boundaries in Africa did divide 
common language and ethnic groups, Brownlie explains 
The picture is, however, more complicated. The European practice did not 
operate upon a principle which excluded ethnological considerations tout 
court. Rather, a variety of considerations were relied upon and these tended to 
be incompatible with tribal distribution. None the less, in a significant 
minority of cases substantial (though not necessarily exclusive) reference was 
made to tribal distribution in delimitation of frontiers.69
Assumptions about the division of cross border identities also tends to foster nostalgia 
about pre-imperial political entities that may or may not be factual. In his study of the 
Hausa people along the Niger-Nigeria boundary, Miles examined this complex 
balance of national vs. local identity in a local African border context.
 
70 Although 
focusing on the boundary’s division of the Hausa as a distinct cultural and political 
entity, Miles did find, contrary to many post-colonial assertions that the division of 
West Africa by colonial boundaries was “an unmitigated evil”, that: “Among the 
people most directly affected – the borderline Hausa – there is rather a continued 
appreciation that the partition heralded an end to the incessant warfare waged between 
surrounding and encroaching kingdoms.”71
It is important to emphasise that Paasi’s mention of boundary visibility was 
part of a number of social initiatives to nationalise the Finnish-Russian border areas 
post-independence. Simply maintaining visibility of an international boundary may 
imbue a distinct socio-political identity based on defined space, but it is difficult to 
conclude that such a practice is sufficient to completely erode existing identities on its 
own, particularly if it does not physically impede crossing.
  
72
                                                 
69 Brownlie, African Boundaries, 6. 
 Indeed, to address the 
70 W.F.S. Miles, Hausaland Divided: Colonialism and Independence in Nigeria and Niger (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1994). 
71 Miles, Hausaland Divided, 75. 
72 Just to emphasise, my use of the term ‘demarcation’ here is not in reference to the few physical 
fences or walls that have been constructed bilaterally along a boundary, such as the boundary fence 
erected by Malaysia and Thailand. This form of ‘demarcation’ would have a much more dramatic, 
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strong cross border identities of African borderland populations, Asiwaju 
recommends that “special governmental arrangements should be evolved at the local 
level to accommodate the idiosyncrasies of the border societies” so that “boundaries 
can be maintained and promoted as lines of mutual contact rather than of 
exclusion.”73
Given the strength of sub-national cross border identities, Allott’s comments 
above present another notion that has contributed to the more generalised critiques of 
Africa’s ‘colonial’ boundaries, that a regional political body (such as regional 
economic unions) or continent-wide (such as the OAU/AU) would be a more 
appropriate administrative spatial structures for post-independence Africa than the 
inherited state model. This suggests that the regional or continental ‘identity’ is more 
influential than national identities, which tends to undermine the criticism of colonial 
boundaries based on their division of more localised ethnic or cultural identities. In 
addition, regional bodies would still have cross border communities existing at their 
own territorial boundaries and any pan-African governing structure would still require 
some kind of internal political division to facilitate participatory governance and 
administration, still potentially creating cross border identities. If the newly 
independent African states have had difficulty extending their administrative 
structures to encompass the peripheries of their own state territory after independence 
(as represented by the lack of national identity), it is implausible that regional or 
continental administrative body could do the same thing over an even greater 
territorial extent. Promotion of pan-Africanism in the early stages of decolonisation, 
particularly in the context of the OAU, failed to address what Funmi Olonisakin 
called “the natural tension between sovereignty, which stipulated non-interference in 
the affairs of member states, and pan-Africanism, which implied the submission of 
some sovereignty to a supranational authority, [and] appeared to have been resolved 
in favour of the former.”
 
74
Mamdani suggests that the Pan-Africanist response to the current overarching 
crisis of political institutions in Africa has been critical of colonial boundaries 
  
                                                                                                                                            
physical influence on transborder movements and, consequently, borderland identities. However, as 
noted in Chapter 1, the vast majority of border control barriers are constructed unilaterally and 
therefore should not be understood as boundary demarcation. 
73 Asiwaju, ‘The Conceptual Framework,’ 13. 
74 F. Olonisakin, ‘Conflict Management in Africa: the role of the OAU and sub-regional organisations’ 
Monograph 46, Building Stability in Africa: Challenges for the new millennium, February 2000 
(Tshwane: Institute for Security Studies, 2000), 2. 
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“because these boundaries were and are artificial – in the African case more so, since 
they were drawn up with a pencil and ruler on a map at a conference table in Berlin in 
the 1880s.”75 While no doubt presenting a slightly popularised criticism of African 
boundaries which over-simplifies colonial delimitation practice and fails to mention 
demarcation, Mamdani responds to this criticism on two counts. First he presents the 
traditional political geography response that all boundaries are inherently artificial and 
that historically boundaries have been linked to shifting power relations. Second, and 
more important, Mamdani argues that the Pan-Africanist thinking makes “the 
assumption that cultural and political boundaries should coincide, and that the state 
should be a nation-state – that the natural boundaries of a state are those of a common 
cultural community.”76 This powerful argument is based on Mamdani’s earlier work 
that sought to re-focus postcolonial critique on the politico-institutional inheritance of 
African states,77
Given Paasi’s look at how knowledge of the Finnish-Russian boundary as a 
distinct and ‘known’ line on the physical landscape contributed to the development of 
a distinct national identity, demarcation of vague colonial boundaries should have 
seemed an attractive exercise for post-independence African governments in helping 
concretise national identity within borderland populations. The reluctance of African 
states to dedicate time and resources to boundary demarcation and maintenance until 
the very recent AUBP initiative may hint at a deeper underlying notion of the 
relationship between sovereignty and territory in the immediate post-independence 
environment.  
 rather than being limited to small scale geographical, cultural or 
economic arguments that have tended to generalise all African colonial boundaries. 
Jackson and Rosberg believe that the independent states of Africa initially 
achieved sovereignty through recognition only, that few had the full trappings of 
statehood to effectively cover their inherited territory.78
                                                 
75 M. Mamdani, ‘Identity and national governance’ In Towards a New Map of Africa eds., B. Wisner, 
C. Toulmin and R. Chitiga (London: Earthscan, 2005), 266-267. Although the term Pan-Africanism is 
not used as widely as in the immediate post-independent period of the 1960s, the sentiment remains 
strong. A prime example can be found on the website of the African Union where the opening page 
includes an animation showing all the states of Africa as dispersed puzzle pieces all coming together to 
make up a continental map and the text reads “Africa…Must…Unite”. 
 Lacking the adequate 
infrastructure for governance over their territories, Jackson and Rosberg suggest 
76 Mamdani, ‘Identity and national governance,’ 267. 
77 Mamdani, ‘Identity and national governance,’ 267-279. 
78 R.H. Jackson and C. Rosberg, ‘Sovereignty and underdevelopment: juridical statehood in the African 
crisis’ Journal of Modern African Studies 24, no. 1 (1986): 1-31. 2. 
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“their sovereignty derives more from right than from fact” indicating a prioritisation 
of juridical over empirical statehood.79 This can be represented through the lack of 
attention given to territorial boundaries, as Allott states succinctly: “It is one thing, 
however, to declare respect for the border; it is another thing to determine where it 
runs.”80 With the bases of the political establishment in newly independent African 
states often far less than the extent of recognised state territory, Jackson and Rosberg 
indicate that this led to an entrenchment of negative sovereignty where African 
governments felt no obligation to enforce jurisdictions since their legitimacy over 
territory was enshrined in uti possidetis and guaranteed by external forces.81 This 
presented little motivation for African governments to exercise positive sovereignty, 
guaranteeing domestic legitimacy and improving the capacity for self government.82
 Although this argument does draw a fairly general concept across many 
individual histories of decolonisation and doesn’t full address the impact of inherited 
colonial governing structures,
 
83 it provides an interesting lens with which to interpret 
post-independence African boundary demarcation. If the governments of independent 
DRC and Zambia felt their legitimacy over their territory was guaranteed through 
acceptance of their colonially-inherited boundary then why should it require 
demarcation? Inayatullah reflects that independence of states entailed more than rights 
to the resources of territory but also the responsibility for administration of people 
(positive sovereignty).84 This responsibility as “the expression of sovereignty requires 
wealth.”85
Within these questions rises the issue of the (supposed) boundary fence along 
the DRC-Zambia boundary near BP 18, a fixed, linear and (seemingly) bilateral entity 
known on the physical landscape. If FQM did erect the ‘boundary’ fence along the 
 If the lack of wealth or the insufficiency of capacity (infrastructural, 
political etc.) has made it difficult for post-independent African states to administer 
the full extent of their territories, then why should they reinforce the territorial limits 
of that responsibility through boundary demarcation? 
                                                 
79 Jackson and Rosberg, ‘Sovereignty and underdevelopment,’ 2-3. 
80 Allott,‘Boundaries and the law in Africa,’ 17. 
81 Jackson and Rosberg, ‘Sovereignty and underdevelopment,’ 13. 
82 Jackson and Rosberg, ‘Sovereignty and underdevelopment,’ 14. 
83 See especially N. Chazan, P. Lewis, R. Mortimer, D. Rothchild and S.J. Stedman, Politics and 
Society in Contemporary Africa, Third Edition (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1999), 46. 
84 N. Inayatullah, ‘Beyond the sovereignty dilemma: quasi-states as social constructs’ In State 
Sovereignty as Social Construct eds., T.J. Biersteker and C. Weber (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996). 73. 
85 Inayatullah, ‘Beyond the sovereignty dilemma,’ 75. 
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DRC-Zambia boundary as a result of its mining operations, it posits two important 
issues at what might be described as the ‘post-colonial’ moment of the demarcation 
narrative. First, it would indicate that a private company assumed the responsibility 
for demarcating territory from the two respective territorial sovereigns. This recalls 
efforts made by the British South Africa Company (BSAC) during the colonial period 
to participate in demarcation along several of Northern Rhodesia’s boundaries.86
Second, the ‘boundary’ fence suggests that the ‘post-colonial’ moment is 
remarkably similar to the ‘colonial’ moment in that the demarcation practice 
continues to be contextualised (albeit on a less expansive scale that the pains-taking 
work of the 1927-33 Anglo-Belgian boundary commission along the full length of the 
watershed) based on the exploitation of natural resources. Both moments reflect a 
perpetuation of the Lockean notion of land use and continued influence of economic 
geography on boundary demarcation which precipitated the shift from the ‘imperial’ 
to the ‘colonial’ moments in the demarcation narrative of the Belgian Congo-Northern 
Rhodesia boundary. Their influence can be seen again when contrasting the section 
around BP 18 with the boundary section around BP 16 and the Sakania crossing point. 
The local economic geography around BP 16 is largely small scale agriculture and is 
populated by what would have been considered in the British colonial administration 
‘native’ populations. Given the lack of boundary maintenance and clearance, this 
section of the boundary is no better known on the ground than it was at the imperial 
moment, in the wake of the 1914 Anglo-Belgian boundary commission.  
 Even 
if Congolese government authorities had endorsed or participated in the construction 
of the boundary fence, it cannot be construed as valid boundary demarcation unless it 
involved Zambian consent which is unclear. 
The wide separation of Congolese and Zambian border control infrastructures 
gives rise to a frontier zone, an inefficient division of land from a Lockean 
perspective and indicative of more primitive division of politico-territorial structures 
from the modernist perspective. In contrast, the Frontier mine represents a large scale 
economic contribution to both the DRC and Zambia, employing 1,030 people at the 
end of December 2007.87
                                                 
86 See especially the Tanganyika estate demarcation in Chapter 5, p. 160. 
 In 2007, FQM paid total income taxes of almost $183 
87 FQM 2008 Annual Information Form. 23. 
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million for all of its operations in both DRC and Zambia.88
An initial reaction to the way economics continues to influence demarcation 
along the DRC-Zambia boundary might be that this narrative contributes to the 
lengthy debates concerning the very origins of European imperialism in Africa. It 
might be seen as lending support to the economic interpretations of European 
imperialism emphasised by late nineteenth century thinkers such as Alexander 
Helphand and John Robson and revived in the post-colonial Marxist discourses.
 Although this figure does 
not discern how much was paid to each government, it is obvious that the company’s 
economic impact in terms of both tax revenue and local employment is not 
unsubstantial. 
89 
These discourses saw the European partition of Africa in the late nineteenth century 
as a continuation of previous economic investment in the (by that time outlawed) 
slave trade, motivated by the pursuit of African markets for surplus production 
through ‘legitimate trade’ and of raw materials to feed European production.90 
However, as examined in Chapter 2, the demarcation is an a posterori act, predicated 
on some form of legal boundary delimitation or territorial allocation.91
 
 Therefore its 
perceived relationship with the original imperial ‘partition’ of Africa is difficult to 
substantiate directly. Nevertheless, it is equally difficult to ignore the continued 
disparity in boundary demarcation practice within areas of high and low economic 
‘value.’ 
Insight from recent land reforms in Zambia 
Taking a cue from Locke’s understandings of land usage and property, an interesting 
perspective to this disparity of boundary demarcation and maintenance in the DRC-
Zambia context can be found in the issues of land tenure within Zambia. In her 
unpublished conference paper of 2006, Mweembe Mudenda examined how the lack 
of adequate domestic property demarcation has inhibited land reforms, and the move 
                                                 
88 FQM 2007 Annual Report p. 71. This amount was the total income tax paid for all of its operations 
in both DRC and Zambia. 
89 L.H. Gann, and P. Duignan, ‘Reflections on Imperialism and the scramble for Africa’ (eds.) 
Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960 Vol. 1 The History and Politics of Colonialism eds., L.H. Gann and P. 
Duignan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 104-105. 
90 S. Akinrinade and T. Fulola, ‘Africa and Europe: Prelude to the Partition’ In Africa and Europe: 
From Partition to Independence or Dependence ed., A. Sesay (Croom Helm: Beckenham, 1986), 11. 
91 Prescott and Triggs, International Frontiers and Boundaries: Law, Politics and Geography, 66. 
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from customary to leasehold tenure. Commenting on the Zambian 1995 Lands Act, 
she states:  
Although the act explicitly recognizes and protects customary land rights, an 
unstated but crucial assumption underlying the act is that overtime the 
conversion of customary to leasehold tenure will open up more land for 
investment and diminish the amount of land held under customary tenure. 
Most Zambians are also at a disadvantage when it comes to protecting their 
land rights because their territorial boundaries are in abstract form.92
This lack of clear land definition has allowed leasehold tenure reforms to be instituted 
by the Zambian government haphazardly, often favouring large scale investors over 
local residents who have in some cases found themselves turned into squatters 
overnight.
 
93
 There have been lengthy debates about the relative benefit of private leasehold 
over customary land tenure within the market reforms across Africa
 
94, but Mudenda’s 
argument suggests that in either case it is necessary to clearly define and demarcate 
boundaries in order to prevent conflict.95 Even if, as she suggests, customary land 
tenure is culturally consistent with African values and ways of life, but it must be 
secured through “boundaries (that) are defined and well maintained.”96 This could 
include community projects for defining their boundary marks through “participatory 
mapping” projects.97
 Taylor Brown interestingly points out that although 94% of land in Zambia is 
held under communal/customary tenure, there are portions of privately held land. 
 
 Private tenure is concentrated in and near Zambia’s cities, along the railway 
line between Livingstone and the Congo border, in the mining areas of the 
Copperbelt, and in certain productive farming areas. Customary lands, on the 
other hand, may be indirectly held, but the allocation and use of these lands (to 
                                                 
92 M.M. Mudenda, ‘The Challenges of Customary Land Tenure in Zambia’ unpublished conference 
paper Conflicts and Land Administration, Shaping the Change XXIII FIG Congress (Munich, 
Germany, October 8-13, 2006). 
http://www.fig.net/pub/fig2006/papers/ts50/ts50_03_mudenda_0740.pdf. p. 6. (1 December 2009) 
93 Mudenda, ‘The Challenges of Customary Land Tenure in Zambia,’ 5. 
94 This has often been instigated in recent decades by the requirements for re-organising state debts or 
gaining monetary aid. See especially S. Evers, M. Spierenburg and H. Wels (eds.) Competing 
Jurisdictions: Settling Land Claims in Africa (Leiden/Boston: Brill, Afrika Studiecentrum Series, 
2005). 
95 Mudenda, ‘The Challenges of Customary Land Tenure in Zambia,’ 9. 
96 Mudenda, ‘The Challenges of Customary Land Tenure in Zambia,’ 9. 
97 Mudenda, ‘The Challenges of Customary Land Tenure in Zambia,’ 9. 
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a greater or lesser extent) are administered by chiefs and headmen on behalf of 
‘tribal communities’. On customary land, titles do not exist, land taxes are not 
paid, and transfer and use are governed by ‘customary’ law…The most 
valuable and productive land, however, is held as private tenure.  
This division between customary and private titled land has its origins in the colonial 
era and has been perpetuated by the post-colonial state.98
Brown points out that it is difficult to assess the actual number of new private 
tenure landowners as official statistics have not been kept in the Ministry of Lands 
since the early 1970s. Although the 1995 Land Act opened up the option of securing 
leasehold tenure over land, Brown suggests that the prohibitive costs involved in 
travelling to the Ministry of Lands headquarters in Lusaka and the appropriate fees 
have proved prohibitive for the vast majority of rural Zambians.
  
99 Brown notes that to 
apply for a fourteen year leasehold title “applicants must not only secure the 
permission of the chief and district council, they must also hire a surveyor to draw a 
sketch map of the land and pay a lease charge – outlays which are at least 500,000 
kwacha (about $100).”100 More intriguingly, if the applicant wishes to apply for a 
ninety-nine year leasehold title “a rigorous boundary survey is required – something 
that can cost millions of kwacha in fees and transportation depending on how far the 
survey team has to travel from Lusaka.”101 Similarly, in her work concerning her 
extensive experience of land re-distribution in post-Apartheid South Africa, Cherryl 
Walker recalls the desire of land applicants who wanted more official title deeds with 
maps rather than simply textual descriptions.102
 What is so interesting about Brown’s comments on applying for leasehold title 
in Zambia from communal/customary lands is the interplay of geographic scales that 
 Although this did not necessarily 
concern boundary demarcation per se, it is obvious that new property owners were not 
satisfied with more abstract definitions of land, so the more accurate the definition of 
land the better. 
                                                 
98 T. Brown, ‘Contestation, confusion and corruption: market-based land reform in Zambia’ in Evers, 
Spierenburg and Wels, Competing Jurisdictions: Settling Land Claims in Africa, 79-102. 82. See also 
B. van Loenen, ‘Land Tenure in Zambia’ (Orono: University of Maine, Department of Spatial 
Information Engineering, 1999). 
http://www.spatial.maine.edu/~onsrud/Landtenure/CountryReport/Zambia.pdf (1 December 2009) 
99 Brown, ‘Contestation, confusion and corruption,’ 90. 
100 Brown, ‘Contestation, confusion and corruption,’ 90. 
101 Brown, ‘Contestation, confusion and corruption,’ 90. 
102 C. Walker, Land-Marked: Land-claims & Land Restitution in South Africa (Athens, OH: Ohio 
University Press, 2008), 100. 
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has echoed throughout this work. For a fourteen year lease, Brown points out that 
only a rough survey and sketch map is required, while a full ninety-nine year title 
requires “a rigorous boundary survey”. It is possible to draw a direct parallel with the 
disparity in demarcation methodology undertaken by the two Anglo-Belgian 
boundary commissions examined in Chapters 4 and 5, and the disparity in geographic 
scales in making the boundary ‘known.’ Indeed, similar to the discourse in Chapter 5, 
Brown also draws on Mamdani’s examination of colonial rule when looking at 
Northern Rhodesian land policy up to independence and the dichotomy of political 
participation in colonial governance.103
It is clearly possible to use this current practice of leasehold title acquisition in 
re-examining the discourse about state legal personality within international law being 
strictly territorial. Mudenda and Walker see this in the micro-territorial scale, that in 
order for communities (like individual title holders) to benefit from the security of 
legal personality, they must have a defined area of land, not simply boundaries in 
“abstract form.” Brown then shows how the actual geographic definition of this land 
by scale differs depending on the type of leasehold title sought. The stronger the title 
over the land, the more precise (larger scale) the boundaries of that property are 
required to be. Given his earlier conclusion that the small portion of Zambian land 
held under leasehold title is located within urban, mining or farming areas, it is clear 
that the same Lockean privileging of land based on its economic value echoes through 
domestic land reforms in Zambia.
 
                                                 
103 Brown, ‘Contestation, confusion and corruption,’ 82-84. 
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7. Using boundary demarcation in Africa as an 
analytical lens 
 
“the process of demarcating a boundary is quite apart from definition or delimitation. 
It is the crux of all boundary-making. Any political administrator can define a paper 
boundary, given the necessary topographical and ethnographical data, but it falls to 
the demarcator to do the real spade work of boundary construction; to determine the 
sites for pillars and artificial boundary marks and fit the line to the conformation of 
the land. It is in this process that disputes usually arise, and weak elements in the 
treaties or agreements are apt to be discovered.” 
Thomas Holdich 19161
                                                 
1T.H. Holdich, Political Frontiers and Boundary Making (London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd., 1916), 208. 
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Overview          
 
This work began by drawing a distinction between the terms boundary and border, 
with boundaries distinguished by their three essential characteristics of being fixed, 
bilateral and linear, and borders distinguished as unilateral state actions. To this end, 
Newman and Paasi2, and Van Houtum3
What this research has conveyed is that boundary-making practices are far 
more organic than the label of ‘technical practices’ might imply, and can certainly be 
exposed to theoretical critique. Boundaries themselves cannot simply be assumed as 
mathematical constructs, but have a discernible life-cycle; they may be conceived 
originally by a diplomatic pen on a small scale map, but they become manifest as 
physical features through various physical symbols, these symbols whither by forces 
of the border landscape and may or may not be re-built with a similar methodology. 
Within this practice, even something as seemingly mundane as building a boundary 
pillar is imbedded with political meaning. In his study of the 2000 Iraq-Kuwait 
boundary demarcation commission, Jan Klabbers notes candidly that:  
 have suggested that the separation between 
borders and boundaries has come to form separate sub-disciplines within political 
geography. With an emphasis on the actual expressions of state control, the bordering 
sub-discipline has tended to focus on the unilateral practices of state securitisation, 
national identity and the broader geographic border regions. With this perspective of 
borders and bordering becoming increasingly dominant within political geography, 
the sub-discipline of boundaries has been cast as ‘technical practices’ that are 
divorced from theoretical analysis.  
It is repeatedly stated that the Commission was called on to perform a 
technical and not a political task, and that it was not supposed to reallocate 
territory; indeed, repetitions of this statement are so abundant that one cannot 
help but form the impression that what is actually occurring is some kind of 
exorcism: if we claim often enough that we are not reallocating territory, then 
perhaps we will not be seen to be reallocating territory.4
                                                 
2 D. Newman and A. Paasi, ‘Fences and neighbours in the postmodern world: boundary narratives in 
political geography’ Progress in Human Geography 22, no. 2 (1998): 186-207. Especially 188-189. 
 
3 H. Van Houtum, ‘The geopolitics of borders and boundaries’ Geopolitics 10, no. 4 (2005): 672-679. 
674. 
4 J. Klabbers, ‘No more shifting lines? The report of the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation 
Commission’ International and Comparative Law Quarterly 43, no. 4 (1994), 904-913. 908. 
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Although the Commission repeatedly claimed to be performing a mere 
technical task, it could not escape the necessity of relying heavily on 
considerations of equity...5
The key element that distinguishes boundaries from borders is that boundary practices 
are exercised with the direct participation or consent of both neighbouring states. 
However, the elements of control emphasised by bordering scholarship and the 
bilateral element of boundary practices have been brought together in this research to 
reveal that these two sub-disciplines are more entwined than contemporary political 
geography may give credence. 
 
Before examining boundary practices (demarcation specifically) in the DRC-
Zambia context, it was necessary to begin by analysing those three distinguishing 
characteristics of boundaries (linear, fixed and bilateral) in greater depth. Isolating a 
‘boundary’ as a theoretical construct, these characteristics were shown to be 
inextricably linked with the concept of territorial sovereignty which is not an 
unfamiliar conclusion to be drawn. However, in Chapter 2 the examination delves 
more deeply into how state territorial sovereignty, as it remains conceived within 
international law, cannot be actuated (and recognised) without these distinguishing 
geographic features. One important contributor to the historical development of 
territorial sovereignty that had implications for the idea of boundaries was the concept 
of exclusive property rights. Having supplanted other forms of land use appropriation 
and political organisation in European state development, the legacy of private 
property rights still resonates in the unique geographic characteristic of modern 
territorial sovereignty that requires fixed and defined territorial extent for the 
application of legal title and jurisdiction (positive sovereignty). 
Overlapping titles come into tension with the concept of exclusive land rights 
and have the potential to provoke disputes. At lower political levels (e.g. private 
property), these disputes may be negotiated or adjudged through the defined legal 
mechanisms within a political space. However, international law developed without 
such an overriding legal jurisdiction. So as the peaceful intermediary for disputes that 
often led to major territorial conflict, international law had to define states’ title to 
territory as a constant, rather than as a variable based on the actual application of state 
control and power. Recognised title to territory endowed states with an equal measure 
                                                 
5 Klabbers, ‘No more shifting lines?,’ 910 
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of legal personality (sovereignty) and allowed them to use international law as a legal 
mechanism for resolving their disputes through respected binding measures. 
Sovereignty, thus conceived as a legal constant, led to the familiar Janus-faced 
trappings of the modern state, the legitimacy (if not the exclusive means) to exercise 
control within its defined territory and the ability to interact with other states as an 
equal, legal personality. The development of territorial sovereignty as a legitimising 
construct reached its zenith in the imperialism of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, as illustrated by the European imperial practice of supposedly 
endowing (or rather imposing) modernity’s model of territorial sovereignty on the 
African continent. However, the logical tension of sovereignty requiring defined and 
fixed territory prior to its validation through recognition presented legal difficulties in 
the African imperial context and leading to the dubious ‘legal’ practice of claiming 
geographically-imagined territory prior to any extensive application of actual 
administrative control. Elucidating these more general concepts provided the 
theoretical framework for using boundary demarcation as a tool that could be used to 
expose some of the land-use prejudices that are engrained in the very model of 
territorial sovereignty.  
Rather than as a formulaic or ‘technical’ system, demarcation practices along 
the DRC-Zambia boundary were recovered as a historical narrative. Taking this 
narrative approach revealed a disparity in colonial methodology that called into 
question assumptions of boundary-making being a strictly objective or technical 
process. Under critical analysis, the demarcation narrative exposed differing 
perceptions of territory at three particular historical moments that have been identified 
as the imperial, the colonial and the postcolonial. Demarcation undertaken by the 
1911-14 Anglo-Belgian boundary commission was indicative of an ‘imperial’ 
perception of territory whereby demarcation practice with crude and widely spaced 
pillars made the boundary ‘known’ only to a privileged few who possessed (and could 
interpret) maps. Although through the imperial lens of small scale mapping the 
boundary as a line may have appeared distinct, on the ground (at large scale and in 
three dimensions) the division of respective ‘authority’ was left in a more ‘primitive’ 
state, as a zone or frontier, held at the time to be more indicative of the division of 
pre-imperial, ‘traditional’ African political entities.  
Similar to other contemporary inter-colonial boundary commissions across 
Africa, the work of the first Anglo-Belgian boundary commission indicated that 
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making the boundary ‘known’ at the local level was of only minor concern to the 
neighbouring imperial ‘sovereigns.’ More often boundary commissions were used for 
territorial exploration in order to capture comprehensive geographic knowledge of the 
border landscapes. If the work of these boundary commissions was researched solely 
from a ‘technical’ perspective, with a demarcated boundary as a distinct product, the 
contribution of their narratives to the geopolitical imagination of the era could easily 
be overlooked. It would be interesting to conduct similar analyses of the narratives of 
other colonial boundary commissions both around Africa and other inter-imperial 
border landscapes prior to 1914. This might yield a more comprehensive idea of the 
contribution made by boundary commissions to the collective geographical 
knowledge project at the height of European imperial positivism in the last decades of 
the nineteenth century.6
 Many of Africa’s colonial boundaries, including the section of the DRC-
Zambia boundary between Lakes Mweru and Tanganyika, were left effectively 
suspended in the imperial moment, with the linear division of territory imagined on a 
small scale map and illustrated by geographical characteristics of the landscape 
collected by boundary commissions and reproduced in government reports and in 
presentations before the RGS. However, in the DRC-Zambia narrative the emergence 
of copper mining in the 1920s along the watershed section became the dominant 
political feature of the border landscape. It was the economic ‘value’ of land that 
dictated the demarcation practice of the second Anglo-Belgian boundary commission 
(1927-33) and lead to a clear definition of the fixed and linear boundary on the local 
landscape. This represented a distinct shift from territory being perceived through the 
imperial lens of small scale mapping to territory being perceived as an economic 
commodity that had to be apportioned and exploited; from imperial imagination to 
colonial exploitation.  
 
It could be argued that the rigid demarcation of the Belgian Congo-Northern 
Rhodesia boundary by the 1927-33 Anglo-Belgian boundary commission was simply 
indicative of a greater penetration of colonial administration in the 1920s. Analysis of 
the overall penetration of colonial administration in Northern Rhodesia and Belgian 
Congo between 1914 and 1927 was beyond the scope of this research, and itself 
would be difficult to quantify. Yet what the demarcation narrative suggests is that 
                                                 
6 Perhaps looking at the sheer quantitative volume of contributions from boundary commissions to the 
RGS’s Geographical Journal would be an appropriate starting point for further research. 
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there was much greater administrative attention paid to the watershed region than 
other areas along the boundary. This penetration of administration was not motivated 
by the expansion of responsible administration over local population within a defined 
area, but rather by the presence of valuable mineral deposits. Proper state 
administration over this form of land-use, according to the European territorial model, 
required well-defined boundaries that clearly distinguished the allocation of resources 
on the ground and provided the legally defined area for efficient exploitation. There 
could be similar examples of the shift from the imperial to the colonial moments 
illustrated by boundary practices that could be worth further analysis. 
From the imagined control over territory in the imperial perspective, through 
the realities of administration for economic exploitation in the colonial perspective, 
the DRC-Zambia boundary currently resides in the postcolonial moment. As at the 
colonial moment, knowledge of the boundary on the ground is still subject to 
contextualisation based on the economic resources of the land itself. However, the 
postcolonial moment of the DRC-Zambia boundary sees a private corporation 
undertaking the demarcation practice that had once been so jealously guarded by 
government actors. While commercial interests influenced demarcation practice in the 
colonial moment, they now appear to have supplanted those ‘sovereign’ actors in the 
actual demarcation practice; the marking of sovereign territory. As examined in 
Chapter 6, the lack of Zambian government engagement in boundary practices since 
independence has been blamed on lack of financial commitment and difficulties in 
engaging with the neighbouring Congolese government. Both of which indicate a lack 
of political interest in boundary practices which tends to reinforce Jackson and 
Rosberg’s assertions about African states over reliance on juridical rather than actual 
empirical statehood.7
 
 Along the watershed boundary, the practical aspects of 
territorial administration and control appear to have been assumed by a private 
company. 
Economic contextualisation of African territory     
 
Demarcation of boundaries in the African colonial context was still largely a 
‘secondary’ practice that followed the original, small scale territorial allocations and 
                                                 
7 R.H. Jackson and C. Rosberg, ‘Sovereignty and underdevelopment: juridical statehood in the African 
crisis’ Journal of Modern African Studies 24, no. 1 (1986): 1-31. 2-4. 
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boundary delimitations made by the imperial powers. Therefore, it is difficult to 
engage demarcation practice in the lengthy arguments about imperial motivations for 
the original partition of Africa. For example, Uzoigwe provides a summary of the 
various ‘economic’, ‘psychological’, ‘diplomatic’ and ‘African dimension’ theories 
behind the original imperial partition of Africa.8 While demarcation practices may or 
may not have significantly altered the position of boundaries from the initial, small 
scale diplomatic partition of African territory,9
Critiquing European imperialism in Africa as having been economically 
motivated is certainly not new, with notable economic perspectives stemming from 
Karl Marx and John Hobson among many others. Drawing on a distinctly 
geographical perspective, the American geographer Isaiah Bowman was highly 
critical of colonialism in the introduction to his famed work The New World, 
suggesting that its sole raison d’être was the supply of raw materials: 
 the DRC-Zambia case indicates that 
the initiation of subsequent boundary making processes – in other words, demarcation 
and maintenance – was often motivated by the economic resources of the landscape.  
The uplift of the native is mere pretence, because that would be missionary 
work and no government is permitted by the electorate to spend millions in 
doing good to distant aliens. The maintenance of order likewise would interest 
the merchant and the statesman not at all if there were no capital investments 
to safeguard from disorder.10
The second half of Bowman’s comment is remarkably appropriate to this research 
considering this book was published in 1928 when the second Anglo-Belgian 
boundary commission was in the field bringing territorial ‘order’ along the Congo-
 
                                                 
8 G.N. Uzoigwe, ‘European partition and conquest of Africa: an overview’ In General History of Africa 
VII: Africa Under Colonial Domination 1880-1935 ed. A.A. Boahen (Heinemann, CA: UNESCO, 
1985), 20-27. There are numerous texts that review the various theories about imperial motivations for 
the partition of Africa dating back to Marx, Helphand, Hobson and Keltie. Another of the more recent 
reviews of these arguments is: L.H. Gann and P. Duignan eds., Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960 Vol. 
1: The History and Politics of Colonialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977). 
9 The definition of many colonial boundaries in Africa was much more of a reductive process. One 
prominent example is the significant changes to the boundary between Nigeria and the French colonial 
territories west of the Niger river (now the Niger-Nigeria boundary). This was initially defined along a 
lengthy ‘straight’ line between two identified points in 1890, but was dramatically altered in 1898 as a 
result of greater local knowledge and again in 1904 following a joint commission survey, which even 
called for a subsequent demarcation commission to refine the boundary farther. See I. Brownlie African 
Boundaries: A Legal and Diplomatic Encyclopaedia (London: Hurst and Co., 1979), 448-451. 
10 I. Bowman, The New World: Problems in Political Geography, Fourth Edition (Yonkers, NY: World 
Book Company, 1928), 18. 
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Zambezi watershed in an unveiled exercise to facilitate copper mining.11 There have 
been many postcolonial critiques that follow Bowman’s thinking. One notable 
analysis from Naeem Inayatullah views British and French colonial administration in 
Africa as having exercised economic integration that contributed to the ‘positive 
sovereignty’ of the respective metropoles. However, the same colonial practice did 
not exercise the political/cultural integration that was essential for bringing an equal 
level of positive sovereignty to the respective colonies.12
From a more historical perspective, the contextualisation of demarcation 
practice might be indicative of what Robinson and Gallagher saw in 1962 as the 
sequential imposition of territorial governance in colonial Africa.  
 
…in the 1880s the policy makers had intended nothing more ambitious than 
building diplomatic fences around these territories and ham-stringing their 
rulers by informal control. But such methods would not work with the proto-
nationalists of Egypt and Ethiopia, the Muslim revivalists of Tunisia and the 
(Sudan belt), the Arab slavers of Nyasaland and the Congo, the large animist 
kingdoms of Buganda, Ashanti and Dahomey. They had to be conquered. 
Once conquered they had to be administered; once administered, they had to 
be developed to pay the bills for their governance. But the crux of this 
imperialism lies in its sequence.13
The progression of boundary making along the Belgian Congo-Northern Rhodesia 
boundary can be seen in this sequence. The original delimitation in 1894 was left 
undemarcated until the first Anglo-Belgian boundary commission embarked in 1911. 
Even in the wake of their work, the boundary was left unclear at the local scale and 
remained little more than a ‘diplomatic fence’. But the discovery of copper, and its 
potential economic benefit to the Northern Rhodesia administration, led to the second 
Anglo-Belgian boundary commission and the rigorous determination of territorial 
 
                                                 
11 Bowman’s use of the term ‘order’ is particularly poignant from a territorial boundary perspective and 
in a North American context when read in H.B. Johnson’s 1976 work on cadastral surveys in the 
American mid-west, Order Upon the Land: The US Rectangular Land Surveys and the Upper 
Mississippi Country (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976). 
12 N. Inayatullah, ‘Beyond the sovereignty dilemma: quasi-states as social constructs’ In Sovereignty as 
Social Construct eds. T.J. Biersteker and C. Weber (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
70. 
13 R. Robinson, R. and J. Gallagher, ‘The partition of Africa’ In The New Cambridge Modern History 
Vol. XI: Material Progress and World-Wide Problems 1870-1898 ed. F.H. Hinsley (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1962), 623-633. This quote is re-emphasised in the conclusion to their 
subsequent work R. Robinson and J. Gallagher with A. Denny, Africa and the Victorians: The Official 
Mind of Imperialism Second Edition (London: MacMillan, 1981/rep. 1992), 482. 
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division at the very largest scale. What Robinson and Gallagher’s sequential model 
fails to address when applied to the Belgian Congo-Northern Rhodesia context is that 
the penetration of colonial governance was not only motivated by control over 
conquered peoples, but control of economic resources. To recall a quote by Achille 
Mbembe cited in Chapter 5: 
The colonial space had its space, its shape, its borders. It had its geological 
make up and its climates. It had its resources, its soils, its minerals, its animal 
and plant species, its empty lands. In short, it had its qualities.14
Demarcation methodology may not have represented exactly the level of colonial 
administrative activity in border areas, but the DRC-Zambia narrative reveals that it 
did illustrate a higher level of political interest than other boundary sections with less 
‘valuable’ economic assets.  
 
This indicates that despite boundary-making practices (especially 
demarcation) being dismissed as technical exercises, in reality there are deep political 
notions to be drawn from those practices. If clear boundary demarcation was reserved 
for areas with economic prospects, it suggests that the territorial state model 
purportedly brought to the African continent through imperial division and colonial 
administration, and subsequently inherited by post-independent African states, was 
applied unevenly. This is Mamdani’s central notion in Citizen and Subject with 
regards to the application of administration over people. What this research into the 
DRC-Zambia demarcation narrative indicates is that the notion may be applied 
similarly to the administration of territory itself: that not all African territory, just like 
individuals under colonial administration, was considered equal, despite small-scale 
cartographic representation of boundaries suggesting otherwise. If territorial 
boundaries are a constituent element of the territorial state model, why were its 
practices so unevenly distributed?  
In this sense it is difficult to assess whether or not the European territorial state 
model is or is not appropriate for post-independent Africa since the inherited ‘model’ 
was never exported/imposed with any consistency. The inconsistency of current 
boundary practices suggests that African governments have been lulled into an 
imperial perspective of their territory due to their ambivalence towards large scale 
boundary practices on the ground. While it may be regarded as the European model 
                                                 
14 A. Mbembe, On the Postcolony (Berkley: University of California Press, 2001), 32. 
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due to the origin of its ‘exporters’, the ‘model’ of exclusive territorial state 
sovereignty imposed across Africa through nineteenth century imperialism and 
twentieth century colonialism was itself never actually consistent within Europe.15 
Similarly, there is no clear indication that pre-colonial Africa had a single consistent 
model of political organisation.16 While it is true that the acceptance of colonially 
defined territory by the OAU in 1964 entrenched the political power of African elites 
who assumed government positions at independence, has there been any counter 
model of political organisation that is deemed to be more appropriate in Africa. 
Despite grand rhetoric about “unscrambling” the political map of Africa, Makau wa 
Mutua provides no suggestion as to how the new map would be drawn. 17
Because this research has concentrated on boundary practices in relation to the 
territorial state as exported through the imperial and colonial moments, these issues 
require more reflection than is available here. In addition, this concentration on that 
specific idea of ‘boundary’ and the practice of ‘demarcation’ unfortunately has had to 
exclude a broader historiography of the pre-imperial political entities in the region of 
the DRC-Zambia boundary.
 If Africa 
should be an exception to the ‘European’ territorial state model, perhaps due to the 
mobility of its population, seemingly inextricable fusion of political and ethnic 
identities or its tradition of commonly held land rights, then what should be the 
alternative model of political organisation? Can these criticisms be assumed across 
the full breadth of the continent? Would any re-drawing of the political map of Africa 
not involve the use of fixed, linear and bilateral boundaries between politico-
administrative unit, or would it be based on anthropological characteristics? 
18
                                                 
15 This is explored in Chapter 2. See especially S. Beaulac, The Power of Language in the Making of 
International Law: The word sovereignty in Bodin and Vattel and the myth of Westphalia 
(Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhof, 2004) and S.D. Krasner, ‘Compromising Westphalia’ International 
Security 20, no. 3 (1995-96): 115-151. 
 Although Mbembe has suggested that the division of 
16 Jan Vansina indicates that even within a relatively limited area of the central African rainforest, there 
was little ethnic, cultural or political consistency between the numerous tribal groups. J. Vansina, Paths 
in the Rainforests: Toward a History of Political Tradition in Equatorial Africa (Madison: University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1990). See especially pp. 19-21. See also I. Kopytoff ‘The internal African 
frontier: the making of African political culture’ in I. Kopytoff, ed., The African Frontier: The 
Reproduction of African Societies (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987), 8-
9. 
17 M. wa Mutua, ‘Why redraw the map of Africa: A moral and legal inquiry’ Michigan Journal of 
International Law, 16 (1994-95): 1113-1176. 1162. Would it see polities defined by ethnicity? Or 
language? Or religion? 
18 An excellent example of such work is Giacomo Macola’s historiography of the Kazembe kingdom in 
what became North East Rhodesia, which examines the pre-colonial political structure and the initial 
engagement with European imperialism. G. Macola, The Kingdom of Kazembe: History and Politics in 
North-eastern Zambia and Katanga to 1950 (Münster: Lit, 2002). 
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pre-colonial African political entities were divided by ‘boundaries capable of infinite 
extension and abrupt contraction,’19
Demarcation as a continuous process 
 in terms of demarcation as a political practice, 
further research into any methodologies of territorial marking by pre-colonial African 
polities would be a fascinating contribution to boundary studies. 
Beyond the conclusions that can be drawn concerning the imposition of the European 
territorial state model on Africa, the focus on demarcation raised further significant 
issues about the relationship between boundary-making practices and more recent 
discourses on borders and bordering. It is not only contemporary political geography 
that has distanced itself from boundary-making practices, having once been so 
engaged both theoretically and practically, there are also misunderstandings about the 
practices held by government practitioners themselves, conveyed most overtly by the 
OAU heads of state incorrect description of all African boundaries as ‘tangible 
realities.’20 The very first specific recommendation in the agreed conclusions of the 
2008 African Union Border Programme Symposium called for: “the establishment by 
the AU Commission of a working group to prepare a practical handbook on 
delimitation and demarcation in Africa.”21 Now over sixty years old, Jones’ 1945 
Boundary-Making remains the primary (and arguably only) source of instructive 
discourse on practical demarcation methodology.22 As noted in Chapter 2, Kristof 
criticised De la Pradelle’s boundary-making stages of preparation, decision and 
execution as pursuing boundaries in an objective rather than subjective sense.23
                                                 
19 A. Mbembe, ‘At the edge of the world: boundaries, territoriality and sovereignty in Africa’ trans. S. 
Rendall Public Culture 12, no.1 (2000): 259-284. 263-264. See also I. Kopytoff The African Frontier: 
The Reproduction of Traditional African Societies (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 1987) 
 The 
same critique may be levelled at Jones, although he took great pains to emphasise that 
20 17 July 1964 Declaration of the Council of Ministers, Organization of African Unity, Resolution 
16(1). 
21 African Union Border Programme (AUBP) Conclusions of the 2nd International Symposium on Land, 
Maritime, River and Lake Boundaries Management AUBP/EXP/3(VI). Article 10(i). The fruition of 
this call, a book entitled Boundary Delimitation and Demarcation: An African Union Border 
Programme Practical Handbook is now in print and was edited by myself. 
22 See especially J.W. Donaldson and A. Williams, ‘Delimitation and demarcation: analysing the 
legacy of Stephen B. Jones’ Boundary-Making’ Geopolitics 13, no. 4 (2008): 676-701. 
23 L.K.D. Kristof, ‘The Nature of Frontiers and Boundaries.’ Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers 49, no. 3-1 (1959): 269-282. 276. 
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Boundary-Making was an ideal set of guidelines that reflected a very specific 
geopolitical context.24
While boundary practitioners in Africa seek out guidelines to inform their 
practices, there are two conceptual elements thrown up by Kristof’s critique as viewed 
through the lens of the DRC-Zambia boundary narrative. First, it must be questioned 
whether or not a disparity in demarcation techniques along a boundary requires a 
disparity in the perception of territory? Is the political rhetoric about the homogeneity 
of territory a myth that is eroded by the practical realities of the landscape? If so, what 
realities are more important than others, and therefore require more precise territorial 
division? These questions refer back to the discussion in Chapters 1 and 2 about the 
neutral perception of territory in international law versus the heterogeneous 
perception reflected in more recent bordering discourses. The DRC-Zambia boundary 
narrative does not provide direct answers to these questions, but it does elevate these 
core tensions to the surface for political consideration. 
  
The DRC-Zambia boundary narrative expresses that demarcation practices 
operate within this tension between national (imperial) and local political contexts; 
both the idealised, cartographic imagery of two sovereign homogeneous territories as 
well as the varied tapestry of human and physical contexts in local border landscapes. 
Recalling Megoran’s comments noted in Chapter 1, contemporary political geography 
may view boundary-making practices only as exercising high (imperial/national) 
political decisions, but the process of demarcation forces an interaction with the local 
border landscapes. The DRC-Zambia boundary narrative reveals that rather than 
simply the technical production of a pre-existent line superimposed on the physical 
landscape, demarcation practices can be, and have been, subject to the conditions of 
local contexts which have had greater or lesser influence on those practices. Indeed, 
both Holdich and Jones emphasised that demarcation, and determination of the final, 
most accurate position of a boundary on the ground, is best advised by a deep 
understanding of the human as well as the physical geography of the border 
                                                 
24 S.B. Jones, ‘Boundary concepts in the setting of place and time.’ Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers 49, no. 3 (1959): 241-255. 251-252. See also Donaldson and Williams, 
‘Delimitation and demarcation.’ 
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landscape. 25
Drawing from this tension, the DRC-Zambia boundary narrative does put 
forward a second, more practical notion that may be influential to policy-makers. As 
suggested in Chapter 2, approaching boundary-making as a technical process tends to 
imply the production of a discrete product (boundary). Perhaps this stems from 
conceptualising territory as neutral and homogeneous; the two-dimensional plane on 
which to draw a mathematical line. However, this narrative has demonstrated that the 
physical definition of a boundary has a much more cyclical lifespan, indicating that it 
fades in and out of clarity on the landscape. With clarity of boundary definition being 
a constitutive component of both neighbour states’ territorial sovereignty within 
international law, ambiguity can lead to overlapping claims and dispute. Therefore, 
the practical lesson for governments is to resist the temptation to approach boundary-
making as a system with a finite objective, rather than an on-going responsibility. 
 This is where political geography can re-engage with boundary practices 
that are tending to lean towards an objective rigidity within international law. 
 Even beyond its inherent importance as a political geographic process, what 
the DRC-Zambia narrative suggests about demarcation is that it cannot be seen as a 
technical stage in a finite system, nor as a finite process itself. Accepting the 
definition of demarcation from Holdich and Jones as the visual representation of the 
boundary and even taking it as the final stage in a perceived objective production 
process, a boundary can never be assumed unless it is experienced in the local context 
whether through the unilateral state practices of bordering or the bilateral markers of a 
boundary. Visual knowledge of even a demarcated boundary is constantly 
undermined by vegetation growth, erosion of pillars and human activity. To take this 
to its logical end, it might be said that visual knowledge of a boundary through 
demarcation is strictly positivist; a boundary is either demarcated or it is not; it is 
visually known or it is not. Saying that the DRC-Zambia boundary was demarcated 
from 1927 to 1933 by the Anglo-Belgian boundary commission cannot imply that it is 
visually and physically known on the local landscape today, as my visit to BP 16 
revealed. 
In Jones’ 1945 boundary-making rubric, he suggested that demarcation was 
followed by the process of ‘administration’, which in essence he refers to as the 
                                                 
25 See especially Holdich, Political Frontiers and Boundary Making, 208; and S.B. Jones, Boundary-
Making: A Handbook for Statesmen, Treaty Editors and Boundary Commissioners (Washington, DC: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1945), 165. 
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physical maintenance of the boundary marks.26 While he outlined these as distinct 
parts of boundary-making, because demarcation itself is the act of making a boundary 
visible, any ‘administration’ or maintenance of the physical symbols that keep the 
linear boundary visible must be considered demarcation. Prescott and Triggs treat 
demarcation and administration as a single discrete subject in their recent work. 27 
While this certainly hints at the notion that demarcation is not a finite process, they do 
not make the conceptual link between the demarcation and maintenance practices 
directly. If the marks or pillars disappear from the landscape, the boundary may revert 
back to its legal delimitation28
This idea of demarcation being a continuous practice recalls discussion in 
Chapter 1 about Robert Sack’s statement in Human Territoriality that “territories 
require constant effort to establish and maintain.”
 and, therefore, require new demarcation. In other 
words, the boundary shifts back to the small scale perspective, back to the objective 
abstraction, back to the privileged knowledge of territorial extent through lines on 
maps or legal texts. 
29 Taken even further, Sack says that 
“delimitation becomes a territory only when its boundaries are used to affect 
behaviour by controlling access” and suggests that space becomes territory “if the 
boundaries are used by some authority to mold, influence, or control activities.”30 
More importantly, the discussion in Chapter 1 highlighted what David Newman calls 
the “functional continuum” of bordering practice31
                                                 
26 Jones, Boundary-Making, 5 and 220-224. 
, revealing the influence of Sack’s 
concepts on contemporary border studies. Taking Sack’s lead, the boundaries of 
territory either need to be enforced by some sort of actual control (bordering), or be 
satisfactorily ‘known’ through symbols such as boundary pillars or marks in order to 
influence directly or indirectly the patterns and movements of people. The degree of 
control places bordering practices within Newman’s functional continuum which 
27 J.R.V. Prescott and G. Triggs  International Frontiers and Boundaries: Law, Politics and Geography 
(Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2008), 60-61 and 69. 
28 This is the case if demarcation had never been legally ratified which is commonplace. Some parts of 
the DRC-Zambia watershed section since the results of the 1927-33 Anglo-Belgian boundary 
commission demarcation were not officially ratified through an exchange of notes. Given the duration 
of time and the lack of any objection by either state to the 1927-33 demarcation, it is unlikely that 
demarcation along the un-ratified portions would ever be considered illegal but it presents a legal ‘grey 
area.’ 
29 R.D. Sack, Human Territoriality: Its theory and history (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986), 19. 
30 Sack, Human Territoriality, 19. 
31 D. Newman, ‘From the International to the Local in the Study and Representation of Boundaries: 
Theoretical and Methodological Comments’ In Holding the Line: Border in a Globalized World eds. H. 
Nicol and I. Townsend-Gault (Vancouver: University of British Colombia Press, 2005), 400. 
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allows analysis of the variations in demarcation practices to open up conversations 
about the relationship between state and territory. 
If demarcation is a continuous process, can it be said to reside conceptually 
within that ‘functional continuum’ of bordering or are they indicators of an inert 
mathematical boundary line? Certainly as the symbols of territorial sovereignty, 
boundary pillars are intended to assert indirect control over populations by 
communicating that an individual is passing from one area of state jurisdiction and 
control into another. In terms of its actual construction, demarcation can be seen on a 
spectrum or continuum where at one end exists undemarcated frontier zones, where 
jurisdiction is undefined and control may be asserted on an individual from either 
neighbouring state within a wide geographic area, to the other end where boundary 
markers stand side-by-side to form a physical barrier, wall or fence.  
What the historical narrative of the DRC-Zambia boundary communicates is 
that the position of demarcation methodology on such a spectrum can convey the 
level of state interest in rights to the land itself rather than in the responsibilities for 
governing people. The lack of demarcation suggests a lack of administrative 
influence, both in the pejorative sense of controlling movements and influencing 
identity, as well as the (potentially) more beneficial aspects of administrative control 
such as rule of law, conflict prevention and state-provided services. In the DRC-
Zambia context, the presence of economic resources within the land itself along the 
watershed is the catalyst for the strict imposition of the territorial state model. Areas 
of less economic ‘value’ do not require as great a penetration of state administrative 
mechanisms and, therefore, do not require as clear a division of sovereignty. 
This brings the theoretical discourse back to the initial discussion about the 
growing separation between boundary studies and contemporary political geography. 
The DRC-Zambia case shows that although demarcation may appear as a technical 
process pursuing an objective boundary product, in reality demarcation can be much 
more of a contextualised practice, influenced by aspects of the local border landscape. 
Demarcation was not undertaken uniformly across all African boundaries, either by 
colonial or post-independence governments. Instead it can be seen along a continuum, 
influenced by local contexts that include, as the DRC-Zambia case indicates, the 
economic resources of the land itself. The disparity in boundary demarcation practice 
along various boundary sections does suggest that states have often taken a more 
subjective approach to boundary-making rather than treating each boundary as an 
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objective whole. This in effect heeds Kristof’s warning about approaching boundaries 
subjectively rather than treating the boundary as a homogeneous line that would 
conceptually reflect homogeneous territory. However, what the demarcation narrative 
of the DRC-Zambia boundary has revealed is that economic resources are often 
elevated to the relevant ‘subjectivity’ that influences demarcation practices, over other 
aspects of state responsibility. 
 
Epilogue           
 
In December 2008, I attended the Second International Symposium on Land, River 
and Lake Boundary Demarcation, held in Maputo, Mozambique. Although the first 
symposium held in Bangkok in 2006 had a more global scope32, this second 
symposium was focused exclusively on African boundaries, having been organised 
under the aegis of the newly constituted African Union Border Programme (AUBP). 
The African Union (AU) invited (and sponsored) representatives from all member 
states33 and the symposium was intended to focus on the practical aspects of ensuring 
member states work toward the – practically impossible – deadline of having all 
African boundaries recovered and demarcated by 2012.34
There are no international regulations for boundary demarcation methodology 
and at one point discussion in the technical working group turned to whether or not 
 The symposium brought 
together many of the surveyors and practitioners who are responsible for boundary 
demarcation in their respective governments across Africa. As a co-facilitator of the 
programme, I also served as rapporteur in one of the two working groups. This 
technical working group discussed many of the practical issues involved in the 
demarcation methodologies. Having written the discussion points myself, this was an 
excellent forum to understand how African governments are approaching boundary 
demarcation today. 
                                                 
32 International Boundaries Research Unit and Kingdom of Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Proceedings of the International Symposium on Land and River Boundaries Demarcation and 
Maintenance in Support of Borderland Development Bangkok, Thailand, 7-11 November 2006. 
33 However, not all member states were represented. There were two representatives from Zambia, 
including Mr. Danny Mubanga, and one representative from DRC. 
34 African Union, Declaration on the African Union Border Programme and its Implementation 
Modalities as Adopted by the Conference of African Ministers in Charge of Border Issues, Addis 
Ababa, 7 July 2007. Preamble Art. 1c(iii); See also African Union, Memorandum of Understanding on 
Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA, adopted by the OAU Assembly 
of Heads of State and Government, Durban, South Africa, July 2002 [Decision CM/Dec.666(LXXVI)]. 
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the doctrine of intervisibility should be agreed as a key principle, if not a legal 
requirement, for demarcation. It was agreed that the overall goal of boundary 
demarcation should be to make pillars/marks intervisible on the ground in order to 
prevent bilateral disputes and to clarify jurisdiction for local administration. However, 
a debate ensued when it was questioned whether or not intervisible boundary 
demarcation was appropriate in uninhabited desert areas. Some delegates suggested 
that while intervisibility should remain the goal, demarcation should be subject to 
three influences: topography, available resources (for demarcation) and population 
density. Other delegates argued that the very purpose of intervisibility in preventing 
bilateral disputes was compromised if it was not applied consistently. They mentioned 
that disputes over boundary position could arise even in uninhabited desert areas 
especially if “oil” (the term actually used in debate) was discovered in border areas. In 
the end, the working group decided that intervisible demarcation was the overall aim, 
but it was subject to geographic conditions (both human and physical) and to the 
available resources of the neighbouring governments. This debate prompted me to 
think about two overriding themes that have been exposed throughout the DRC-
Zambia boundary narrative. 
The first intriguing aspect of the discussion on intervisibility was the 
assumption that rigorous demarcation would be necessary to prevent disputes over 
economic resources (oil in particular). No doubt this was just an off-hand comment, 
but it reflects what is often seen as a discernible rise in media interest and political 
tension when boundary disputes involve (either directly or imagined) economic 
resources.35
                                                 
35 To take just one of numerous examples, the Bakassi peninsula at the centre of the Cameroon-Nigeria 
boundary dispute continues to be referred to in media stories as being ‘oil rich’ when in fact all 
operations are located well offshore. DRC and Uganda are currently in dispute over Rukwizi island in 
Lake Albert after an increase in oil exploration on the Ugandan side of the lake. See ‘DRC, Uganda 
presidents agree security and boundary measures’ International Boundaries Research Unit news 
archive, 8 September 2007; ‘Briton killed as tensions build on DRC-Uganda border in Lake Albert’ 
International Boundaries Research Unit news archive, 3 August 2007; ‘River shift poses questions on 
DRC-Uganda boundary’ International Boundaries Research Unit news archive, 30 May 2007. 
 This close association between economic resources and the political 
value of territory reminded me of the way the DRC-Zambia boundary was marked 
around BP 18 by the 3 metre high fence near the Frontier copper mine, while it was 
left totally indistinct just a few kilometres away at BP 16. It suggests that territory 
continues to be contextualised by governments who see the demarcation of 
boundaries as necessary for the allocation of land with economic resources; that such 
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resources are worth disputing while land without such resources is less likely to cause 
dispute. 
This raises the question of whether economic resources alone attract territorial 
administration and necessitate clear knowledge of jurisdictional limits. It is true that 
the technical working group also discussed the need for clearer boundary demarcation 
in more populated areas. However, the almost instinctive reaction that the discovery 
of oil in remote border areas would prompt a boundary dispute recalls the key critique 
of colonial demarcation practice as being contextualised by the economic value of 
territory. Indeed, the similarities between the colonial and post-colonial moments of 
the DRC-Zambia boundary suggest that post-colonial African governments, much like 
their colonial predecessors, still view territory as a commodity to be exploited. The 
responsibilities for ‘modern’ and efficient administration are reserved for those areas 
with the greatest economic yield, begging the question, is it ill-defined territory or ill-
defined economic resources that continues to provoke boundary disputes between 
neighbouring African states? 
 
As discussed in the context of the 1927-33 Anglo-Belgian boundary 
commission, the notion of intervisibility is intriguing because it makes the linear limit 
of territory visible at the local scale. As a methodological goal this indicates that state 
territory should not be contextualised when defining its boundaries at any scale and 
particularly in the demarcation process. The distinct coloured lines on maps (at any 
scale) should be as distinctly visible in the lived 1:1 scale. Although the delegates at 
the 2008 Maputo symposium reflected that this was effectively entrenching 
boundaries made by the “colonial masters,”36
Indirectly the debate on intervisibility was tied to a second intriguing 
discussion on the involvement of local populations in the demarcation process that 
links with the postcolonial discourses on identity noted at the end of Chapter 6. 
 their preference for intervisible 
demarcation can be seen as a preference to conceive and communicate the territorial 
extent of the state as a de-contextualised whole at the lived scale, clarifying the linear 
limits of both territorial state rights and responsibilities, and removing the prospect of 
inter-state dispute over boundary definition. This is an objective approach that 
eliminates the complex political questions of treating territory subjectively. 
                                                 
36 The phrase “colonial masters” was used repeatedly throughout the symposium, although its use 
eventually gained a tongue-in-cheek resonance. 
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Boundary pillars or marks have been shown throughout this work to be quite literally 
the signposts of national political identity based on the territorial state model that in 
many cases was haphazardly transposed during the colonial period, both in terms of 
territorial definition and political institutions. Several delegates at the Maputo 
symposium stated that borderland populations often destroyed boundary pillars, not to 
protest their significance for political identity but believing that they contained some 
kind of precious metal (e.g. mercury or gold).37
This research has tried to suggest that the seemingly de-contextualised practice 
of demarcation is, in fact, imbued with context. Nevertheless, it exposes the difficult 
balance that my research at the International Boundaries Research Unit seeks to make 
between academic critique and sound practical advice. If a state is advised not to treat 
demarcation as a totally de-contextualised practice, avoiding the jaws of the territorial 
trap, they must make the political decision as to what land is worthy of being clearly 
marked on the ground by boundaries and what is not. If international law intends that 
the clear definition of territory by boundaries is essential to prevent conflict, then a 
contextualised demarcation practice suggests that some land is worth disputing while 
some is not. What then are the criteria that a state uses to assess the ‘value’ of its 
territory? Is it the Lockean and imperial approach favouring the economic uses of 
land, as evidenced by the DRC-Zambia boundary narrative? Should it be based on 
some kind of human geographical homogeneity (language, culture, ethnicity) or 
perhaps based on the actual practice of control? These questions raised by the 
narrative of the DRC-Zambia boundary are for further reflection, but what is clear 
from this research is that demarcation practices are able to be critically assessed and 
 The consensus in the technical 
working group was that borderland populations should be educated about the 
demarcation process, in order to dispel myths about the pillars themselves, and to 
participate directly in pillar construction. It was felt that if borderland populations 
knew more about boundary pillars the more they would be respected and maintained; 
an interesting premise suggesting that local borderland populations, effectively, take 
possession of marks and symbols that are imbued with national significance. 
                                                 
37 This was reinforced recently the Ugandan government announced that some 1,500 boundary pillars 
along all of its international boundaries have been uprooted since independence. Although some had 
been destroyed by Idi Amin’s soldiers in 1979, “some pillars are said to have been uprooted by vandals 
who believed they contained mercury at the base.” B. Okiror, ‘1,500 border pillars uprooted’ New 
Vision/All Africa (Kampala), 4 May 2009. 
Chapter 7 – Using demarcation as an analytical lens 
  234 
doing so provides a unique perspective on the foundational relationship between state 
and territory.
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1. General Act of the Conference of Berlin, relative to the 
Development of Trade and Civilization in Africa; the free navigation 
of the rivers Congo, Niger &c.; the suppression of the Slave Trade by 
Sea and Land; the occupation of Territory on the African coasts, &c. 
“Berlin Act” Berlin, 26 February 1885 – relevant article only1
 
 
CHAPTER I.—DECLARATION RELATIVE TO FREEDOM OF TRADE IN THE 
BASIN OF THE CONGO, ITS MOUTHS AND CIRCUMJACENT REGIONS, 
WITH OTHER PROVISIONS CONNECTED THEREWITH. 
Freedom of Trade to all Nations. 
ART. I. The trade of all nations shall enjoy complete freedom:— 
Basin of the Congo Defined. 
1. In all the regions forming the basin of the Congo and its outlets. This basin is 
bounded by the watersheds (or mountain ridges) of the adjacent basins, namely, in 
particular, those of the Niari, the Ogowé, the Schari, and the Nile, on the north; by the 
eastern watershed line of the affluents of Lake Tanganyika on the east; and by the 
watersheds of the basins of the Zambesi and the Logé on the south. It therefore 
comprises all the regions watered by the Congo and its affluents, including Lake 
Tanganyika, with its eastern tributaries. 
Maritime Zone Defined 
2. In the maritime zone extending along the Atlantic Ocean from the parallel situated 
in 2° 30' of South Latitude to the mouth of the Loge, 
Northern Boundary. 
The northern boundary will follow the parallel situated in 2° 30' from the coast to the 
point where it meets the geographical basin of the Congo, avoiding the basin of the 
Ogowé, to which the provisions of the present Act do not apply. 
Southern Boundary. 
The southern boundary will follow the course of the Logé to its source, and thence 
pass eastwards till it joins the geographical basin of the Congo. 
Eastern Boundary. 
3. In the zone stretching eastwards from the Congo Basin as above defined, to the 
Indian Ocean from 5 degrees of North Latitude to the mouth of the Zambesi in the 
south, from which point the line of demarcation will ascend the Zambesi to 5 miles 
above its confluence with the Shire, and then follow the watershed between the 
affluents of Lake Nyassa and those of the Zambesi, till at last it reaches the watershed 
between the waters of the Zambesi and the Congo. 
Free Trade Principles applied to Signatory Powers, and to such 
Independent States as may approve the same. 
It is expressly recognized that in extending the principle of free trade to this eastern 
zone, the Conference Powers only undertake engagements for themselves, and that in 
the territories belonging to an independent Sovereign State this principle shall only be 
applicable in so far as it is approved by such State. But the Powers agree to use their 
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good offices with the Governments established on the African shore of the Indian 
Ocean for the purpose of obtaining such approval, and in any case of securing the 
most favourable conditions to the transit (traffic) of all nations. (See also Art. XY, p. 
33). 
 
 
2. Circular of the Administrator-General of the Department of 
Foreign Affairs of the Independent State of the Congo Declaring 
Neutrality of the State, within its Limits as defined by Treaties. 
Brussels, 1 August 18852
(Translation.) 
 
Neutrality. 
THE Undersigned, Administrator-General of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs of the Independent State of  the Congo, is charged by the King, 
Sovereign of this State, to make known to his Excellency the Marquis of 
Salisbury, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in London, that in 
conformity with Article X of the General Act of the Berlin Conference 
(No. 17), the Independent State of the Congo declares by these presents 
that it shall be perpetually neutral, and that it claims the advantages 
guaranteed by Chapter III of the same Act, at the same time assuming the 
duties which neutrality carries with it. The state (condition) of neutrality 
shall apply to the territory of the Independent State of the Congo 
comprised within the limits resulting from the successive Treaties 
concluded by the International Association with Germany (No. 52), 
France (No. 47), and Portugal (No. 68), Treaties notified to the Berlin 
Conference and annexed to its Protocols, and which are thus determined,* 
namely:— 
To the North. 
A straight line starting from the Atlantic Ocean and joining the mouth of 
the river which flows into the sea to the south of Cabinda Bay, near 
Ponta Vermelha, at Cabo-Lambo;  
The parallel of this latter point prolonged as far as its intersection by the 
meridian of the confluence of the Culacalla with the Luculla; The 
meridian thus determined until it meets the River Luculla;  
The course of the Luculla to its confluence with the Ohiloango (Luango 
Luce); 
The River Ohiloango, from the mouth of the Luculla to its most northern source; 
The watershed between the Niadi-Quillou and the Congo as far as the meridian of 
Manyanga; 
A line to be determined which, while following as much as possible a natural 
division of the land, terminates between the station of Manyanga and the 
cataract of Ntombo-Mataka, at a point situated on the navigable portion of the 
river; 
The Congo as far as Stanley Pool; 
The median line of Stanley Pool; 
                                                 
2 FO 881/6067X and in Hertslet, 1894. 198. 
Appendix – Transcriptions of relevant treaties, agreements and exchanges of notes 
  260 
The Congo from a point to be determined above the River Likona-Nkundja. 
A line to be determined from this point to the 17th degree of longitude east of 
Greenwich, following as much as possible the watershed of the Licona-Nkundja 
Basin; 
The 17th degree of longitude east of Greenwich until it meets the 4th parallel of 
north latitude ; 
The 4th parallel of north latitude until it meets the 30th degree of longitude east of 
Greenwich. 
 
To the East. 
The 30th degree of longitude east of Greenwich up to 1° 20' of south latitude ; 
A straight line drawn from the intersection of the 30th degree of longitude by the 
parallel of 1° 20' of south latitude as far as the northern extremity of Lake 
Tanganyka; 
The median line of Lake Tanganyka; 
A straight line drawn from Lake Tanganyka to Lake Moero by 8° 30 south 
latitude; 
The median line of Lake Moero ; 
The watercourse which unites Lake Mooro with Lake Bangweolo.* 
The western shore of Lake Bangweolo.* 
 
To the South. 
A line drawn from the southern extremity of Lake Bangweolo until it meets the 
24th degree of longitude east of Greenwich, and following the watershed 
between the Congo and the Zambezi; 
The watershed of the basin of the Kassa'i between the 12th and 6th parallels of 
south latitude; 
The 6th parallel of latitude to its intersection by the Quango; 
The course of the Quango until it meets the parallel of Nokki: 
The parallel of Nokki until it meets the meridian which passes through the mouth 
of the River Uango-Uango; 
The course of the Congo from the confluence of the River Uango-Uango to the 
sea. 
To the West. 
The Atlantic Ocean between the mouth of the Congo and the river which flows 
into the sea to the south of Cabinda Bay near Ponta Yarmelha. 
EDM. VAN 
EETVELDE. 
Brussels, 1st August, 1885. 
____________________ 
 
LIST OF TREATIES (CONTRACTS) between the Belgian Expedition to the 
Upper Congo and Native Chiefs, 1882-1884 
 
20 Oct., 1882 Laufountchou and Kindokki - Cession. Villages and Districts. Land 
between the Rivers Nsoundon and 
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Ntombé to their confluents, and the road 
leading from the village of Laufountchou 
of Lutéle to that of Kimbanda. 
29 Oct., 1882 Selo – Cession Sovereignty. Villages and District. 
6 Jan., 1883 Palla Balla – Cession District 
1 Apr., 1884 M’Boma (King Né Pereira) – Cession Sovereign rights. Villages 
and lands. Seugne (Manilombi), Sara 
Ora, and Chinquella Goma (Capitos), 
Luçala, Emboche (Manilombi), N’Boch 
19 Apr., 1884 M’Boma (King Né Corado) – Cession Sovereign rights. Villages 
and lands. M’Banza, Chianda, Dimbo, 
Chincorda, N’Sança, Lutélé, Maktandan, 
Jouco Dekeli (Capita), Sacra N’Jouka 
(Manilombi) 
19 Apr., 1884 Moïnda (Nelambé Zoulau) – Cession Sovereign rights. Seven 
villages (not named) 
19 Apr., 1884 Palla Balla Meaning of term “Cession of Territory” 
in Treaty of 6th January, 1883. 
“Suzerainty” not “Purchase of Soil” 
19 Apr., 1884 M’Boma (King Né Canha or Né Pereira) – Cession Soverign 
rights. Towns and lands. M’Bonza, 
N’Comboa, Caia M’Boma, N’Bouvalle 
(Monilombi), Louvongo, N’Souni, 
Mahunda (Capita) 
20 Apr., 1884 Moïnda (Nelambé Zoulau) – Cession Bank of the Congo 
bordering his States on the South. (Land 
acquired by Foreign Houses excepted). 
 
 
3. Charter granted to the British South Africa Company, signed 
at Westminster, 29 October 1889 – Relevant Clauses Only3
VICTORIA, by the grace of God of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland 
Queen, Defender of the Faith, to all to whom these presents shall come, greeting. 
 
WHEREAS a humble Petition has been presented to us in our Council by the Most 
Noble James Duke of Abercorn Companion of the Most Honourable Order of the 
Bath; the Most Noble Alexander William George, Duke of Fife, Knight of the Most 
Ancient and Most Noble Order of the Thistle, Privy Councillor; the Right Honourable 
Edric Frederick. Lord Gifford, V.C.; Cecil John Rhodes, of Kimberley, in the Cape 
Colony, Member of the Executive Council and of the House of Assembly of the 
Colony of the Cape of Good Hope; Alfred Belt, of 29, Holborn Viaduct, London, 
merchant: Albert Henry George Grey, of Howick, Northumberland, Esquire; and 
George Cawston, of 18, Lennox Gardens, London, Esquire, Barrister-at-Law ; 
 And whereas the said Petition states, amongst other things: 
That the Petitioners and others are associated for the purpose of forming a 
Company or Association, to be incorporated, if to us should seem fit, for the objects in 
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the said Petition set forth, under the corporate name of “The British South Africa 
Company”; 
That the existence of a powerful British Company, controlled by those of our 
subjects in whom we have confidence, and having its principal field of operations in 
that region of South Africa lying to the north of Bechuanaland and to the west of 
Portuguese East Africa would be advantageous to the commercial and other interests 
of our subjects in the United Kingdom and in our Colonies; 
That the Petitioners desire to carry into effect divers Concessions and 
Agreements which have been made by certain of the Chiefs and tribes inhabiting the 
said region, and such other Concessions, Agreements, Grants, and Treaties as the 
Petitioners may hereafter obtain within the said region or elsewhere in Africa, with 
the view of promoting trade, commerce, civilization, and good government(including 
the regulation of liquor traffic with the natives) in the territories which are or may be 
comprised or referred to in such Concessions, Agreements, Grants, and Treaties, as 
aforesaid;   
That the Petitioners believe that if the said Concessions, Agreements, Grants, 
and Treaties can be carried into effect, the condition of the natives inhabiting the said 
territories will be materially improved and their civilization advanced, and an 
organization established which will tend to the suppression of the Slave Trade in the 
said territories, and to the opening up of the said territories to the immigration of 
Europeans, and to the lawful trade and commerce of our subjects and of other nations; 
That the success of the enterprise in which the Petitioners are engaged would 
be greatly advanced if it should seem fit to us to grant them our Royal Charter of 
Incorporation as a British Company under the said name or title, or such other name 
or title, and with such powers, as to us may seem fit for the purpose of more 
effectually carrying into effect the objects aforesaid; 
That large sums of money have been subscribed for the purposes of the 
intended Company by the Petitioners and others, who are prepared also to subscribe 
or to procure such further sums as may hereafter be found requisite for the 
development of the said enterprise, in the event of our being pleased to grant to them 
our Royal Charter of Incorporation as aforesaid: 
Now, therefore, we, having taken the said Petition into our Royal consideration in 
our Council, and being satisfied that the intentions of the Petitioners are praiseworthy 
and deserve encouragement, and that the enterprise in the Petition described may be 
productive of the benefits set forth therein, by our prerogative Royal and of our 
especial grace, certain knowledge, and mere motion, have constituted, erected, and 
incorporated, and by this our Charter, for us and our heirs and Royal successors, do 
constitute, erect, and incorporate into one body politic and corporate, by the name of 
"The British South Africa Company," the said James, Duke of Abercorn, Alexander 
William George, Duke of Fife, Edric Frederick, Lord Gifford, Cecil John Rhodes, 
Alfred Beit, Albert Henry George Grey, and George Cawston, and such other persons 
and such bodies as from time to time become and are members of the body politic and 
corporate by these presents constituted, erected and incorporated, with perpetual 
succession and a common seal, with power to break, alter, or renew  the same at 
discretion, and with the further authorities, powers, and privileges conferred, and 
subject to the conditions imposed by this our Charter.  And we do hereby accordingly 
will, ordain, give, grant, constitute, appoint, and declare as follows, that is to say:—              
1. The principal field of the operations of the British South Africa Company (in 
this our Charter referred to as "the Company") shall be the region of South Africa 
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lying immediately to the north of British Bechuanaland, and to the north and west 
of the South African Republic, and to the west of the Portuguese dominions. 
2. The Company is hereby authorized and empowered to hold, use and retain for 
the purposes of the Company, and on the terms of this our Charter, the full benefit 
of the Concessions and Agreements made as aforesaid, so far as they are valid, or 
any of them, and all interests, authorities, and powers comprised or referred to in 
the said Concessions and Agreements. Provided always that nothing herein 
contained shall prejudice or affect any other valid and subsisting Concessions or 
Agreements which may have been made by any of the Chiefs or tribes aforesaid, 
and in particular nothing herein contained shall prejudice or affect certain 
Concessions granted in, and subsequent to, the year 1880, relating to the territory 
usually known as the district of the Tati; nor shall anything herein contained be 
construed as giving any jurisdiction, administrative or otherwise, within the said 
district of the Tati, the limits of which district are as follows, viz., from the place 
where the Shasi River rises to its junction with the Tati and Ramaquaban River, 
thence along the Ramaquaban River to where it rises, and thence along the 
watershed of those rivers. 
3. The Company is hereby further authorized and empowered, subject to the 
approval of one of our Principal Secretaries of State (herein referred to as " our 
Secretary of State ") from time to time, to acquire by any Concession, Agreement, 
Grant, or Treaty, all or any rights, interests, authorities, jurisdictions, and powers 
of any kind or nature whatever, including powers necessary for the purposes of 
government and the preservation of public order in or for the protection of 
territories, lands, or property comprised or referred to in the Concessions and 
Agreements made as aforesaid, or affecting other territories, lands, or property in 
Africa, or the inhabitants thereof, and to hold, use, and exercise such territories, 
lands, property, rights, interests, authorities, jurisdictions, and powers respectively 
for the purposes of the Company, and on the terms of this our Charter. 
4. Provided that no powers of government or administration shall be exercised 
under or in relation to any such last-mentioned Concession, Agreement, Grant, or 
Treaty, until a copy of such Concession, Agreement, Grant, or Treaty, in such 
form and with such maps or particulars as our Secretary of State approves, verified 
as he requires, has been transmitted to him, and he has signified his approval 
thereof, either absolutely or subject to any conditions or reservations; and provided 
also that no rights, interests, authorities, jurisdictions, or powers of any description 
shall be acquired by the Company within the said district of the Tati, as 
hereinbefore described, without the previous consent in writing of the owners for 
the time being of the Concessions above referred to relating to the said district, 
and the approval of our Secretary of State. 
5. And we do lastly will, ordain, and declare, without prejudice to any power to 
repeal this our Charter by law belonging to us, our heirs and successors, or to any 
of our Courts, Ministers, or officers, independently of this present declaration and 
reservation that in case at any time it is made to appear to us in our Council that 
the Company has substantially failed to observe and conform to the provisions of 
this our Charter, or that the Company is not exercising its powers under the 
Concessions, Agreements, Grants, and Treaties aforesaid, so as to advance the 
interests which the petitioners have represented to us to be likely to be advanced 
by the grant of this our Charter, it shall be lawful for us, our heirs and successors, 
and we do hereby expressly reserve and take to ourselves, our heirs and 
successors, the right and power, by writing under the Great Seal of our United 
Appendix – Transcriptions of relevant treaties, agreements and exchanges of notes 
  264 
Kingdom, to revoke this our Charter, and revoke and annul the privileges, powers, 
and rights hereby granted to the Company. 
In witness whereof we have caused these our 
Letters to be made Patent. 
Witness ourself at Westminster, the 29th day of 
October, in the 53rd year of our reign. 
By warrant under the Queen's Sign Manual. 
       MUIR MACKENZIE 
 
 
4. Agreement between Great Britain and His Majesty King 
Leopold II, Sovereign of the Independent State of the Congo, relating 
to the Spheres of Influence of Great Britain and the Independent 
State of the Congo in East and Central Africa, signed in Brussels, 12 
May 1894 and attached map4
THE Undersigned, the Honourable Sir Francis Richard Plunkett, a Knight Grand 
Cross of the most distinguished Order of St. Michael and St. George, Her 
Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the King 
of the Belgians, on behalf of the British Government, and M. van Eetvelde, 
Officer of the Order of Leopold, Grand Cross of the Orders of St. Gregory the 
Great, of Christ of Portugal, and of the African Redemption, &c., Secretary of 
State of the Interior of the Independent State of the Congo, on behalf of the 
Government of the Independent State of the Congo, duly authorized by their 
respective Governments, have agreed as follows: 
 
His Majesty the King of the Belgians, Sovereign of the Independent State of the 
Congo, having recognized the British sphere of influence, as laid down in the 
Anglo-German Agreement of the 1st July, 1890 (No. 129), Great Britain 
undertakes to give to His Majesty a lease of territories in the western basin of the 
Nile, under the conditions specified in the following Articles:— 
Boundary. North of German Sphere. Watersheds between the 
Nile and the Congo. 
ART. I.— (a.) It is agreed that the sphere of influence of the Independent 
Congo State shall be limited to the north of the German sphere in East Africa by a 
frontier following the 30th meridian east of Greenwich up to its intersection by 
the watershed between the Nile and the Congo, and thence following this 
watershed in a northerly and north-westerly direction. 
Boundary. North of the Zambesi. Luapula River. Lake Moero 
to Lake Bangweolo. 
(b.) The frontier between the Independent Congo State and the British 
sphere to the north of the Zambesi shall follow a line running direct from the 
extremity of Cape Akalunga on Lake Tanganika, situated at the northernmost 
point of Cameron Bay at about 8° 15' south latitude, to the right bank of the River 
Luapula, where this river issues from Lake Moero. The line shall then be drawn 
directly to the entrance of the river into the lake, being, however, deflected 
towards the south of the lake so as to give the Island of Kilwa to Great Britain. It 
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shall then follow the "thalweg" of the Luapula up to its issue from Lake 
Bangweolo. Thence it shall run southwards along the meridian of longitude of the 
point where the river leaves the lake to the watershed between the Congo and 
Zambesi which it shall follow until it reaches the Portuguese frontier. 
Lease of certain Territories by Great Britain to the Congo State. 
West Shore of Lake Albert and Watershed between the Nile 
and the Congo. 
ART. II Great Britain grants a lease to His Majesty King Leopold II, 
Sovereign of the Independent Congo State, of the territories hereinafter defined, to 
be by him occupied and administered on the conditions and for the period of time 
hereafter laid down. 
Boundaries. 
The territories shall be bounded by a line starting from a point situated on the 
west shore of Lake Albert, immediately to the south of Mahagi, to the nearest 
point of the frontier defined in paragraph (a) of the preceding Article. Thence it 
shall follow the watershed between the Congo and the Nile up to the 25th 
meridian east of Greenwich, and that meridian up to its intersection by the 10th 
parallel north, whence it shall run along that parallel directly to a point to be 
determined to the north of Fashoda. Thence it shall follow the "thalweg" of the 
Nile southward to Lake Albert, and the western shore of Lake Albert to the point 
above indicated south of Mahagi. 
This lease shall remain in force during the reign of His Majesty Leopold II, 
Sovereign of the Independent Congo State. 
Nevertheless, at the expiration of His Majesty's reign, it shall remain fully in 
force as far as concerns all the portion of the territories above mentioned situated 
to the west of the 30th meridian east of Greenwich, as well as a strip of 25 kilom. 
In breadth, to be delimitated by common consent, stretching from the watershed 
between the Nile and the Congo up to the western shore of Lake Albert, and 
including the port of Mahagi. 
This extended lease shall be continued so long as the Congo territories as an 
Independent State or as a Belgian Colony remain under the sovereignty of His 
Majesty and His Majesty's successors. 
 
Flag. 
Throughout the continuance of a lease there shall be used a special flag in 
the leased territories. Lease of Territory by Congo State to Great Britain between 
Lake Tanganika and Lake Albert Edward. 
 
ART. III. The Independent Congo State grants under lease to Great Britain, to be 
administered when occupied, under the conditions and for a period hereafter 
determined, a strip of territory 25 kilom. in breadth, extending from the most 
northerly port on Lake Tanganika, which is included in it, to the most southerly 
point of Lake Albert Edward. This lease will have similar duration to that which 
applies to the territories to the west of the 30th meridian east of Greenwich.] 
Self-Denying Declaration. 
ART. IV. His Majesty King Leopold II, Sovereign of the Independent Congo 
State, recognizes that he neither has nor seeks to acquire any political rights in the 
territories ceded to him under lease in the Nile Basin other than those which are in 
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conformity with the present Agreement. Similarly, Great Britain recognizes that 
she neither has, nor seeks to acquire, any political rights in the strip of territory 
granted to her on lease between Lake Tanganika and Lake Albert Edward other 
than those which are in conformity with the present Agreement. 
Telegraphic Communication. 
ART. V. The Independent Congo State authorizes the construction through its 
territories by Great Britain, or by any Company duly authorized by the British 
Government, of a line of telegraph connecting the British territories in South 
Africa with the British sphere of influence on the Nile. The Government of the 
Congo State shall have facilities for connecting this line with its own telegraphic 
system. This authorization shall not confer on Great Britain or any Company, 
person or persons, delegated to construct the telegraph line, any rights of police or 
administration within the territory of the Congo State. 
Equality of Treatment in Territories Leased. 
ART. VI. In the territories under lease in this Agreement the subjects of each of 
the Contracting Parties shall reciprocally enjoy equal rights and immunities, and 
shall not be subjected to any differential treatment of any kind. 
In witness whereof the Undersigned have signed the present Agreement, 
and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms. 
Done in duplicate at Brussels, this 12th 
day of May, 1894. 
(L.S.) FRANCIS RICHARD 
PLUNKETT. 
(L.S.) EDM. VAN EETVELDE. 
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Map to illustrate the 1894 Anglo-Belgian Treaty (southern section) 
 
 
5. Exchange of Notes between Great Britain and Belgium in 
regard to the Delimitation of the Boundary between Northern 
Rhodesia and the Belgian Congo, exchanged in London, 4 April and 
3 May 19275
 
 
To: His Majesty’s Principal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, London 
M. le Secrétaire d’Etat,                                     
Londres, le 4 avril 1927. 
LA conference par le Gouvernement du Roi, mon auguste Souverain et par le 
Gouvernement de Sa Majeste britannique en vue de conference les instructions á 
remettre á une commission de délimitation de la frontière entre le Congo et la 
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Rhodésia du Nord, s’est réunie comme le sait votre Excellence, du 16 au 19 mars 
1927, á Bruxelles. 
Les délégués belges et britanniques ayant été charges de s’entendre, sous reserve 
de l’approbation de leurs Gouvernements respectifs, j’ai l’honneur, d’ordre de 
mon Gouvernement, de porter á la connaissance de votre Excellence que le 
Gouvernement belge accepte les conclusions de la conference. 
Je saisis, &c. 
BN. MONCHEUR. 
Belgian Ambassador 
____________________ 
 
To: The Belgian Ambassador, London 
Your Excellency, 
Foreign Office, May 3, 1927. 
IN your note of the 4th ultimo your Excellency was so good as to inform me that 
the Belgian Government had accepted the conclusions of the conference, which 
met in Brussels from the 16th to the 19th March, with a view to prepare 
instructions for the commission which is to delimit the frontier between the 
Belgian Congo and Northern Rhodesia. 
2. I have the honour on behalf of His Majesty's Government in Great Britain to 
inform you that they also accept the conclusions of the above-mentioned 
conference. 
I have, &c. 
(For the Secretary of State), 
R.H.CAMPBELL. 
____________________ 
 
Agreement respecting the Appointment of a Commission for the Demarcation of 
the Katanga-Northern Rhodesia Boundary, from the Convention in Brussels, signed 
19 March 1927 
THE. British and Belgian delegates appointed to agree, subject to the approval of 
their respective Governments, upon the scope and composition of a Mixed 
Commission to carry out the demarcation of the boundary between Katanga, a 
part of the Belgian Congo, and Northern Rhodesia, and upon the text of the 
instructions to be given to that Commission, met at the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs, Brussels, from the 16th to the 19th March, 1927, inclusive: 
The British delegate was Colonel H. St. J. L. Winterbotham, of the War Office. 
The Belgian delegates were M. Louwers. of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
MM. Halewyck de Heusch and Maury, of the Ministry of Colonies. 
The decisions arrived at are given below in English and French, and shall be 
included in the instructions to be given to the respective Commissioners. 
Of the two appendices attached to this document, appendix I gives a short and 
signed resume of the agreement already reached on the subject of the whole 
Anglo-Belgian boundary from Lake Tanganyika to pillar 46. Appendix II [not 
reproduced] shows the type of boundary pillars agreed to. 
1. A Mixed Anglo-Belgian Commission will be appointed to demarcate 
precisely that portion of the boundary between the Congo and Northern Rhodesia 
lying between boundary pillars 1 and 46, erected by the Anglo-Belgian 
(Rhodesia-Congo) Boundary Commission of 1911-1914. 
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Throughout this portion the boundary is defined as the ideal watershed 
dividing the basins of the rivers Congo and Zambesi. 
11.5.3.2 Powers of the Commission. 
2.—(l) The Commissioners shall have authority, generally, to make such minor 
rectifications, and adjustments, to the ideal watershed as are necessary to avoid 
the troubles which might arise from a literal interpretation of the treaty. 
(2) The present position of the boundary pillars shall be accepted where they 
lie not further than 200 metres from the ideal watershed. In exceptional 
circumstances, and in areas of no particular known economic value, errors of 
position up to 500 metres may be allowed. In adjusting such departures from the 
ideal watershed to the general run of the boundary, no sharp re-entrants will be 
formed. 
 (3) Where there are alternative ideal watersheds, including undrained basins, 
the Commissioners shall agree upon, and demarcate, a compromise line. 
(4) In all cases of encroachment by the nationals of either party, the 
Commissioners will be guided by the following general principles:— 
(a) Properties and enclosures which lie athwart the ideal watershed 
shall be left undivided as far as possible, whether they be State, corporation, 
tribal or individual, in character. 
(b) The good faith and economic importance of any encroachment 
shall be taken into account. 
(c) No encroachment of a date subsequent to the signature of this 
agreement shall be considered. 
(5) In the possible event of a difference of opinion, each Commissioner will 
forward an immediate report embodying the view of both parties to— 
(a) The home authority. 
(b) The local authority, together with a request that local views may be 
represented as early as possible to the home authority. 
In the above case the ideal watershed will be marked temporarily, but 
adequately, during the progress of discussion. 
(6) The Commissioners shall consider the question of the Belgian railway, 
north and north-west of Mokambo station, with a view to establishing whether a 
modification of the boundary, such as to allow of shortening the railway, can be 
arranged. 
 
3. The general report of the Commission shall include:— 
(a)—(l) A general description of the line. 
(2) A plan, cadastral in nature, showing all field measurements, both linear and 
angular, the positions of all boundary pillars, main and auxiliary, the levels and 
spot heights, and the relative positions of artificial detail, such as railways and 
buildings, lying within 500 metres of the actual boundary. The scale of this plan 
shall be 1/10,000. 
(3) A special report, accompanied by its own topographical plan (at the scale of 
1/10,000), to illustrate any important deviation from the ideal watershed 
considered necessary under the terms of paragraph 2. 
(4) A list of boundary pillars descriptive of construction and tabulating the 
bearings and check measurements necessary for restoration. 
(b)—(1) A diary of the work and conclusions of the Commission. 
(2) A technical report on methods and instruments. 
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4.—(1) Main boundary pillars shall include Nos. 1 to 46 as already established, 
or as altered by the present Commission, amplified by the insertion of additional 
pillars at a mean interval of 5 kilometres. 
(2) Auxiliary boundary pillars, at a mean interval of 500 metres, shall be 
inserted to define change of bearing, and in such a fashion as to allow of a 
definition of the boundary by the straight lines joining them. 
(3) Successive pillars shall be intervisible between instrument (taken as 1-40 
metres) and stave (taken as 3 metres). 
 
5.—(1) Main boundary pillars shall be established with reference to the ruling 
triangulation, except in cases where natural difficulties make it necessary to 
traverse. 
(2) Auxiliary pillars shall be points of a continuous traverse, except where 
ranges or hill features make direct recourse to triangulation easier and cheaper. 
 
6. Trigonometrical heights will be obtained for all boundary pillars, main and 
auxiliary; the actual position of the ideal watershed being obtained, where 
necessary, by levelling sections perpendicular to the boundary. 
 
7. The error of triangular closure shall not exceed 12 seconds, and of traverses 
a closing discrepancy, angular √n X 30" (where n is the number of summits), and 
linear √d∕1,000  metres (where d is the distance in kilometres). 
The British field measures shall be in feet, and the Belgian in metres. 
 
8. The tables used shall be based on Clarke's 1880 figure. Main boundary 
pillars shall be defined by their geographical co-ordinates, and auxiliary pillars 
shall be defined in rectangular co-ordinates referred to the main pillar lying next 
to the east as origin.  
All values shall be the mean of the British and Belgian results, and shall be 
given in metres. 
 
9. All boundary pillars, main or auxiliary, shall be marked in iron, concrete, 
cement or stone. 
For main pillars the general type of the attached diagram [not reproduced] shall 
be adhered to wherever possible. At auxiliary pillars a section of iron piping, 3 
feet in length and 2 inches in diameter, may be driven in Hush with the surface, 
and marked by a cairn or pillar, and trench, above. In addition to the marks as 
defined above, a line of 5 metres in width will be cleared along the boundary. 
 
10. The Commission shall allocate responsibility for the upkeep of boundary 
pillars, and of cleared boundary lines, to the respective local Governments in 
such a fashion as to halve the labour and cost in the most convenient way. A joint 
perambulation and inspection of the boundary shall be made every 10 years, and 
during this inspection the position of any restored shall be verified. Repairs 
considered necessary will be brought to the notice of the responsible official, who 
shall be authorised to undertake them as a matter of routine. 
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11. The Mixed Commission shall consist of British and Belgian elements 
similar in strength and composed as under:— 
One Chief Commissioner. 
Two Assistant Commissioners. 
Four Technical Assistants. 
 
12. The Commission shall assemble at Elisabethville on or about the 15th July, 
1927, and shall start with the demarcation between boundary pillars 22 and 29. 
 
13. It will be necessary to arrange for a medical officer, for transport, labour 
and porters, and for suitable escort. The Governments of Northern Rhodesia and 
Katanga shall be asked to consider, to decide and to provide what may be 
necessary under the above headings. 
 
14. Each nationality shall bear the expense of its own Commission, transport, 
stores, &c., and the Mixed Commission shall endeavour, by equitable division in 
the field, to avoid subsequent accounting. 
 
15. The decisions and conclusions of the Commissioners shall be submitted for 
ratification by the two Governments, and the delimitation shall, thereby, become 
authoritative. 
 
Signed in duplicate at Brussels on the 19th day of March, 1927. 
H. S. WINTERBOTHAM, Colonel. 
HALEWYCK DE HEUSCH. 
0. LOUWERS. 
MAURY. 
APPENDIX I TO No. 3.— Resume of Agreement respecting the whole Anglo-
Belgian Boundary from Lake Tanganyika to Pillar 46. 
IN order to facilitate negotiations for the final delimitation and demarcation of 
the Anglo-Belgian boundary included in the following four sectors, viz.:— 
I.—Congo-Zambesi watershed section, 
II.—Bangweulu section (Mpanta meridian), 
III.—Luapula river and Lake Mweru section, 
IV.—Mweru-Tanganyika section,  
the conference take occasion to define the points on which agreement has 
already been reached. 
I.— Congo-Zambesi Watershed Section. 
It is agreed in principle that this boundary is defined upon the ground by the 
ideal watershed between boundary pillars 1 and 46. Small adjustments to the 
ideal watershed are envisaged, but pillars 1 and 46 are both already fixed for the 
following reasons:— 
(a) Pillar 1 .—The meridian of Mpanta has been agreed to, and actually 
provides the only definite point of departure for sections I and II. The meridian is 
partially cleared on the ground and the position is known to be substantially 
correct. 
(b) Pillar 46.—The position of this point should be agreed to simultaneously by 
Great Britain, Belgium and Portugal, forming as it does a common point. Great 
Britain and Portugal have already ratified the treaty dealing with the Anglo-
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Rhodesia boundary and have, therein, agreed to the present position of this pillar. 
It remains therefore to include that position, as it exists, in the demarcation now 
be to undertaken. 
 
II.—Bangweulu Section (Mpanta Meridian). 
There is, for this section, an agreement as to the longitude of the Mpanta 
meridian, and upon the fact that the River Luapula does not issue from Lake 
Bangweulu, and is cut by the Mpanta meridian south of the Lake. 
 
III.—Luapula River—Lake Mweru. 
The agreed upon line—the thalweg of the Luapula river to its debouchment 
into Lake Mweru and the line through Lake Mweru to the point where the River 
Luvua leaves the Lake, leaving the island of Kilwa to Rhodesia—is agreed to. 
 
IV.—Mweru-Tanganyika Section. 
Practically no agreement has been reached in this section. The straight line, 
defined by treaty, extending from the point where the River Luvua issues from 
Lake Mweru (on the west) to the Cape Akalunga (on the east) is not possible of 
demarcation without further agreement. 
The western terminal point, chosen with difficulty, and subsequently agreed 
upon by the commission of 1913, denies access to the Lake to the town of 
Pweto—a modus vivendi establishes that access temporarily. The eastern 
terminal point has not so far been agreed to. Cape Akalunga cannot be 
established. It appears that no such name is recognised, and the intention of the 
treaty is interpreted in different ways by the parties interested. 
0. LOUWERS. 
HALEWYCK DE HEUSCH. 
MAURY. 
H. S. WINTERBOTHAM, Colonel. 
 
 
6. 7 April 1933 Exchange of Notes between Great Britain and 
Belgium concerning the Results of the Boundary Commission of the 
boundary between Northern Rhodesia and the Belgian Congo6
 
 
M. le Ministre,      Brussels, April 7, 1933. 
 
I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government in 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, having noted the 
protocols signed on the 1st October, 1929, and the 24th February, 1930, 
containing the decisions of the Commissioners appointed to delimit and 
demarcate a section of the boundary between the Belgian Congo and Northern 
Rhodesia, declare that they approve these protocols and consider as being the 
exact boundary between these two territories the boundary resulting from the text 
of the said protocols as printed and annexed hereto and the accompanying maps. 
 
                                                 
6 FO 93/14/65 and FO 93/14/66. 
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2. At the end of the protocol of the 1st October, 1929, is an undertaking which 
may be summarised as follows:— 
"It was not found possible to effect a modification of the boundary north-
west of Mokambo which would have allowed the Belgian railway to 
construct in this area a short portion of the railway with the object of 
facilitating the working of the line, but it is agreed that, if at some future date 
the British interests in that portion of Rhodesian territory which would have 
to be ceded to Belgium to enable this alteration to be effected should admit, 
the question of the possibility of a modification of the boundary between the 
main pillars 22 and 22 II might be considered." 
 
3. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom confirm this undertaking. 
On the other hand, they note the renunciation previously agreed to by the Belgian 
Government of the facilities which the Commissioners had decided to offer it, 
pending the contemplated rectification of the boundary, so as to allow the 
Belgian railway to pass through Rhodesian territory. 
 
4. I have the honour to propose that the present note and your Excellency's reply 
in similar terms shall be regarded as placing on record the agreement arrived at 
between the two Governments in this matter. 
I avail, &c. 
GRANVILLE. 
 
Enclosure 1 in No. 1.—Protocol containing the Decisions of the Commissioners 
respecting the Frontier between Boundary Pillars Nos. 11 and 29. - 1 October 1929 
THE undersigned: [Names of the Commissioners] having been duly appointed by 
their respective Governments to delimit and demarcate the frontier between 
British and Belgian territory along the Congo-Zambesi watershed, in accordance 
with the agreement signed in Brussels between Great Britain and Belgium on the 
19th March, 1927, have surveyed the boundary in accordance with the 
instructions laid down and have come to the following agreement:— 
(1) The international frontier between Northern Rhodesia and the 
Belgian Congo between boundary pillar No. 11 and boundary pillar No. 29 
shall, except where modified by special agreement between us (vide 
appendix III), follow as closely as possible the line of ideal watershed 
separating the river Zambesi from the river Congo. 
 
(2) The boundary, as actually demarcated on the ground, consists of a 
series of straight lines, each of an average length of about 500 metres. These 
lines have been sited in such a way that they follow, as closely as possible, 
the line of ideal watershed (except where the boundary has been modified, 
ride paragraph (1). 
 
(3) At every change of direction between these straight lines a 
boundary pillar has been erected. The boundary pillars are classified under 
two heads:— 
(a) Main boundary pillars (constructed of concrete), at intervals of 
approximately 5 kilometres along the boundary. 
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(b) Auxiliary pillars (cairns of stones), at every intermediate point between 
main pillars. 
For details of construction, see appendix VIII. 
In addition, a lane of 5 metres in width has been cut all along the boundary. 
 
(4) The existing numbering of the boundary pillars erected by the 
1912-14 Commission has been retained. 
As these pillars were, in many cases, at a considerable distance apart, it was 
found necessary to erect a number of extra main pillars, in order to comply 
with the instructions that there shall be a main pillar every 5 kilometres 
approximately. 
These extra main pillars have been numbered by adding roman numerals to 
the original numbers, e.g., between B.P. 24 and B.P. 25 it was found 
necessary to insert four extra main boundary pillars. 
These were, therefore, numbered as follows:— 
24.1, 24.11, 24.III and 24.IV. 
The auxiliary boundary pillars have been designated by adding a letter of the 
alphabet to the number of the main boundary pillar to which their co-
ordinates are referred. 
To avoid confusion, in no case has the letter "I" been used. The sequence of 
lettering runs, therefore, direct from "H" to "J," omitting "I," e.g., between 
B.P. 24.1 and B.P. 24.11 there are eleven auxiliary pillars, which are 
numbered as follows:— 
24.I.A, 24.I.B, &c., to 24.I.L. 
All numbering is from east to west along the boundary. 
 
(5) The actual positions of the boundary pillars are defined as 
follows:— 
(a) Main pillars.—By their geographical co-ordinates. 
(b) Auxiliary pillars.—By their rectangular co-ordinates on the Cassini 
projection, the origin for each bay of the boundary between main boundary 
pillars being the next main pillar to the eastward along the boundary, and the 
axes of reference the meridian through that point and the line at right angles 
to it. 
 
(6) In appendix VI will be found a complete list of all boundary pillars, 
both main and auxiliary, giving the reduced horizontal distance between 
successive pillars, and the included angles between the successive legs as 
obtained from direct field measurement and, in addition, provisional values 
for their co-ordinates of position and altitudes. 
In accordance with section 2 (2) of the Brussels agreement (1927), the 
original positions of some of the main boundary pillars as sited by the 1912-
14 Commission were altered so as to conform to the actual location of the 
ideal watershed. 
A list of the occasions where these original pillars have not been accepted, 
and where a new position has therefore been selected, will be found in 
appendix V. 
 
 (7) Twenty-five plans on a scale of 1/10,000 are attached to this 
protocol (vide appendix VII). 
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These cadastral plans illustrate the run of the boundary from B.P. 11 to B.P. 
29, and contain sufficient data for re-establishing any boundary pillars which 
may be destroyed. 
In addition, one special plan is attached illustrating the only important 
deviation from the ideal watershed in this section of the boundary. The 
special report dealing with this deviation will be found in appendix III. 
 
 (8) A general description of the boundary will be found in appendix II. 
 
 (9) No fresh determination (by re-survey or re-computation) of the 
position of any natural feature or boundary pillar mentioned in this protocol 
shall alter the boundary line as marked on the ground and herein described. 
 
 (10) Responsibility for the upkeep of boundary pillars and for the 
clearing of the boundary lines is allocated as follows:— 
Government of Northern Rhodesia. 
From B.P. 11 (inclusive) to B.P. 24 (exclusive). 
Government of the Belgian Congo. 
From B.P. 24 (inclusive) to B.P. 29 (inclusive). 
It is agreed that each Government shall, annually, ensure that the portion of 
the boundary for which it is responsible shall be cut or cleared in whatever 
manner appears suitable, and that the boundary pillars shall be maintained in 
a proper state of repair. 
A joint perambulation and inspection of the boundary shall be made every 10 
years by representatives detailed by the Governments of Northern Rhodesia 
and the Belgian Congo to ensure that the boundary is kept properly cleared 
and that the pillars have not been moved. 
The first perambulation shall take place during 1938. 
 
 (11) In accordance with section 2, paragraph (6), of the agreement 
signed at Brussels on the 19th March, 1927, the possibility of effecting a 
modification to the boundary to the north-west of Mokambo has been 
investigated. 
In consequence of mineral development in that area, it has not been found 
possible at the present time to effect any such modification. 
It is agreed, however, that if at some future date it is found that the small 
area of Rhodesian territory concerned is not required for a commercial 
development, the question of the possibility of a modification of the 
boundary between B.P. 22 and B.P. 22.11 shall be reconsidered. 
In the meantime, by virtue of an agreement which was signed by the British 
and Belgian Commissioners on the 15th May, 1929, the Belgian railway is 
authorised, under certain conditions, to reconstruct a short portion of the 
railway through Rhodesian territory immediately to the south of the 
Mokambo hills. 
A copy of the above-mentioned agreement is attached to this protocol (vide 
appendix IV). 
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 (12) The two original copies of the present protocol, in English for the 
British Section and in French for the Belgian Section, are signed this 1st day 
of October, 1929. 
A. B. CLOUGH, Lieut.-Colonel, 
Senior British Commissioner. 
F. GENDARME, Lieut.-Colonel. 
Senior Belgian Commissioner. 
_____________________ 
 
11.6.3 APPENDIX I TO ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 1.— Agreement between Great 
Britain and Belgium respecting the Appointment of a Commission for the 
Demarcation of the Katanga-Northern Rhodesia Boundary.—Brussels, March 19, 
1927. (see Appendix 1, section 10.5) 
 
APPENDIX II TO ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 1.— General Description of the 
Boundary, B.P. 11-B.P.29. 
For practically the entire distance from B.P. 11 to B.P. 29, the boundary 
passes through "savannah bush." Visibility is restricted to 100 to 200 yards at a 
maximum. The trees average about 40 feet in height and about 6 inches in 
diameter. As a general rule the undergrowth is not thick. The prevalence of many 
large ant-hills is a peculiar feature. 
Except on rare occasions the watershed ridge is of a flat-topped nature 
showing very little rise or fall for a considerable distance on either side. In the 
following description the terms "unmistakable," "well-defined" and "ill-defined" 
afford a relative idea as to the nature of the actual watershed ridge. 
B.P. 11.  
Situated on a prominent summit at the northern extremity at the Kabwa hills, 
about 15 miles to the south-east of Ndola. Its centre point corresponds with 
the trigonometrical station in the triangulation known as Kabwa. 
From B.P. 11 the boundary bears north-west for a distance of about 3 miles and 
then runs due north to B.P. 12. The watershed is ill-defined. Between B.P. 11 
and B.P. 12 one additional main boundary pillar has been erected as 
follows:— 
B.P. 11.I.: Situated at a distance of about 2¾ miles from B.P. 11. 
B.P. 12. 
Is situated a short distance north of the sources of the rivers Mwatesi 
(Rhodesia) and the Makinka (Congo) and lies about 12 miles to the east of 
Ndola. 
Between B.P. 11 and B.P. 11.I there are 15 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 11.I and B.P. 12 there are 13 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
From B.P. 12 to B.P. 13 the watershed is ill-defined and traverses a large 
plateau following a general north-westerly direction for about 6 miles, when 
it bears west-north-west and after 2 more miles B.P. 12 is reached. 
Between B.P. 12 and B.P. 13 two additional main boundary pillars have been 
erected as follows:— 
B.P. 12.I: About 3 miles to the north-west of B.P. 12. 
B.P. 12.II.: A little over 2 miles to the north-west of B.P. 12.1. 
Between B.P. 12 and B.P. 12.I. there are 8 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
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Between B.P. 12.I. and B.P. 12.II. there are 9 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 12.II. and B.P. 13  there are 10 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
B.P. 13. 
Situated between the sources of the rivers Mupatanzi (Rhodesia) and Kaluoza 
(Congo). 
From B.P. 13 the watershed is ill-defined and follows a general north-westerly 
direction, crossing a large plateau, the slopes of which are gentle towards the 
Congo but steeper towards the Rhodesian valley of the river Itawa. 
B.P. 14 is reached after about 9 miles along the watershed from B.P. 13, the 
watershed being ill-defined. 
Between B.P. 13 and B.P. 14 one supplementary main pillar has been erected 
as follows:— 
B.P.13.I.: Which is situated nearly 4 miles to the north-west of B.P. 13. 
Between B.P. 13 and B.P. 13.I there are 16 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 13.I and B.P. 14 there are 13 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
B.P. 14. 
Situated about 3 miles to the east of Misundu (the frontier station of the 
railway from Ndola to Sakania). 
Continuing in a north-westerly direction for about 1 mile after passing B.P. 14, 
the boundary bears sharp to the west and swinging round slightly towards the 
south, reaches B.P. 15, about 3 miles from B.P. 14 measured along the 
boundary. 
Between B.P. 14 and B.P. 15 there are 13 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Situated immediately to the west of the railway line, just north of Misundu, 
where the railway crosses from Rhodesia into Congo territory. 
At B.P. 15 the boundary turns sharply towards the south, thus commencing the 
extensive and very pronounced loop towards Rhodesia, which has a depth of 
about 5 miles from west to east and is about 15 miles in length from north to 
south. 
The sources of the river Itawa are found a short distance to the south of B.P.'s 
14 and 15, and the pronounced and marshy valley of the Itawa runs thence in 
a southerly direction, on the east-side of the railway, towards Ndola, 10 
miles to the south. 
Leaving B.P. 15 in a south-south-westerly direction B.P. 15.I. is reached, about 
40 metres north of the Ndola-Nkana road. The actual watershed line is ill-
defined. It crosses to the south of the road at this point and, looping first to 
the west and then northwards, crosses the road again about 1,800 metres 
further to the west, at a point which is now B.P. 15.I.D. The boundary here 
was, however, modified and runs now from B.P. 15.1. to B.P. 15.I.D. at a 
distance of about 10 metres to the north of the road, thus leaving the road 
wholly in Rhodesian territory. 
At B.P. 15.I.D. the boundary swings to the north-west away from the road until 
reaching B.P. 16. 
Between B.P. 15 and B.P. 15.I. there are 21 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 15.I. and B.P. 16 there are 15 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
B.P. 16. 
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Is situated on the side of the branch road leading from the main Ndola-Nkana 
road to Sakania, at a distance of approximately 500 metres from the road 
junction. 
This road junction is about 11½ miles from Ndola. 
From B.P. 16 the boundary follows a general north-north-westerly direction 
and B.P. 17 is reached after traversing a wide plateau for a distance of about 
3½ miles. 
The watershed is ill-defined. 
Between B.P. 16 and B.P. 17 there are 9 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
B.P. 17. 
Situated close to, and just to the north-east of, the source of the south branch of 
the river Mwekera (Rhodesia). 
Leaving B.P. 17 the watershed ridge becomes rather more pronounced and 
turns towards the north-west. 
B.P. 17.I.: Is reached at a distance of about 3½ miles from B.P. 17. The ridge 
then becomes less pronounced as the boundary is followed to B.P. 18. 
Between B.P. 17 and B.P. 17.I. there are 12 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 17.I. and B.P. 18 there are 10 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
B.P. 18. 
Situated about 6 miles to the north-west of B.P. 17 and in close proximity to 
the northern branch of the Mwekera river (Rhodesia) and of the river 
Kamoka (Congo). 
This latter stream drains into a small enclosed basin lying to the north-west of 
Sakania between the boundary and the Katanga railway. 
Old B.P. 18 was situated at a point where now stands B.P. 18.F. This point lies 
in open ground resembling a "dembo" from which an open clear view is 
obtained to the south-west and north-east. 
Continuing in a north-westerly direction for about 2 miles after leaving B.P. 
18, the boundary then swings round to the north-north-east, thus 
commencing the northern limits of the big loop which originated at B.P. 15 
to the southward. The ridge here is ill-defined. 
Between B.P. 18 and B.P. 19 one supplementary main boundary pillar has been 
erected, viz.:— 
B.P. 18.I: Situated about 4 miles north-north-west of B.P. 18. 
Immediately after leaving B.P. 18.I. the boundary swings round to the east and 
at a distance of about 3 miles from B.P. 18.I., B.P. 19 is reached. 
Between B.P. 18 and B.P. 18.I. there are 18 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 18.I. and B.P. 19 there are 14 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
B.P. 19. 
Shortly after leaving B.P. 19 the boundary swings round to the north 
approaching close to the railway and reaching B.P. 20 at a distance of about 
3 miles along the boundary from B.P. 19. 
Between B.P. 19 and B.P. 20 there are 11 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
B.P. 20. 
Situated about 300 metres to the west of the railway. The watershed ridge now 
becomes well-defined. Leaving B.P. 20 the boundary follows a general 
north-north-easterly direction for about U miles when it swings round to the 
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north-west and continues thus to B.P. 21, a further distance of about 14 
miles. The railway runs more or less parallel to the boundary all the way. 
Between B.P.'s 20 and 21 four supplementary main boundary pillars have been 
erected as follows:— 
B.P. 20.I.: In close proximity to kilometre 28 on the railway. 
B.P. 20.II.; Close to kilometre 35 on the railway. 
B.P. 20.III-: About 4^ miles north-west of B.P. 20.II. 
B.P. 20.IV.: Situated on an unmistakably rocky prominence in the vicinity of 
kilometre 49 on the railway and about 2 miles to the south-east of Tshofoshi 
railway station. 
Between B.P. 20 and B.P. 20.I. there are 11 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 20.I. and B.P. 20.II. there are 22 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 20.II. and B.P. 20.III. there are 19 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 20.III. and B.P. 20.IV. there are 19 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 20.IV. and B.P. 21 there are 25 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
B.P. 21. 
Situated on a small hill about 2 miles to the north-west of Tshofoshi station and 
in close proximity to kilometre 54 on the railway. 
The rivers Mutundu (Rhodesia) and Tshofoshi (Congo) have their sources in 
the vicinity of B.P. 21. 
Leaving B.P. 21 the boundary continues along the well-defined watershed 
ridge towards the foot of the very prominent Mokambo hills. 
B.P. 22 is reached at a distance of just over 4 miles from B.P. 21. 
Between B.P. 21 and B.P. 22 there are 22 auxiliary pillars. 
B.P. 22. 
Situated 150 yards to the west of Mokambo railway station. 
From B.P. 22 the boundary continues towards the north-west and climbs up the 
steep shoulder of Mokambo hill to B.P. 22.I. which corresponds with the 
main trigonometrical point, "Mokambo south." 
Dropping down to a col at B.P. 21.I.D. the boundary turns in a general westerly 
direction, and, after a series of three very pronounced bends, reaches B.P. 
22.III. 
The watershed ridge after leaving Mokambo hill becomes ill-defined once 
more. 
About half-way between B.P. 22.I. and B.P. 22.III. another supplementary 
main boundary pillar has been erected, viz., B.P. 22.II. 
B.P. 22.III.: (A supplementary main pillar) is 100 metres distant from the 
railway line in the vicinity of kilometre 86. 
From B.P. 22.III. to B.P. 22.IV. the boundary runs towards the west for a 
distance of about 2 miles and then bends round towards the north reaching 
B.P. 22.IV. in the close vicinity of kilometre 91 on the railway. The 
watershed is ill-defined. 
B.P. 22.IV.: (A supplementary main pillar) is situated in the vicinity of 
kilometre post 91 on the railway. 
From B.P. 22.IV. the boundary proceeds westwards for about 1½ miles and 
then bears to the south-west reaching B.P. 23 after a further 2 miles. 
Between B.P. 22 and B.P. 22.I. there are 8 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 22.I. and B.P. 22.II. there are 21 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
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Between B.P. 22.II. and B.P. 22.III. there are 14 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 22.III. and B.P. 22.IV. there are 12 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 22.IV. and B.P. 23 there are 12 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
B.P. 23. 
Situated about 800 metres to the south of the railway in the vicinity of 
kilometre 98. 
The old traction road from Tshinsenda crosses the railway from the north side 
at kilometre 99 and passes close by B.P. 23 proceeding in a south-easterly 
direction towards Sakania. 
At B.P. 23, the watershed ridge turns sharply to the south and forms a most 
pronounced loop about 3 miles in depth and of an average width of 
approximately 2 miles. 
The eastern and western sides of this loop are well-defined. The base of the 
loop, at its south end, is, however, ill-defined. 
B.P. 23.I.: At the most south-westerly point on the loop. 
B.P. 23.II.: About 1{ miles to the south-west of Lubembe station. 
B.P. 23.III.: The boundary approaches close to the railway once more at 
kilometre 108 near which point is situated B.P. 23.111. 
From this point the watershed is fairly well-defined and follows a sinuous and 
roughly westerly direction as far as B.P. 23. VI. which is situated close to 
kilometre 118 on the railway, and the railway runs close to and parallel with 
it all the way. B.P.'s 23.IV. and 23.V. are erected in close proximity to, and 
connected by traverses with, the terminals "B" and "A" respectively of the 
old control base of Tshinsenda. 
After leaving B.P. 23.VI. the boundary turns to the south-west for a distance of 
about 2½ miles, when it swings round rapidly in the form of a loop and, 
following a general northerly direction, reaches B.P. 24. Along this section 
the watershed is less well-defined. 
B.P. 23.VII.: Situated about 2½ miles south-south-west of B.P. 24 and lies 
about 200 metres to the east of the Tshinsenda-Nchanga road. 
Between B.P. 23 and B.P. 23.I. there are 15 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 23.I. and B.P. 23.II. there are 15 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 23.II. and B.P. 23.III. there are 10 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 23.III. and B.P. 23.IV. there are 8 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 23.IV. and B.P. 23.V. there are 10 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 23.V. and B.P. 23.VI. there are 7 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 23.VI. and B.P. 23.VII. there are 16 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 23.VII. and B.P. 24 there are 13 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
B.P. 24. 
Situated about 190 yards to the west of the main railway track at Tshinsenda 
station. The concrete pillar has been constructed alongside and within 2 
metres of the small anthill in which the pipe, indicating the position, had 
been fixed by the 1912-14 Commission. 
The original pipe has been left in situ. 
From B.P. 24 and to B.P. 25 the line of watershed separates the waters of the 
rivers Muliashi (Rhodesia) and those of the rivers Tshinsenda and Luina 
(Congo). 
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Leaving B.P. 24 it is ill-defined and runs for approximately 5 miles in a north-
north-westerly direction, when it makes a sharp bend to the west-north-west 
and, rising gradually and becoming well-defined, it reaches a point (B.P. 25) 
where the very prominent Chiwolere ridge juts out away to the north-west 
and the watershed itself turns very sharply to the south-south-west. 
Between B.P. 24 and B.P. 25 four supplementary main pillars have been 
erected as follows:— 
B.P. 24.I: About 150 metres from the railway line in the vicinity of kilometre 
130. 
B.P. 24.II.: About 500 metres north of Kawimba railway station. 
B.P. 24.III.: About 3 miles west of B.P. 24.II. 
B.P. 24.IV.: About 4½ miles west of B.P. 24.III. 
Between B.P. 24 and B.P. 24.I. there are 14 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 24.I. and B.P. 24.II. there are 11 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 24.II. and B.P. 24.III. there are 9 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 24.III. and B.P. 24.IV. there are 19 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 24.IV. and B.P. 25 there are 5 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
B.P. 25. 
Is situated 750 metres to the south-south-east of the main trigonometrical 
station on the summit of Chiwolere hill. It marks the point of intersection of 
the Congo-Zambesi watershed with the crest of a very prominent ridge and 
line of hills extending thence in a north-westerly direction and separating the 
basins of the rivers Mushosa and Luina (both in the Congo). The concrete 
pillar is constructed close alongside and within 2 metres of the original pipe 
inserted by the 1912-14 Commission. 
From B.P. 25 the boundary descends sharply towards the south and south-west 
and continues thus for about 6 miles, separating the head waters of the rivers 
Muliashi and Mingomba (Rhodesia) from those of the Chikalonga (Congo). 
Along this section the watershed is ill-defined. The boundary then runs in a 
westerly direction, rising quickly to the top of a very prominent ridge which 
forms the northern limit of the Konkola hills. Continuing along the crest of 
this unmistakable ridge, and descending gradually, a point is reached about 
U miles north of Konkola trionometrical point, where the boundary bends, 
first to the north-west and then again to the west, and rises sharply to the 
summit of an isolated kopje on which stands B.P. 26. 
NOTE.—B.P. 26, as described above, is not situated on the same site or in the 
vicinity of the original B.P. 26 fixed by the 1912-14 Commission. Old B.P. 
26, although within a few metres of the ideal watershed, was not capable of 
being fixed trigonometrically. An entirely new site was therefore chosen for 
new B.P. 26. 
Between B.P. 25 and B.P. 26, five supplementary main boundary pillars have 
been erected as under:— 
B.P. 25.I.: About 3½ miles to the south-west of B.P. 25. 
B.P. 25.II.: On a rocky kopje about 500 metres south of the old traction road 
between Baya and Tshinsenda, which was opened during 1928, and about 
2½ miles south-west of B.P. 25.1. 
B.P. 25.III.: On the top of one of the most prominent rocky kopjes on the ridge 
mentioned above, and about 2 miles to the west-north-west of B.P. 25.II. 
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B.P. 25.IV.: Cannot be defined with any relation to any prominent landmark. It 
is in the normal bush and about 30 metres north of the old traction road from 
Baya to Tshinsenda. It is about 2¾ miles to the west of B.P. 25.III. 
B.P. 25.V.: On a steep rocky kopje at the western end of the well-defined ridge 
mentioned above, and about 300 metres to the north of the road, and about 
2¼ miles west of B.P. 25.IV. 
Between B.P. 25 and B.P. 25.I. there are 22 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 25.I. and B.P. 25.II. there are 11 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 25.II. and B.P. 25.III. there are 10 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 25.III. and B.P. 25.IV. there are 12 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 25.IV. and B.P. 25.V. there are 8 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 25.V. and B.P. 26 there are 13 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
B.P. 26. 
Situated on a small kopje (as previously described) about 2 miles to the south 
of Mushoshi station. 
From B.P. 26 the boundary runs first to the north-east for about 2 miles and 
then turns sharply to the north-west. With many fluctuations the boundary 
continues in a general north-westerly direction for about 30 miles before 
reaching B.P. 27. Along the whole of this section the watershed is ill-
defined. 
Between B.P. 26 and B.P. 27 the boundary runs almost parallel with and at an 
approximate distance of 10 miles from the river Kafue (Rhodesia). 
Nine supplementary main pillars have been erected between B.P.'s 26 and 27 
as follows:— 
B.P. 26.I.: Just over 3 miles north of B.P. 26 and roughly ¾ mile to the west of 
the railway in the vicinity of kilometre 180. 
B.P. 26.II.: About 3½ miles to the west-north-west of B.P. 26.I. and about 200 
metres to the south of the railway in the vicinity of kilometre 186. 
B.P. 26.III: About 3¾ miles north-west of B.P. 26.II. and 400 metres distant 
from the railway in the vicinity of kilometre 193. 
B.P. 26.IV.: About 4 miles north-north-west of B.P. 26.III. and about 470 
metres west of the railway in the vicinity of kilometre 200. 
B.P. 26.V.: Just over 3 miles north-north-west of B.P. 26. IV. 
B.P. 26.VI: Nearly 2½ miles north-west of B.P. 26.V. 
B.P. 26.VII: Just over 2½ miles north-north-west of B.P. 26.VI. 
B.P. 26.VIII.: About 4 miles north-north-east of B.P. 26. VII. and 430 metres 
to the west of the railway in the vicinity of kilometre 213. 
B.P. 26.IX.: Nearly 3¾ miles north-west of B.P. 26.VIII.  
From the neighbourhood of Mushoshi station (north-east of B.P. 26) to a point 
within 4 miles of B.P. 27 the Belgian railway runs parallel with and at an 
average distance of about 1 mile from the boundary. 
Between B.P. 26 and B.P. 26.I. there are 18 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 26.I. and B.P. 26.II. there are 13 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 26.II. and B.P. 26.III. there are 14 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 26.III. and B.P. 26.IV. there are 14 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 26.IV. and B.P. 26.V. there are 13 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 26.V. and B.P. 26.VI. there are 13 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 26. VI. and B.P. 26. VII. there are 10 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
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Between B.P. 26.VII. and B.P. 26.VIII. there are 19 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 26. VIII. and B.P. 26.IX. there are 16 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 26. IX. and B.P. 27 there are 11 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
B.P. 27. 
Is situated nearly 5 miles west-south-west of Baya station, on the south side of 
the road leading from Baya to Kipushi. 
From B.P. 27 the boundary continues in a roughly north-westerly direction for 
a distance of about 15 miles when B.P. 28 is reached. At a distance of about 
6 miles from B.P. 27 the branch railway from Munama junction to Kipushi 
mine approaches very close to the boundary and continues to run parallel 
with and about 200 metres from it to within a short distance of Kipushi. 
Here the boundary swings away a little to the south-west and then bends 
sharply again towards the north-west before reaching B.P. 28. The watershed 
here is ill-defined. 
Between B.P. 27 and B.P. 28 five supplementary main pillars have been 
erected as follows:— 
B.P. 27.I.: About 3½ miles to the north-west of B.P. 27. 
B.P. 27.II.: About 6 miles north-west of B.P. 27 at the point where the Kipushi 
railway approaches close to the boundary in the vicinity of kilometre 21, as 
measured from Munama. It is at B.P. 27.11. that the Kipushi boundary 
modification commences. (See Appendix III) 
The railway here is 200 metres to the north of the boundary. 
B.P. 27.III.: 200 metres south of the railway in the vicinity of kilometre 26, and 
about 3 miles west-north-west of B.P. 27.II. 
B.P. 27.IV.: Nearly 3 miles west-north-west of B.P. 27.III. and 200 metres 
south of the railway line in the vicinity of kilometre 30. 
B.P. 27.V.: On the north side of the Kipushi-Kansanshi road, about 350 metres 
from the right-angled junction between this road and the old Kipushi mine-
Elisabethville road. 
Between B.P. 27 and B.P. 27.I. there are 12 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 27.I and B.P. 27.II. there are 10 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 27.II. and B.P. 27.III. there are 11 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
In addition, an extra pillar has been erected on the boundary line between 
B.P.27.I1.C. and B.P. 27.II.D., at the point where the road leading towards 
Baya and Kansanshi crosses the boundary. 
This road, after crossing the railway at kilometre 22, rejoins the old road from 
Kipushi to Elisabethville. 
The boundary pillar is constructed of concrete and is similar in all respects to a 
main pillar. It carries the inscription 27.I1.C.-D. and is situated at a distance 
of 420 metres to the west of 27.I1.C. 
Between B.P. 27.III. and B.P. 27.IV. there are 11 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 27.IV. and B.P. 27. V. there are 18 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 27. V. and B.P. 28 there are 4 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
B.P. 28. 
Is situated on the old traction road from Elisabethville through B.P. 30 to 
Musofi, 
From B.P. 28 to B.P. 29 the watershed is ill-defined and runs in a northerly 
direction, climbing up towards the Mukambo hills. The actual watershed 
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runs parallel with and from 1 to 2 miles to the west of the prominent 
Mukambo ridge. B.P. 29 itself is not on the prominent summit called 
"Mukambo A," but about 1 mile to the west of it. 
Between B.P. 28 and B.P. 29, three supplementary main pillars have been 
erected as follows:— 
B.P. 28.1.: A little more than 3 miles to the north-north-east of B.P. 28. 
B.P. 28.11.: About 3 miles to the north of B.P. 28.I. 
B.P. 28.III.: About 4 miles to the north of B.P. 28.II. The river Kafue 
(Rhodesia) has its source in the vicinity. 
Between B.P. 28 and B.P. 28.I. there are 13 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 28.I. and B.P. 28.II. there are 15 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 28.II. and B.P. 28.III. there are 18 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
Between B.P. 28.III. and B.P. 29 there are 11 auxiliary boundary pillars. 
B.P. 29. 
Situated about 1 mile to the west of "Mukambo A" trigonometrical point, the 
most prominent point on the Mukambo hills. 
 
A. B. CLOUGH, Lieut.-Colonel, 
Senior British Commissioner. 
F. GENDARME, Lieut.-Colonel, 
Senior Belgian Commissioner. 
_____________________ 
 
11.6.5 APPENDIX III TO ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 1.— Summary of the 
Occasions where the Commissioners agreed to deviate from the Ideal Watershed 
when demarcating the Boundary, Sub-Section B.P. 11-B.P. 29. 
11.6.5.1 (A)—MAJOR ADJUSTMENTS. 
Only one major modification has been effected, namely, in the vicinity of Kipushi. 
Special Report on the Modification of the Boundary in the Vicinity of Kipushi. 
When locating the line of ideal watershed in the vicinity of Kipushi 
(approximately 25 kilometres to the south-west of Elisabethville), it was 
found that the branch railway line running from Munama (a station on the 
main C.F.K. line at kilometre 240) to Kipushi crossed over the watershed 
into Rhodesian territory at varying intervals along the total length of 
approximately 3 to 4 kilometres. 
At the first time of crossing it remained on the Rhodesian side of the watershed 
for 800 metres, but lay close to it. It then recrossed and remained on the 
Belgian side for nearly 5j kilometres, when it again crossed over into 
Rhodesia. 
This time it remained for 2,600 metres on the Rhodesian side of the watershed, 
for a considerable part of which it ran close to the watershed line. At the end 
nearest to Kipushi, however, the watershed makes a re-entrant into the 
Congo, thus causing the railway to cut off a triangle whose greatest depth 
was about 530 metres. 
The instructions to the Commissioners laid down that properties lying athwart 
the ideal watershed should be left undivided as far as possible, but the good 
faith and economic importance of each particular case should be taken into 
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account and no encroachment subsequent to the 19th March, 1927, should be 
considered. 
The portion of the railway under consideration was in operation in April 1926, 
so this latter contingency did not arise. 
Owing to the thickly wooded nature of the country, the actual watershed is 
nowhere obvious and the good faith of the railway engineers who sited the 
railway must be acknowledged. 
There remains the economic clause to be considered. From the available 
evidence it would not appear that the land in question had any obvious 
economic value. 
The then Senior British Commissioner, Lieutenant-Colonel D. Cree, R.E., 
therefore agreed to allow this encroachment to stand and to trace the 
boundary line so as to run parallel to the railway and at such a distance from 
it as not to cramp it. 
On the suggestion of the Belgian Commissioner, it was agreed that, in 
compensation for the area thus ceded by the British Commissioner, the 
boundary should be traced parallel to the railway and at 200 metres from it, 
from the point where it first crossed over into Rhodesia as far as the point 
where it finally crossed back into the Congo. 
On this basis, the exchanges of area were approximately equal. 
The attached plan, drawn on a scale of 1/10,000, shows:— 
(a) The line of ideal watershed. 
(b) The line of railway. 
(c) The boundary agreed to by the British and Belgian Commissioners. 
We, the undersigned, therefore, being duly authorised, under the provisions of 
section II of the technical instructions, to make certain modifications and 
adjustments to the watershed boundary as seems desirable for special 
reasons, do agree that the line of boundary between B.P. 27.II. and B.P. 
27.IV. shall be so modified as to leave entirely in Belgian territory the line of 
railway from Munama to Kipushi, in so far as it existed in the month of 
August 1927. This modification is to be interpreted as it has been actually 
marked, on the ground, by boundary pillars and auxiliary beacons, by this 
present Commission, and as illustrated by the attached plan (scale 1/10,000), 
which represents the topographical features and line of boundary between 
B.P. 27.II. and B.P. 27.IV. 
A. B. CLOUGH, Lieut.-Colonel, 
Senior British Commissioner. 
F. GENDARME, Lieut.-Colonel, 
Senior Belgian Commissioner. 
11.6.6 (B)—MINOR ADJUSTMENTS. 
1. Between B.P. 15 and B.P. 16, it was found that the line of ideal watershed 
made a loop towards the south in such a way that a portion of the main 
Ndola-Nkana road remained on the Belgian side of the watershed for a 
length of about 1,800 metres. 
In exchange for a series of small concessions at various places along the 
railway between B.P. 20 and B.P. 23.VII. (see paragraph 2, A, below), the 
boundary between B.P. 15 and B.P. 16 was modified in such a way as to 
leave the Ndola-Nkana road entirely in Rhodesian territory. 
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Along the stretch of road in question the boundary has therefore been 
demarcated at a distance of 10 metres on the north side of the road. This 
modification takes effect between B.P. 15.1. and B.P. 15.I.D. on the newly-
located boundary. (See attached sketch map, "A."). 
2. On locating the line of ideal watershed it was found that at several places 
between B.P. 20 and B.P. 27 the watershed line approached very close to the 
railway. 
As it is essential, in the case of a railway running through tropical bush 
country, to be able to cut and clear a width of trees and undergrowth on 
either side of the track as a fire precaution, the boundary was modified in all 
such cases in such a way that it should nowhere approach closer than 100 
metres to the centre line of the track. 
Such minor adjustments were effected as follows:— 
A.—Between B.P. 20 and B.P. 23. VII. 
(1) In the neighbourhood of kilometre 31. 
(2) In the neighbourhood of Mokambo station. 
(3) In the neighbourhood of kilometres 91, 92 and 94. 
(4) At several places to the east and west of Kilenko station between 
B.P. 23.III. and B.P. 23.VII. 
In exchange for this series of small concessions, the boundary was modified 
between B.P. 15 and B.P. 16 (see paragraph 1), where the Ndola-Nkana road 
was found to lie for a certain distance on the Belgian side of the watershed. 
B.—At Tshinsenda Station. 
Between B.P. 24 and B.P. 24.C. the watershed line approached so close to 
the railway that, without modification, much inconvenience would have been 
caused to the station authorities with regard to the provision of a fire guard 
and the erection of station buildings. 
At the same time, working back from B.P. 24 towards B.P. 23.VII. the 
watershed line put a stretch of nearly 1,000 metres of the road from 
Tshinsenda to Nchanga into Belgian territory. 
A small local exchange of territory was therefore effected which would— 
(a) Satisfy the requirements of the Belgian railway. 
(b) Put the Tshinsenda-Nchanga road entirely in Rhodesian territory. 
C.— Between B.P. 24 and B.P. 27. 
On two occasions the boundary was slightly modified so as to be 100 metres 
from the railway. 
Both these small adjustments were taken into account in making the 
exchange near Tshinsenda station (see paragraph 2, B). 
3. Between B.P. 25 and B.P. 25.D. it was found that an iron claim which had 
been pegged by the Bwana M'Kubwa Mining Company (Rhodesia) lay 
athwart the watershed line. 
At the request of the British Commissioner and in accordance with section 2, 
paragraph (4), of the Brussels agreement (1927), the boundary was slightly 
modified in order to preserve the claim intact. (See attached sketch map 
"B.") 
A. B. CLOUGH, Lieut.-Colonel, 
Senior British Commissioner. 
F. GENDARME, Lieut.-Colonel, 
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Senior Belgian Commissioner. 
 
11.6.7 APPENDIX IV TO ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 1.—Agreement between 
the Commissioners regarding the Construction of the Belgian Railway near 
Mokambo.—May 15, 1929. 
(Not reproduced.] 
APPENDIX V TO ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 1.— Details regarding the 
Boundary Pillars whose Original (1913-14) Positions have not been retained. 
B.P. 12. 
The old B.P. 12 lay within 3 metres of the actual watershed, close to what is 
now B.P.11.I.K. A new position for B.P. 12 has been selected 1,450 metres 
further to the north-west along the watershed where it was found possible to 
tie in the boundary traverse to a trigonometrically fixed point. 
B.P. 13. 
The old B.P. lay within 50 metres of the actual watershed, between what are 
now B.P. 12.II.G. and B.P. 12.II.H. A new position for B.P. 13 has been 
selected for the same reason as applies to B.P. 12 (above) and is about 1,350 
metres to the north-west of the old site. 
B.P. 14. 
The old B.P. 14 was found to lie 400 metres on the Rhodesian side of the true 
watershed line. As this exceeded the limit allowed by our instructions a new 
position was selected on the actual line of watershed. 
B.P. 15. 
No marked pipe was found representing old B.P. 15, but two small pillars on 
either side of the railway were discovered. It is assumed that these marked 
the actual dividing line on the railway between Rhodesia and the Belgian 
Congo. 
The new position of B.P. 15 is on the actual watershed line immediately on the 
west side of the railway. The two small pillars referred to above lay within 
about 10 metres of the true watershed, and from 40 to 50 metres on either 
side of the railway. 
B.P. 16. 
Old B.P. 16 was found to lie 280 metres on the Congo side of the true 
watershed. 
As this exceeded the limiting distance allowed, a new position was selected on 
the actual watershed line. 
B.P. 17. 
Old B.P. 17 lay correctly on the actual watershed, but was inconveniently 
situated for tying into a trigonometrically fixed point. Old B.P. 17 is situated 
in close proximity to what is now B.P. 17.D. on the newly-located boundary. 
B.P. 18. 
Old B.P. 18 was found to lie correctly on the line of ideal watershed, but its 
position was not suitable for tying into a trigonometrically fixed point. 
New B.P. 18 was therefore sited about 2,400 metres further to the south-east 
along the watershed. 
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Old B.P. 18 practically coincides with what is now B.P. 18.F. on the newly-
located boundary. 
B.P. 19. 
Old B.P. 19 was found to lie more than 1,000 metres on the Rhodesian side of 
the watershed. 
A new position for B.P. 19 was therefore selected with due regard for ease in 
tying into trigonometrically fixed point, about 2,500 metres further to the 
east. 
Old B.P. 19 lies about 1,300 metres to the north-west of new B.P. 18.1.L. 
B.P. 20. 
Old B.P. 20 was found to lie about 350 metres on the Rhodesian side of the 
true watershed line. A new site for B.P. 20 was therefore selected on the 
actual watershed, about 350 metres to the east-south-east of old B.P. 20. 
B.P. 21. 
Old B.P. 21 was correctly sited on the watershed, but a new position for new 
B.P. 21 was selected 30 metres further to the north-west so as to facilitate 
fixation by triangulation. 
B.P. 22. 
Old B.P. 22 was within 50 metres of the watershed, but as its position was less 
than 100 metres from the railway, a new position was selected at the full 
distance of 100 metres from the track. 
B.P. 26. 
Old B.P. 26 was found to lie within 50 metres of the true watershed line, but 
was inconveniently situated for fixing trigonometrically. A new site for B.P. 
26 was therefore selected on a small kopje, lying on the watershed, about 
1,500 metres to the south-west of old B.P. 26. 
B.P. 27. 
Old B.P. 27 lay about 800 metres on the Rhodesian side of the watershed, thus 
exceeding the limit allowed. New B.P. 27 lies therefore about 800 metres to 
the south-east of old B.P. 27. 
B.P. 28. 
Old B.P. 28 lay just over 300 metres on the Congo side of the watershed, thus 
exceeding the limit allowed. A new site was therefore selected 320 metres 
west-south-west of old B.P. 28. 
B.P. 29. 
Old B.P. 29 was erroneously sited on top of Mukambo hill, which is not on the 
watershed. 
A new site has been selected, which is roughly one mile further to the west on 
much lower ground, and on the ideal watershed. 
A. B. CLOUGH, Lieut.-Colonel, 
Senior British Commissioner. 
F. GENDARME, Lieut.-Colonel, 
Senior Belgian Commissioner. 
 
11.6.9 APPENDICES VI-VIII TO ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 1. 
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[Not reproduced.] 
Enclosure 2 in No. 1.—Protocol containing the Decisions of the 
Commissioners 
respecting the Frontier between Boundary Pillars Nos. 29 and 33.— February 
24, 
1930. 
THE undersigned:—[Names.] having been duly appointed by their respective 
Governments to delimit and demarcate the frontier between British and 
Belgian territory along the Congo-Zambesi watershed, in accordance with 
the agreement signed in Brussels between Great Britain and Belgium on the 
19th March, 1927 (vide appendix 1), have surveyed the boundary in 
accordance with the instructions laid down and have come to the following 
agreement:— 
 (1) The international frontier between Northern Rhodesia and the Belgian 
Congo between boundary pillar No. 29 and boundary pillar No. 33 shall 
follow as closely as possible the line of ideal watershed separating the river 
Zambesi from the river Congo. 
 (2) The boundary, as actually demarcated on the ground, consists of a series of 
straight lines, each of an average length of about 500 metres. These lines 
have been sited in such a way that they follow, as closely as possible, the 
line of ideal watershed. 
 (3) At every change of direction between these straight lines a boundary pillar 
has been erected. The boundary pillars are classified under two heads:— 
(a) Main boundary pillars (constructed of concrete) at intervals of 
approximately 5 kilometres along the boundary. 
(b) Auxiliary pillars (cairns of stones) at every intermediate point between 
main pillars. 
In addition, a lane of 5 metres in width has been cut all along the boundary. 
 (4) The existing numbering of the boundary pillars erected by the 1912-14 
Commission has been retained. 
As these pillars were, in many cases, at a considerable distance apart, it was 
found necessary to erect a number of extra main pillars, in order to comply 
with the instructions that there shall be a main pillar every 5 kilometres 
approximately. 
These extra main pillars have been numbered by adding roman numerals to 
the original numbers, e.g., between B.P. 29 and B.P. 30 it was found 
necessary to insert 6 extra main boundary pillars. 
These were therefore numbered as follows:— 
29.I, 29.II, 29.III, 29.IV, 29.V, and 29.VI. 
The auxiliary boundary pillars have been designated by adding a letter of the 
alphabet to the number of the main boundary pillar to which their co-
ordinates are referred. 
To avoid confusion, in no case has the letter "I" been used. The sequence of 
lettering runs, therefore, direct from "H" to "J" omitting "I." 
E.g.: Between B.P. 29.I and B.P. 29.II there are 16 auxiliary pillars, which 
are numbered as follows:— 
29.IA. 29.IB, &c., to 29.IQ. 
All numbering is from east to west along the boundary. 
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 (5) The actual positions of the boundary pillars are defined as follows:— 
(a) Main pillars.—By their geographical co-ordinates. 
(b) Auxiliary pillars.—By their rectangular co-ordinates on the Cassini 
projection, the origin for each bay of the boundary between main boundary 
pillars being the next main pillar to the eastward along the boundary, and the 
axes of reference the meridian through that point and the line at right angles 
to it. 
 (6) In appendix IV will be found a complete list of all boundary pillars, both 
main and auxiliary, giving the reduced horizontal distance between 
successive pillars, and the included angles between the successive legs as 
obtained from direct field measurement and, in addition, provisional values 
for their co-ordinates of position and altitudes. 
In accordance with section 2 (2) of the Brussels agreement (1927), the 
original positions of some of the main boundary pillars as sited by the 1912-
14 Commission were altered so as to conform to the actual location of the 
ideal watershed. 
A list of the occasions where these original pillars have not been accepted, 
and where a new position has therefore been selected, will be found in 
appendix III. 
 (7) 10 plans on a scale of a/10,000 are attached to this protocol (vide appendix 
V). 
These cadastral plans illustrate the run of the boundary from B.P. 29 to B.P. 
33, and contain sufficient data for re-establishing any boundary pillars which 
may be destroyed. 
 (8) A general description of the boundary will be found in appendix II. 
 (9) No fresh determination (by re-survey or re-computation) of the position of 
any natural feature or boundary pillar mentioned in this protocol shall alter 
the boundary line as marked on the ground and herein described. 
 (10) Responsibility for the upkeep of boundary pillars and for the clearing of 
the boundary lines is allocated as follows:— 
Government of Northern Rhodesia. 
From B.P. 31 (inclusive) to B.P. 33 (inclusive). 
Government of the Belgian Congo. 
From B.P. 29 (inclusive) to B.P. 31 (exclusive). 
It is agreed that each Government shall, annually, ensure that the portion of the 
boundary for which it is responsible be cut or cleared in whatever manner 
appears suitable and that the boundary pillars be maintained in a proper state 
of repair. 
A joint perambulation and inspection of the boundary shall be made every 10 
years by representatives detailed by the Governments of Northern Rhodesia 
and the Belgian Congo to ensure that the boundary is kept properly cleared 
and that the pillars have not been moved. 
The first perambulation shall take place during 1938. 
 (11) The two original copies of the present protocol, in English for the British 
Section and in French for the Belgian Section, are signed this 24th day of 
February, 1930. 
A. B. CLOUGH, Lieut.-Colonel, 
Senior British Commissioner. 
F. GENDARME, Lieut.-Colonel, 
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Senior Belgian Commissioner. 
 
APPENDIX I TO ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 1.—Protocol between Great Britain and 
Belgium respecting the Appointment of a Commission for the Demarcation of the 
Katanga -Northern Rhodesia Boundary.—Brussels, March 19, 1927. 
(see Appendix 1, section 10.5) 
 
APPENDIX II TO ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 1.—Description of Boundary, 
B.P. 29 to B.P. 33. 
From B.P. 29 to B.P. 33 the watershed ridge is covered throughout with 
"Savannah bush." It differs little in aspect or characteristics from the portion 
of boundary between B.P. 11 and B.P. 29, which was demarcated during 
1927-28. 
Limited visibility on the watershed itself and the difficulty of getting rays 
through from points on the watershed to triangulation points on either side of 
the boundary continued to add to the difficulty of the actual survey work. 
From B.P. 29 to B.P. 31, a distance of about 56 miles, the watershed runs 
approximately north-east-south-west. 
At B.P. 31 the direction changes, and from this point as far as B.P. 33, a 
distance of about 54 miles, the watershed runs approximately east-west. The 
country on either side is on the whole well watered. There is a great scarcity 
of villages on or near the watershed ridge. Game is scarce. 
The trees average about 40 feet in height and from 6 to 8 inches in diameter. 
B.P. 29. 
Situated about 1 mile to the west of Mukambo, a trigonometric station which is 
the most prominent point in the Mukambo hills. 
From B.P. 29 the boundary runs south-west for a distance of about 4½ miles as 
far as B.P. 29.I., at which point it turns due west and continues thus for about 
7½ miles, when B.P. 29.III. is reached. Along this stretch of boundary, the 
watershed separates the headwaters of the river Kafue (Rhodesia) from those 
of the river Lupoto (Congo). 
At B.P. 29.III. the boundary commences to turn towards the south, and after 
following a sinuous course arrives at B.P. 30, about 13 miles to the south of 
B.P. 29.III. 
Between B.P. 29 and B.P. 30, six supplementary main boundary pillars have 
been erected as follows:— 
B.P. 29.I.: Situated 4¼ miles south-west of B.P. 29. From B.P. 29 to B.P. 
29.I. the 
watershed is ill-defined. 
B.P. 29.II.: Situated 4 miles to the west of B.P. 29.1. Between B.P. 29.I. and 
B.P. 29.II. the watershed is ill-defined. 
B.P. 29.III.: Situated about 3 miles to the west of B.P. 29.11., at the point 
where the watershed begins to turn towards the south. The watershed here 
tends to become better defined. 
B.P. 29.IV.: Situated about 2½ miles to the south-west of B.P. 29.III. 
Between B.P. 29.III. and 29.IV. the watershed is well-defined, but follows a 
somewhat tortuous course. 
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B.P. 29.V.: Situated about 3½ miles south-south-east from B.P. 29.IV., a 
short distance to the north of the sources of the river Pompono (Congo). 
Between B.P. 29.IV. and 29.V the watershed is well-defined. 
B.P. 29.VI: Situated about 4 miles south-south-west from B.P. 29.V. near the 
sources of the rivers Maubu (Congo) and Mushindamu (Rhodesia). 
Between B.P. 29.V. and 29.VI. the watershed is well-defined. 
Auxiliary boundary pillars are erected as follows:— 
Between B.P. 29 and 29.I. there are 13. 
Between B.P. 29.I. and 29.II. there are 16. 
Between B.P. 29.II. and 29.III. there are 15. 
Between B.P. 29.III. and 29.IV. there are 13. 
Between B.P. 29.IV. and 29.V. there are 15. 
Between B.P. 29.V. and 29.VI. there are 14. 
Between B.P. 29.VI. and 30 there are 19. 
B.P. 30. 
Is situated at the point where the old traction road (now overgrown and unused) 
from Elizabethville to Musofi crosses the watershed. The old B.P. 30 was 
not on the true line of watershed and lay about 660 yards on the Rhodesian 
side of the present boundary. 
About 3 miles to the south of B.P. 30 the boundary commences a sharp bend 
towards the south-west and this general direction is maintained for a distance 
of about 15 miles when, a short distance after reaching B.P. 30.IV., the 
boundary cuts across the main Kipushi-Kansanshi road. At this point the 
boundary turns due west and continues thus for a further distance of about 5 
miles when B.P. 31 is reached. 
For most of the distance between B.P. 30 and B.P. 31 the watershed is ill-
defined. 
Between B.P. 30.IV. and B.P. 31 the boundary crosses and recrosses several 
times the Kipushi-Kansanshi road. 
Five additional main boundary pillars have been erected between B.P. 30 and 
B.P. 31 as follows:— 
B.P. 30.I.: About 5½ miles from B.P. 30 as measured along the boundary, 
near the source of the river Sigwibu (Rhodesia). 
B.P. 30.II.: About 4 miles to the south-west of B.P. 30.I. 
B.P. 30.III: About 4 miles to the south-west of B.P. 30.II.. and rather less 
than a mile on the north side of the Kipushi-Kansanshi road. 
B.P. 30.IV.: About 3½ miles to the north-east of Luamibanga hill. It is 
distant only about 150 yards from the Kipushi-Kansanshi road, and on the 
north side of it, just before the boundary crosses the above road for the 
first time. 
B.P. 30.V.: Immediately due north of Luamibanga hill and about 300 yards 
on the north side of the road mentioned above. 
Auxiliary boundary pillars have been erected as under:— 
Between B.P. 30 and B.P. 30.I. there are 14. 
Between B.P. 30.I. and B.P. 30.II. there are 14. 
Between B.P. 30.II. and B.P. 30.III. there are 13. 
Between B.P. 30.III. and B.P. 30.IV. there are 9. 
Between B.P. 30.IV. and B.P. 30. V. there are 10. 
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Between B.P. 30. V. and B.P. 31 there are 12. 
B.P. 31. 
Is situated on a prominent isolated hill which lies about 100 metres on the 
north side of the Kipushi-Kansanshi road and about 1½ miles to the west of 
the junction between this road and the road which comes up from Nchanga. 
After leaving B.P. 31 the boundary follows a general westerly direction, 
though forming a series of prominent bends to north and south. Between 
B.P. 31 and 32 the watershed separates the numerous headwaters of the 
rivers Lunga and Chifubwa (Rhodesia) from those of the rivers Moatsi and 
Nakolwe (Congo). 
Immediately after leaving B.P. 31 the boundary takes a sweep to the north 
towards Selano hill and then bends down to the south again towards the 
prominent group of hills called Kapundungoma. 
As a result of this latter bend to the south a strip of road about 3 miles in length 
is left in Congo territory. 
Immediately to the north-west of Kapundungoma the boundary recrosses to the 
north side of the road and follows a general direction west-north-west 
towards B.P. 32. 
From B.P. 31 to B.P. 32 is a distance of approximately 26 miles as measured in 
a straight line across country. 
Between B.P. 31 and B.P. 32, seven supplementary main boundary pillars have 
been erected as follows:— 
B.P. 31.I.: About 3 miles to the north-west of B.P. 31 near the source of the 
river Karobwe (Rhodesia). 
B.P. 31.II.: About 2¾ miles to the north-east of Kapundungoma hill, near the 
source of the river Ngofwa (Rhodesia). 
B.P. 31.III.: Lies 1¾ miles to the north-north-west of Kapundungoma hill. 
B.P. 31.IV.: Is situated about 4 miles to the north-west of Kapundungoma hill 
and on the north side of the Kipushi-Kansanshi road. It lies about 3 miles to 
the west of B.P. 31.III. 
B.P. 31.V.: About 3 miles to the north-west of B.P. 31 .IV., at the head of the 
river Chifubwa. 
B.P. 31.VI.: Is situated on high ground a short distance to the east of the 
sources of the river Cheshale (Rhodesia). 
B.P. 31.VII.: About 4 miles to the north-west of B.P. 31. VI. and 4½ miles 
south-east of B.P. 32. 
Between B.P. 31 and B.P. 31.IV. the watershed is fairly well defined. From 
B.P. 31.IV. to 31.V. it is ill-defined. From B.P. 31.V. to B.P. 32 it becomes 
very well-defined. 
Auxiliary boundary pillars have been erected as under:— 
Between B.P. 31 and B.P. 31.I. there are 16. 
Between B.P. 31.I. and B.P. 31.II. there are 15. 
Between B.P. 31.II. and B.P. 31.III. there are 11. 
Between B.P. 31.III. and B.P. 31.IV. there are 11. 
Between B.P. 31.IV. and B.P. 31.V. there are 10. 
Between B.P. 31.V. and B.P. 31.VI. there are 13. 
Between B.P. 31.VI. and B.P. 31.VII. there are 21. 
Between B.P. 31.VII. and B.P. 32 there are 17. 
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B.P. 32 
Lies at the most northerly point of the extensive loop in the watershed which 
separates the headwaters of the rivers Chimalala-Katandana (Rhodesia) from 
those of the river Musos (Congo). 
The prominent sugar-loaf hill of Kalungeme lies about 3¾ miles west by north 
from B.P. 32, and the very prominent massif of Chafugoma lies 6¾ miles 
south by west from B.P. 32. 
After leaving B.P. 32, the boundary follows a south-westerly course and passes 
within about 1½ miles of Kalungeme hill, which lies on the north side of the 
boundary. 
At a distance of about 8 miles south-west of B.P. 32 the boundary meets the 
old traction road which runs up from Kansanshi. At this point of junction 
between the boundary and the road, the ground drops away very steeply to 
the south and there is a fine open view towards the south-south-east with 
Chafugoma hill in the distance. 
From this point the boundary follows along the edge of this abrupt slope (the 
slopes to the north being gentle) in a due westerly direction for a distance of 
about 3 miles, when it bears slightly towards the north and, following a west-
north-westerly direction for about a further 9 miles, reaches B.P. 33. 
Along this stretch of boundary between B.P. 32 and B.P. 33 the watershed 
separates the headwaters of the rivers Katandana, Chafugoma, Solwezi and 
Mutanda (Rhodesia) from those of the rivers Musofi, Kianbashi, 
Musombweshi and Kamalengo (Congo). 
The distance from B.P. 32 to B.P. 33, as measured direct across country, is 
about 16 miles, the watershed throughout is fairly well-defined. 
Between B.P. 32 and 33 five supplementary main boundary pillars have been 
erected as under:— 
B.P. 32.I.: About Ij miles to the south-south-east of Kalungeme hill and about 
3 
miles south-west of B.P. 32. 
B.P. 32.II.: About 3 miles south-west of B.P. 32.I. 
B.P. 32.III.: About 3 miles to the west of the point where the boundary, 
coming 
from B.P. 32, first meets the old traction road. It lies within 100 yards of the 
road on the south side, and is on the edge of the abrupt slopes to the southward. 
B.P. 32.IV.: About 2 miles to the north-west of B.P. 32.III. and on the south 
side 
of the old traction road. 
B.P. 32.V.: Is on the summit of a small prominent hill immediately on the 
south 
side of the old traction road and rather less than 1 mile to the south-west of 
Musombweshi hill. 
B.P. 33. 
Is situated on the summit of Kapaka hill, which is a point in the ruling 
triangulation. This hill lies about 3j miles to the south-east of the prominent 
hill and triangulation point of Itembe. 
Auxiliary boundary pillars have been erected as under:— 
Between B.P. 32 and B.P. 32.I there are 17. 
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Between B.P. 32.I. and B.P. 32.II. there are 11. 
Between B.P. 32.II. and B.P. 32.III. there are 17. 
Between B.P. 32.III. and B.P. 32.IV. there are 8. 
Between B.P. 32.IV. and B.P. 32. V. there are 13. 
Between B.P. 32. V. and B.P. 33 there are 15. 
A. B. CLOUGH, Lieut.-Colonel, 
Senior British Commissioner. 
F. GENDARME, Lieut.-Colonel. 
Senior Belgian Commissioner. 
 
APPENDIX III TO ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. l.—List of Main Boundary Pillars 
whose Original (1913-14) Positions have not been retained. 
B.P. 29. 
Old B.P. 29 was erroneously sited on top of Mukambo hill, which is not on the 
watershed. A new site was therefore selected on the ideal watershed, about 1 
mile further to the west. 
B.P. 30. 
This was found to be over 600 yards on the Rhodesian side of the actual 
watershed line. As this distance exceeds the limiting distance allowed by our 
instructions, a new site for B.P. 30 was selected on the actual watershed line. 
B.P. 33. 
Old B.P. 33 was correctly sited on the watershed. The new position was 
selected a few metres to the north in order to facilitate its fixation by 
triangulation. 
A. B. CLOUGH, Lieut.-Colonel, 
Senior British Commissioner. 
F. GENDARME, Lieut.-Colonel, 
Senior Belgian Commissioner. 
 
APPENDICES IV-V. 
[Not reproduced.] 
 (No. 2.)— The Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the 
British Ambassador at Brussels. 
 
M. 1'Ambassadeur,     Bruxelles, le 7 avril 1933. 
 
VOTRE Excellence m'a fait 1'honneur de m'informer que Ie Gouvernement de 
Sa Majesté britannique au Royaume-Uni de Grand-Bretagne et d'lrlande du 
Nord, ayant pris connaissance des protocoles signés le 1" octobre 1929 et le 24 
février 1930 et contenant les decisions des Commissaires désignés pour la 
délimitation et la demarcation d'une section de la frontière entre le Congo beige 
et la Rhodesie du Nord, approuve ces protocoles et entend considérer comme 
étant la frontière exacte entre les deux territoires en cause celle qui resulte du 
texte de ces protocoles, tells qu'ils sont ici annexés et des cartes qui les 
accompagnent. Je remercie votre Excellence de cette communication. 
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De mon côté, j'ai 1'honneur de lui faire savoir que le Gouvernement du Roi 
approuve les mêmes protocoles et entend aussi considerer comme etant la 
frontiere exacte entre le Congo beige et la Rhodésie du Nord celle qui résulte 
desdits protocoles et des cartes qui les accompagnent. 
La lettre de votre Excellence rappelle que le protocole du 1" octobre 1929 
porte in Fine une stipulation qui peut être resumee comme suit: 
"II n'a pas été possible d'établir au nord-ouest de Mokambo une frontiere qui 
eût permis au chemin de fer beige de construire dans cette région une courte 
variante destiné à faciliter 1'exploitation de la ligne, mais il est entendu que si, 
dans 1'avenir, les intérêts britanniques pouvant être en cause dans la portion de 
territoire rhodesien qui devrait être cédée a la Belgique pour la réalisation de 
cette variante le permettaient, la question de la possibilité d'une modification 
de la frontière entre les bornes principales 22 et 22.II pourrait être envisagée." 
Votre Excellence a bien voulu me dire que le Gouvernement britannique prend 
à son compte cette promesse; le Gouvernement du Roi lui en est reconnaissant. 
Je tiens, d'autre part, à donner acte à votre Excellence de la renonciation à 
laquelle le Gouvernement belge a précédemment consenti, au sujet de facilités 
que les Commissaires avaient décidé de lui offrir en attendant la rectification 
de frontière envisagée pour permettre au chemin de fer belge de passer en 
territoire rhodésien. 
Le Gouvernement belge accepte la proposition de votre Excellence de 
considerer le présent échange de lettres comme tenant lieu d'instrument de 
l'accord intervene entre les deux Gouvernements dans cette matière. 
Je saisis, &c. 
HYMANS 
